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The topic of this dissertation is the analysis of buyer power and its treatment in EU competition 
law. The aim of the study and its main research question are connected to identifying, 
synthesizing, discussing, and evaluating the buyer power regulation in EU competition law. To 
do so, my research seeks to clarify what buyer power is, how it is legally treated, and whether 
there is a consistent and coherent buyer power competition policy and legal regulation in EU 
competition law. 
Buyer power represents the other side of competition law, focusing on buying conducts and how 
a buyer can exert its market power to the detriment of competition. Buyer power is an umbrella 
concept that groups different forms of buying and bargaining over purchasing prices: monopsony 
and bargaining power (sensu stricto). I define buyer power as the market power possessed by a 
buyer (or a coordinated group of buyers) that allows said buyer to reduce purchasing prices it 
pays for an input in a profitable manner below the supplier’s standard selling price. This price 
reduction can be obtained by either withholding purchases – monopsony – or through bilateral 
negotiations and pure competitive bargaining that grants the buyer with better contractual 
conditions. In both cases, the buyer captures a higher share of surplus when negotiating with the 
supplier that would have been retained by the supplier, absent buyer power. These better terms 
and conditions can be the result of efficient outcomes, as usually occurs with bargaining power. 
As it stems from this definition, the economics effects of buyer power are ambiguous. The 
welfare results caused by it would depend on the type of buyer power exercised and the 
competitiveness of the upstream and downstream market. In the upstream market buyer power is 
exerted vis-à-vis suppliers and its effects may be efficient and competitive enhancing because it 
neutralizes opposed seller market power and reduces the purchasing prices towards the 
competitive level that may be passed on to end consumers in the form of lower prices, if there is 
sufficient competition in the related downstream market. However, buyer power may be 
anticompetitive and inefficient because it may imply a reduction of purchases and, therefore, an 
allocative loss, or be used with exclusionary effects of rival buyers in the upstream market or 
even rival retailers in a connected downstream market. Therefore, my thesis assumes that there 
tends to be both a positive and negative view concerning buyer power. 
To analyze the competition law regulation of buyer power I have structured the thesis in VI parts 
and 12 chapters which I summarize below. 
Part I of the thesis - Introduction and Methodology - consists of Chapters 1 and 2. These two 
chapters are designed to introduce the research problem and the methodological framework I 
employ to analyze my research questions concerning buyer power.  
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In Chapter 1 Introduction and Analysis Framework I present in detail the subject matter of the 
study, the structure, research questions, project justification and delimitation. Unlike traditional 
studies in EU competition law, my analysis is made anchored on a cross-sectoral and behavioral 
perspective in which issues of coordinated conducts, unilateral behaviors and concentrations are 
discussed in a joint manner based on different buyer power problems represented by theories of 
harm. 
In Chapter 2 Methodology I discuss the economic and legal methods employed in the dissertation. 
The thesis uses an economically informed legal analysis which combines traditional legal 
dogmatics with economic theory. I employ state of the art microeconomics and industrial 
organization to guide the legal discussion, but not to construct the legal discussion or legal 
suggestions on economic arguments, like a law & economics methodology seeks to do. I also 
discuss what relevant sources are employed in my analysis, the way in which I carry out the 
interpretation of them as well as the use of comparative law from selected EU Members States 
and, in particular, US antitrust law. This use of non-EU legislation is to either complement the 
discussion of similar type of cases in EU competition law – when they exist – or to compare and 
contrast different legal solutions to a given buyer power topic. 
Part II – Buyer Power Economics and Ordoliberal Buyer Power Policy - constitutes the 
economic and competition policy background of my study. Chapter 3 Buyer power: Monopsony 
and Bargaining Power, an economic approach discusses in depth the economics of buyer power 
as an umbrella concept covering monopsony and bargaining power. I discuss these different 
aspects of buyer power and make a distinction between them that will be used through the thesis. 
Monopsony power is an inefficient purchasing behavior that involves withholding demand to 
decrease the purchasing price paid, and which is the equivalent of monopoly power on the buying 
side. As inefficient, conducts that exert monopsony power are undesirable and should be 
prohibited and sanctioned by EU competition law. On the other hand, bargaining power is, 
generally speaking, an efficiency enhancing purchasing behavior that neutralizes seller market 
power and approaches purchasing prices towards the competitive level. Furthermore, those price 
reductions can be passed on to end consumers in the form of lower final prices if there is 
sufficient competition in the related downstream market. However, bargaining power can be 
occasionally used anticompetitively and, therefore, should also be under the scrutiny of EU 
competition law. In this chapter, I also introduce the need to evaluate the dual effect of buyer 
power on competition. This is, buyer power will always have an impact in the upstream 
conditions and the relation between the buyer and its direct suppliers – as well as other rival 
buyers and other suppliers; however, it will also have an impact on end consumer prices and non-
price competition in a related downstream market. Consequently, I put forward that buyer power 
analysis must resort to a dualistic approach to fully capture buyer power effects in all the related 
markets in which the undertaking carries out its economic activity. 
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Chapter 4 Buyer Power Trough an Ordoliberal Lens aims to show how ordoliberal competition 
policy addresses the issue of buyer power so that a comparison between the current legal 
treatment and the regulation with ordoliberalism can be made allowing the reader to determine 
the consistency – or otherwise – of the EU buyer power treatment to ordoliberal theory. I discuss 
in brief the main postulates of the ordoliberal school, and how a contemporary ordoliberal 
competition policy – from my interpretation – looks at buyer power problems and what sort of 
regulation would apply to them. In particular, I discuss the need for resorting to a dualistic 
approach to buyer power regulation, the protection of the market structures upstream and 
downstream and, therefore, the applicability of EU competition law even absent evidence of 
short-term consumer harm to achieve the well-being of the market functioning in the medium and 
long term. 
Part III - Relevant Buying Markets - analyzes in Chapters 5 and 6, Market Definition in Buyer 
Power Cases: Revisiting the Traditional Methodologies and Buyer Market Power Assessment, 
respectively, why and how should relevant purchasing markets be defined in a competition 
assessment. In Chapter 5, I submit that up to date EU competition law has not paid sufficient 
attention to the specificities of relevant buying markets from a methodological perspective. In 
order to remedy this lacuna, I propose revisiting the existing methodologies based around the idea 
of the Buyer’s SSNIP Test based on reverse demand and supply substitution, and adjusting these 
variables and methodologies to reflect the specificities of buying markets. Additionally, I stress 
the need of employing a dualistic approach, implying that both the relevant upstream and 
downstream markets should be defined. In Chapter 6, I discuss how buyer power is assessed and 
when substantial buyer power (but not necessarily dominance) arises. To measure buyer market 
power, I resort to different variables, namely: i) market shares, ii) market concentration; iii) the 
fact that the undertaking is an unavoidable trading partner or the supplier is dependent on it; iv) 
the ability of buyers to act as gate-keepers and; v) alternative supply sources that the buyer can 
resort to. Again, I resort to a dualistic approach in which the market power of the undertaking(s) 
under investigation is measured as a buyer in the upstream market and as a retailer in the related 
downstream market. Once this is carried out, an analysis of the undertaking’s market power in all 
markets involved must be done to fully capture the price and non-price effects of buyer power in 
competition as a whole. 
Then, the thesis moves to the core of the study contained in Part IV ‘Exerting Buyer Power. 
Exclusion and Exploitation’ and Part V ‘Buyer Power from a Seller’s Perspective: 
Countervailing Buyer’ Power and Buyer Power Limitation’. These two parts deal expressly with 
buyer power conducts that may be considered as anticompetitive and discussing what is their 
regulation under EU competition law, from a buyer and from a seller’s side, respectively.  
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Part IV – Exerting Buyer Power. Exclusion and Exploitation - looks at buyer power from an 
active perspective, as it discusses in detail the conducts and the theories of harm through which 
buyer power is exerted and under which circumstances these conducts are anticompetitive. In my 
analysis, I distinguish three main different ways in which buyer power can be used perniciously 
across all areas of EU competition law and which I discuss in individual chapters. 
In Chapter 7 Exclusionary Buyer Power I discuss how buyer power is employed in order to 
foreclose rival buyers in the upstream market and/or rivals in a related downstream market that 
compete as retailers. In this chapter I explain that most exclusionary buyer power theories of 
harm consist on increasing rival’s costs in the upstream market to make them less efficient buyers 
or retailers, allowing the powerful buyer to gain market shares in the markets in which it operates 
at the expense of its competitors. Also, I put forth that the use of buyer power with exclusionary 
effects should be the Gordian knot of buyer power policy, as it constitutes its most pernicious 
expression. I, then, analyze different conducts and its regulation by the EU competition law based 
on the case law and practice (if available) by looking into exclusive supply obligations (7.3); 
overbuying (7.4); concentrations leading to input (vertical) foreclosure (7.5); purchasing price 
discrimination with exclusionary effects (7.6); leveraging market power (7.7); and squeeze to buy 
(7.8). The chapter ends with the discussion of two policy aspects relevant to buyer power 
exclusion by firstly analyzing the pertinence of applying an ‘as efficient buying competitor test’, 
and secondly, which welfare standard is protected and what type of harm is required to trigger the 
application of EU competition law in exclusionary cases. In this latter I identify a broader scope 
that triggers the application of the law even absent direct end consumer harm, in contrast to the 
narrower approach that has been developed in the latest years in US antitrust law.  
Chapter 8, entitled Exploitative Buyer Power, deals with the use of purchasing market power vis-
à-vis suppliers in order to obtain a supracompetitive benefit to detriment of the former as there is 
a transfer of profits from these to the buyer, usually but not exclusively in the form of lower 
purchasing prices. In the chapter, however, I discuss if and when this transfer of profit is 
anticompetitive or whether it is the example of aggressive and competitive purchasing behavior 
that approximates the purchasing price to the competitive level. To do so, I analyze first the 
unilateral imposition of unfairly low purchasing prices by resorting to a reverse application of the 
United Brands test (8.3), and price discrimination that is exploitative vis-à-vis certain suppliers 
(8.4). Then, I discuss issues related to centralization of purchases and cooperative purchasing 
(8.5). The following section (8.6) discusses at length the difference between buyers’ cartels and 
buying alliances. I conclude that in EU competition law, buyers’ cartels fixing purchasing prices 
or other purchasing conditions (such as quotas or territories) are considered anticompetitive (and 
objects restrictions of competition), whereas buying alliances are by and large considered as a 
procompetitive and lawful example of bargaining power exercise. However, buying alliances, 
depending on their effects, may be also considered a restriction of competition under Article 101 
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TFEU. This is followed by a discussion on possible defenses and efficiency justifications that 
buyers may invoke to claim that their behavior is efficiency enhancing and, therefore, either does 
not breach Article 102 TFEU, or can be exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU, or under the SIEC 
test in concentration cases. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the welfare and harm 
standards employed in buyer power exploitation. It confirms that, like in the case of exclusion, 
EU competition law adopts a broader standard that protects the competitive structure in the 
upstream market and grants certain protection to suppliers – even absent direct consumer harm - 
in order to preserve competition as such, but without this implying an excessive protection of 
suppliers or the protection of inefficient undertakings. 
Chapter 9 Exploitative Buyer Power: Unfair Purchasing Practices explores a different angle of 
buyer power exploitation connected to practices that are considered as ‘unfair’ and contrary to 
good morals within a commercial relationship. The chapter discusses whether and how large is 
the scope of application of EU competition law to such practices, under Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU and the Merger Control Regulation, answering that it is very limited because the core 
competition regulation seeks the protection of economic efficiency and the prevention of market 
power abuses, but not to redress issues of bilateral or relative market power, or issues of fairness 
and contract profit distribution (9.4). Also, this limited applicability of EU competition law to 
these practices is justified because, in general, they do not adversely affect competition as a 
whole, unless imposed by a cartel or a dominant firm. Then, I analyze the regulation given to 
such practices in different Member States, either within competition laws (sensu stricto) or 
outside of it, resorting to regulatory measures such as unfair competition laws, sectoral regulation 
for food retailing or even soft law alternatives, like codes of conduct (9.5 and 9.6).  
Part V - Buyer Power from a Seller’s Perspective: Countervailing Buyer Power and Buyer Power 
Limitation - discusses buyer power aspects from a negative perspective as it analyses them from 
the seller’s angle. To do so, I discuss in Chapter 10 countervailing buyer power as an efficiency 
defense raised by a selling undertaking claiming that is market power is neutralized due to the 
existence of a large buyer that disciplines it, not allowing its conduct to have anticompetitive 
effects in all competition law areas. In my discussion, I analyze the treatment given to 
countervailing buyer power by the European Commission’s soft law (10.4), and the Decisions 
and Judgments dealing with it to identify the treatment of countervailing buyer power, its sources 
and hindrances (10.5). From this, I put forward that in EU competition law is possible to identify 
a ‘comparison test’ to determine the sufficiency of countervailing buyer power to neutralize seller 
market power and, therefore, be considered as a successful defense (10.6 and 10.7). The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the ‘spillover effect’ requirement, which implies that for 
countervailing buyer power to be a sufficient and successful defense, the market power of the 
selling undertaking must be neutralized not only for the large buyer but also for smaller ones, 
which reinforces the idea of a general buyer power policy with a broader protective scope. 
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Chapter 11 Limiting Buyer Power ends the substantive analysis of the thesis with a discussion 
concerning which types of practices and under which circumstances the limitation of buyer power 
by other undertakings or even the state is anticompetitive. The chapter finds that limiting the 
exercise of buyer market power over suppliers can be considered a breach to EU competition 
laws, which is quite clear with respect to the imposition of minimum purchasing conditions and 
supply limitation measures (11.2 and 11.3). However, the situation is less clear when it comes to 
the granting of rebates or discounts to buyers (11.4), or countervailing benefits in certain types of 
verticals relations (11.5). In these cases, buyers do not see their buyer power restricted 
anticompetitively, even though their freedom to resort to other suppliers is restricted or 
eliminated, instead, they obtain benefits or purchasing conditions from suppliers that are 
sufficient to compensate the loss of the buyer’s freedom. This, however, does not imply that 
rebates – from a seller-oriented perspective – may be anticompetitive if they have a foreclosing 
and unjustified effect and are granted by a dominant firm. 
Lastly, in Part VI – Conclusions of this Study - and Chapter 12 I present the main findings of the 
dissertation. I conclude that buyer power cases are rare because monopsony seldom arises in 
practice and because bargaining power tends to be efficiency enhancing. Furthermore, I stress the 
need to resort to a dualistic approach to buyer power cases in which the buyer market power 
effects are assessed in all the related markets and, connected to this, the fact that in buyer power 
cases EU competition law goes beyond requiring direct end consumer harm to trigger its 
application and, therefore, conducts may be prohibited even in its absence. This is so because 
competition law intervention will take place whenever buyer power has a substantial and 
detrimental effect on the competitive process and competition as such, in either the upstream or 
downstream markets. The thesis ends with a discussion on the main principles derived from the 
current state of the law towards the creation of a buyer power doctrine and policy, as well as 
highlighting those areas in law and economics in which further research is needed.  
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1 Introduction and Analysis Framework 
1.1 Subject of this dissertation 
The topic of this dissertation is the analysis of buyer power and its treatment in EU competition 
law. My original contribution to the legal research is identifying, synthetizing, discussing, and 
evaluating the buyer power regulation in EU competition law and clarifying what buyer power is, 
how it is legally treated, and whether there is a consistent and coherent buyer power competition 
policy and legal regulation. 
Buyer power represents the other side of competition law, focusing on buying conducts and how 
a buyer can exert its market power to the detriment of competition. This implies that I have 
shifted the traditional competition law focus on the protection of the market against the 
wrongdoings of buyers and not sellers. The concern about buyers’ anti-competitive behavior is 
not new and can be traced back to 1890 in the US with the Sherman Act’s prohibition of 
monopsony power.1 It is not until the mid-1990s, however, that buyer power concern, for both 
monopsony and bargaining power, started to become a topic of interest for competition 
academics and competition authorities alike. This interest is arguably due to the growing amount 
of economic research highlighting both the benefits and consequences of buyer power, and due to 
the rising importance of buyer-resellers in the different product and geographic markets and the 
increased concentration in purchasers’ markets, such as in the case of food retailing.2 
As Korah and O’Sullivan held in 2002, “[f]rom thinking in both Europe and the USA, it is clear 
that it is not easy to know what to do about buyer power”.3 This difficulty and the lack of clear 
guidance was my main motivation for studying this area of competition law. Buyer power is an 
interesting research topic because its welfare effects are ambiguous, which as Ezrachi puts it 
                                                          
1 Raising this connection see, inter alia: Robert G. Harris and Thomas M. Jorde, ‘Antitrust Market Definition: An 
Integrated Approach’ 72 California Law Review (1984), 3, p.16-18; Gregory J Werden, ‘Monopsony and The 
Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New Light’ 74 Antitrust Law Journal (2007); Damien Geradin, ‘Loyalty 
Rebates after Intel: Time for the European Court of Justice to Overrule Hoffman-La Roche’ 11 Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics (2015), 707. 
2 Also highlighting this see, inter alia: A. Pera, Assessment of buyer power in recent investigations and mergers, in 
O. Gianni, Grippo & Partners (ed.), Legal Update: Antitrust, (2010), available at: 
http://www.gop.it/doc_pubblicazioni/40_hjv4kr3vun_eng.pdf; College of Europe and Centre for European Policy 
Studies, The Impact of National Rules on Unilateral Conduct that Diverge from Article 102 of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union (2012);Lars Henriksson, Swedish National Report: The Grocery Retail Market 
in Sweden: Is Antitrust Efficiently Handling this Market? (LIDC Congress, 2013); F.A.H. van Doorn, ‘The Law and 
Economics of Buyer Power in EU Competition Policy’ (Eleven International Publishing 2015), p. 13; 
Bundeskartellamt Sektoruntersuchung: Lebensmitteleinzelhandel, (2014); European Commission, The Economic 
Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food Sector (2014). 
3 Valentine Korah and Denis O'Sullivan, Distribution Agreements under the EC Competition Rules (Hart Publishing 
2002), p. 53. 
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“raises challenging questions of policy and enforcement”,4 or, as Faull and Nikpay argue it, there 
are “two views of buyer power”, a positive and a negative,5 and because there is little research 
that deals with it from a legal perspective. In fact, it has even been called the “new kid on the 
block” by the American Antitrust Institute.6 This welfare ambiguity has caused it to either being 
demonized – as in the case of monopsony power – or seen as mostly procompetitive in the case 
of bargaining power. Also, in the legal circles, buyer power has mostly been identified with 
monopsony power and simplified by assuming that its treatment should be symmetrical to or the 
‘mirror image’ of seller side cases or opting for simplifications of the topic.7 Because of the 
uncertainty concerning its welfare effects, the scarce case law clarifying its regulation, and the 
scant academic legal literature addressing it, the time is ripe in legal academia to undertake a 
holistic study regarding the competitive effects and regulations of buyer power.  
By studying buyer power, I analyze two different purchasing patterns with different economic 
effects; consequently, buyer power can be positive or negative for welfare, depending on the 
circumstances of the case and, particularly, whether the purchaser exercises monopsony or 
bargaining power: the two sub-types of buyer power discussed in this thesis. 
Monopsony power represents the negative aspect of buyer power and is the analogue reverse 
form of a monopoly. In a monopsony the buyer pays a price that is below the competitive level by 
reducing the quantity it acquires. In welfare terms, this behavior leads to an inefficient outcome 
in the upstream market because less goods and/or services are employed and it shifts profits from 
the seller to the buyer without adequate compensation.8 Monopsony power, additionally, may or 
may not impact downstream consumers, depending on whether the buyer also has downstream 
market power or whether the demand withholding of goods shifts prices upwards. On the other 
hand, bargaining power, theory based on the work of Galbraith of countervailing power, tends to 
be in most cases efficiency enhancing as the buyer reduces the prices it pays without lowering the 
quantity of goods it purchases by means of resorting to its competitive advantage over the seller. 
What occurs in the upstream market is a transfer of profits from the seller to the buyer that 
neutralizes seller market power and drives prices towards, but not below, the competitive level. 
Additionally, the price reduction obtained by the buyer may be passed on in the downstream 
market to end consumers in the form of lower prices if there is competitive pressure. However, 
bargaining power can be detrimental to welfare depending on the circumstances of the case, for 
                                                          
4 Ezrachi A, EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases (4th ed. edn, Hart 2014), p. 435. 
5 Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition (Oxford University Press 1999), para. 6.300. 
6 American Antitrust Institute, ‘The New Kid on the Block: Buyer Power’ in Albert A. Foer (ed), The Next Antitrust 
Agenda: The American Antitrust Institute's Transition Report on Competition Policy to the 44th President of the 
United States (American Antitrust Institute 2008), p. 95. 
7 This is the general conclusion of another recent PhD dissertation dealing with Buyer Power in EU law, see: van 
Doorn. 
8 For the sake of brevity and avoiding unnecessary repetition I employ in this dissertation, unless noted otherwise, 
the term “goods” as encompassing both products, works and services. 
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example, if it is used to foreclose rival buyers or leveraged to, or from, another market to exploit 
suppliers or end consumers. 
To analyze buyer power I have based my research on several assumptions, which have an 
important influence on the project’s delimitation and research questions. First, based on the case 
law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), I assume that purchasing is an 
economic activity if the goods acquired are subsequently employed in a downstream economic 
activity. This rather restrictive approach to purchasing as an economic activity has created a 
lacuna regarding the competition law application to purchases carried out by contracting 
authorities under the scope of competition law to goods that are not subsequently used in an 
economic activity, pursuant to the FENIN and Selex economic activity doctrine.9 I have discussed 
this lack of public buyer power competition law scrutiny in public procurement markets 
elsewhere and this falls outside of the scope of this dissertation.10 Secondly, this thesis assumes 
ab initio that buyer power is under the scope of application of EU competition law if exercised by 
an undertaking. For this reason, I do not inquire as to whether there is a legislative gap 
concerning buyer power control, which was the research focus of van Doorn, but rather ask what 
is the legal treatment given to buyer power.11 
1.1.1 Research questions and thesis structure 
In my analysis of buyer power treatment, I have centered my research on the following main 
research questions:  
i. What is and what ought to be understood in EU competition law by buyer power? Are 
there different buyer power types? Why and how do these differentiate? Do the CJEU and 
the General Court (the Courts) distinguish between monopsony and bargaining power? 
ii. Is, and should, the legal treatment of buyer power be symmetrical to monopoly power? 
iii. How are buyer markets defined? Are they different from seller markets? If so, how and 
why? How is buyer market power assessed? 
iv. Which buying behaviors entail anti-competitive risks that ought to be tackled by EU 
competition law? What do these ‘theories of harm’ look like? 
v. What is the legal regime applicable to these anti-competitive conducts? 
                                                          
9 Judgment of 11 July in FENIN v Commission, C-205/03 P, EU:C:2006:453; Judgment of 4 March 2003, Fenin v 
Commission, T-319/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:50; Judgment of 26 March 2009 in Selex Sistemi Integrati v Commission, 
C-113/07 P, EU:C:2009:191. 
10 Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui, ‘Centralizing Public Procurement and Competitiveness in Directive 2014/24’ 4 
European Law Reporter (2015) 119; Albert Sánchez Graells and Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui, ‘Revisiting the 
Concept of Undertaking from a Public Procurement Law Perspective - A Discussion on EasyPay and Finance 
Engineering’ 37 European Competition Law Review (2016) 93; Albert Sánchez Graells and Ignacio Herrera 
Anchustegui, ‘Impact of Public Procurement Aggregation on Competition. Risks, Rationale and Justification for the 
Rules in Directive 2014/24’ in Patricia Valcárcel Fernández (ed), Compra conjunta y demanda agregada en la 
contratación del sector público Un análisis jurídico y económico (Thomson-Aranzadi 2016). 
11 van Doorn. 
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vi. Are the legal solutions to buyer power problems coherent between each other or does the 
treatment given shift from case to case? 
vii. Can buyer power neutralize seller market power? If so, how much neutralization is 
required for it to be effective? 
viii. Is the EU buyer power treatment in line with an ordoliberal conception of competition 
policy? What are the similarities and differences? 
ix. What is the welfare standard employed for buyer power cases? 
x. Is there a buyer power doctrine in EU competition law? 
 
Therefore, from these research questions, my overall aim is the identification, synthetization, and 
schematization of a comprehensive and cross-sectional discussion of buyer power to determine 
what the legal regulation to buying conducts in EU competition law is. This contribution is novel 
and valuable due to its approach, depth, scope, and the absence of academic works of a similar 
extent in the field. Also, although my study is focused mainly on EU competition law, part of my 
contribution is contrasting buyer power regulation in US antitrust law and the law of selected EU 
Member States (MS). I do this by also analyzing similar conducts and the legal treatment in those 
jurisdictions and contrasting the outcomes with the EU competition law solutions. 
Furthermore and to achieve these goals, the research questions have been formulated following a 
preferred order as they are interrelated and as such follow a logical deductive sequence where the 
answer (or answers) to a specific question is likely to be influenced by or dependent on a 
previous answer. Also, I have attempted to structure the answers of the questions in an 
intrinsically coherent manner, to form a logical general structure, which is reflected in the design 
of the dissertation. This structuring, however, does not imply that each question is answered in 
each substantive chapter in a direct manner, as some of these questions are broader and the 
answer is provided after this work is read in its entirety. In the case of any discrepancy regarding 
the answers and the areas of competition law, an express disclaimer shall be made, and further 
reasoning will accompany the dissenting outcome. 
My research structure aims to answer these research questions by analyzing specific purchasing 
behaviors or ‘theories of harm’ that are relevant for competition law, its treatment by the case law 
(if any), and policy discussions concerning the adequacy of such treatment. I have decided not to 
explore buyer power from a structural perspective focused on a partial study of its regulation 
under Article 101, Article 102 TFEU and the EU Merger Control regime, as recently done by van 
Doorn.12 Instead, have I opted to analyze it from a cross-sectoral behavioral perspective, by 
focusing my research on purchasing conducts that are relevant to buyer power.  




The cross-sectional analysis of buyer power is conducted with independence from the 
‘competition law sector’ they belong to, which allows me to compare the treatment of arguably 
similar economic conducts with their legal regulation, and determine whether the treatment given 
by the Commission and/or the Courts is consistent across all areas of EU competition law. In my 
opinion, as is discussed in the thesis’ economic analysis of buyer power, the treatment of the 
same type of behavior, regardless of the ‘area’ of competition law, should be as consistent and 
symmetrical as possible to ensure predictability, cohesiveness, and internal rationale. Also, from 
an economic standpoint, a homogenous treatment is justified because buyer power economics and 
its welfare effects do not drastically change depending on the area of competition law in which 
they take place, even though important differences exist depending on whether the conduct is 
actual or expected or if there is coordination among buyers. This, however, does not imply that 
this general cohesive approach to buyer power should not be adjusted to the case at hand. My 
analysis shows that the Courts and the Commission apply general buyer power regulation 
consistently but adjust their approach according to the economic and regulatory nuances of 
agreements, unilateral behaviors or concentrations, as also occurs in selling side cases. 
Furthermore, such an approach allows me to minimize the description of the discussed cases and 
limit as much as possible repetition of economic concepts, making the thesis a more analytical 
and critical work. 
However, the cross-sectional nature of this research is ambitious and challenging because it 
requires readjustment and reinterpretation of many traditional competition law concepts that are 
employed in seller side cases but which are not the same for buyer cases. Also, the aim of 
producing a cross-sectional and holistic study of buyer power has resulted in this thesis to being 
lengthy work. I acknowledge the length of my dissertation, but justify it as the way to present a 
thorough analysis of buyer power regulation. 
Based on this holistic and behavioral approach to buyer power, I have structured this thesis based 
on these areas of research by dividing them as sections and chapters as follows: Part I serves as 
the introduction to my buyer power study. In this section, chapter 1 introduces the research topic, 
its scope, delimitation and expected contributions, while in chapter 2 I discuss the methodological 
aspects that have guided this study. 
Part II groups two background chapters of my research dealing with economic and policy aspects 
related to buyer power, which serve as the foundation for the understanding of the legal 
discussion. In chapter 3 I carry out a detailed analysis regarding buyer power economics by 
distinguishing monopsony from bargaining power as different expressions of buyer power, and 
examine their effect on welfare in the upstream and downstream markets. In chapter 4 I discuss 
buyer power through an ordoliberal lens and explain how I employ ordoliberalism as a 
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competition policy benchmark to guide the analysis of buyer power regulation, as well as discuss 
the legal treatment given to it from both a de lege lata and lege ferenda perspectives. 
Part III deals with the definition of relevant purchasing markets. To this end, I have divided the 
part in two chapters inspired by a dualistic approach to buyer markets. The dualistic approach 
suggests that buyer market definition should go beyond a purely upstream focus (where 
purchasing takes place) and also assess the competitiveness of the undertaking in the downstream 
market where it acts as a retailer to fully capture the buyer power effects vis-à-vis suppliers, end 
consumers and rival undertakings. Chapter 5 deals with the relevant market definition by 
revisiting the ‘hypothetical monopsonist test,’ with a focus on product market definition. This is 
followed in chapter 6 by the methodology employed for the assessment of buyer market power by 
means of different tools and sources, its quantification and an examination of when buyer power 
substantially arises to become a competitive concern. 
Part IV constitutes the core of this thesis as it discusses buyer power as a competitive concern 
anchored on theories of harm grouped on how buyer power is employed. Chapter 7 initiates the 
study of buyer power theories of harm, focusing on buyer power exclusion whenever market 
power is employed to the detriment of rival undertakings that compete in the upstream 
purchasing market, as a buyer, or in the downstream market, as a retailer. This exclusionary use 
of buyer power involves increasing a rival’s cost with the aim of making it less efficient, and 
therefore, less attractive for end consumers and suppliers alike with the aim of pushing them out 
of the market to gain unopposed buyer and/or seller power. Chapter 8 follows with a discussion 
of buyer power in its exploitative form by imposing low purchasing prices or withholding 
demand by either concerted or unilateral behavior to extract supracompetitive profits. In this 
chapter, I also discuss the case of buying alliances and its distinction from buyer cartels as a 
positive expression of buyer power that does not exploit suppliers and has a beneficial effect on 
end consumers. This part concludes with another modality of buyer power exploitation centered 
on unfair purchasing practices, conducts that are commonly claimed to take place in food 
retailing markets. This chapter 9 questions the anti-competitive nature of unfair purchasing 
practices and discusses whether these conducts ought to be regulated by other legal disciplines, as 
they tend to constitute problems of bilateral equilibrium and contractual fairness. Also, my 
analysis looks into the different regulatory avenues outside EU competition law in the 
Community and national law to tackle this expression of buyer power.  
Part V discusses buyer power from a seller’s perspective by analyzing countervailing buyer 
power as a seller market power neutralizer, and considering how buyer power can be limited by 
suppliers. Countervailing buyer power, discussed in chapter 10, constitutes a ‘positive’ aspect of 
buyer power as it has the ability to neutralize opposing seller market power and preclude an 
undertaking from behaving independently from its competitors and exerting dominance, 
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significantly impeding competition as the result of a concentration, or serving as an efficiency 
defense for the acceptance of an agreement among undertakings. In chapter 11, I deal with buyer 
power limitation, its compatibility with competition law and the types of conduct suppliers 
employ to neutralize a buyer’s ability to exercise market power against them, for instance, by 
setting price ceilings, establishing selling quotas, or granting fidelity rebates.  
Part VI ends this thesis by discussing at large the findings of the study, paving the way towards a 
synthetization of an EU buyer power policy and signaling other areas ripe for further research. 
Lastly, in each of the individual parts and chapters, I aim to answer specific research questions 
regarding particular aspects of buyer power regulation. These sub-research and chapter-specific 
questions are specified in the introduction parts or chapters and are connected to the overall 
research questions, yet designed to address a specific legal question concerning a type of conduct 
or buyer power problem. 
1.1.2 Analysis structure 
The different expressions of buyer power and the competitive issues generated by it are discussed 
in individual chapters following a similar structure. The chapters begin with a general discussion 
of the topic and the main economic intuition explaining the type of abuse to be discussed as a 
starting point of the analysis of the theories of harm and the legal regulation of them.  
Then, I proceed to analyze the behavior from the perspective of each of the cross-sectional areas 
of competition law: unilateral behaviors, concentrations and agreements. Discussion of the 
theories of harm is firstly structured in accordance to issues that are typical of unilateral behavior, 
for several reasons. Buyer power problems are better illustrated through unilateral behavior 
because the economic rationale of the conduct of a single undertaking is simpler and more 
intuitively appealing than coordinated behavior, which is more complex and has implications in 
horizontal and vertical levels that are not always found in single undertaking conducts. 
Furthermore, dominance issues illustrate similar problems that may arise in concentration cases 
that may significantly affect effective competition. Also, most buyer power cases and theories of 
harm deal with unilateral exercise of buyer power as shown by the case law and the relatively 
fewer cases of buyers’ cartels or buying alliances. Furthermore, buyer power effects tend to be of 
a vertical nature (buyer vs supplier) that “may lead to restrictive effects on competition on the 
purchasing and/or downstream selling market or markets, such as increased prices, reduced 
output, product quality or variety, or innovation, market allocation, or anti-competitive 
foreclosure of other possible purchasers”.13 However, buyer power can also have horizontal 
effects in cases of coordination because it may be employed by buyers to reduce upstream and/or 
                                                          
13 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 200. 
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downstream competition.14 The analysis of the practices and its legal treatment is made by a 
study of the relevant case law and Commission’s practice and its discussion with other aspects of 
buyer power regulation.  
Lastly, the chapters conclude with a discussion of the findings and evaluation of the treatment of 
buyer power, of the types of practices, the harm required to trigger the applicability of EU 
competition law, expressing the state of the law from a de lege lata perspective, and introducing 
interpretative or policy suggestions de lege ferenda, if any. 
Also, and as a general rule, my analysis of buyer power is predominantly legal, but it does 
incorporate economics into the discussion through a method that I denominate an “economically 
informed legal analysis”,15 and which I discuss in detail in chapter 2 section 2.2.1. I firstly 
employ economic theory to define the implications of buyer power from a welfare-oriented 
perspective. This understanding of the economic implications of buyer power is used to 
comprehend the competition effects of the conducts that are being evaluated on other market 
participants and competition as a process. Therefore, I resort to economics to illustrate the 
competitive problem (or benefit) posed by buyer power and to serve as a foundational ground for 
the discussion of the legal treatment given by the Courts and the Commission to these behaviors. 
In other words, my use of economic theory is subordinated to the law, implying that I use it to 
understand the factual problem that the law ought to solve. In this sense, I do not carry out a ‘law 
& economics’ analysis understood as either evaluating the law and case law from an economic 
perspective nor do I base my interpretation of the cases or de lege ferenda suggestions on pure 
welfare considerations. Generally, and in particular for this thesis, the use of such an approach 
does not imply, however, that economic arguments are not relevant for the Courts, nor that they 
cannot be used as authoritative sources in case the law is unclear or for future legislative 
suggestions. 
Additionally, and related to my implementation of an economically informed legal analysis, I 
employ ordoliberalism as the competition school of thought that orients my evaluation and 
comparison of the legal treatment to buyer power, as discussed in chapter 2, section 2.3.1 and 
chapter 4. In a nutshell, ordoliberalism proposes the ordering of society, and in particular the 
market, by means of a pre-set of legal rules integrated in the economic constitution that aim to 
protect the competitive order and safeguard individual freedom and consumer welfare against the 
abuse of market power: public or private. I employ ordoliberalism as an analytical and 
benchmarking tool that allows me to compare and determine whether the case law and the 
reasoning of the Courts are in line with ordoliberal thinking or not, or whether they adopt a 
different competition policy line. I, however, do not discuss whether or not EU competition law 
                                                          
14 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 201. 
15 I would like to thank Albert Sánchez Graells for suggesting me to adopt this name for my analysis methodology. 
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or the EU buyer power regulation is or ought to be ordoliberal, as this is outside of my scope and 
would require a different legal methodology. 
1.2 Project justification 
Buyer power is an important topic that has received little attention by competition law academics, 
which leaves an important gap concerning what its legal treatment should be. Although EU 
competition rules are drafted in a ‘neutral way’, most of the case law, the research and the norms 
are oriented to seller side cases and the provision and not the purchase of goods. This thesis 
rotates this approach and analyzes competition law from the other side of the walkway, with the 
buyer as the center of the discussion. 
Despite the gap concerning the legal regulation of buyer power, in the last decade buyer power 
has gained preponderance in the academic, political and institutional discourse partly due to 
modern retailing techniques and the increasing presence of intermediaries that acquire input and 
resell the same or the processed input in the downstream market. Because these powerful buyers 
also tend to have a large presence as sellers, suppliers may be dependent on then to reach end 
consumers and sell their goods. An example that depicts such a situation and which has been at 
the forefront of buyer power analysis is the case of food retailing where the good and evil of 
buyer power has been portrayed. This surge in practical importance of buyer power in the 
markets has not been accompanied with sufficient legal research that clarifies what the regulation 
of it is and what it should be. This legal gap is also pernicious from a practical perspective as 
competition regulators, the Courts, undertakings, the academic community, legislators, and the 
public in general have doubts regarding the legal treatment of buyer power and its regulation. 
Also, the academic research that has been carried out so far tends to study buyer power from 
either a purely economic or legal perspective, albeit with an increasing trend towards 
interdisciplinary work. The existing research, nevertheless, has a sectoral or partialized focus, as 
few studies have dealt with buyer power as a whole or made inquiry regarding the existence of a 
buyer power doctrine in EU competition law. Also, I have identified two specific shortcomings of 
the research. Concerning legal studies, most research has simplified buyer power issues and 
approaches these as purely monopsony cases, suggesting a symmetrical treatment to seller market 
power cases. This has led to confusion among the legal community and to the myth that all buyer 
power cases are monopsony cases. The small amount of legal research that has been carried out 
in the field of bargaining power is partially due to the small amount of cases and also due to the 
economic complexity of the topic. In this dissertation, I aim at clarifying this issue and clearly 
differentiating between monopsony and bargaining power as sub-expressions of bargaining 
power that ought to be treated differently by the law because of their distinct welfare 
implications. Also, in my research I have found a lack of economic consensus regarding what the 
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welfare effects of certain buyer power expressions are, and, accordingly, what the competition 
treatment of these should be. 
Also, my study is justified because it paves the way towards further academic research in the 
field of buyer power and, in particular, a de lege ferenda study regarding the refinement and 
improvement of buyer power policies and regulation within and outside of EU competition law. 
Consequently, and for the reasons stated, a general buyer power study in EU competition law is 
needed because, by drawing similarities and comparing the differences in the treatment of the 
different buyer power expressions, it is possible to synthetize and clarify the legal treatment of 
buying conducts in EU competition law. This de lege lata clarification is needed to provide legal 
certainty and predictability concerning the behavior of buyers in competitive markets. 
1.3 Delimitation 
As part of my research, I have identified several areas related to buyer power regulation that I 
have decided to leave outside of the scope of my research due to their nature and specificity.  
First, I have excluded a study of the exercise of buyer power by contracting authorities under the 
scope of application of EU public procurement law, in particular central purchasing bodies. 
According to the current case law, the status of the purchasing as an ‘economic activity’ of 
contracting authorities depends on the nature of the subsequent use they are given to. Therefore, 
not all purchasing carried out by contracting authorities is within the scope of EU competition 
law, and arguably most of it is outside of it.16 The problem of buyer power in public procurement 
is not a theoretical chimera but rather may affect close to 19% of the GDP of the European 
                                                          
16 See Judgment of 4 March 2003, Fenin v Commission, T-319/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:50, paras. 35-41; Judgment of 
11 July in FENIN v Commission, C-205/03 P, EU:C:2006:453, paras. 25-27; Judgment of 26 March 2009 in Selex 
Sistemi Integrati v Commission, C-113/07 P, EU:C:2009:191; Judgment of 23 April 1991, Höfner and Elser v 
Macrotron, C-41/90, EU:C:1991:161; Judgment of 16 March 2004 in AOK-Bundesverband and Others, joined cases 
C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, EU:C:2004:150; Judgment of 18 June 1998, Commission v Italy, 
EU:C:1998:303. See also discussing the topic of economic activity: Judgment of 22 October 2015 in EasyPay and 
Finance Engineering, C-185/14, EU:C:2015:716; Judgment of 12 July 2012 in Compass-Datenbank, C-138/11, 
EU:C:2012:449 [2012], published in the electronic Reports of Cases; Judgment of 24 October 2002 in Aéroports de 
Paris v Commission, C-82/01 P, EU:C:2002:617. For some literature on this see, inter alia: Catriona Munro, 
‘Competition Law and Public Procurement: Two Sides of the Same Coin?’ 6 Public Procurement Law Review 
(2006) 352; Erika Szyszczak, The Regulation of the State in Competitive Markets in the EU (Hart 2007); Mustafa T. 
Karayigit, ‘Under the Triangle Rules of Competition, State Aid and Public Procurement: Public Undertakings 
Entrusted with the Operation of Services of General Economic Interest’ 30 European Competition Law Review 
(2009) 542; Office of Fair Trading Competition in Mixed Markets: Ensuring Competitive Neutrality, (2010); Rainer 
Lindberg, ‘Buying Exclusion in EU Competition Rules — Assessing Reasons and Consequences’ 7 European 
Competition Journal (2011) 433; Carmen Estevan de Quesada, ‘Competition and Transparency in Public 
Procurement Markets’ 5 Public Procurement Law Review (2014) 229; Martin Farley and Nicolas Pourbaix, ‘The EU 
Concessions Directive: Building (Toll) Bridges between Competition Law and Public Procurement?’ Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice (2014); Albert Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition 
Rules (2nd edn, Hart 2015); Sánchez Graells and Herrera Anchustegui ‘Revisiting the Concept of Undertaking from 
a Public Procurement Law Perspective - A Discussion on EasyPay and Finance Engineering’ (2016). 
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Union,17 which may be exacerbated pursuant to the drive of procurement aggregation techniques 
in the 2014 public procurement directives, such as strengthening central purchasing bodies, 
framework agreements and dynamic purchasing systems.18 These issues have been excluded 
because they would imply the integration of a different legal discipline and due to the likelihood 
that public purchasing patterns do not respond to the same economic incentives as private buyers. 
Second, I have excluded the question of whether EU competition law should promote the creation 
of bargaining power to foster economic efficiency and neutralize seller power, as this is an area 
of de lege ferenda research, which should be answered once there is sufficient certainty 
concerning bargaining power economic effects and their legal treatment. This approach has been 
commanded in the US by Kirkwood, who has suggested that there three circumstances in which 
cartels that countervail seller or buyer market power may be considered lawful,19 and a more 
recent work which suggests using public buyer power to decrease the purchasing prices of 
medicines as part of the US healthcare system.20 The flip-side of the argument is claiming that 
allowing such exemptions jeopardizes the consistency of the system and also argues that 
competition should intervene if the dominant position is abused; i.e.: after the wrongdoings have 
occurred. 
Third, I have excluded from the research the study of ‘private labels’ as an example of own store 
brands developed by retailers that decide to expand their line of business by either producing 
themselves or outsourcing goods to be sold to the end consumer.21 Private labels are often 
                                                          
17 European Commission http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=788; European Parliament. “Public 
procurement package: getting the best value for money”. Press Release – Competition – 05/09/2013 on 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130903IPR18507/html/Public-procurement-package-
getting-the-best-value-for-money. Accessed on 26/11/2013. 
18 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement 
and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65; Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC [2014] OJ L 94/243. For a discussion of the aggregated demand 
techniques see, inter alia: Carina Risvig Hamer, ‘Regular Purchases and Aggregated Procurement: The Changes in 
the new Public Procurement Directive Regarding Framework Agreements, Dynamic Purchasing Systems and Central 
Purchasing Bodies’ 4 Public Procurement Law Review (2014) 201; Herrera Anchustegui (2015); Sánchez Graells, 
[2015]; Sánchez Graells and Herrera Anchustegui, ‘Impact of Public Procurement Aggregation on Competition. 
Risks, Rationale and Justification for the Rules in Directive 2014/24’ [2016]. 
19 John B. Kirkwood, ‘Collusion to Control a Powerful Customer: Amazon, E-Books, and Antitrust Policy’ 69 
University of Miami Law Review (2014) 1. 
20 John B Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Healthcare Prices (2015) 1. 
21 For some literature dealing with private labels from a legal and economic perspective see: Alastair Gorrie, 
‘Competition Between Branded and Private Label Goods. Do Competition Concerns Arise when a Customer is also a 
Competitor?’ 27 European Competition Law Review (2006) 217; Ariel Ezrachi and Ulf Bernitz (eds), Private 
Labels, Brands and Competition Policy: The Changing Landscape of Retail Competition (Oxford University Press 
2009); Ariel Ezrachi, ‘Unchallenged Market Power? The Tale of Supermarkets, Private labels and Competition Law’ 
33 World Competition (2010) 257; S. Meza and K. Sudhir, ‘Do Private Labels Increase Retailer Bargaining Power?’ 
8 QME-Quant Mark Econ (2010) 333; Chris Doyle and Richard Murgatroyd, ‘The Role of Private Labels in 
Antitrust’ 7 Journal of Competition Law and Economics (2011) 631; Ariel Ezrachi and Koen De Jong, ‘Buyer 
power, private labels and the welfare consequences of quality erosion’ 33 European Competition Law Review (2012) 
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associated with buyer power and unfair purchasing practices as the competitive pressure they 
exert on a supplier may increase a retailer’s bargaining power upstream and its market share 
downstream, often a food retailing undertaking. The impact and importance of private labels, 
however, is not a pure buyer power issue (more likely it is a topic of upstream integration or 
expansion) and also adopts a sectoral approach. For these reasons, I have decided to exclude 
private labels from my analysis but recognize it is an area ripe for further legal research. 
From a temporal perspective, I have chosen to delimit the scope of my research to all the relevant 
legal sources and academic published material available by May 1st, 2016 to best reflect the state 
of the law up to that date. 
Lastly, in this dissertation I have tried to incorporate all the relevant literature, case law, and 
legislation available primarily in English, which represents, by far, the language in which the vast 
majority of relevant academic research has been done regarding buyer power. To a minor extent, 
I have also resorted to material available in other languages in which I have some linguistic 
proficiency: Spanish, German, French, Italian and Scandinavian languages. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
257; Wernhard Möschel, ‘Market Definition with Branded Goods and Private Label Products’ 35 European 





In this chapter I discuss the methodological aspects that guided this research project by providing 
a detailed account of how the research project has been designed, the external factors considered, 
and which legal and interdisciplinary methods have been chosen to guide the data collection, 
analysis of the case law, the Commission’s practice and legal discussions on buyer power 
regulation. The chapter is structured as follows: section 2.2 discusses the interdisciplinary method 
employed in this dissertation and my implementation of an economically informed legal analysis. 
Section 2.3 examines my use of economic theory and ordoliberalism as a comparative tool. 
Section 2.4 describes the way in which I carried out the relevant economic and legal literature 
review on buyer power. Section 2.5 discusses the legal doctrinal method and legal sources 
employed in this study, followed by a discussion on the interpretation of the relevant legal 
sources in section 2.6. Lastly, section 2.7 is a description of the citation method and nomenclature 
used in this study. 
2.2 Methods 
For this research, I employ a research methodology that combines microeconomic and legal 
theory to carry out an economically informed legal analysis of the buyer power regulation, 
following an integrative approach to the study of economic regulation.22 On the one hand, I 
employ microeconomics and industrial organization theory, to explain the economics behind 
buyer power, and to serve as a starting point for the legal analysis and to integrate23 economic 
thinking when identifying and analyzing the different theories of harm I discuss — because legal 
economic research must be informed by economics.24 This methodological choice provides an 
                                                          
22 Albert Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (2nd edn, Hart 2015), p. 20. 
23 National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine, and National Academy of Engineering, Facilitating 
Interdisciplinary Research (The National Academies Press 2004), p. 2; Maurice Adams, ‘Doing What Doesn’t Come 
Naturally. On the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’ in Mark Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of legal research: 
which kind of method for what kind of discipline? (Hart 2011), p. 237-240. 
24 Sánchez Graells, [2015], 20. See discussing the role of economics in competition law, inter alia: Giorgio Monti, 
EC Competition Law (Cambridge University Press 2007), p. 1-6; Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of 
EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement (Sweet & Maxwell 2010), paras. 1-001 to 1-013; 
Alexander Italianer, The Interplay Between Law and Economics (8 December 2010); Gunnar Niels, Helen Jenkins 
and James Kavanagh, Economics for Competition Lawyers (Oxford University Press 2011), p. 2-6; Douglas H. 
Ginsburg and Eric M. Fraser, ‘The Role of Economic Analysis in Competition Law’ in R. Ian McEwin (ed), 
Intellectual property, competition law and economics in Asia (Hart 2011); Doris Hildebrand, The Role of Economic 
Analysis in EU Competition Law: The European School (Fourth Edition edn, Kluwer Law International 2016); Jorge 
Padilla, ‘The Role of Economics in EU Competition Law: From Monti's Reform to the State Aid Modernization 
Package’ 2-2016 Concurrences Review (2016) 1. 
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economically informed legal analysis – although not a ‘law and economics’ approach – to the 
interpretation and application of the law as I do not directly evaluate the economic consistency of 
the regulations nor suggest policy changes anchored purely on microeconomic models. On the 
other hand, I employ the legal doctrinal method with emphasis placed on teleological 
interpretation to identify the relevant cases, analyze, evaluate and discuss the current state of the 
law. The following sections discuss these choices in further detail. 
2.2.1 An economically informed legal analysis for buyer power 
Competition law is one of the economic regulatory pillars of the EU internal market,25 its goals 
are the promotion, protection and enforcement of the fundamental freedoms, societal welfare and 
economic efficiency.26 Competition law regulates the behaviors of undertakings that carry out 
economic activity in the market and determines which conducts are allowed and which forbidden, 
depending on their perniciousness to market functioning. Its goals are preventing competition 
from being restricted, distorted or affected, and seeking to maximize economic welfare. As 
competition law’s regulation is directly focused on economic conduct, a proper understanding of 
these behaviors’ effects requires knowledge concerning microeconomics and the market 
functioning. Therefore, the study of competition law is an area ripe for interdisciplinary research 
that combines legal and economic methodologies, and, as Bishop and Walker argue, “[t]he 
application of competition law cannot therefore properly take place without regard to economic 
considerations”.27  
To this end, and mindful of my limitations as a non-economist, I have decided to resort to an 
economically informed analysis of the law, an interdisciplinary method that employs economic 
knowledge to better understand the object of the legal regulation, the implications of the rules and 
the consequences of the outcomes of the case law for welfare. An economically informed legal 
analysis entails the employment of economic theory to conform legal analysis with the economic 
realities and market consequences of a decision. It does not, however, imply that economics 
should be used with a normative effect; this is, the legal decision-making is determined by the 
outcome of economic modeling or argumentations by itself and outside of the legal system as a 
whole. Instead, the answers to the research questions and the determination of the buyer power 
regulation are obtained through the analysis of the law itself with economics as an auxiliary tool 
                                                          
25 For literature dealing with European economic law and the role of the state in the market, see, inter alia, Nina 
Boeger, ‘Book Review: The Regulation of the State in Competitive Markets in the EU by Erika Szyszczak’ 33 
European Law Review (2008) 442; Wolf Sauter and Harm Schepel, State and Market in European Union Law: The 
Public and Private Spheres of the Internal Market Before the EU Courts (Cambridge University Press 2009). For a 
general overview on the single market as an objective of the EU as a whole see Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, 
EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press 2011), p. 581-610. 
26 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press 2014), 
p. 1. 
27 Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 1-002. See also on the importance of economics in EU competition law: Monti, 
[2007], p. 53-87. 
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used to guide the application of the law and improve the economic quality of the decision-
making, but not to substitute the law by pure economics.28 From my perspective, the use of 
microeconomics and industrial organization are auxiliary to the study and application of law, in 
the sense that they may influence the legislative drafting process and provide the judge with some 
essential knowledge to refer to when deciding a case. However, at least in my point of view, they 
are not the sole answer to legal problems. 
This point requires further clarification. This dissertation uses a qualitative interdisciplinary 
method incorporating an economic approach to law but does not employ either a ‘law and 
economics’ or ‘behavioral economics and law’ approach when analyzing the law.29 Law and 
economics presupposes the use of economic theory, traditionally microeconomics, to predict 
human conduct in response to the law – for example, conduct changes under the influence of 
incentives – and also provides “a useful normative standard for evaluating law and policy”.30 
Behavioral economics and law provides explanations and predicts how humans will behave when 
making decisions based on the current status of the law or how they will behave if the law is 
changed.31 These two methodologies take economic theory one step further than my 
economically informed legal approach does because they assume a construction of the legal rules 
anchored on economic theory and see economics as the guide to law and not as a supplement to 
it. On the other hand, in the economically informed legal analysis, the study, evaluation and 
bettering of EU competition law uses economic theory as a starting point to improve the legal 
regulation of buyer power, determine what the legal principles are and try to ensure that the legal 
regulation of purchasing behaviors is as economically sound and efficient as possible, within the 
goals and principles pursued by the EU competition law. 
The economically informed legal analysis in this study, therefore, serves four purposes. Firstly, 
understanding what buyer power is, its economic implication and how it works is a necessary 
starting point for a legal analysis of buying conducts. Secondly, the understanding of buying 
conducts has allowed me to group different behaviors together and classify them as either 
exploitative, exclusionary of seller-oriented exercises of buyer power. Thirdly, within each of the 
sub-type of exercise of buyer power, I have identified economic theories of harm that are 
assessed through the legal treatment by the competition provision, the case law and the 
Commission’s practice. Using theories of harm anchored on economic scenarios allows me to 
discuss buyer power in a holistic manner encompassing all competition law areas, without 
dividing economic conducts and effects into legal constructs. Fourthly, an understanding of buyer 
                                                          
28 Jan M. Smits, What is Legal Doctrine? On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Dogmatic Research (2015) 1. 
29 For more on behavioral economics and law, see: J De Conninck, ‘Behavioural Economics and Legal Research’ in 
Mark Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of legal research: which kind of method for what kind of discipline? (Hart 
2011), p. 257-275. 
30 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (Pearson 2008), p. 4. 
31 De Conninck [2011], p. 258-266. 
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power effects allows me to assess which type of harm triggers competition intervention and the 
welfare standard that is protected as the outcome of the case law. The identification of which 
harm triggers competition intervention and which type of welfare is protected allows me to 
determine whether there is a consistent competition policy across the different theories of harm 
and types of conducts. Concerning the type of harm required to trigger the application of the law, 
my discussion aims to identify which type of standard is employed in EU competition law. In 
other words, whether EU buyer power regulation intervenes adopting a broad perspective even 
absent evidence of direct end downstream consumer harm towards the protection of the 
competitive process in either the upstream or downstream markets; or whether it resorts to a 
narrower approach in which competition law is triggered as advocated by the Chicago school, 
only upon direct end consumer harm.32 
2.3 The use of economic theory 
Following the discussion regarding the economically informed legal analysis, I have integrated 
economic theory in this dissertation by means of a literature review on buyer power economics, 
in chapter 3. Here, I discuss the economic effects of monopsony and bargaining power from a 
static and dynamic perspective, as well as its impact on welfare. This analysis is made by a 
literature review focused on the main works that have been published over the last two decades, 
while not disregarding the seminal work of Galbraith, which has inspired theories of buyer 
(bargaining) power.33 This literature review comprises recounting and analyzing economic theory 
and goes beyond a mere summary of it. One of the important remarks to be made concerning the 
economics of buyer power and its theorization is that most economic models studying buyer 
power deal with private buyers and not public buyers,34 which tend to be outside of the scope of 
EU. Also, these models tend to be based on an intermediate dealer that usually enjoys substantial 
upstream and downstream market power, as is the case, for example, with large food-retailers.35 
                                                          
32 On the different welfare standards, see: Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 2-001-2-019. See also in detail chapter 4, 
section 4.4.3. 
33 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society & Other Writings 1952-1967: American Capitalism; The Great 
Crash, 1929; The Affluent Society; The New Industrial State. (The Library of America 2010), p. 97-135.  
34 A notable exception to this is the study made by Daniel Condon, ‘Monopsony Power and the Market for Clergy: 
Some Evidence from the Census’ 42 The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (2002) 889. 
35 See, for example on food retailing: European Commission and others Buyer Power and its Impact on Competition 
in the Food Retail Distribution Sector of the European Union, (2000); UK Competition Commission Supermarkets: 
A report on the Supply of Groceries from Multiple Stores in the United Kingdom, London (2000); Paul W Dobson, 
‘Exploiting Buyer Power: Lessons from the British Grocery Trade’ 72 Antitrust Law Journal (2004-2005) 529; S. 
Robson (Rob) Walton, ‘Wal-Mart, Supplier-Partners, and the Buyer Power Issue’ 72 Antitrust Law Journal (2004-
2005) 509; Jorge Rodrigues, Buyer Power and Pass-Through of Large Retailing Groups in the Portuguese Food 
Sector (2006); Paul W. Dobson and Ratula Chakraborty, ‘Buyer Power in the U.K. Groceries Market’ 53 The 
Antitrust Bulletin (2008) 333; Oddgeir Hole, Price Setting in the Swedish Grocery Market: Monopoly and 
Monopsony Market Forces (2008); Paul Walter Dobson, ‘Relationship Between Buyer and Seller power in Retailing: 
UK Supermarkets’ in Bruce Lyons (ed), Cases in European competition policy: the economic analysis (Cambridge 
University Press 2009); Lehiaren Defentsarako Euskal Auzitegia / Tribunal Vasco de Defensa de la Competencia 
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My study, however, does not carry out a sectoral analysis of any industry in particular and instead 
analyzes buyer power as a whole. 
Finally, I resort to ordoliberalism as a benchmarking tool pertaining to the consistency and 
compatibility of buyer power regulation; I discuss this economic school of thought below. 
2.3.1 Comparing buyer power regulation with ordoliberal competition policy 
The use of economics and the adoption of specific schools of economic thought have a 
considerable impact on the design, interpretation and evaluation of competition regulation, as 
well as affecting the ethical implications and moral choices of policy makers and academics.36 
Furthermore, competition policies and rules are based on different goals and premises, which are 
protected by the Courts in the application of the law and which shape the judgments’ content 
through the legal language. The protection of these goals is usually obtained through the use of 
economic and legal arguments that academically support one argument or solution over another.  
As part of my research, I have decided to compare the regulation of buyer power in the EU and 
(to a limited extent) in the US antitrust with a buyer-power inspired ordoliberal competition 
policy.37 It is important to stress that this comparison does not intend to determine whether EU 
buyer power regulation is ‘ordoliberal’, but rather whether the buyer power regulation and the 
case law is compatible with this economic school of thought. Such an approach would require 
different methodology and would answer different research questions than those which I 
investigate in this study, although I acknowledge this as an area ripe for competition policy 
research. The use of ordoliberal competition as a comparison benchmark enables me to determine 
whether the case law and the Commission’s practice are compatible with this economic school of 
thought or not, as regards buyer power. Also, employing ordoliberal competition policy as a 
benchmark tool gives my comparison and policy choices an academic background and 
justification. 
There are several reasons that justify this particular comparison. A comparison of the EU 
regulation on buyer power with ordoliberalism is interesting and valuable because it allows 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Distribution of Daily Consumer Goods: Competition, Oligopoly and Tacit Collusion, Vitoria-Gasteiz (April 2009); 
Bob Young, ‘Supermarket Buyer Power’ Competition Law Insight (2013) 13; Javier Berasategi, Supermarket 
Power: Serving Consumers or Harming Competition (2014); European Commission (2014); Bundeskartellamt 
Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector, (2014). 
36 For a general treatment of ethics in economics see: A. Dutt and C. Wilber, Economics and Ethics: An Introduction 
(Palgrave Macmillan UK 2010). See also: Walter J. Schultz, The Moral Conditions of Economic Efficiency 
(Cambridge University Press 2001), who puts forward that “efficient outcomes of market interaction cannot be 
achieved without a system of moral normative constraints for securing competitive behavior and a set of conventions 
for facilitating exchange, for coordinating supply and demand, and for internalizing certain types of externalities” p 
1. 
37 See for a somewhat similar methodology employed by Bovis to the analysis of public procurement rules under a 
method he has labeled as “[t]he ordoliberal approach to public procurement regulation” in Christopher Bovis, The 
Law of EU Public Procurement (2nd ed. edn, Oxford University Press 2015), paras. 1.20-1.62. 
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determination of whether the current legal treatment is consistent in policy terms with this 
economic school of thought and opens the way for further research in this area. In particular, my 
comparison will try to determine whether EU buyer power regulation also seeks to protect the 
competitive process in the upstream and downstream markets and protects the economic freedom 
of rival buyers without the need for downstream consumer harm. Also, the comparison would 
allow me to determine the internal consistency of the case law across the different competition 
law areas, as an ordoliberal background grants me full scope with which to contrast the specific 
regulations against. Furthermore, this comparative analysis also allows me to contrast whether 
there is any policy tension among the EU institutions regarding buyer power; i.e. whether the 
Courts and the Commission have different enforcement and policy preferences, particularly 
regarding the type of harm required for competition intervention in buyer power cases. Also, 
resorting to ordoliberalism as a benchmarking tool provides the reader with the academic 
background information and assumptions that underpin my qualitative assessment of the case law 
and the Commission’s practice. Furthermore, a comparison of the EU buyer power regulation 
with ordoliberal competition policy also enables me to contrast the outcomes with other 
competition policy schools — in particular the Chicago and Post-Chicago schools — and 
determine whether a different policy approach has an impact in the outcome of the cases. Lastly, 
a comparison with ordoliberal economic theory grants this study further novelty when compared 
to various other attempts to discuss buyer power regulation in EU competition law. 
To carry out this comparison of EU buyer power regulation to ordoliberalism, I incorporated, in 
chapter 4 of the thesis, a discussion of ordoliberal competition policy and my interpretation of 
what an ordoliberally inspired buyer power competition policy implies. This analytical study of 
buyer power through an ordoliberal lens is the basis of my assessments through the dissertation. 
This comparison is incorporated by analyzing the outcome of the case law to ordoliberal theory 
and highlighting the congruence of the case law with it. As part of this analysis, I also discuss 
arguments that may explain the reasons why the Courts have decided to adopt their given 
approach from a competition policy perspective. My research visits to the University of Freiburg 
and the Walter Eucken Institute under the supervision of Professor Emeritus Viktor Vanberg and 
Professor Lars Feld were of invaluable help. 
2.4 Literature review 
I have performed an ongoing analysis of the economic and legal literature to describe the current 
state of the law, criticize and/or support my arguments and analysis. In this thesis the economic 
literature review is mostly confined to chapters 3 and 4, which expressly deal with the economic 
analysis of buyer power and ordoliberalism; however, the use of economic arguments and 
sources is found across the entire study. The legal literature review is carried out through the 
whole dissertation and not drafted in the form of a specific chapter. The ideas and arguments 
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formulated in each chapter will be anchored and supported by previous existing academic work 
and the case law. The material was obtained through perusal of electronic and physical databases 
and by reference in most cases to peer-reviewed prestigious journals. The relevant information 
concerning the employed literature has been gathered in the bibliography section. 
2.5 The legal analysis, a doctrinal work 
The core of this dissertation is the legal analysis of EU competition law regulation of buyer 
power by means of studying the relevant legal norms, the case law, soft law instruments and 
academic literature. This legal study will be carried out following the legal doctrinal method, as I 
describe in this sub-section. This qualitative legal method implies the use of the legal system as 
the subject of inquiry with its own hierarchy or norms and rules,38 and as the theoretical 
framework in which the research answers are to be found.39 For this I have collected the relevant 
legal material – by referring to the relevant legal sources, interpreting the law following the legal 
rules of interpretation with a preference for a teleological approach and recourse to classical rules 
on legal construction of arguments, and principles of EU law.  
I use the legal doctrinal method for the evaluation of buyer power regulation to determine both 
what the current state of the law (de lege lata) is and how it ought to be (de lege ferenda), in the 
case of inconsistencies, based on the law itself, economic theory and competition policy. This 
method comprises a systematic study of the regulation governing buyer power as an economic 
phenomenon, the content of such regulation, resolving its unclarities and creating a consistent and 
cohesive legal buyer power regulation.40 The adoption of the legal method is justified because the 
focal point of my research is determining what the regulation of buyer power is, and, therefore, 
clarifying the state of the law. 
Thus, the interpretation of the texts shall be based upon the hierarchy of norms, deductive 
reasoning and argumentation by analogy towards the systematization and rationalization of the 
current law on buyer power. In this sense, this dissertation adopts an analytical posture when 
examining the law and resorts to qualitative analysis rather than any quantitative analysis of the 
law. In the following sections, I discuss how I have identified, gathered and used the relevant 
legal sources to my study. 
                                                          
38 P. C. Westerman, ‘Open or Autonomous? The Debate on legal Methodology as a Reflection of the Debate on Law’ 
in Mark Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for what Kind of Discipline? 
(Hart 2011), p. 90. 
39 J. BM. Vranken, ‘Methodology of Legal Doctrinal Research: A Comment on Westerman’ in Mark Van Hoecke 
(ed), Methodologies of legal research: which kind of method for what kind of discipline? (Hart 2011), p. 113. 
40 Smits, p. 5. 
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2.5.1 Selection of legal sources 
This dissertation studies the legal regime applicable to buyer power cases under EU competition 
law. Consequently, the main source will be EU competition law, as integrated in the EU 
foundational treaties and derived community law’s practice.41 However, due to the primacy of 
EU competition law and the effects of the Regulation 1/200342 on the national competition laws 
of MS this implies that there is a harmonized and largely homogeneous legislative framework 
across the EU that regulates the buyer power of undertakings.43 Consequently, the general 
conclusions that are extrapolated from this EU buyer power analysis can be extrapolated with 
minor adjustments to the national regulation of buyer power in different MS, with the exception 
of unilateral behavior that can go further than what is stipulated by EU competition law. The 
focus on EU law explains the limited use of national legislation addressing buyer power, with the 
exception of the regulation of unfair purchasing practices, which remains an issue mostly 
addressed outside EU competition law. 
Lastly, for all legal sources, a continual selection and review of analysis has been made 
throughout the research project, covering not only the existing state of the law, but also the 
developments that have occurred since the start of the research project in October 2012 and until 
its completion in October/November 2016. 
2.5.2  EU Sources 
EU treaty law constitutes the primary source of law for this dissertation, as both the TEU and 
TFEU constitute the vertex of the hierarchy of norms in EU law. In accordance with the direct 
effect doctrine norms contained in the treaties, it “must be interpreted as producing direct effects 
and creating individual rights which national courts must protect”.44 The core regulation of EU 
competition law is contained in the TFEU, in particular, its Title VII Chapter 1 on the norms of 
competition (arts. 101-109 TFEU), which are of fundamental importance for this research project. 
                                                          
41 For a general treatment of the sources of EU law see: Craig and De Búrca, [2011], p. 103-120; Derrick Wyatt and 
Alan Dashwood, Wyatt and Dashwood's European Union Law (6th ed. Alan Dashwood ... [et al.]. edn, Hart 2011), 
p. 23 and ss; Lorna Woods and Philippa Watson, Steiner & Woods EU Law (11th Edition edn, Oxford University 
Press 2012), p. 77-78. For a classical treatment of the sources of law in the Common Law system, see: John Chipman 
Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (2nd Edition edn, The MacMillan Company 1927), p. 152-308. For an 
eminently positivist treatment of the hierarchy and sources of the law, based on the idea of a “Grundnorm”, see: 
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Vol. 1 (Reissued. edn, Russell & Russell 1961), p. 123-161. For an 
international law perspective, see: Marci Hoffman and Mary Rumsey, International and Foreign Legal Research : A 
Coursebook (2nd ed. edn, BRILL 2012), p. 9-16.  
42 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1. 
43 For a discussion on harmonization of EU Law and its historical development see: Craig and De Búrca, [2011], p. 
162-163. 
44 Judgment of 5 February 1963 in Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen, C-26/62, EU:C:1963:1. For a 
detailed treatment of the direct effect doctrine see: Craig and De Búrca, [2011], p. 180-217; Wyatt and Dashwood, 
[2011], p. 235-285; Woods and Watson, [2012], p. 100-120. 
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The TFEU, however, does not expressly contain norms for the assessment of concentrations 
(merger control regime), which is in turn regulated by means of secondary sources of EU law.45 
Also, some general treaty provisions of the TFEU, albeit not directly part of EU competition law, 
are relevant for this thesis, such as Article 2.3 on common economic policies; and Article 4.2(a) 
on the regulation of the fundamental freedoms in the internal market. None of these provisions 
deal explicitly with buyer power but with the control of market power in general. Regarding the 
EEA pillar, the corresponding provisions dealing with competition law are Articles 53 to 60 EEA 
the content of which is equivalent to the competition provisions in the TFEU. For the sake of 
clarity, I only refer to the provisions in the TFEU unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
Additionally, EU competition law is also regulated by means of derived legislation as defined in 
Article 288 TFEU. These legal sources are regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations 
and opinions, the latter two having no binding force (Article 288 TFEU). Regulations and 
directives are usually accompanied by recitals, which, despite lacking binding force, serve as 
interpretative guidelines for the application of the law by determining the objectives pursued by 
the legislation in question. In the words of the CJEU, “[w]hilst a recital in the preamble to a 
regulation may cast light on the interpretation to be given to a legal rule, it cannot in itself 
constitute such a rule”.46 Lastly, for this study, Regulations and Directives have been of 
importance as instruments of positive law that occasionally regulate the exertion or limitation of 
buyer power or related aspects, particularly concerning sectoral specific regulation. 
2.5.3 EU and national case law 
I also analyze the case law from the EU/EEA Courts, namely the CJEU, the General Court and 
the EFTA Court when deciding buyer power cases. The EU case law is of pivotal importance for 
determining what the regulation of buyer power is, and, in practice, the most important and 
frequent source given the lack of direct regulation and the vagueness of the primary EU 
competition law sources. Firstly, the case law and its interpretation have binding power (either 
inter partes or erga omnes) in the form of legal precedents, whether they are direct actions47 or 
references for preliminary rulings,48 as clarified in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of 
                                                          
45 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1. 
46 Judgment of 13 July 1989 in Casa Fleischhandel v BALM, C-215/88 EU:C:1989:331, para. 31. 
47 Infringement actions against MS (arts. 285-260 TFEU); actions of review of legality of acts of EU institutions 
(arts. 263, 264 and 266 TFEU), actions for failure to act (Article 265 and 266 TFEU) and action for damages (arts. 
268, 340(2) and 340(3)TFEU).  
48 Article 267 TFEU. See the position of Carl Baudenbacher who puts forward that preliminary rulings have inter 
partes binding power but might also have erga omnes effects “for rulings stating the invalidity of a provision of 
secondary law” but “in the more frequent cases where the ECJ interprets Community law, the rulings of the ECJ are 
not legally binding on other courts. However, in practice, judgments of the ECJ rendered under Article 234 EC (now 
267 TFEU) will in many cases have a factual erga onmes effect”, Carl Baudenbacher, ‘The Implementation of 
Decisions of the ECJ of the EFTA Court in Member States' Domestic Legal Orders.’ 40 Texas International Law 
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Justice.49 Secondly, the case law shapes the content of the legal provisions by determining its 
scope, content and applicability, being of great value to academics and practitioners in terms of 
determination of what the state of the law is and the expected outcome of a case. 
I analyze the case law in English. In the case of doubt and/or to corroborate the correct 
interpretation of it, the Spanish, and to a lesser extent, French official translations have been 
cross-checked. This cross-checking is made to attest whether inconsistencies might exist between 
the versions which might lead to different applicability of the law in the different Member States. 
When analyzing case law of the CJEU, particular attention shall be paid to the Advocate 
General’s Opinions, should there be any.50 Despite the fact that the opinions have no binding 
force, they are usually influential for the CJEU, which goes as far as echoing them in its 
decisions, and its reasoning is usually more comprehensive and thorough than the judgment 
itself.51 Some of the Opinions have considerable value in shaping the CJEU’s Judgments and 
developing the legal treatment to buyer power cases and have been thoroughly assessed.52 
National case law emanating from the EU MS will also be analyzed, albeit to a lesser extent as 
national treatment of buyer power is outside of the scope of this dissertation. The study of 
national case law does not attempt to carry out a comparative analysis between the jurisdictions, 
but to borrow solutions from undecided cases at the EU level, determine the consistency among 
the supranational and national courts or illustrate buyer power problems to enrich the discussion 
of buyer power. Also, I occasionally analyze decisions rendered by the highest-ranking decision-
making body of that MS, as well as decisions by the National Competition Authorities (NCAs). 
My linguistic limitations have also influenced the determination of which national jurisdictions 
will be subject to scrutiny. Case law in English and Spanish will be analyzed; to a second and 
lesser degree, case law in French, Italian, Portuguese and German will be studied only when its 
importance justifies its inclusion.  
Both EU and national case law will be selected by the following pre-established criteria: cases 
dealing with agreements among undertakings and the applicability of Article 101 TFEU; cases 
involving unilateral behavior under the scope of Article 102 TFEU; and cases dealing with 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Journal (2005) 383, p. 396-397. The author agrees with this pragmatic view that in most cases the CJEU preliminary 
rulings – and analogically the EFTA Court preliminary rulings are likely to have a de facto binding power. 
49 “A judgment shall be binding from the date of its delivery. 2. An order shall be binding from the date of its 
service”, Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice [2012] OJ L 265/1. 
50 Article 252 of the TFEU; Article 20 of the Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union [2010] OJ C 83/210; and Article 82 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice [2012] OJ L 265/1. 
51 Craig and De Búrca, [2011], p. 62. 
52 On the influence of the Opinions of the Advocate Generals on Judgments see: Cyril Ritter, ‘A New Look at the 
Role and Impact of Advocates-General — Collectively and Individually’ 12 Columbia Journal of European Law 
(2006) 751; Carlos Arrebola, Ana Julia Mauricio and Héctor Jiménez Portilla, An Econometric Analysis of the 
Influence of the Advocate General on the Court of Justice of the European Union (2016). On the methodological 
impact of Advocate General Decisions in EU competition law see Malgorzata Agnieszka Cyndecka, ‘The 
Applicability and Application of the Market Economy Investor Principle’ (2015), 14-15. 
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concentration assessments under the EU Merger Control Regulation.53 Therefore, I have excluded 
cases dealing with State aid, Services of General Economic Interest under the scope of Article 
106 TFEU, and purchasing conducts by public buyers under the scope of public procurement. 
Lastly, the relevant case law has been obtained through the perusal of public legal databases 
services, such as EURlex and Info-Curia, and private databases such as LexisNexis or Westlaw. 
Owing to the vastness and complexity of the topic, it is possible that I may have overlooked some 
cases or investigations dealing with buyer power and I acknowledge these possible 
inadvertencies.  
2.5.4 US antitrust law and case law 
Selected US antitrust regulation and case law, particularly rendered by the Supreme Court and 
Courts of Appeals of the United States of America will also be studied, to a minor extent, to 
study the legal treatment given to buyer power. The integration of US antitrust into this study 
does not aim at producing a comparative analysis concerning buyer power regulation as such, due 
to the complexity of the task and the need for a specific methodology for it. However, the study 
of buyer power regulation in US antitrust allows me to identify and evaluate the legal treatment 
and contrast it with the regulation of buyer power in EU competition law. This added component 
is valuable because both jurisdictions and academics pay close attention to the legal 
developments and it also serves to highlight competition policy similarities and differences 
among the regimes.54 I have obtained the US legal sources by means of public legal databases 
services such as the website of the Supreme Court, Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission, and private services such as LexisNexis or Westlaw. Lastly, to guide the correct 
application and the integration of the most relevant US cases to this dissertation, my visits to the 
Law School of the University of Wisconsin under the supervision of Professor Emeritus Peter C. 
Carstensen and the Law School of the University of Minnesota under the supervisor of Professor 
Daniel J. Gifford were of invaluable assistance. 
2.5.5 Soft law: The Commission’s and NCAs’ Guidance Notes and Decisions 
The Commission’s Guidance Notices and individual Commission Decisions are two secondary 
legal sources of special importance for the analysis of buyer power regulation. Their role and 
purpose are derived from a “duty to pursue a general policy designed to apply, in competition 
                                                          
53 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1. 
54 Daniel J. Gifford and Robert T. Kudrle, The Atlantic Divide in Antitrust: An Examination of US and EU 
Competition Policy (University of Chicago Press 2015). 
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matters, the principles laid down by the Treaty and to guide the conduct of undertakings in the 
light of those principles”.55 
In accordance to Article 288 TFEU, the Commission’s Communications and Notices constitute 
soft law56 as instruments without direct effect or binding force for the Courts, as recently stressed 
by the CJEU in Post Danmark when stating that “the administrative practice followed by the 
Commission is not binding on the national competition authorities and courts”.57 However, the 
Commission’s guidance notices do have a binding effect for the Commission itself when deciding 
cases,58 and, therefore, have a decisive role in the decision-making process59 as they guide the 
enforcement priorities and grant undertakings some guidance regarding the way the Commission 
applies competition law and approaches different practices.60 In my study, I analyze the different 
guidance instruments issued by the Commission because, even if they do not generally address 
buyer power as a main concern, some of them contain important policy and economic statements 
concerning buying conducts, particularly regarding horizontal and vertical agreements, as well as 
concentrations. 
I have also resorted to the analysis of Commission’s Decisions regarding buyer power cases as a 
secondary legal source, as these Decisions are not binding for the Courts but binding for the 
parties involved as part of the Commission’s enforcement role in EU competition law.61 
Individual decisions are important for the study of buyer power for several reasons: firstly, due to 
the lack of a large amount of case law, the Commission’s Decisions are a good source by which 
to determine the Commission’s approach to some of the buyer power issues and, therefore, shed 
some light concerning the legal treatment to some issues. This is particularly the case for certain 
theories of harm or topics in which there is no case law and only Commission’s practice that 
should be given some legal value as a precedent, but with no binding force sensu stricto as the 
Court’s judgments; secondly, individual Decisions usually deal in extenso with the factual and 
                                                          
55 Judgment of 28 June 2005 in Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, C-189/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, para. 
170, quoting Judgment of 7 June 1983 in Musique Diffusion Française and Others v Commission, Joined cases C-
100-103/80, EU:C:1983:158, para. 105. 
56 Linda Senden, Soft Law in European Community law, Vol. 1 (Hart 2004). See also Francis Snyder, ‘Soft Law and 
Institutional Practice in the European Community’ in Stephen Martin (ed), The Construction of Europe: Essays in 
Honour of Emile Noël (Springer Netherlands 1994) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8368-8_10>. 
57 Judgment of 6 October 2015 in Post Danmark, C-23/14, EU:C:2015:651, para. 52. 
58 Judgment of 28 June 2005 in Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, C-189/02 P, EU:C:2005:408; Oana 
Stefan, ‘European Union Soft Law: New Developments Concerning the Divide Between Legally Binding Force and 
Legal Effects’ 75 Modern Law Review (2012) 879; Oana Stefan, Soft Law in Court: Competition Law, State Aid and 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, Vol. 81 (Kluwer 2013); Jones and Sufrin, [2014], p. 118. 
59 For a discussion of the legal value of these secondary sources and soft law in EU law see: Senden, [2004]; Craig 
and De Búrca, [2011], p. 107. Jones and Sufrin, [2014], p. 118. 
60 Judgment of 28 June 2005 in Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, C-189/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, para. 170 
and Judgment of 7 June 1983 in Musique Diffusion Française and Others v Commission, Joined cases C-100-103/80, 
EU:C:1983:158, para. 105. 
61 Article 105 TFEU and Article 7 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1. 
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economic analysis of buying conducts as part of the case assessment. Thirdly, the Commission’s 
Decisions are also a main source of the judgments rendered by the Courts, which also allows for 
a comparison of the buyer power treatment between the Commission and the Courts and shapes 
buyer power regulation and the Commission’s enforcement practice. 
Lastly, on a national level, the NCAs’ Decisions and Notices fulfill a role equivalent to that 
played by the Commission at the community level. Due to the scope of this dissertation, their 
individual decisions and guidance instruments will be the subject of analysis to only a minor 
extent and only when considered relevant.62 
2.6 Interpretation of legal sources: the teleological method 
For the interpretation of the legal sources, I employ the teleological method. This interpretative 
approach places the emphasis on interpreting the text of the statute or legal rule in accordance 
with its purpose “as inferred from its context or to the aims of a group of legal norms seen in their 
interrelationships”.63 The teleological interpretation presupposes that the legislator had a policy 
goal in mind when drafting the norm and that the outcome of its interpretation should be in 
accordance with that policy goal.64 In fact, the interpretative method of the CJEU has been 
qualified as a “purposive method”, following the Common Law tradition,65 as its role as an 
adjudicative body with binding precedents allows it to pursue some EU competition law goals 
that are in accordance with the economic and/or political policies it aims to support or implement. 
This key characteristic of its judicial interpretation has allowed the CJEU to play a leading role in 
the dynamic development of EU competition law.  
There are several reasons that justify the choice of such an interpretative method. First, the 
teleological approach is an interpretative method widely employed by the Courts66 and the EFTA 
                                                          
62 For example, both the former Office of Fair Trading (UK) and the Bundeskartellamt (Germany) have issued 
interesting discussion papers and studies in the field of buyer power that are extensively used in this dissertation. 
63 Joxerramon Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European 
Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press 1993), p. 250.  
64 See also: Takis Tridimas, ‘The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism. (European Community)’ 21 European Law 
Review (1996) 199, p. 205; Bruno de Witte, Elise Muir and Mark Dawson, Judicial Activism at the European Court 
of Justice (Edward Elgar 2013). 
65 The purposive method of interpretation is seen in the Common Law countries as the equivalent to teleological 
interpretation. In this sense, see the opinion of Lord Slynn of Hadley when stating: “To my mind ‘teleological’ is 
synonymous with ‘purposive’, and ‘purposive construction’ is a notion familiar to English lawyers. It is for this 
reason that in my opinion it is wrong to say that English judges apply simply literal interpretation. In the past they 
may have done so but for many years there has been a willingness to look at a ‘purpose’”, in Gordon Slynn, ‘They 
Call it 'Teleological.' (Interpreting Law by Looking at the Design and Purpose of the Legislature)’ 7 Denning Law 
Journal (1992) 225. 
66 See for example the case Judgment of 12 November 1969 in Stauder v Stadt Ulm, C-29/69, EU:C:1969:57, para 3, 
in which the CJEU stated: “When a single decision is addressed to all the Member States the necessity for uniform 
application and accordingly for uniform interpretation makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in 
isolation but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim he seeks to 
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Court,67 particularly in the field of competition law.68 Second, the teleological interpretative 
method is suited for competition rules because the raison d’être of EU competition law deals 
with the promotion and protection of competition and economic efficiency, economic and 
societal goals that are suitable to be factored in by the Courts when interpreting and applying the 
law to buying behaviors.69 Third, the fact that the teleological interpretative method integrates 
goals and aims of the rules also makes it an adequate choice due to its compatibility with an 
economically informed legal analysis of buyer power, as it allows room for the integration of 
economic discussions as part of the legal analysis.70 
2.7 Citation and nomenclature 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Articles of the former EC Treaty have been 
renumbered.71 The provisions dealing with the treatment of undertakings have remained identical 
in their content with minor terminology modifications and are now grouped under Title VII, 
Chapter 1, Section 1, in particular, Articles 101-109 TFEU. Consequently, and to facilitate the 
reading of this dissertation, when discussing legislation and the case law I employ the post-TFEU 
numbering and re-number the original provisions in brackets, unless for some historical or 
contextual reason this is undesirable. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
achieve, in the light in particular of the versions in all four languages”. This same text was used by the CJEU in 
Judgment of 7 July 1988 in Moksel v BALM, C-55/87, EU:C:1988:377. 
67 For a similar view and supporting the use of a teleological method in EU Treaty Law for being particularly suited 
for the interpretation of the Treaties see Tridimas (1996). For an analysis of the interpretative methods used by the 
EFTA Court and in particular its use of a teleological (pro-integrationist) approach, see Halvard Haukeland 
Fredriksen, ‘The EFTA Court 15 Years On’ 59 Int Comp Law Quart (2010) 731; Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen and 
Christian N.K. Franklin, ‘Of Pragmatism and Principles: The EEA Agreement 20 Years On’ 52 Common Market 
Law Review (2015); Carl Baudenbacher (ed) The Handbook of EEA Law (Springer 2015). 
68 J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick and L. Moral Sorian, ‘Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the 
European Court of Justice’ in Gráinne De Búrca and J. H. H. Weiler (eds), The European Court of Justice, Vol. 10/1 
(Oxford university press 2001), p. 43. See also supporting the wide use of the teleological approach: Bengoetxea, 
[1993], p. 250, 255-258 and 264, when making particular reference to the usage of a teleological criterion by the 
CJEU in Judgment of 21 February 1973 in Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company v 
Commission, C-6/72, EU:C:1973:22, and in p. 226, when addressing the correct interpretation of article 2 of the EC 
Treaty. Also, using referring to Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company v Commission, see: 
Renato Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: The Objective and Principles of Article 102 
(Oxford University Press 2011), p. 1. See also, Asterios Pliakos and Georgios Anagnostaras, ‘Mediaprint Zeitungs- 
und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG v. Österreich-Zeitungsverlag GmbH’ 48 Common Market Law Review 
(2011) 1313, p. 1321. 
69 See also using teleological interpretation within EU competition law Nazzini, [2011], p. 107-133. 
70 Ibid, p. 107. 
71 The Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty of the European Union entered into force on 
December 1st, 2009, along with the Treaty of the European Union. 
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Regarding the legal citation and in accordance with the absence of legal citation rules at the 
Faculty of Law of the University of Bergen, I have used OSCOLA as the referencing system.72 
However, I have adjusted it slightly to better suit the needs of my research. 
For the citation of the Courts case law, I employ a slightly modified version of the European Case 
Law Identifier (ECLI), which has been developed by the CJEU “to facilitate the correct and 
unequivocal citation of judgments from European and national courts”.73 The national case law, 
in particular that of the US, is cited in the standard form adopted in the country, which is not 
consistent with the ECLI system. Also, for Commission Decisions, soft law and judgments I have 
chosen to employ full references to facilitate any corroboration exercise by the reader. 
  
                                                          
72 University of Oxford Faculty of Law, OSCOLA: Oxford University Standard for the Citation of Legal Authorities 















3 Buyer power: Monopsony and Bargaining Power, an 
economic approach 
3.1 Introduction 
Understanding buyer power economics in its forms of monopsony and bargaining power is a pre-
requisite to the analysis of buyer power treatment in EU competition law and policy. In this 
chapter, I shift the traditional angle of competition law to discuss the economics of buying 
conducts by engaging in a literature review on the matter.74 In conducting this economic analysis 
I detach from traditional approaches to buyer power that equate it with monopsony cases,75 or the 
view that buyer power cases are the mirror image of monopoly cases.76 Also, I challenge the view 
that the only positive expression of buyer (bargaining power) is countervailing buyer power or 
that, as Vogel claimed back in 1998, the concept of buyer power is alien to the economic analysis 
of competition law.77 Since the early 2000s there has been a surge in economic literature dealing 
with buyer power, which attempts to shed light on its competitive effects and that requires further 
analysis and syntethization. 
In this chapter, I analyze the economics behind monopsony and bargaining power by reviewing 
the existing literature in industrial organization, albeit not doing original economic research, due 
to the scope of this thesis. My aim is to present a general theory on buyer power that can be 
resorted to as guidance for most type of cases, neither anchored on the more common ‘model-
based’, nor ‘sectoral based’ approaches by synthetizing the economic state of the art. This general 
approach also corresponds with the holistic legal analysis I carry out regarding buyer power 
regulation as I aim to offer a “one-stop shop” of buyer power effects that guides the theories of 
                                                          
Since the late 1990s and, particularly, during the first decade of the 21st century, the application of competition law 
to buyers has become a topic of interest for academics, legal practitioners, economists and businessmen and courts 
have seen an increase in buyer power cases being litigated. Arguably, the interest increase in this field has been 
generated by the emergence of powerful buyers in several economic sectors, among them being the most explored 
the food retailing. See, among others: OECD Policy Roundtables: Buying Power of Multiproduct Retailers, (1999); 
Commission and others (2000); Walton (2004-2005); Dobson (2004-2005); Warren S Grimes, ‘Buyer Power and 
Retail Gatekeeper Power: Protecting Competition and The Atomistic Seller’ 72 Antitrust Law Journal (2004-2005) 
563; Dobson and Chakraborty (2008); Hole, [2008]; OECD Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power, 
(2009); Ezrachi and De Jong (2012). 
75 The opinion of the Bundeskartellamt when stating “the simple monopsony model often does not adequately reflect 
the reality of procurement markets” is similar in this regard: in Bundeskartellamt Buyer Power in Competition Law - 
Status and Perspectives, Bonn (2008) 2, p. 2. 
76 van Doorn; Peter C. Carstensen, ‘Emerging Issues in Buyer Power Analysis’ 3 Agriculture and Food Committee e-
Bulleting, American Bar Association (2012) 2. 
77 Louis Vogel, ‘Competition Law and Buying Power: The Case for a New Approach in Europe’ 19 European 
Competition Law Review (1998) 4. Also supporting the view that competition economics neglected buyer power 
issues see: Bundeskartellamt ‘Buyer Power in Competition Law - Status and Perspectives’ (2008) 1. 
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harm in which the legal analysis is built. Furthermore, this chapter has been written with a legal 
audience in mind, which explains why I have decided to keep economic jargon and 
microeconomic modeling to the minimum, focusing on getting the main issues across without 
compromising the depth of the discussion. 
My contribution, therefore, consists in clarifying that buyer power is an umbrella term that covers 
monopsony and bargaining power effects, which, despite being connected to buyers, are very 
different in their nature and welfare effects. This distinction between them means that buyer 
power has ambiguous economic effects.78 Furthermore, I contribute with an analysis of the 
situations in which monopsony and bargaining power arise by discussing their sources as well as 
their economic effects on welfare. As this chapter discusses, however, in terms of such effects, 
there is no clear economic picture when it comes to buyer power among economists. In the case 
of monopsony, there is agreement among the literature that monopsony is an inefficient and anti-
competitive purchasing behavior because it decreases prices below the competitive level and 
withholds demand, generating an allocative welfare lose due the use of fewer resources.79 
Nevertheless, monopsony rarely occurs because it does not constitute an efficient buying conduct 
for the purchaser. The same clear cut answer, however, is not to be found regarding bargaining 
power effects that by and large tend to be welfare enhancing but depend not only on the upstream 
effects of the purchasing but also on its related downstream effects by means of a dualistic 
approach. These downstream effects are connected to whether or not there is sufficient 
competition that forces the powerful buyer to pass on the benefits to end consumers in the form 
of lower prices, increased quantity and quality and more variety. Furthermore, in the chapter I 
submit that whenever a powerful buyer is also a powerful retailer it enjoys of an ‘hourglass 
shape’80 that increases the anti-competitive risks by a buying conduct. Lastly, a contribution of 
this chapter is also to remark upon the lack of economic consensus regarding the bargaining 
power effects, which further limits the ability to provide standard answers that can serve as legal 
guidance or evidence. This means that, from a legal perspective, the best alternative is to take a 
cautious approach to buyer (bargaining) power cases and, until further necessary economic 
analysis is carried out in the future,81 adopt a case-by-case assessment of conducts and effects. 
In discussing buyer power economics, I have structured this chapter as follows. Section 3.2 
discusses buyer power as an umbrella concept covering both monopsony and bargaining power; 
section 3.3 analyzes the economics of monopsony, presents a model to back up this theory and 
                                                          
78 Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt, ‘Buyer Power in International Markets’ 79 Journal of International Economics 
(2009) 222, p. 223; Ioannis Kokkoris and Howard Shelanski, EU Merger Control: A Legal and Economic Analysis 
(Oxford University Press 2014) 408, p. 408. 
79 Zhiqi Chen, ‘Buyer power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy’ 22 Research in Law and Economics (2007) 17. 
80 Term coined by the author. 
81 Chris Doyle and Roman Inderst, ‘Some Economics on the Treatment of Buyer Power in Antitrust’ 28 European 
Competition Law Review (2007) 210. 
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discusses its sources and the likelihood that it will appear in practice. In section 3.4, I discuss the 
economics of bargaining power, its differences from monopsony and its sources. I then, in section 
3.5, analyze the direct and price effects of buyer power, both in monopsony and bargaining 
power; while, in section 3.6, I discuss the indirect effects of buyer power. Section 3.7 concludes 
with a summary of the discussion. 
3.2 Buyer power as an umbrella term for competition risks 
In this study I employ buyer power as an umbrella term to describe two situations that represent 
different forms of buying and bargaining over purchasing prices: monopsony and bargaining 
(sensu stricto) power. The term ‘buyer power’ has no generally accepted definition in economic 
and legal literature and engulfs different types of purchasing strategies.82 Authors use the term to 
only express the idea of either monopsony,83 or bargaining power;84 or to encapsulate both.85 In 
                                                          
82 Also highlighting this, see: Chen (2007) p. 19; Doyle and Inderst (2007) p. 211; Bundeskartellamt Summary of the 
Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector, (2014), 1. 
83 See using the term buyer power to refer to monopsony, inter alia: Manfred Neumann, Competition Policy: 
History, Theory and Practice (Edward Elgar 2001), p. 11 to 12; Grimes (2004-2005); Roger G Noll, ‘"Buyer Power" 
and Economic Policy’ 72 Antitrust Law Journal (2004-2005) 589; Victor Chimienti, ‘The Abuse of Dominance in 
the new Albanian Competition Act’ 26 European Competition Law Review (2005) 151; Frances Dehtmers, 
‘Collective Dominance under EC Merger Control - After Airtours and the Introduction of Unilateral Effects is there 
still a Future for Collective Dominance?’ 26 European Competition Law Review (2005) 638. See also using the term 
buyer power mainly referring to monopsony and oligopsony effect and, in my view, somewhat imprecisely to 
bargaining/countervailing power: David A. Hyman and William E. Kovacic, ‘Monopoly, Monopsony, and Market 
Definition: An Antitrust Perspective on Market Concentration Among Health Insurers’ 23 Health Affairs (2004), 25; 
Jonathan M. Jacobson, ‘Monopsony 2013: Still Not Truly Symmetric’ December 2013 The Antitrust Source (2013), 
1; Robert O'Donoghue and A. Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU (Hart 2013), p. 840; Mika 
Oinonen, ‘The New 30% Rule: A Viable Solution to Detrimental Buyer Power in the Finnish Grocery Retail 
Sector?’ 10 European Competition Journal (2014), 97. 
84 See using the term buyer power to refer to bargaining power: Doyle and Inderst (2007); Paul W. Dobson and 
Roman Inderst, ‘The Waterbed Effect: Where Buying and Selling Power Come Together’ Wisconsin Law Review 
(2008) 331. 
85 See, using buyer power as an umbrella term, inter alia: Commission and others (2000); Ioannis Kokkoris, ‘Buyer 
Power Assessment in Competition Law: A Boon or a Menace?’ 29 World Competition (2006), 139; Chen (2007); 
Paul W. Dobson and Roman Inderst, ‘Differential Buyer Power and the Waterbed Effect: Do Strong Buyers Benefit 
or Harm Consumers?’ 28 European Competition Law Review (2007), 393; Doyle and Inderst (2007); Peter C. 
Carstensen, ‘Buyer Power and Merger Analysis–The Need for Different Metrics’ (Workshop on Merger 
Enforcement held by the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission), 1; American Antitrust Institute 
[2008], 96; Dobson and Inderst (2008); OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009); Ioannis 
Kokkoris and Leanne Day, ‘Buyer Power in UK Merger Control’ 30 European Competition Law Review (2009), 
176; Dennis W. Carlton and Mark Israel, ‘Proper Treatment of Buyer Power in Merger Review’ 39 Review of 
Industrial Organization (2011), 127; Ariel Ezrachi, ‘Buying Alliances and Input Price Fixing: In Search of a 
European Enforcement Standard’ 8 Journal of Competition Law and Economics (2012), 47; Ezrachi and De Jong 
(2012); John B Kirkwood, ‘Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement’ 92 Boston University Law Review (2012), 
1485; European Competition Network, ECN Activities in the Food Sector (2012), para. 73; Lars Henriksson, 
Countervailing Buyer Power in EU Antitrust Analysis (October 17, 2012); Henriksson, Swedish National Report: 
The Grocery Retail Market in Sweden: Is Antitrust Efficiently Handling this Market? (2013); Ariel Ezrachi and Mark 
Williams, ‘Competition Law and the Regulation of Buyer Power and Buyer Cartels in China and Hong Kong’ 9 
Asian Journal of Comparative Law (2013) 295; Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector 
Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014); van Doorn, p. 76-84; Kirkwood (2014); Kokkoris and Shelanski, [2014] 
33 
 
my view, however, the imprecise use of the term has led to misunderstanding and confusion 
among, particularly but not exclusively, legal scholars.  
This use of an umbrella term, however, is not free from criticism; for instance, Carstensen argues 
that making a distinction between bargaining power and monopsony power is “not helpful”.86 In 
my view, the distinction is helpful because, even though bargaining power may at times be anti-
competitive, unlike monopsony power, bargaining power exercise tends to be welfare enhancing 
on most occasions; rather like two different animals can belong to the same species. 
Following Chen’s definition, buyer power lato sensu is exerted when a buyer (or a coordinated 
group) is able to reduce purchasing prices in a profitable manner below the supplier’s standard 
selling price. This price reduction can be obtained by either withholding purchases – monopsony 
– or through bilateral negotiations and pure competitive bargaining to reduce the supplier’s prices 
and obtain better contractual conditions.87 In both cases, the buyer captures a higher share of 
surplus when negotiating with the supplier that, absent buyer power, would have been retained by 
the supplier.88 These better terms and conditions, contrary to Grimes’ view, can be the result of 
efficient outcomes, as occurs with bargaining power.89  
This proposed definition, however, only captures pricing effects of buyer power. Additionally, 
powerful buyers may also capture non-price contractual benefits such as, for example, slotting 
allowances, listing charges, preferential treatment, contribution to retail expenses, transfer of 
contractual risks, which are often associated with unfair purchasing practices and which I discuss 
at length in chapter 9.90 The nature of the non-price benefits will largely depend on the industry 
and type of contract at hand as they will derive from the outcome of negotiation between parties 
that enjoy bargaining power and are usually the result of offers and counteroffers, as the Courts 
of Appeal of Düsseldorf remarked.91 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
407 to 441; Ezrachi [2014], p. 435; Dennis W. Carlton, Mary Coleman and Mark Israel, ‘Buyer Power in Merger 
Review’ in Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, 
Vol. 1 (Oxford University Press 2015), p. 530; Antonio Robles Martín-Laborda, ‘La Cadena Alimentaria: Cuando el 
Poder de Mercado lo Tiene el Comprador’ (2015) accessed 12.10.2015. 
86 Peter C. Carstensen, ‘Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor Progress on an Important Issue’ 
14 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law (2012) 775, p. 788. 
87 Chen (2007), p. 19. Also following Chen’s definition see: Kirkwood ‘Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement’ 
(2012), p. 1493. A similar definition is also used by Dobson in Dobson (2004-2005), p. 532; Dobson and Inderst 
(2007), p. 393. 
88 Carlton and Israel (2011), p. 128. 
89 To Grimes, buyer power is the ability of the buyer to “significantly influence the terms of a purchase for reasons 
other than efficiency”, Grimes (2004-2005), p. 565. This holds true only for monopsony cases and not for bargaining 
power cases. 
90 Dobson (2004-2005), p. 532; Alberto Pera and Valentina Bonfitto, ‘Buyer Power in Anti-trust Investigations: A 
Review’ 32 European Competition Law Review (2011) 414, p. 414; Oinonen (2014), p. 101. 
91 Düsseldorf Appellate Court in Decision of 18 November 2015 EDEKA/Plus-Übernahme revoking a Decision B2-
58/09 Edeka Konditionenforderungen - Verstoß gegen das "Anzapfverbot", 3 July 2014 by the Bundeskartellamt. 
Summary available at: http://www.olg-
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In general, buyer power as a whole has two main sources: first, the existence of alternative 
suppliers that would allow the buyer to obtain better price conditions from the buyer, and second, 
each party’s own bargaining skill. In sections 3.3 and 3.4, I discuss the specific sources for each 
of the forms of buyer power that I identify in this chapter. 
However, monopsony and bargaining power are different types of buyer power. In my view, the 
main difference between monopsony and bargaining power lies in whether there is a reduction of 
purchases – withholding effect – to affect the price paid by the buyer.92 For monopsony to exist, 
the purchasing conduct must unavoidably require a demand withholding (i.e. purchase less 
quantity), whereas in bargaining power cases, the reduction in purchasing price is obtained 
according to the negotiation strength of each party, where a redistribution of profit between 
buyers and sellers takes places leaving “nothing on the table” (i.e. there is no allocative efficiency 
loss), if parties resort to complex contracts using two-part tariffs, instead of linear pricing 
contracts. 
This distinction however is not shared by all legal scholars dealing with buyer power. For van 
Doorn, for instance, the main difference between monopsony and buyer power lies in the fact that 
monopsony power is only exercised against suppliers with no seller power, while bargaining 
power occurs among parties with market power.93 This approach, however, overlooks the fact 
that a buyer with monopsony power could still withhold purchases, even if the supplier has seller 
market power when the supply curve is upward slopping. However, van Doorn also admits that 
for monopsony power to exist there must be a purchase withholding, while for bargaining power 
there is none.94  
Consequently, and to facilitate the understanding of the terminology, I will use term buyer power 
whenever I am referring to the two variants in a joint manner. Moreover, I will employ the 
specific terms when referring to a particular expression of buyer power. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
duesseldorf.nrw.de/behoerde/presse/Presse_aktuell/20151118_PM_Edeka/index.php. See the discussion of this case 
by the author in an invited entry in the blog "Competencia y Regulación" of Prof. Antonio Robles Martín-Laborda 
entitled "El Acuerdo DIA-EROSKI: Alianza compradora o cártel de compra?" (The DIA-EROSKI Agreement: 
Buying alliance or buyers cartel?)", http://derechocompetencia.blogspot.no/2015/12/el-acuerdo-dia-eroski-
alianza.html. 
92 This also appears to be the distinction used by the Commission to define what constitutes a monopsony practice, as 
stressed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines where monopsony is linked to a withholding effect, see Guidelines on 
the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, paras 61-63. See also remarking that buyer power (monopsony) may significantly 
impede competition when “it is likely to lead to a reduction in output of the final products or the foreclosure of 
competitors of the merged entity”, Commission Decision of 21/12/2005 declaring a concentration to be compatible 
with the common market (Case No COMP/M.3968 - Sovion/Südfleisch) according to Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 [2005], para. 37 (emphasis added). 
93 van Doorn, p. 78. 
94 Ibid, p. 78- 102. 
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One of the most relevant characteristics of buyer power is that its exercise will affect the 
upstream and downstream markets, which, therefore, requires in my view a dualistic approach to 
buyer power that captures both effects.95 In this thesis I define the upstream market as the market 
in which the buyer acquires the input it needs to offer a processed good or some service in a 
different market, by either transforming it or by consuming it. The downstream market, herein, is 
where the buyer offers its goods to its customers (which may or not be final consumers), as for 
example occurs when a supermarket buys packaged milk from farmers (upstream market) and 
sells it to end consumers (downstream markets).  
On the upstream market, buyer power affects the competitive conditions between the buyer, rival 
buyers and suppliers and in particular the agreement between the buyer and the supplier that have 
entered into a contract. Additionally, buyer power may indirectly affect, in positive or negative 
terms, market conditions in the downstream market and, therefore, have an impact on end 
consumers. For example, buyer power problems in the upstream market may imply that 
competition among rival buyers and suppliers is adversely affected, with the consequence that 
there is a diminishment on innovation, quality of price competition intensity, that, in the medium 
and long run, would hurt consumers, even if there is no direct immediate downstream end 
consumer harm caused by the purchasing conduct. 
Connected to this impact on upstream and downstream markets, buyer power problems are most 
likely to arise between parties that regularly trade between each other due the importance the 
buyer signifies for the supplier precisely because the close connection between them; although 
not necessarily due to a powerful buyer having a monopolistic position as a retailer or as a buyer, 
as simplified by Faull and Nikpay.96 This explains why buyer power not only may be an 
exploitative conduct vis-à-vis suppliers but can also act as an exclusionary device against rival 
buyers that may or may not compete as retailers in the downstream market.  
Furthermore, buyer power cases arise when the purchasing undertaking acquires an input, 
processes it and sells it as an output, acting as a retailer or middleman. Therefore, in buyer-
supplier situations there tends to be contractual relations of considerable length, with fairly 
frequent contact, and, on occasions, investment by the parties to meet the needs of their 
counterparts. The importance of the trade relationship among parties is an element that explains 
how buyer power is exercised among undertakings and why exploitative monopsony power tends 
to be a rare phenomenon. 
                                                          
95 Chen (2007), p. 20 Also remarking that buyer power is combined with seller market power, see: Korah and 
O'Sullivan, [2002], p. 46. See also, stressing that monopsony causes inefficiency both in a consumer welfare and 
total welfare perspective: Roger D. Blair and John E. Lopatka, ‘Predatory Buying and the Antitrust Laws’ 2 Utah 
Law Review (2008) 415, p. 443-444.  
96 Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition (Oxford University Press 1999), para. 3-110. 
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From a legal perspective, the exercise of both monopsony and bargaining power is under the 
scope of application of EU competition law, as these conducts are capable of creating market 
inefficiencies, and affecting competitive conditions and ‘competition as such’ that may cause 
competitive harm to end consumers, rival buyers and suppliers alike. Furthermore, buyer power 
is a competition concern affecting all areas covered by EU competition law. It can be created by 
coordinated undertakings by joining their purchasing efforts through buyer agreements or tacit 
coordination,97 and also exercised by a unilateral and dominant undertaking or it can be the 
expected outcome of a merger among buying undertakings. However, the fact that buyer power is 
present in different areas of competition law does not mean that the economics of buyer power 
changes. In fact, the opposite happens: from an economic perspective, buyer power remains 
largely the same in any of these different scenarios and this justifies a general approach to buyer 
power economics. 
3.3 Monopsony, the model 
The traditional or “old”98 angle given to buyer power issues is focused on the intuitively 
appealing but rather simplified monopsony model as one example of bargaining over purchasing 
prices inefficiently. Literature describes monopsony as the mirror image of monopoly.99 This 
section shows that even though the figures are analogous, they are not entirely symmetrical.100 I 
first present a discussion of the monopsony model, followed by an example illustrating the 
exercise of monopsony power. The section also discusses how monopsony arises and ends with a 
discussion of whether monopsony is problematic in reality. 
                                                          
97 Neumann, [2001], p. 156. 
98 Using the term of “older literature” to refer to the discussion of buyer power as pure monopsony issues see: 
Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 9. 
99 In my view, the use of this or similar expressions denotes the negative approach that is shown regarding 
monopsony situations by the relevant academic literature. Examples of such expressions are to be found in, for 
example: Blair and Lopatka (2008), p. 415; Capps, who also use the expression “mirror image” when comparing 
monopsony to monopoly in Cory S. Capps, ‘Buyer Power in Health Plan Mergers’ 6 Journal of Competition Law 
and Economics (2009) 375, p. 376. The German and US reports to the OECD use the same term in OECD ‘Policy 
Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), respectively. Waterman uses the expression of “flip side” 
borrowing it from Carlton and Perloff when stating: “In a standard textbook treatment, monopsony is a flip side 
version of monopoly”, in David Waterman, ‘Local Monopsony and Free Riders’ 8 Information Economics and 
Policy (1996) 337. A similar expression is used by the US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines Washington D.C. (2010) 2, when stating: “[e]nhancement of market power by buyers, 
sometimes called ‘monopsony power’, has adverse effects comparable to enhancement of market power by sellers”. 
In similar terms see: Steven C Salop, ‘Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers’ 72 Antitrust Law Journal 
(2004-2005) 669. See also, US Supreme Court case Weyerhauser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber part III. 
No.- 05-381, (549 U.S. 312 (2007). 
100 Jacobson (2013). 
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According to the textbook microeconomic model,101 monopsony exists when there is a single 
buyer in the market enjoying substantial purchasing market power.102 This sole buyer – or 
coordinated oligopsony103 – could be facing a myriad of fringe suppliers,104 part of a highly 
competitive upstream market, in which none of them enjoys substantial market power, or facing a 
single supplier with substantial market power and could thus be in a bilateral monopoly 
situation.105 Furthermore, monopsonist buyers can be found at any level of the production 
chain,106 although they are often retailing firms that compete in a downstream market.107  
In any of these situations, the buyer will exercise its buyer market power by withholding 
purchases (i.e. buying less)108 to decrease the purchasing price it pays for a good below the 
                                                          
101 For example, see the treatment of the ‘classic’ monopsony model in microeconomics texts in, inter alia, James P. 
Quirk, Intermediate Microeconomics (Science Research Associates 1987) 358 to 362; Robert H. Frank and Amy 
Jocelyn Glass, Microeconomics and Behavior (McGraw-Hill 1999) 503 to 508; Hal R. Varian, Intermediate 
Microeconomics: A Modern Approach (W.W. Norton & Co. 2006) 471 to 474; B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. 
Whinston, Microeconomics (McGraw-Hill Irwin 2008) 648 to 652; Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 
Microeconomics (Pearson Prentice Hall 2009) 373 to 381. 
102 It should be noted that, for the Commission, a monopsony includes the situation in which the exercise of the 
market power is carried out by a group of coordinated buyers. In my opinion, such a figure corresponds, technically 
speaking, to a buyer’s cartel or the situation of oligopsony. The Commission defined monopsony power, in a very 
broad manner, as a situation that “emerge[s] when a buyer, or a coordinated group of buyers such as a buying 
alliance, purchases a charge share of an upstream supplier’s outputs that the suppliers ability to switch to alternatives 
quickly are eliminated. As a result, the monopsony buyer can obtain lower input prices or favourable contract terms, 
typically by withholding (or threatening to withhold) purchases”. European Commission’s contribution in OECD 
‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 225. 
103 The effects and analysis made here also apply to oligopsony cases. Similarly, see: Neumann, [2001], p. 154; Noll 
(2004-2005), p. 589; Chen (2007), p. 22. 
104 Jonathan Parker and Adrian Majumdar, UK Merger Control (Hart 2011), p. 562. 
105 Noll (2004-2005), p. 602-606; OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p 35-36. A 
bilateral monopoly takes place, in its simplest form, whenever a single supplier in the upstream market faces a single 
buyer who is also a monopolist in the downstream market. On a non-cooperative solution the welfare outcome 
depends on who has the lead in the negotiation by setting a price whereas the counterpart simply determines quantity. 
If it is the buyer, then the seller becomes a price taker and vice versa, see: ibid; Office of Fair Trading Research 
Paper 16: The Welfare Consequences of the Exercise of Buyer Power, (1998) para 5.3; Roger D. Blair and Jeffrey L. 
Harrison, Monopsony in Law and Economics (Cambridge University Press 2010) 126. However, such a solution does 
not maximize the profits for both parties and, therefore, they would rather enter into a negotiated agreement setting 
by jointly determining the optimal quantity and price terms and distributing the surplus, OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: 
Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 35. In practice, however, the intersection will be given by the bargaining 
outcome among parties. Noll even goes further and claims that, because of this, non-cooperative bilateral monopolies 
“can probably never arise” in Noll (2004-2005) 602. Ideally, this occurs whenever marginal revenue downstream 
equals to marginal cost upstream. Also in a similar vein stressing that bilateral monopolies very rarely occur in 
practice, see Henriksson, Countervailing Buyer Power in EU Antitrust Analysis. 
106 J. M. Jacobson and G. J. Dorman, ‘Joint Purchasing, Monopsony and Antitrust’ XXXVI The Antitrust Bulletin 
(1991) 1, p. 5. 
107 American Bar Association, Market Power Handbook: Competition Law and Economic Foundations (ABA 
Section of Antitrust Law ed, 2012) 52, p. 52; O'Donoghue and Padilla, [2013] 840, p. 840. 
108 Salop labels such demand withholding practice as “underbuying”, arguing that “[m]onopsony conduct involves 
‘underbuying’ an input to profitably reduce its price”, Salop (2004-2005), p. 672; see also using this term: P. Areeda, 
Herbert Hovenkamp and J. Solow, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their Application Vol. IIB 
(3rd edn, Wolters Kluwer 1995), p. 442. 
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competitive levels.109 The price is set by the buyer fixing a purchasing price it is willing to pay 
for the input, in a take-it or leave-it offer,110 or by refusing to negotiate on price. In such a setting, 
the monopsonist becomes a price-maker,111which negotiates based on quantity and price.112 For 
the monopsonist withholding demand is profitable because it allows it to lower the market-wide 
purchasing prices113 transferring profits from suppliers to the buyer,114 and which may lead to 
higher prices to end consumers due to scarcity.115  
Monopsony power generates a reduction of welfare due to loss of allocative efficiency because 
too few resources are employed.116 As few resources are employed there are unrealized gains 
from additional trade.117 This misallocation of resources holds irrespectively of the downstream 
market situation; this is: monopsony is always inefficient.118  
3.3.1 Isolation’s supermarket 
In order to clearly grasp the monopsony effects, I employ an example that illustrates this 
problem.119 In a secluded town named Isolation, there is a sole supermarket. Isolation’s 
                                                          
109 A similar definition is provided by the OECD when stating: “[a]firm as monopsony power if its shares of 
purchases in the upstream input market is sufficiently large that it can cause the market price to fall by purchasing 
less and cause it to rise by purchasing more”. Note, however, that it is stressed that monopsony under this definition 
can occur even if there is more than a single buyer in the market, in OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and 
Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 9. As I describe infra in the competition regulation of monopsony and bargaining power, 
this purchasing price needs to be below competitive levels in order for it to be considered anticompetitive. See, for 
example the contribution of Canadian Competition Bureau as well as Germany’s contribution in ibid, p. 142 and 176, 
respectively. See also: Andrew Gavil, William Kovacic and Jonathan Baker, Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, 
Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy (2nd edn, Thomson West 2008) 517 to 518, p. 517-518; Kirkwood 
(2014), p. 35. 
110 Kirkwood ‘Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement’ (2012), p. 1501; Carstensen ‘Buyer Power and the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor Progress on an Important Issue’ (2012), p. 796. 
111 The main characteristic of both a monopolist and a monopsonist is that, in contrast to buyers and sellers in a 
competitive market, they are price makers instead of price takers. See, for instance: Bernheim and Whinston, [2008], 
p. 472. In contrast, see the concept of perfect competition and price taker in John P. Burkett, Microeconomics: 
Optimization, Experiments, and Behavior (Oxford University Press 2006), p. 60; OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: 
Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 26. 
112 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 9. 
113 This is, not only the monopsonist benefits from the reduction in price but it affects all other buyers. John B 
Kirkwood, ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced 
Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ 72 Antitrust Law Journal (2004-2005) 625, p. 638.  
114 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 9. Note, however, that higher prices in a 
downstream market will only occur in the event the buyer uses the acquired input to produce goods and/or services 
that will be sold later on or offered in a downstream market. In principle, no higher prices in a downstream market 
will be generated if the input is acquired for inner consumption. 
115 Competition Commission - UK The Supply of Groceries in the UK Market Investigation, London (2008), para. 
9.68. 
116 Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 44. The same negative consequence is pointed out by the OECD in OECD ‘Policy 
Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 9; Jacobson (2013), p. 2. 
117 Office of Fair Trading ‘Research Paper 16: The Welfare Consequences of the Exercise of Buyer Power’ (1998), 
p. 12. 
118 Jacobson (2013), p. 3; Carlton, Coleman and Israel [2015], p. 531. 
119 A somewhat similar case was handled by the European Commission in the Friesland Foods/Campina merger 
Decision, which involved the merger of two dairy cooperatives in the Netherlands for the collection of raw milk. 
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Supermarket is the only buyer of agricultural goods produced by the local farmers who have no 
other alternative buyers as they are too far away from them, making transportation costs too high. 
Also, Isolation’s Supermarket faces no possible competitors entering the market because the town 
is too remote and Isolation’s Supermarket has also gained the reputation of being a fierce 
competitor when confronted by any kind of potential entrants, for instance by entering into 
predatory buying conducts. Additionally, Isolation’s mayor, by means of an administrative 
decree, gave Isolation’s Supermarket an exclusive license to operate in the town for the next 20 
years. Hence, Isolation’s Supermarket possesses a legal and de facto monopoly as the sole food 
retailer in the town. Therefore, not only does it have buyer power but also it also substantial has 
seller market power.  
The board of directors of Isolation’s Supermarket behaves like a rational economic agent and 
pursues the maximization of the undertaking’s profits as a buyer.120 To do so, and following 
monopsony theory, they decide to exploit their suppliers by offering a purchasing price that is 
below the competitive level, which allows them to reap extra profits as a buyer. Also, as there is 
no competition as a food retailer Isolation Supermarket can also exert seller market power to reap 
additional benefits vis-à-vis end consumers. 
To exert monopsony power, the supply curve the buyer faces has to be upward sloping. This is to 
say, the more beef they buy, the more they have to pay for each additional unit; however, if they 
decide to restrict the amount they buy they are able to decrease the purchasing prices below the 
price set by the competitive level.121 This ability to purchase beef below the competitive price is 
strengthened because beef is a perishable product: once a cow is killed for a portion of its beef 
the rest will have to be sold or will go to waste. This puts farmers in almost a take it or leave 
situation to minimize their loss.122 
To maximize Isolation’s Supermarket profits, the board decides to employ its buyer power by 
acquiring fewer kilos of beef than they would require, driving the purchasing price of all units 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
See: Summary of Commission Decision of 17 December 2008 declaring a concentration compatible with the 
common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.5046 — Friesland Foods/Campina) 
[2009] OJ C 75/21. See discussing also this case: Ariel Ezrachi and Maria Ioannidou, ‘Buyer Power in European 
Union Merger Control’ 10 European Competition Journal (2014) 69, p. 80-81. 
120 As Noll describes it: “[…] the motivation behind monopsony behavior is to transfer wealth in the form of 
economic rents from one side of the market to the other”, Noll (2004-2005), p. 589. 
121 As will be explained further on, a requirement for monopsony and bargaining power to occur is the existence of 
an upward-sloping supply curve, this is, the curve is convex in its form. If the supply curve is concave (downward-
sloping) or flat, then the buyer cannot influence the prices he or she pays for the goods and/or services by reducing 
the amount he or she purchases. 
122 Also considering the threat of purchase delay as a source of buyer power see: Guidelines on the assessment of 
horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 
31/5, para. 65; Korah and O'Sullivan, [2002], p. 49; European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering 
Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 28. 
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down.123 This practice affects both farmers and consumers alike. On the one hand, farmers must 
kill a cow even if they are only selling 70% of the meat, and end consumers have less quantity 
readily available for their own consumption, which – provided demand remains the same – will 
result in an upward rising price in the downstream market. Additionally, the local farmers have 
no alternative as they are presented with take-it-or-leave-it contract.124 Either they offer their 
produce to Isolation’s Supermarket or their beef will perish and, in the long run, they will be 
forced out of the farm business as they are unable to cover their costs.125  
As Isolation’s Supermarket is a price maker, it can select any level of price combinations (p) 
depending of the amount of beef that will be purchased (b). However, the profit maximization 
strategy for the supermarket will be when the marginal revenue from purchasing one kilo of beef 
equals the marginal cost that represents buying that same kilo of beef.126 In terms of the 
representation of this effect on a graph (as shown below), the amount of kilos of beef to be 
purchased will be determined by the intersections of the demand curve with the marginal cost 
curve, therefore generating a price (Pm) and an amount of beef (Bm).127 By doing so, the 
supermarket reduces the prices paid for each kilo of beef causing a withholding effect. This is 
best seen with the following graph: 
 
                                                          
123 The monopsonist is aware of their powerful situation and, therefore, willingly decides to make use of their market 
power to maximize their profits. A similar view is expressed by Jacobson and Dorman when stating: “[t]he essence 
of monopsony is the firm’s recognition that its own buying activities have an influence on the input price and that by 
altering its buying pattern the firm is able to enhance its profits at the expense of its suppliers”, Jacobson and 
Dorman (1991), p. 6. 
124 The Dutch Competition Authority uses the term “like it or lump it” contract for similar situations observed in two 
bargaining power cases related to insurance agreements between medical doctors and dentists. See The Netherlands 
contribution in OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 207-211. 
125 This implies that the supply demand is inelastic. As will be explained infra, the elasticity of supply is a relevant 
factor for monopsony to exist. On this point, see Pindyck and Rubinfeld, [2009], p. 377-378. 
126 Quirk, [1987], p. 359 and 377; Bernheim and Whinston, [2008], p. 472. Pyndick and Rubinfeld use a different 
terminology but to the same ends when stating that “the monopsonist purchases up to the point where marginal 
expenditure intersects marginal value”, see Pindyck and Rubinfeld, [2009], p. 373-381; Blair and Harrison arrive at 
the same conclusion, employing different terminology, when stating: “[…] it will hire [labor] where the marginal 
factor cost (MFC) equals demand (D), which is the value of the marginal product”, Blair and Harrison, [2010] 44, p. 
44. 
127 Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, ‘The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach’ 78 
Antitrust Law Journal (2012) 471, p. 493. Contrast this outcome with the ‘standard outcome’ in a perfectly 
competitive market in which the price to be paid by the buyer is represented by the intersections of the curves of 




Figure 1: Isolation's Supermarket - Monopsony128 
Consequently, Isolation’s Supermarket purchases fewer kilos of beef in order to pay less and 
maximize profits while reducing its expenditure. For the buyer, this reduces costs when compared 
to a situation pre-monopsony, and under very specific circumstances may increase societal 
welfare, if a Williamson tradeoff model is used.129  
For Isolation’s Supermarket, the monopsony gains are represented by the sum of A minus B (A – 
B), while the farmers’ loss is represented by A plus C (A + C). This surplus is captured from the 
portion that, under competitive market circumstances, would have corresponded to the seller.130 
In sum, society is worse off by the sum of B + C, which is the deadweight loss generated by 
                                                          
128 This graphic has been made based on the previous work by Pindyck and Rubinfeld, [2009], p. 377-378. 
129 From a welfare perspective, the gains originating from the cost reduction resulting from the monopsony exercise 
may under very strict circumstances offset the deadweight loss generated by the allocative inefficiency due to the 
lesser amount of goods purchased and, therefore, be welfare enhancing from a suppliers’ perspective or even a total 
welfare perspective, in line with the Williamson tradeoff model: Oliver E. Williamson, ‘Economies as an Antitrust 
Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs’ 58 The American Economic Review (1968) 18. I would like to thank Daniel J. 
Gifford for bringing this to my attention. 





monopsony power.131 Furthermore, the monopsony effect is detrimental for society, as there is an 
allocative efficiency loss due to the unused kilos of beef.132  
In contrast, a competitive market in which neither the seller nor the buyer has market power 
would lead to a very different outcome when compared to the monopsony situation. In this 
scenario, the supermarket would decide to purchase more kilos of beef (Bc) at the intersection of 
the supply and demand curves and, therefore, pay a higher price per kilo (Pc) and maximize 
social welfare,133 represented by the sum of consumer and producer surplus. Here, all factors are 
exploited to their maximum capacity, resulting in an efficient outcome thanks to the competitive 
pressure in which the buyer maximizes purchases in the upstream market leading to further sales 
in the downstream market, and which is equivalent to a state of competitive market equilibria and 
more resources are efficiently employed. 
3.3.2 The conditions for monopsony power 
Monopsony power can be exerted only if several conditions are present. In this section I discuss 
which conditions must exist in order for monopsony purchasing to occur. One aspect found in my 
research is that there is no academic consensus when it comes to all these monopsony sources.134 
However, there is consensus regarding the following necessary conditions:  
i) the existence of a sole buyer or few buyers (oligopsony);  
ii) an upward sloping supply curve;  
iii) an inelastic supply curve;  
iv) economic rents to be extracted;135  
v) little to no possibility of entry into the purchasing market by competitors. 
 
Assessing the existence of these conditions is of importance from an enforcement perspective 
because absent these circumstances the case is unlikely to be that of a monopsony, but instead a 
case of bargaining power, with all the welfare effect implications this distinction has.  
3.3.2.1 A sole buyer – or a group of a few buyers –with substantial market power 
The “textbook” monopsony model is characterized by the presence of a sole buyer, however, it is 
possible that monopsony may arise as a consequence of coordination among buyers in a market 
                                                          
131 Section 3.5.1 of the present chapter deals in detail with the negative welfare effects derived from monopsony 
power. 
132 For a similar view, see Quirk, [1987], p. 360, who states that “[u]nder monopsony with an upward-sloping supply 
curve for the input, the price paid per unit of the input is lower that it would be under perfect competition, and fewer 
units are hired”; Blair and Sokol (2012), p. 493. 
133 Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 43. 
134 For example in Office of Fair Trading ‘Research Paper 16: The Welfare Consequences of the Exercise of Buyer 
Power’ (1998), para. 4.5, there is a reference to only three requirements, namely: upward sloping supply curve, high 
share on the purchase market, and barriers to entry to the market and not considering, at least explicitly, for example, 
the elasticity factor. On the other hand, Chen argues that the only condition necessary to exercise monopsony power 
in a detrimental way is that supply curves are upward sloping, see in Chen (2007), p. 22. 
135 Noll (2004-2005), p. 592. 
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that will now act as single entity.136 As there are no other buyers to resort to, suppliers have no 
alternative sources of demand.137 Therefore, market shares – which represent buyers’ size – 
provide some indication of monopsony power, although other requirements are to be factored in. 
Conversely, when there are many competing buyers on the buying side of the market then they 
are unable to exert monopsony power, as the suppliers have alternative sources of demand.138 
3.3.2.2 An upward sloping supply curve 
Monopsony additionally requires that the supply curve the buyer faces must be upward sloping or 
convex.139 Due to scarcity factors, the intuition is that the more goods are purchased, the higher 
the price is to be paid or that there is presence of decreasing returns of scale. This implies that, 
with each additional purchase, the purchasing price of all the units of goods/services increases. 
Classic examples of industries with upward-slopping supply curves are labor markets and 
agriculture.140 For instance, if Isolation’s Supermarket buys 100 kilos of beef, it will pay a per 
unit price €10.25, but it if acquires 101 kilos then the unit price increases to €10.30.141  
Thanks to an upward sloping supply curve, a monopsonist is able to decrease the purchasing 
prices by acquiring a lesser amount of input from its suppliers.142 If the supply curve is either flat 
or downward slopping, the monopsonist cannot exercise any influence in reducing the price as it 
will either maintain constant and/or decrease in price when purchasing more units.143  
                                                          
136 “There are three necessary conditions for the exertion of monopsony power: (1) the buyer or group of buyers must 
represent a substantial portion of total purchases in the market; (2) the supply curve must be upward sloping; and (3) 
there must be some barriers to entry into the buyers' market” Jacobson and Dorman (1991), p. 10. I, instead, prefer 
stating that the buyer(s) enjoys market power than rather limiting the requirement to sole market share as a 
purchaser. 
137 As Blair and Harrison point out: “[t]here is no doubt that the market share of the large buyer is an important 
determinant of buyer power” in Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 58. In similar terms, see Kokkoris, borrowing from the 
work of the Office of Fair Trading, when stating that it is a requirement that “[…] the buyers contribute to a 
substantial portion of purchases in the market” in Kokkoris (2006), p. 144; and see Office of Fair Trading ‘Research 
Paper 16: The Welfare Consequences of the Exercise of Buyer Power’ (1998), para. 4.5. 
138 Pindyck and Rubinfeld, [2009], p. 378. 
139 For a general treatment of supply curves see, inter alia, Jagdish N. Sheth and Arun Sharma, ‘Supplier 
Relationships: Emerging Issues and Challenges’ 26 Industrial Marketing Management (1997) 91; Varian, [2006], p 
5-6 and 383-422; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, [2009], p. 22-23 and 284-306. The supply curve in a market is formed by 
the sum of all the cost curves of all suppliers of an input as discussed by Jacobson (2013), p. 5 
140 Carstensen ‘Emerging Issues in Buyer Power Analysis’ (2012); Jacobson (2013), p. 6. 
141 See the comparison to a flat or horizontal supply curve in Jacobson and Dorman (1991), p. 11. See also: Bernheim 
and Whinston, [2008], p. 472. 
142 Varian, [2006], p. 648. 
143 Supply curves can be flat or downward sloping in industries with positive economies of scale or where marginal 
costs are flat or decreasing, such as, for example, the case of constant-cost industries and decreasing cost industries, 
such as manufacturing markets, software or pharmaceuticals. See inter alia: F. M. Scherer and David Ross, 
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Houghton Mifflin 1990), p. 97-141. See also: Dennis W. 
Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization (Pearson/Addison Wesley 2005), p. XXIII, 822 s.: 
ill. For a discussion on supply structures in industrial organization, see: Jeffrey Church and Roger Ware, Industrial 
Organization: A Strategic Approach (McGraw-Hill 2000), p. 22-25. 
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Jacobson and Dorman remark, nonetheless, that in practice upward sloping supply curves are not 
as common as flat supply curves as in many industries “increased production can be achieved at 
roughly constant per unit costs”.144 Upward sloping supply curves may be present, for example, 
on increasing-costs industries in which the production costs increases as per each unit produced 
wherein the effect of diminishing returns dominate,145 or where labor is a key factor.146 
3.3.2.3 The supply curve must be inelastic 
Additionally, the supply curve must be inelastic.147 For monopsony to be present the suppliers 
have little to no alternatives to selling to the monopsonist even if the price for the goods or 
services they sell have their selling price drastically reduced.148 In other words, there are few 
alternative sources of demand for the supplier, or there are no other uses for its produce.149 Going 
back to Isolation’s Supermarket case, the farmers are constrained to selling their produce to the 
supermarket, even with the reduction in purchasing prices, because there are no other demand 
sources for acquisition of the goods and, therefore there is an inelastic supply curve. Thanks to 
this need to sell at almost any price, the monopsonist can obtain the price reduction.150 
3.3.2.4 The existence of economic rents that can be extracted by the monopsonist 
According to Noll, monopsony power can only exist when there are suppliers’ supracompetitive 
rents that can be extracted, which implies a transfer of wealth from the supplier to the buyer.151 
Rents are necessary as their existence allows the buyer to gain surplus that would have otherwise 
been gained by the producer under normal market circumstances.152 The transferred rent from the 
                                                          
144 Jacobson and Dorman (1991), p. 12. More recently, Jacobson held that “[t]his is a condition that, although critical 
to monopsony analysis, does not always hold in the real world”, in Jacobson (2013), p. 4. Cf this with Shea who 
argues that upward sloping supply curves are not that rare: John Shea, ‘Do Supply Curves Slope Up?’ 108 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics (1993) 1.  
145 Pindyck and Rubinfeld, [2009], p. 300-301. 
146 Jacobson and Dorman (1991), p. 13. 
147 The same view was expressed by the Canadian Competition Bureau when stating: “[…] monopsony includes 
within its meaning situations where supply is perfectly inelastic such that a decrease in price below competitive 
levels does not result in a decrease in output” in OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), 
p. 142. Elasticity is the measure of the sensitivity of one variable (price) to another (supply). Elasticity describes the 
change that will occur when the price of a good/service, for instance beef, rises and whether people will purchase 
less, the same or more of it. Elasticity can be elastic or inelastic. A demand will be elastic, when after, say, an 
increase in price of beef, the demand drops substantially. Whereas, demand will be inelastic when the increase in 
price is not translated into a reduction of demand. For a detailed discussion on elasticity in competition law see: 
Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 11-001 to 11-038; Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 34-37. 
148 Neumann, [2001], p. 12. 
149 For a similar argument see Canadian contribution in OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ 
(2009), p. 142. Also see Hungary’s contribution in ibid, p. 185; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, [2009], p. 378. 
150 Pindyck and Rubinfeld, [2009], p. 377-378; Kirkwood (2014), p. 35. 
151 For Noll, a rent is present in a determined market when “in the aggregate, suppliers of the product receive more 
revenues than are necessary to introduce them to provide the quantity of goods that is sold”, Noll (2004-2005), p. 
592 
152 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 21-22 and 27. 
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suppliers to the buyer can be observed in the Isolation Supermarket model by a portion of the A + 
C areas that are lost by the sellers and appropriated by the monopsonist. 
3.3.2.5 Entry barriers to the buyer’s side of the market 
Lastly, monopsony demands the existence of entry barriers153 to the buyer’s market.154 In their 
absence other buyers would enter the market or current buyers would expand their capacity to 
extract the extraordinary monopsonistic gains, in a similar fashion to which entry would occur in 
a monopolistic market. The more alternative demand sources there are, the less chance buyers 
have of making the suppliers’ curve inelastic. 
3.3.3 Is monopsony power a problem likely to arise in practice? 
Monopsony cases occur rarely in practice, especially over a considerable period of time,155 an 
opinion also shared by Carlton, Coleman and Israel.156 Due to this unlikelihood and the narrow 
conditions in which it appears, not only is monopsony said to be the ‘older’ approach to buyer 
power, but it is also no longer considered by some NCAs as a likely measurement of buyer 
power, as, “[t]he Agencies do not view a short-run reduction in the quantity purchased as the 
only, or best indicator, of whether a merger enhances buyer market power”.157 These remarks are 
supported by my study, which confirms that the case law and data collected by Competition 
Agencies shows that demand withholding is a rare practice.158 
There are several arguments that support this proposal of unlikelihood of monopsony cases. 
Firstly, if monopsony is employed to reduce purchasing prices below the seller’s marginal costs, 
                                                          
153 For a general treatment of entry barriers in competition law see inter alia: Richard Schmalensee, ‘Economies of 
Scale and Barriers to Entry’ 89 Journal of Political Economy (1981) 1228; Harold Demsetz, ‘Barriers to Entry’ 72 
The American Economic Review (1982) 47; David T. Scheffman and Pablo T. Spiller, ‘Buyers' Strategies, Entry 
Barriers, and Competition’ 30 Economic Inquiry (1992) 418; David Harbord and Tom Hoehn, ‘Barriers to Entry and 
Exit in European Competition Policy’ 14 International Review of Law and Economics (1994) 411; Bishop and 
Walker, [2010], para. 3-020 to 3-030. 
154 Jacobson and Dorman (1991), p. 10. See as well Office of Fair Trading ‘Research Paper 16: The Welfare 
Consequences of the Exercise of Buyer Power’ (1998), para. 4.5. 
155 See making this same point, the UK NCA decision CA98/09/2003 BetterCare Group Ltd/North & West Belfast 
Health & Social Services Trust [2003], para 56. For a concurrent opinion see: Kirkwood ‘Powerful Buyers and 
Merger Enforcement’ (2012), p. 1497-1500. Also remarking that monopsony in food retailer markets is unlikely to 
appear, see: Federal Trade Commission, Report on the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Slotting Allowances 
and Other Marketing Practices in the Grocery Industry (2001): 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/report-federal-trade-commission-workshop-slotting-
allowances-and-other-marketing-practices-grocery/slottingallowancesreportfinal_0.pdf; Kirkwood (2014), p. 7; 
Antonio Buttà and Andrea Pezzoli, ‘Buyer power and competition policy: from brick-and-mortar retailers to digital 
platforms ’ 41 Economia E Politica Industriale (2014) 159, p. 160. Cf with the work of van Doorn which does not 
address this issue in: van Doorn. 
156 Carlton, Coleman and Israel [2015], p. 531. 
157 US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), p 32. 
158 According to the UK Competition Commission: “[h]owever, having reviewed industry cost structures, as well as 
recent purchasing patterns and retail prices, in the fresh fruit sector, we did not find any evidence to support a finding 
that demand withholding was taking place” in Competition Commission, UK (2008), para 9.69. 
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suppliers will slowly be forced out of the market, as their economic activity is no longer 
profitable (not even costs are covered).159 Consequently, a rational buyer will not “squeeze” a 
reasonable amount of its suppliers because by doing so it will be left without the input that it 
requires to provide downstream its output for final consumers. This type of argument was 
employed by Advocate General Poiares Maduro in FENIN v Commission, stating that “[an] 
undertaking in a monopsonistic position has no interest in bringing such pressure to bear on its 
suppliers that they become obliged to leave the upstream market”.160 However, the monopsonist 
can afford to squeeze some marginal suppliers out of the market as other more efficient suppliers 
will remain in the market (even if their profitability decreases). Nevertheless, as some suppliers 
leave the market, those remaining grow stronger and may be able to countervail the monopsony 
power of the large buyer in what becomes a neutralizing cycle.  
Secondly, most buyers that may employ monopsony power would rather use bargaining power 
instead to maximize their purchases and reduce their input prices. This would lower the buyer’s 
costs, which would allow it to increase its sales in the downstream market, which, taken as a 
whole, would imply a higher margin of profit compared to the monopsony profit it could 
otherwise obtain. In other terms, monopsony is not the most profit maximizing conduct for a 
powerful buyer. 
Thirdly, exercise of monopsony power reduces the overall market price of the input – i.e. the 
reduction in price will also benefit other buyers and not only the price paid by the buyer. Hence, 
such a move, absent additional measures, such as imposing exclusive supply obligations, will not 
be particularly beneficial to the powerful buyer as noted by Kirkwood.161 
Lastly, the monopsony model is short sighted because it assumes that purchasing contracts are 
only negotiated based on quantity and on anonymous take-it-or-leave it offers, and that the price 
paid per unit remains static.162 In practice, however, this is not the case as most contracts are 
usually the outcome of bilateral negotiations that take into account other factors beyond price and 
quality,163 and adopting two-part tariffs.  
                                                          
159 Hovenkamp expresses a similar idea when stating that: “[n]o supplier would stay in business if it were forced to 
sell to the monopsonist at a price lower than its average costs, and price would tend toward average cost in a 
competitive market”, in Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice (3rd 
edn, Thomson/West 2005), p. 14; O'Donoghue and Padilla, [2013], p. 841. However, not all suppliers will be forced 
out of the market at the same time, as suppliers have different costs curves. The suppliers that will be forced to exit 
the market first would be those whose marginal cost curve is the highest. 
160 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro of 10 November 2005 in Judgment of 11 July in FENIN v 
Commission, C-205/03 P, EU:C:2005:666, para. 66. 
161 Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced 
Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 638. 
162 Carlton and Israel (2011), p. 129. 
163 Bundeskartellamt ‘Buyer Power in Competition Law - Status and Perspectives’ (2008), p. 2. 
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3.4 Bargaining power  
Bargaining power, or more strictly efficient bargaining power in opposition to inefficient 
monopsony power, is the “newer” approach to buyer power and should be the focus of buyer 
power economics and legal regulation.164As shown in this study, competition law cases dealt 
with in EU competition law (and even those not covered by it, such as imposing “unfair” 
purchasing conditions”) largely tend to be bargaining power cases because they do not involve 
demand withholding and instead transfer profit from suppliers to buyers through negotiations,165 
more specifically by, for example, threatening to purchase less,166 withdrawing a benefit,167 or 
shifting demand to another supplier.168 This allows the powerful buyer to obtain better conditions 
from its sellers than when compared to other buyers.169 
In this dissertation, I employ bargaining power170 as a concept that describes the strength in 
bilateral negotiations of a buyer vis-à-vis its supplier(s) that allows the purchaser to obtain better 
trading conditions and transfer supracompetitive profits from supplier to buyer, for example by 
receiving rebates or special preferential conditions.171 These better purchasing conditions include 
price and non-price terms,172 unlike monopsony power that only includes a reduction in 
purchasing price.173 
In turn, these lower purchasing prices may be passed on to final consumers – if the downstream 
market is competitive – who will benefit from the same or higher output with a lower price.174 
The more competitive the market downstream, the stronger the passing on effect to consumers 
                                                          
164 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 9. 
165 See also stressing this: Doyle and Inderst (2007), p. 211; Dobson and Inderst (2008), p. 338-341; OECD ‘Policy 
Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 21; Competition Commission, UK (2008), para. 9.2; Ezrachi 
and Williams (2013), p. 296. 
166 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 37. 
167 Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced 
Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 638-639; American Bar Association, [2012], p. 53-54. 
168 Ezrachi and De Jong (2012), p. 257-258. 
169 Kokkoris and Shelanski, [2014], p. 407. 
170 Bargaining power, if present, can be exercised by any of the parties entering into bilateral negotiations. Due to the 
nature of this dissertation, I will not discuss issues related to general bargaining theory or game theory that deal with 
sellers. 
171 Dobson and Inderst (2007), p. 393; Dobson [2009], p. 115-116; Buttà and Pezzoli (2014). 
172 Carlton, Coleman and Israel [2015], p. 533. 
173 See also adopting such an approach: American Antitrust Institute [2008], p. 99. 
174 “NCAs also agree that the exercise of buyer power can bring positive effects if competition among retailers exists 
in downstream markets and the lower purchasing costs achieved in procurement markets are passed to consumers in 
terms of lower prices.” in European Competition Network (2012), para 253; Competition Commission, UK (2008), 
para 36. Pera reaches the same conclusion when stating that “[NCAs] have tended to downplay the anti-competitive 
effects of buyer power, unless it is associated with market power on the selling side: absence of such a market power 
compels retailers to transfer to consumers the preferential conditions they have obtained” in Alberto Pera, 
‘Assessment of Buyer Power in Recent Investigations and Mergers’ (2010), available at: 
http://www.gop.it/doc_pubblicazioni/40_hjv4kr3vun_eng.pdf, p. 16. 
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is.175 Thus, prima facie, bargaining power is efficiency enhancing176 because it countervails or 
neutralizes seller market power driving prices closer to the competitive level, an effect firstly 
theorized by Galbraith.177 
Despite the ability to neutralize seller market power and generate efficiencies, not all exertions of 
bargaining power would be efficiency enhancing, particularly with regard to end consumers, as 
the passing on of the benefits in the form of lower purchasing prices depends on the 
competitiveness of the market where the buyer operates, particularly downstream,178 and the type 
of contract that buyers and suppliers enter into. As will be discussed and proven in the legal 
sections of this thesis, bargaining power can also be employed anti-competitively to exploit 
suppliers or exclude competitors and not benefit consumers.179 
Concerning the ways of exercising bargaining power, it is important to distinguish between two 
different forms of purchasing, depending on whether parties adopt a single or a two-part tariff or 
other type of complex contract, as the efficiency of these contracts and of bargaining power are 
different.180 For both of these different bargaining forms, I operate with the same assumptions: a 
market in which there is a single buyer negotiating with a single supplier, and where the buyer is 
a monopolist downstream. Both of these modalities of bargaining have in common that the 
purchasing price is lowered towards the competitive level and the buyer is able to extract profit 
that otherwise would stay with the supplier. 
In the first case, when parties adopt a linear contract (i.e.: only one form of pricing) the supplier 
will be incentivized to increase its selling price at a level above its marginal costs of production. 
On the other hand, the buyer will use its buyer bargaining power to decrease the purchasing price 
as close as possible to the supplier’s marginal cost and obtain the largest amount of the contract’s 
profit. As the prices for the goods are “pushed down” by the buyer towards the supplier’s 
marginal cost curve, buyer power is seen as beneficial because it reduces the prices closer to the 
competitive level. However, in this setting the outcome of the contract negotiation is not fully 
efficient as the buyer will seek to increase its prices, having an effect on the downstream prices 
                                                          
175 Dobson and Inderst (2008), 340. 
176 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 43; European Competition Network 
(2012), para. 73. 
177 The concept of countervailing power was first developed by Galbraith, in John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent 
Society & Other Writings 1952-1967: American Capitalism; The Great Crash, 1929; The Affluent Society; The New 
Industrial State. (The Library of America 2010), ps. 97-135. Some authors use the term countervailing power as 
synonym for bargaining power, see inter alia: Chen (2007); Kirkwood ‘Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement’ 
(2012); Kirkwood (2014). Galbraith’s idea of countervailing buyer power has become widely accepted wisdom by 
modern economists. For more, see Lester C. Thurow, Galbraith, John Kenneth, Vol. II (John Eatwell, Murray 
Milgate and Peter Newman eds, The MacMillan Press Limited 1987), p. 455. See also: Bradley J. Ruffle, Buyer 
Countervailing Power: A Survey of the Theory and Experimental Evidence (2005) 6, p. 6. 
178 Cf with Jacobson (2013). 
179 European Competition Network (2012), para. 73. American Antitrust Institute [2008], p. 103. 
180 See distinguishing the outcomes if there is single or two part tariff for bargaining power models: Chen (2007). 
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set by the buyer to end consumers. Therefore, as prices are set above the supplier’s marginal cost, 
there is a problem of double marginalization.181 Another problem with this model is that parties 
would be unable to offer rebates based on quantity, as the contract is linear. These inefficiencies 
are offset, however if the buyer has all the bargaining power and is able to reduce the wholesale 
purchasing price to the point where it intersects the supplier’s marginal cost. 
 
 
Figure 2: Bargaining Power - Linear Contract 
A better outcome within bargaining models would be the possibility of parties adopting a 
different strategy and entering into complex contracts employing a two-part tariff system in 
which parties agree to set the wholesale purchasing price at the marginal cost level. In a narrow 
approach, only this type of contracting between buyers and sellers would be fully efficient 
bargaining. As remarked by Chen, this type of contract is efficient because “the use of two-part 
tariffs allows the undertakings to eliminate the double-marginalization problem, and, thus, in 
equilibrium the manufacturer and each retailer will set the contract terms in such a way to 
maximize their joint profit”.182 In this case, what occurs is that after setting that wholesale price 
                                                          
181 See stressing that if contracts in buyer power are not complex (i.e.: not having two part tariff structures), then 
issues of double marginalization arise: Zhiqi Chen, Monopoly and Product Diversity: The Role of Retailer 
Countervailing Power (2006, revised version) 1, p. 10; Roman Inderst and Christian Wey, ‘Buyer Power and 
Supplier Incentives’ 51 European Economic Review (2007), p. 650. 




the parties to the contract will negotiate how profit will be distributed among them and the buyer 
uses its bargaining power to obtain a larger proportion of the share of the joint profits. Therefore, 
under this scenario bargaining power does not decrease the purchasing price paid, sensu stricto, 
like in the example of linear contracts, but indirectly allows for the parties to agree to a price that 
is the equivalent to the marginal cost. Therefore, incidentally it does achieve the most optimal 
price reduction possible from the supplier to the buyer.  
 
 
Figure 3: Bargaining Power – Two-Part Tariff Contract 
This type of bargaining power is fully efficient when compared to the case of linear pricing 
contracts because it eliminates the double marginalization issue as the purchasing price is fixed at 
the marginal cost and neither the supplier nor the buyer increase their prices upstream and 
downstream, respectively, to cover that price increase. Furthermore, two-part tariff bargaining 
models allow for the parties to concede rebates, for example based on quantity, or other types of 
non-price concessions. 
Additionally, my research shows that bargaining power arises only if sellers are reaping 
supracompetitive benefits (in the form of higher prices than the competitive level).183 In the 
absence of seller market power, the buyer would not be able to pressure its suppliers to price 
lower and closer to the competitive market price.184 Hence, bargaining power acts as 
                                                          
183 Similarly, Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for 
Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 639. 
184 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 26 and 43; Kirkwood (2014), p. 58. 
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countervailing power185 offsetting in whole or in part sellers’ market power and leading to a 
competitive or quasi competitive outcome of setting prices,186 by forcing or agreeing with 
suppliers to set wholesale prices as close or at their marginal costs. According to Galbraith’s 
theory and as recently confirmed by Johansen, countervailing power arises naturally among 
suppliers and buyers as a self-generating force that keeps opposed market power in check for 
both buyers and suppliers by neutralizing it,187 without the need for government intervention.188  
Lastly, bargaining power is a dynamic concept in the sense that its intensity varies from moment 
to moment and contract to contract. A buying undertaking may enjoy a large degree of bargaining 
power for example when there is plenty of supply for a good due to excess production in the 
upstream market. For example, this would be the case for a good year for the production of wheat 
to produce durum for pasta.189 In such a situation, the buyer can argue that they have several 
alternative suppliers and there is plenty of wheat to be acquired and hence demand a lower 
purchasing price. However, the bargaining power of the same buyer when compared to the same 
seller can drastically change, for example, due to poor climate or a disease that has abnormally 
and unforeseeingly affected the production of wheat. The buyer that a few months ago enjoyed 
substantial buyer power now has very little, as it is the seller who will be able to choose its buyer 
due to scarcity. This dynamic feature of bargaining power is particularly important when 
discussing the imposition of unfair trade practices in chapter 9 of this dissertation.  
3.4.1 Distinguishing bargaining power from monopsony 
Bargaining power differs from monopsony power in several important factors, despite they both 
represent different purchasing modalities that lower the prices paid by a buyer for their input. 
Firstly, bargaining power benefits do not imply a withholding effect as monopsony does. Instead, 
the benefits are achieved by seeking individual discounts based on negotiation strategies, as 
remarked by Inderst and Doyle.190 Indeed, bargaining power incentivizes the buyer to acquire 
more units if it is able to lower its purchasing price increasing output. Furthermore, unlike in the 
                                                          
185 Galbraith, [2010], p. 97-135. Some authors use the term countervailing power as synonym for bargaining power, 
see inter alia: Chen ‘Buyer power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy’ (2007); Kirkwood ‘Powerful Buyers and 
Merger Enforcement’ (2012); Kirkwood (2014). 
186 Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:413, para. 32; Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should 
Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 
640; OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 21; Kirkwood ‘Powerful Buyers and 
Merger Enforcement’ (2012), p. 1494. 
187 Bjørn Olav Johansen, Buyer Power, Welfare and Public Policy (University of Bergen 2012), p. 3. 
188 Galbraith, [2010], p. 99; Brian Facey and Cassandra Brown, Competition and Antitrust Laws in Canada (Lexis 
Nexis 2013), p. 250. 
189 This example is inspired on the US case National Macaroni Manufacturers Association v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 345 F2.d 421 (7th Cir. 1965). 
190 Doyle and Inderst (2007), p. 212; also similarly American Bar Association, [2012], p. 53-54. 
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monopsony effect, these better terms or conditions will only improve the competitive conditions 
of the specific buyer while not affecting prices market-wide.191  
Secondly, exercising bargaining power, unlike monopsony power, does not imply that the buyer 
becomes a price maker.192 The price is “bargained” between supplier and seller by entering into 
negotiations between buyer and seller, and not in anonymous deals, as remarked by Ezrachi and 
De Jong.193  
Thirdly, bargaining power exercise does not always imply that the buyer forces suppliers to price 
below competitive levels as monopsony does.194 As prices are still somewhat profitable, buyers 
are able to exercise bargaining power more often than monopsony power without squeezing 
suppliers out of the market.195 
Fourthly, unlike monopsony, in bargaining power cases there is likely to be more than one buyer, 
although in these situations there may be relatively few firms negotiating, whereby some of these 
may be relatively large compared to their rivals and enjoy a larger market share.196 
Lastly, unlike monopsony, parties will only trade if their outside option (i.e. buying from a 
different supplier or starting self-supply) is less profitable.197 Consequently, alternative sources of 
supply, as explained below, act as a competitive constraint to the seller, forcing them to offer 
equal or better terms to the buyer than those offered its competitors.  
3.4.2 Sources of bargaining power 
Unlike monopsony, there is no standard microeconomic model for bargaining power, as this 
effect can be the result of several circumstances and takes place in negotiation situations. 
However, it is common for academic literature to propose specialized models pertaining to 
particular industries and even social situations.198 These models offer different frameworks for 
                                                          
191 Supporting this view that bargaining power leads to individualized discounts see: European Commission and 
others (2000), p. 3; Doyle and Inderst (2007), p. 212; OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ 
(2009), p. 37. See also claiming that generally bargaining power has effect only vis-à-vis the involved parties van 
Doorn, 97; Ezrachi and De Jong (2012). 
192 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 21-26. 
193 Ezrachi and De Jong (2012), p. 257. 
194 Kirkwood ‘Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement’ (2012), p. 1494. 
195 Kirkwood (2014), p. 7. 
196 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 37. 
197 Doyle and Inderst (2007), p. 212. 
198 For an example of bargaining power models see, inter alia: K. Kultti, ‘About Bargaining Power’ 69 Econ Lett 
(2000) 341; R. Inderst, ‘Contract Design and Bargaining Power’ 74 Econ Lett (2002) 171; L. P. Osterdal, 
‘Bargaining Power in Repeated Games’ 49 Math Soc Sci (2005) 110; Doyle and Inderst (2007), p. 211-213; OECD 
‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 37 to 39; Meza and Sudhir (2010); Shinn-Shyr Wang, 
Christian Rojas and Nathalie Lavoie, ‘Buyer Market Power and Vertically Differentiated Retailers’ (2010) 
<http://people.umass.edu/resec/workingpapers/documents/ResEcWorkingPaper2010-1.pdf> 1 available at: 
http://people.umass.edu/resec/workingpapers/documents/ResEcWorkingPaper2010-1.pdf, lastly visited on 




explaining how buyers and sellers split the surplus generated from the purchase of goods or 
services.199 In all these frameworks there is a constant: the more bargaining power the buyer is 
capable of exercising vis-à-vis the seller, the larger the surplus it will obtain for itself.200  
The ability to exercise bargaining power is anchored on the existence of sufficient sources that 
allow the buyer to exert competitive pressure on suppliers. In this section, I identify four sources 
of the bargaining power201 that serve as indicators for competition authorities and judges when 
evaluating a case to determine the existence and extent of bargaining power.202 These sources of 
bargaining power are strongly connected with the assessment of buyer market power, as 
discussed in chapter 6, section 6.4 of this dissertation. 
3.4.2.1 Buyer’s size 
In principle, the larger a buyer is – and consequently the more market share it has – the more 
bargaining power it will have. However, as pointed out by Dobson and Inderst, size alone may 
not necessarily imply the existence of bargaining power,203 particularly if the other side of the 
market is highly concentrated or other bargaining power sources are absent. Nevertheless, market 
size – absolute and relative204 – acts as a good proxy for enforcement agencies, as the sheer size 
of an undertaking has negotiation importance.205 However, bargaining power may also exist even 
if market shares are small because other sources, such as the degree of dependency and 
competition among suppliers grant bargaining power to the buyer.206 
There are several reasons why large market shares indicate the possibility of existence of 
bargaining power. Firstly, as stressed by Dobson and Inderst, the larger the market size, the more 
credible the threat of switching suppliers is.207 In principle, and depending on the nature of the 
good purchased, the larger the buyer, the cheaper the switching costs per unit will be, and the 
greater the incentives to invest in seeking potential suppliers.208 Secondly, if a buyer is large 
                                                          
199 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 38. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid, p. 39. Also suggesting that buyer power has several sources, including market concentration, high barriers to 
entry and strong cooperative alliances among buyers in European Competition Network (2012), para. 253. 
202 In Czech Republic, according to the Article 3(2) of Act No. 395/2009 of 9 September 2009 on Significant Market 
Power in the Sale of Agricultural and Food Products and Abuse thereof ‘significant market power’ (bargaining 
power) is said to originate from the following sources: “market structure, barriers to entry, market share of the 
supplier and the buyer, their financial power, size of the customer’s business network, and size and location of their 
individual stores”. 
203 Pierpaolo Battigalli, Chiara Fumagalli and Michele Polo, ‘Buyer power and quality improvements’ 61 Research 
in Economics (2007) 45, p. 47; Dobson and Inderst (2008), p. 339. 
204 Ezrachi and De Jong (2012), p. 257; UK (2008), para. 96. 
205 Doyle and Inderst (2007), p. 213; Dobson and Inderst (2008), p. 339. 
206 Henriksson, Countervailing Buyer Power in EU Antitrust Analysis. 
207 Dobson and Inderst (2007), p. 395. Supporting this view, see: OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer 
Power’ (2009), p. 40. 
208 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 40. 
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enough it can sponsor entry of suppliers into the market,209 as has been recognized by 
Commission in Enso/Stora.210 Thirdly, a large buyer may represent a large portion of the total 
sales of a supplier.211 This proportion of sales allows the determination of whether a supplier is in 
a dependent situation vis-à-vis the buyer and, hence, prone to give larger discounts.212 The larger 
the quota the buyer represents for the supplier, the more it will be willing to give larger discounts 
to avoid losing the buyer as a client and reducing its profits.213 Fourthly, large market shares may 
also be an indicator of lack of alternative sources of demand and, therefore, increased bargaining 
power. 
However, mere size is not a credible source of bargaining power, as confirmed in AstraZeneca v 
Commission.214 A buyer may have a large market share but little or no bargaining power if the 
supplier has alternative sources of demand or enjoys more bargaining power. In AstraZeneca v 
Commission, the position of the German state as a buyer of medicines for public healthcare 
systems had no real bargaining power with which to neutralize the imposition of very high prices 
for particularly advance medicines as the demand curve was highly inelastic. The CJEU found 
that despite the fact that the buyer was a “monopsonist” (rectius, large buyer) the costs of 
medicines were inelastic because they were paid by the MS and products were innovative and a 
“must stock”.215 Thus, size and market shares are a mere indication of bargaining power but not a 
definitive answer. 
3.4.2.2 Alternative sources of supply 
The more supply options, the more bargaining power a buyer has. Alternative sources of supply 
would be those undertakings that are not engaged by the buyer and have spare capacity to sell the 
input required in the market; i.e. other sellers offering the same goods. Each supplier acts as a 
competitive constraint – supply side substitution – to its competitors for the capture of demand. 
The more competition and number of suppliers there is, the better off the buyer will be vis-à-vis 
the sellers.216 Indeed, if there are few alternative sources of supply there will be little supply side 
substitutability and the buyer will be mutually dependent on the seller.  
                                                          
209 Dobson and Inderst (2007), p. 395; OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 40. 
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3.4.2.3  Alternative sources of demand 
The reverse of supply side substitutability is represented by demand side substitutability, this is, 
the amount of buyers competing for the input. The more buyers compete, the less bargaining 
power they will have, as suppliers have alternative buyers to resort to in case the offer made by a 
powerful buyer is not sufficiently profitable. Therefore, the more competitive the upstream 
market is, the less bargaining power a single undertaking has. However, if a buyer has substantial 
market power downstream because it faces little competition from other buyers then it will have 
more bargaining power.217 Therefore, downstream conditions also play a role when determining 
the existence of substantial bargaining power. 
3.4.2.4 Bargaining effectiveness 
Lastly, the buyer’s bargaining effectiveness is a source of bargaining power.218 The OECD 
defines bargaining as referring to the ability to extract a larger share of the incremental surplus 
due to specific negotiation strategies or characteristics of the buyer.219 For example, if the buyer 
is not financially constrained and has enough input in stock, diminishing the urgency of acquiring 
goods or services, then it will have more bargaining power. Also, the amount of market 
information that the buyer has increases its bargaining power, particularly in terms of asymmetric 
information possessed by suppliers.220 This information will allow the buyer to accurately 
determine their other supply options and, thus, be less constrained by their current negotiation 
partner. 
3.5 Direct Buyer power effects 
In this section, I present the direct welfare effects of monopsony and bargaining power in price 
and non-price terms, largely based on the assumption that the buyer competes with the same rival 
in the upstream as buyers and the downstream market as retailers. By direct buyer power effects, 
I mean those that take place between the buyer and its direct supplier and the buyer (as retailer) 
and its direct end consumers. Regarding the direct market effects, if they only compete in the 
upstream market then the effects of buyer power on the downstream market vis-à-vis those rival 
buyers would have to be determined based on and influenced directly by the pure upstream 
effects. More often than not, however, buyers compete with the same rivals both in the input and 
output market, which explains why the focus of this section and literature is on the overall effect 
of buyer power in upstream and downstream market power. Also, if buyer power affects 
downstream competitive conditions – in addition to generating competition effects among 
                                                          
217 Ibid, p. 41. 
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suppliers and buyers – it will have a direct welfare effect on consumer welfare, which also 
explains why the competitive concern of NCAs and Courts is also triggered when buyer power 
adversely affects consumer welfare, as discussed in this thesis. 
Linked to this, it must be stressed that buyer power conducts have a dual effect in the upstream 
and downstream market, which requires a dualistic approach to the analysis of buyer power 
cases, in order to avoid under enforcement of the competition rules. These welfare effects of the 
expressions of buyer power pave the way for the legal discussion regarding the treatment of 
buyer power and suggestions towards a buyer competition policy in EU competition law.  
3.5.1 Monopsony effects 
Monopsony power is always inefficient because the withholding effect generates a deadweight 
loss and loss of allocative efficiency.221 Also, the consequences in price terms for the final 
consumer are almost always inefficient because either the prices increase or remain unchanged, 
while never decreasing. In the following sections, I discuss the price and non-price effects of 
monopsony power. 
Most of the monopsony models assume the use of a single-price strategy, as noted by Noll.222 
Whenever a buyer exercises monopsony power, it withholds demand by purchasing less goods,223 
consequently, employing less resources than in a competitive condition.224 Withholding demand 
implies a reduction in allocative efficiency and a deadweight loss, as recognized by the EU 
Commission in Friesland Foods/Campina.225 This inefficient outcome holds true even if the 
monopsonist faces perfect competition downstream.226 In so doing, the monopsonist transfers 
wealth from the suppliers to itself but does not generate wealth.227 Additionally, due to the 
purchasing of less input, the amount of downstream goods will also be reduced, unless other 
                                                          
221 Chen ‘Buyer power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy’ (2007), p. 22; Kirkwood, also of this opinion 
proposes that cartels that counteract monopsony power should be allowed in US antitrust law because “[i]f the 
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market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.5046 — Friesland Foods/Campina) [2009] OJ C 
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(2007), p. 22; Ezrachi and De Jong (2012), p. 257; Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 80-81.  
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perfect substitutes exist.228 This scarcity of goods pushes the retail price up for the final 
consumers, unless there is compensation in supply by other buyers/retailers, as noted by van 
Doorn.229 
If instead of a linear tariff the monopsonist employs a two-part tariff, the negative welfare effects 
of monopsony power can be minimized, thereby reducing the welfare loss and allocative 
efficiency. To do so, Chen claims that parties ought to set non-linear pricing schemes (i.e. two-
part tariffs or price discrimination) “to capture the lost profit opportunity embedded in the 
deadweight loss”.230  
In the case of an oligopsony, the welfare loss is said to be less than it is with a single monopsonist 
as “the final price is lower and the purchase price is higher […] [c]orrespondingly, both profits 
and the welfare loss are lower”, as remarked by Neumann.231 The reason behind this slightly 
weaker negative effect is that there will be some degree of competition among the oligopsonists, 
particularly those not part of the collusive agreement.232 However, if the oligopsony is the result 
of collusive monopsony, the effects will be as if they were a single monopsonist since buyers will 
coordinate to restrict purchases and lower prices.233  
This less pernicious impact does not imply that competition policy should see oligopsony 
outcomes as desirable. Agreements among buyers tending to reduce purchasing quantities and 
consequently price ought to be forbidden as object restrictions of competition in accordance with 
Article 101(1)(a), and as discussed in chapter 8 of this thesis.  
In addition to the negative welfare effects produced by the monopsony exercise, its impact will 
depend on the market power of the undertaking in the upstream and downstream markets. If the 
undertaking has substantial market power not only as a buyer but also as a seller, a situation that 
I describe as the hourglass shape, the pernicious effects of monopsony are increased because 
there is higher likelihood of competitive harm for suppliers, rival buyers and end consumers. If 
the monopsonist lacks downstream market power then the competitive effects are circumscribed 
only to the upstream market (in the short term) affecting suppliers and rival buyers. In the 
following, I discuss these competitive effects and concerns. 
                                                          
228 Noll (2004-2005), p. 596-597. 
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231 Neumann, [2001], p. 155. This assumes, however, that that parties coordinate their behavior, but the same 
outcome – or slightly similar – holds even in the absence of coordination. 
232 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 31. 
233 Office of Fair Trading ‘Research Paper 16: The Welfare Consequences of the Exercise of Buyer Power’ (1998), 
p. 13; Commission and others (2000), p. 10. 
58 
 
3.5.1.1  Monopsonist with upstream and downstream market power 
If the monopsonist also has substantial market power downstream, in addition to the inefficient 
outcome generated by monopsony power itself, prices in the downstream market for final 
consumers will be in addition higher as the undertaking will also raise selling prices above the 
competitive level for the output price obtaining both monopsony and monopoly profits.234 When 
the monopsonist is also a monopolist it is known as a monemporist.235 
This dual competitive harm happens because by having market power upstream and downstream, 
its output level will be determined by its marginal costs. Hence, to reduce its marginal costs it 
will buy less units and, therefore, will also sell less units in the downstream market but at an even 
higher price, due to the lack of competition.236  
This argument was firstly raised by the Commission, when stating that, “if selling power is 
present in the downstream market, buyer power may be a means of strategically enhancing the 
former, with potentially adverse welfare effects”,237 and reiterated in the concentration 
assessment of Rewe/Meinl when holding that: 
The exercise of buyer power which leads to the securing of more favourable purchase deal is not 
to be considered per se detrimental to the economy as a whole. Especially where the supplier side 
is itself highly concentrated and powerful, buyers are faced with effective competition in their 
own selling market and hence are compelled to pass on any savings to their own customers, buyer 
power can prevent monopoly or oligopoly profits from being earned on the supply side. However, 
if the powerful buyer himself occupies in his selling market a strong position which is no longer 
kept sufficiently in check by the competition, any savings can no longer be expected to be passed 
on to customers.238 
Also, the literature has recognized these pernicious effects, such as, for instance, O’Donoghue 
and Padilla, who argue that when the dominant buyer “also has power as a seller in the output 
market […], it may be able to increase sale prices”239 and there will be a “double reduction in the 
                                                          
234 See calling this phenomenon in overbuying cases “dual market power” Keith N. Hylton, Weyerhaeuser, 
Predatory Bidding, and Error Costs (2008), p. 1. See also: Neumann, [2001], p. 155; Werden (2007), p. 711; 
O'Donoghue and Padilla, [2013] 845, p. 845; Buttà and Pezzoli (2014), p. 161. 
235 The term ‘monemporist’ was firstly coined by Nicholls in 1941 in William H. Nicholls, A Theoretical Analysis of 
Imperfect Competition with Special Application to the Agricultural Industries (Iowa State College Press 1941); 
OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009) p. 30-31. In the case of a monemporist, the 
reduction in purchasing quantity will be even lower than in the case of a monopsonist. This is explained due to its 
profit maximizing function and its marginal costs downstream. In the downstream market, the monopsonist with 
substantial market power will find it more profitable to reduce the quantity of sales even further because its marginal 
costs are higher than they would be if it were not a monopolist, and higher than of a competitive firm. 
236 Ezrachi and De Jong (2012). 
237 Commission and others (2000), p. 33. 
238 Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 71 (emphasis added).  
239 O'Donoghue and Padilla, [2013]. 
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final supply, in which case the welfare effect is, unsurprisingly, worse than if only one of either 
monopoly or monopsony existed.”240  
The undertaking, then, acts as an hourglass that extracts additional profits from both the upstream 
suppliers and downstream consumers, leading to an inefficient outcome from both a consumer 
and a total welfare perspective.241 Hence, the monopsonist not only generates an inefficient 
outcome upstream by reducing quantity in the upstream market but can also raise the selling price 
of the output vis-à-vis final consumer by further reducing output. The closer the monopsonist is 
to become a monopolist, the worse the welfare effect.242 Therefore, and also in line with 
Jacobson’s view, the most competition concern should be placed on those monopsonists that fit 
the hourglass shape.243 
The hourglass shape concept and the idea of this double anti-competitive concern is illustrated in 
the graph below. 
  
                                                          
240 Ibid, p. 845. 
241 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 30-31. Also supporting this, see: Tribunal 
Vasco de la Competencia (April 2009), p. 138. 
242 Office of Fair Trading ‘Research Paper 16: The Welfare Consequences of the Exercise of Buyer Power’ (1998), 
p. 12-13; European Commission and others (2000), p. 8-9. 
243 “Importantly, the Weyerhaeuser Court’s heightened standard appears to favor the monopsonist about which we 







This dual concern when a monopsonist enjoys both market power upstream and downstream 
seems to have been taken into account or reflected by the Courts as a factor that has the potential 
to increase the anticompetiveness of a buyer’s conduct buyer power cases in general, particularly 
in cases dealing with buyer power leverage, as occurred in British Airways v Commission,244 or in 
the US antitrust case of Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Ore. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., later 
on decided by the US supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber 
Co., Inc.245 Furthermore, the dual competitive risk posed by an hourglass shaped undertaking has 
been recognized in soft law instruments issued by the Commission where the main concern 
seems to be placed on the wellbeing of end consumers.246 
                                                          
244 In section 3.5.2 of this shame chapter I discuss the hourglass shape effects for bargaining power cases. 
245 Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Ore. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F. 3d 1030, 10 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Weyerhaeuser Company, v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc., in 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007). I discuss in 
detail this case in chapter 7, section 7.4. 
246 See for instance the Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements when stating: “[…] If downstream competitors 
purchase a significant part of their products together, their incentives for price competition on the selling market or 












Figure 4: Hourglass Shape, Isolation's Supermarket 
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This proposal of the hourglass shape undertaking is based on certain assumptions. Firstly, I 
assume that there is ratio 1:1 between the purchases in the upstream market and the sales in the 
downstream market, as the demand for the input is directly derived from the consumer demand 
for the output.247 For example, such as when a supermarket buys 1,000 liters of processed milk to 
sell in the food retailing market the same 1,000 liters of processed milk to end consumers.248 
Secondly, I am assuming that for the hourglass undertaking there is no profit-maximizing rational 
behavior other than not passing on the benefits to downstream consumers and receiving the 
monopsony profit. 
The hourglass shape explains why certain conducts that appear irrational for a buyer may occur in 
practice; for instance, the case of predatory buying. If the undertaking not only enjoys substantial 
upstream but also downstream market power, it may incur a loss by paying more than it needs to 
secure input and foreclose rival buyers because it will recoup its loss by increasing retailing 
prices in the downstream market vis-à-vis end consumers,249 or by exercising monopsony in the 
upstream market once other buyers have exited the market.  
A counterargument against the exercise of monopsony and downstream market power is that an 
undertaking with downstream market power will be incentivized not to lower its purchases but 
instead increase them.250 The problem with this argument is that, under the assumptions of a 
monopsony model, it would not hold because the supplier’s marginal cost curve is always upward 
sloping. Therefore, the more units the buyer acquires, the higher the price it would have to pay. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
market or markets, the lower purchase prices achieved by the joint purchasing arrangement are likely not to be 
passed on to consumers”, Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 
201 (emphasis added). Similarly, the hourglass shape problem was raised by the Commission in the previous 
horizontal cooperation guidelines when stating: “[…] lower purchasing costs resulting from the exercise of buying 
power cannot be seen as pro-competitive, if the purchasers together have power on the selling markets. In this case, 
the cost savings are probably not passed on to consumers”, in Commission Notice Guidelines on the applicability of 
Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation Agreements (2001/C 3/02), (OJ C 3/2 6.1.2001), para. 127. See 
also Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 194. 
247 Blair and Sokol (2012), p. 488. 
248 See the concern of the Commission related to the supermarket sector in: European Competition Network (2012); 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Food prices in Europe”, (2008) COM(2008) 821 final, available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0821:FIN:EN:PDF. In a Nordic perspective, see 
the concern due to the growing market concentration in the food retailing sector in Scandinavia and the Nordic 
Countries in the Faroese Danish, Finnish, Greenlandic, Icelandic, Norwegian and Swedish Competition Authorities, 
Nordic Food Markets - A Taste for Competition (2005): 
http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/iKnowBase/Content/392450/NORDIC_FOOD_MARKETS.PDF. Also, the 
extinct UK Competition Commission published a report on supermarket retailing where one of the main issues was 
“the examination of circumstances when oligopolistic firms hold both buyer and seller power ([…]” in the 
Competition Commission, UK (2000). See also Dobson [2009]. Another example that the literature recognizes as a 
situation where the undertaking has monopsony power upstream and monopoly power downstream is that of health 
insurers in Hyman and Kovacic (2004), p. 25-28. 
249 Jacobson (2013), p. 9. I would like to thank Bruno Jullien for his comments regarding this argument. 
250 My attention to this argument was drawn by Albert Sánchez Graells, for which I thank him. 
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Hence, such an argument would be valid in cases where the supplier curve is flat or downward 
slopping such as cases of bargaining power that do not involve demand withholding to reduce the 
purchasing price, but not monopsony cases. 
3.5.1.2 Monopsony and no substantial market power downstream 
However, if the monopsonist has no substantial market power in the downstream market, then the 
harmful effects of monopsony power are mitigated or sometimes eliminated in terms of price and 
final quantity available for end consumers.251 Yet, the upstream competitive harm vis-à-vis 
suppliers and other possible buyers remains, in the form of profit distribution, as well as the loss 
of allocative efficiency.252 This would also have an adverse impact for end consumers in the 
downstream market because competition upstream would be weakened, leading to issues of 
dynamic inefficiency in the medium to long term. 
As the monopsony conduct implies a demand withholding this means that there will be less 
output of the good available for end consumers than there previously was, which may lead to an 
increase in price and loss of allocative welfare. However, if there are other buyers that can sell 
readily available substitutes for the monopsonized input in the downstream markets, these units 
sold of substitute goods/services will replace the quantities lost due to the monopsony effect.253 
These additional purchases may be the consequence of the lower market prices caused by the 
monopsony effect, which also benefit other buyers, as noted by Salop.254 If the substitution is not 
perfect, the inefficient outcome will not be precluded but minimized because some end 
consumers are not satisfied.  
If the compensation for the withheld units takes place, then it is possible to say that the 
downstream market price will not be affected because, as stressed by Areeda, Hovenkamp and 
Solow, “if the monopsonist resells in a competitive market, price and output in the output market 
will be unaffected by the exercise of monopsony power.”255 This happens, for example, in the 
case of local input markets characterized by a single buyer but where the downstream market is 
broader and national or regional.256 Consequently, in a perfect competition model, the 
monopsonist has to reduce its selling prices to the competitive level in order to not lose all of its 
                                                          
251 Also stressing that when a monopsonist has no market power downstream, the negative consequences are less 
and, thus, should not be prohibited “per se” see Robles Martín-Laborda. 
252 Jacobson (2013). 
253 Ibid, p. 2-3. 
254 Salop (2004-2005), p. 673. 
255 Areeda, Hovenkamp and Solow, [1995], Volume IIB, ¶501, p. 109. Also remarking that absent downstream 
market power, monopsony exertion does not affect price downstream see: Ezrachi and De Jong, who claim that in 
such a situation, “the market for the output is competitive, the presence of a monopsony upstream is not likely to 
affect the price, since the monopsony is a ‘price taker’”, Ezrachi and De Jong (2012), p. 257. See also: Office of Fair 
Trading ‘Research Paper 16: The Welfare Consequences of the Exercise of Buyer Power’ (1998), para. 4.13; Marius 
Schwartz, ‘Should Antitrust Assess Buyer Market Power Differently than Seller Market Power?’ (DOJ/FTC 
Workshop on Merger Enforcement), 1, p. 2; Oinonen (2014), p. 100. 
256 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 28. 
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sales to other more efficient sellers. However, this does not imply any additional benefits for 
consumers, just the standard competitive outcome.257 
This moderate view regarding the limited effects of monopsony power, should there be no 
downstream competition, has been directly addressed by Advocate General General Poiares 
Maduro, in arguing that:  
Thus, where a purchase is linked to the performance of non-economic functions, it may fall 
outside the scope of competition law. That conclusion is consistent with the economic theory 
according to which the existence of a monopsony does not pose a serious threat to competition 
since it does not necessarily have any effect on the downstream market.258 
However, these claims should not be interpreted as though there is no competitive harm and, 
consequently, a lenient approach to monopsony is under-inclusive.259 It may not produce short 
term consumer harm, but if a broader perspective to buyer power is employed then there is still 
upstream consumer harm (and total welfare diminishment) pursuant to the inefficient use of 
resources and loss of allocative efficiency.260 Furthermore, if there are no substitutes or no other 
buyers that acquire the same input, the scarcity produced by the demand withholding will 
naturally push output prices upwards in the downstream market, compared to a non-
monopsonistic upstream market. However, this upward pricing pressure is not set by the 
monopsonist but by the competitive market itself.  
3.5.2 Bargaining power effects 
Unlike monopsony power, the economic effects of bargaining power tend to be welfare 
enhancing as they have a tendency to increase economic efficiency, improve supply conditions, 
reduce prices for end consumers, neutralize seller market power and increase welfare from both a 
consumer and total welfare perspective.261 However, bargaining power may also be detrimental 
for society, particularly but not exclusively, if the powerful buyer also has substantial market 
power downstream – as in the hourglass shape – as it will not be forced to pass on the benefits of 
its bargaining power to consumers in the form of lower purchasing prices, or if the bargaining 
power is used to exclude rival buyers and/or exploit suppliers. Consequently, it is not possible to 
                                                          
257 Chen ‘Buyer power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy’ (2007), p. 28. 
258 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro of 10 November 2005 in Judgment of 11 July in FENIN v 
Commission, C-205/03 P, EU:C:2005:666, para. 66 (emphasis added). 
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(2014), p. 57, footnote 264. 
261 For such a generalized view on the pro-competitiveness of bargaining power see, inter alia: Bundeskartellamt 
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offer a clear-cut picture regarding bargaining power effects, although it is possible to offer some 
guidance to be employed on a case-by-case assessment.262  
Furthermore, and as discussed in section 3.4, the efficiency and the way that purchasing prices 
are reduced by means of bargaining power depends on the type of contract entered into by the 
parties. However, in this section, I discuss the potential beneficial and negative effects of 
bargaining power from a general perspective and conclude that, by and large, bargaining power 
is usually beneficial from a welfare perspective, particularly for end consumers if the price 
reductions are passed on owing to competitiveness in the markets. Nevertheless, a disclaimer 
must be made. Bargaining models and their effects are highly dependent on the assumptions 
made, including the type of contract at hand, the market structure, and other case-specific 
considerations. Therefore, any effort to present bargaining power effects in general, as I do in this 
section, is ambitious due to its scope, and should be understood as a guiding reference and not as 
a case-specific answer to each situation due to the sensitivity of bargaining power to the facts of 
the case. 
From a price perspective, bargaining power can potentially benefit players in the upstream and 
downstream market by increasing efficiencies and maximizing profit.263 However, occasionally 
bargaining power can be limited to a transfer of wealth from suppliers to buyers, exploitative or 
not, for instance by the imposition of unfair trading practices,264 or may lead to a situation in 
which consumers are worse off, should the powerful buyer have market power downstream.  
3.5.2.1 Buyer with bargaining power and facing a downstream competitive market 
If the buyer enjoys bargaining power but faces a competitive market downstream, this would 
maximize the bargaining power’s welfare enhancing effects. In the upstream market, bargaining 
power countervails supplier’s market power by pushing prices to the competitive level and 
neutralizing the suppliers’ market power. In so doing, the supracompetitive benefits are no longer 
kept by the supplier and are transferred to the buyer, whom, in the downstream market, must pass 
them on to end consumers in the form of lower end consumer prices due to the competitive 
constraint of other rival retailers. In principle, this reduction in purchasing price is individual, as 
pointed out by Dobson and Chakraborty (i.e. it only benefits the buyer and its own end 
customers).265 However, a spillover effect (the antiwaterbed effect) may mean that the reduction 
in purchasing price obtained by the powerful buyer may also benefit other buyers as discussed 
infra.  
                                                          
262 Ezrachi and De Jong (2012), p. 258. 
263 Also suggesting the generally efficiency enhancing nature and effects of the exercise of bargaining power see: UK 
(2008), para 9.4 
264 European Commission Tackling Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business food supply chain, 
Strasbourg (2014), p. 2. 
265 Dobson and Chakraborty (2008), p. 343. 
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In the downstream market, the price reduction derived from the bargaining power will be passed 
on to the final consumer due to competitive pressure exerted by rival retailers.266 Consequently, 
when the downstream market is competitive there is less room for anti-competitive harm 
concerning bargaining power exertion, as remarked upon by the Commission’s Guidelines on 
Vertical Restraints when dealing with exclusive supply,267 and as also noted by Korah and 
O’Sullivan.268 As such, the powerful buyer acts as an agent for end consumers vis-à-vis suppliers 
in the attainment of lower prices and improved quality.269 Unlike the upstream market, the lower 
prices benefit not only the buyer’s end customers but all end customers as the reduction in price 
will spur competition among retailers encouraging efficient practices, innovation and 
improvement in the quality of the goods and/or services offered.270 
3.5.2.2 Buyer with bargaining power and downstream market power  
This constitutes the scenario where bargaining power may trigger the most serious competition 
concerns as its exertion may generate anti-competitive effects without the passing on of the 
benefits. Bargaining power exercised by an hourglass shaped undertaking, a concept discussed in 
section 3.5.1.1, may lead to anti-competitive outcomes both in the upstream and downstream 
market,271 because this hourglass undertaking may employ aggressive tactics as a buyer and as a 
seller,272 which Kirkwood denominates a “self-reinforcing circle”.273  
In the downstream market, due to the lack of competition, the buyer is not forced to pass on the 
profit re-distribution from the supplier to the buyer to its end consumers and it would be able to 
                                                          
266 See also, supporting this view in the short term, the report prepared by the Spanish NCA and discussed in 
European Competition Network (2012), para. 254; Dobson and Inderst (2007), p. 393; Dobson and Chakraborty 
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271 Chen ‘Buyer power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy’ (2007), p. 36. 
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whenever the buyer has downstream market power: Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should 
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retain the wealth transfer between the supplier to the buyer, in a two-part tariff contract.274 In a 
linear tariff model, the buyer, even if a downstream monopolist will have to pass on some sort of 
price reduction to end consumers, although not all of it. Additionally, the powerful buyer will be 
able to discriminate in “favour of its own downstream operations and against potential 
downstream competitors” by leveraging market power from the input market to the downstream 
market, analogous to a price squeeze.275  
Furthermore, the powerful buyer may leverage its privileged downstream position vis-à-vis its 
suppliers, as it may sometimes act as a necessary trading partner or distribution vehicle that 
suppliers depend on to reach end consumers.276 This allows the buyer to extract other rents and 
privileges from suppliers, such as imposing unfair purchasing practices.277  
Additionally, Chen remarks that if the market is oligopsonistic, buyers may find profitable to “to 
raise the purchase prices they pay the suppliers and extract profits from the suppliers in the form 
of lump-sum payments” leading to a general increase in retail prices in the market as a whole.278  
In the upstream market, an hourglass shaped undertaking may abuse its bargaining power to 
stifle competition in the upstream and/or downstream market by excluding rivals buyers that may 
also compete as retailers.279 In so doing, the undertaking will increase its rivals’ costs to foreclose 
competitors280 by, for example, leveraging its market power upstream to protect, strengthen or 
enhance its market position downstream, as discussed in British Airways v Commission.281 
Foreclosure may happen in several ways, for example by entering into predatory overbuying,282 
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275 Christopher Bellamy, Graham D. Child and P. M. Roth, European Community Law of Competition (Sweet & 
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securing supply from the most efficient suppliers through exclusive purchasing agreements,283 or 
by imposing exclusive dealing clauses vis-à-vis suppliers or raising entry or exit barriers for other 
buyers. These conducts with foreclosure effects are discussed at length in chapter 7. 
3.6 Indirect buyer power effects 
In this section, I discuss buyer power effects that go beyond the pure buyer-supplier-end 
consumer price effects of monopsony and bargaining power by looking at what the consequences 
of buyer power on the competitive conditions and third parties from a more dynamic perspective 
are. In particular, I deal with the waterbed and antiwaterbed effects, investment and innovation, 
quality and increased concentration and decreased variety. For all these cases, the discussion is 
centered around bargaining power, as, for the case of monopsony, the positive effects are non-
existent and the risks for anti-competitive effects are increased. 
3.6.1 The waterbed effect 
The exercise of bargaining power may influence the price paid by other buyers vis-à-vis suppliers 
in a positive or a negative way. The ‘waterbed effect’ describes the situation that prevails 
whenever the purchasing prices for other buyers increase due to exertion of buyer power by a 
powerful rival. The waterbed effect is relative in the sense that its consequences will depend on 
the circumstances of the case and will impact each rival buyer (and suppliers) in a particular 
way.284 Furthermore, the waterbed effect is anchored on models assuming linear tariff contracts 
as I discussed in section 3.4. 
There are three theories behind the waterbed effect: a mechanical explanation, bargaining power 
changes due to the upstream market structure, and market share shifting in the downstream 
market.285 I discuss these theories in the following paragraphs.286  
The mechanical explanation of the waterbed effect depicts a situation in which the suppliers 
charge a higher price to the non-powerful buyers to recoup the lost profits on contracting with the 
powerful buyer.287 This is the most intuitive but weakest explanation on how the waterbed effect 
                                                          
283 Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop, ‘Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve 
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work. From a different perspective, the exercise of bargaining power increases rival’s input costs, 
which may lead to either competitors exiting the market or them increasing their prices 
downstream.288 The outcome is that the powerful buyer will enjoy larger market power 
downstream as competitors exit the market or sell at retailer levels at higher prices and, in the 
long run, downstream prices as a whole will tend to rise.289 Consequently, the waterbed effect is 
an exclusionary practice that can lead to exploitative abuse in the medium/long term. This 
mechanic waterbed explanation was recognized by the Commission in its Guidelines on the 
applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, when stating:  
(…) the primary concerns in the context of buying power are that lower prices may not be passed 
on to customers further downstream and that it may cause cost increases for the purchasers’ 
competitors on the selling markets because either suppliers will try to recover price reductions for 
one group of customers by increasing prices for other customers or competitors have less access 
to efficient suppliers.290 
However, the current Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements that replaced the former text depart 
from the mechanical approach to the waterbed effect.291 It no longer makes references to any 
“recovering process” of lost profits while still maintaining that buyer power may lead to “to 
restrictive effects on competition on the purchasing and/or downstream selling market or markets, 
such as increased prices […] [and] [b]uying power of the parties to the joint purchasing 
arrangement could be used to foreclose competing purchasers by limiting their access to efficient 
suppliers.”292 
This departure from the mechanical approach by the Commission is welcome as the theory has 
some pitfalls. Firstly, according to the intuition behind the mechanical waterbed effect, the 
increase in prices vis-à-vis other buyers is the consequence of wanting to recoup the discounts 
granted to the large buyer, and lost profit. This, however, does not explain why suppliers were 
not already charging a higher price to some buyers if this was foreseeable, even in the absence of 
the powerful buyer.293 Nor does it account for why a discount to a buyer implies that the seller is 
forced to increase its selling prices to other buyers; if the deal with the powerful buyer is not 
good enough, the seller has other demand sources to sell its goods to. Secondly, assuming that if 
suppliers do not increase their output prices to other (weaker) buyers implies that suppliers will 
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be forced to leave the upstream market as costs would not be profitable. In my view, however, 
such argument may apply if the buyer exerts monopsony power on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, as it 
pays a purchasing price below the competitive level. However, if bargaining power is exerted or 
there are other alternative buyers, then suppliers would not sell at a loss. 
The upstream approach to the waterbed effect, the second explanation of the waterbed effect, by 
Dobson and Inderst is based on the increase of market shares by a powerful retailer. A 
consequence of market power increase as a retailer is that it enjoys a bargaining position that 
allows for obtaining better terms and conditions by leveraging its success from one market to 
another, and which affects upstream competition.294 The improved bargaining position increases 
market concentration in the supplier’s side as a natural response to avoid the transfer of profit 
from supplier to buyer. This can happen in two ways. Firstly, whenever the exercise of 
bargaining power leads to the exit of some suppliers that find the current market prices no longer 
profitable. Secondly, if the industry has barriers of entry but research and development of new 
products allows for the entry of newcomers the exercise of bargaining power can prevent 
potential entry. In the long run, the increase of buyer market power will generate a trend to 
increase upstream concentration among suppliers, which now have more bargaining power.295 
Consequently, bargaining power effects upstream ought to distinguish between smaller suppliers 
(who will be worse off and may even disappear) and large suppliers, which will in the long run 
either be in the same situation or better off than before.296 Also, in the long run, the buyers’ 
bargaining power decreases, as now they will face suppliers with stronger bargaining position 
themselves. Consequently, smaller buyers are also worse off than before the buyer exercised its 
bargaining power, as they will be less powerful and will have to pay more for the same quantity 
of goods as before.  
In my view, this explanation of the waterbed effect by Dobson and Inderst is in line with the 
postulates of the countervailing theory of Galbraith, as market power tends to naturally grow to 
neutralize opposing market power.297 Unlike Dobson and Inderst, to me, if this concentration is 
the consequence of countervailing power, the outcome in terms of price should be that of an 
equilibrium, such as in the cooperative bilateral monopoly model, and not a rise, assuming that 
quantity remains constant. Also, this presupposes that the buyer will squeeze suppliers or prevent 
their entry. Again such behavior appears to be lacking long-term rationale. A rational buyer 
would not pressure its suppliers in such a way if it wants to avoid a subsequent situation of 
market power neutralization. The buyer will be better served if more suppliers are present in the 
market as it grants it with more supplier side constraint and, thus, enhances its bargaining power. 
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The last theory regarding the waterbed effect is based on a change of retailer’s market shares.298 
Dobson and Inderst submit that in this case the waterbed effect takes place due to the larger 
market shares obtained by the powerful buyer as a consequence of its more competitive offering 
in the downstream market.299 As the buyer increases its sales and gains market share downstream 
thanks to its ability as a buyer to reduce its input costs, it is able to sell goods as a retailer at a 
lower price capturing demand from its competitors that are unable to offer the same lower prices. 
Smaller retailers are worse off as they will lose volume, customers and will receive less 
advantageous terms of supply, creating a waterbed effect.300 This theory has two consequences. 
Firstly, prices in the downstream market will be – at least in the short term – lower for final 
consumers due to the passing on to end consumers. As acknowledged by Dobson and Inderst: 
“[t]he larger retailer can now lever its discounts into lower retail prices and/or better services and 
thereby obtain a larger share of the final market.”301 Secondly, the theory seems to grant a 
protection that is broader than pure end consumer harm and aims to tackle anti-competitive 
effects on smaller retailers and weaker suppliers that may impact the competitive process. 
Summing up, in its three variants the waterbed effect has negative implications for short and 
long term competition. In the short term, the waterbed effect increases rival buyer’s costs and 
retail prices. In the long run, as the powerful buyer is more efficient than its competitors, it 
captures their market share and has a foreclosing effect weakening or eliminating downstream 
competition. This exclusionary effect was acknowledged by Commission firstly in Kesko/Tuko302 
and later in Carrefour/Promodès303 as the “spiral effect”.304 The spiral effect increases market 
concentration downstream, leading to a vicious circle of more retailer power and the capacity to 
later on reap monopoly profits from end consumers due to the creation of entry and exit 
barriers.305 Concerning long-term effects on consumer prices, the increase in input costs for rival 
buyers also pushes retail prices upwards. However, rival buyer-retailers may not increase prices 
excessively as they could lose too much demand to the powerful buyer and eventually be 
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foreclosed. Which of these negative effects predominates is ambiguous.306 However, and as 
remarked by Dobson, the spiral effect may also lead to a “virtous circle”.307 Once the spiral effect 
takes place, the retailer can benefit from further efficiency gains that allow it to further improve 
downstream market conditions and further decrease prices for end consumers.308 
3.6.2 The antiwaterbed effect 
It is, however, disputed in economic literature that buyer power exertion generates a waterbed 
effect. It has been proposed that, in particular, bargaining power, can produce an ‘anti-waterbed 
effect’ as the discounts obtained by a powerful buyer benefits its rivals also in the form of 
discounts.309 The intuition behind this argument is that once a buyer has obtained a discount from 
a supplier, if known to other buyers, they will also try to obtain a discounted price.310 As Dobson 
and Inderst submit, these spillover discounts are generated due to the “now lower margins that 
the supplier earns from conducting business with the first retailer.”311 Thus, giving successive 
discounts to other buyers becomes less costly for the supplier.312 An alternative theory of the anti-
waterbed effect used by the Commission in Enso/Stora explained this positive effect to other 
buyers as being in the interest of a seller under countervailing buyer pressure from a very large 
buyer to keep other customers in the market in order to avoid becoming dependent on a single 
demand source.313 
Furthermore, Dobson and Inderst argue that the anti-waterbed effect will be more dominant the 
more equal buyers are vis-à-vis suppliers. If there is a large difference in market size between 
buyers, then the waterbed effect dominates.314 However, they also note that if suppliers are aware 
of the dominance of the waterbed effect they will be better off by securing the presence of other 
buyers and, therefore, will grant them discounts as well. The logic is that if the waterbed effect 
dominates then suppliers will have less demand sources and, in the long run, will face too 
powerful a buyer.315 
3.6.3 How should the waterbed effect be approached? 
Pursuant to the discussion regarding the water and anti-waterbed effects and the lack of economic 
consensus, in my view EU competition law should adopt a cautious approach to the topic 
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anchored on a case-by-case assessment, as which of these effects dominates will depend on the 
circumstances of the case.316 Furthermore, even if the waterbed effect dominates in the upstream 
market the effect for final consumers may be lower purchasing prices.317 Consequently, I propose 
rejecting a hard and fast rule that equates bargaining power exercise to generating a waterbed 
effect. 
Furthermore, in the assessment of the waterbed effect and the choice of a theory of harm it is 
important to disengage from employing the mechanic theory of the waterbed effect, which 
fortunately the Commission has stop using318 – as it is not well grounded in economics. In my 
view, from a legal perspective, the outcome regarding the existence of the waterbed effect does 
not change based on which one of the three theories is employed, but the argument used (if based 
on the mechanical effect) would be flawed. Lastly, in any case, in the assessment of the water and 
anti-waterbed effects, the emphasis ought to be placed on its effects in the short and long run 
both in the upstream and downstream market to fully capture the dual effect of buyer power in 
competition. 
3.6.4 Buyer power effects on investment, innovation and dynamic efficiency 
Part of the literature suggests that buyer power exertion may have deleterious consequences for 
supplier’s incentives to invest and innovate generating a hold-up problem.319 If buyer power is 
exploited, suppliers may be less incentivized to invest and innovate because the buyer is able to 
extract the extraordinary profits generated by better and more innovative goods and services that 
would otherwise have belonged to the supplier.320 This could happen in retailing markets where 
the buyer power of large supermarkets may act as a disincentive for suppliers to invest and 
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innovate in the production of newer and better products or increase output, leading to reduction 
of capacity, fewer products and lower quality.321  
The adverse effect on investment and innovation, according to Dobson et alia in a Commission’s 
report, might increase if bargaining power is exercised against small suppliers,322 which is also 
the opinion of the Commission concerning abuse of bargaining power in food retailing.323 
However, as remarked by Inderst and Doyle, the argument submitting that buyer power stifles 
innovation overlooks the fact that a supplier’s decision to invest depends on the profit difference 
that would be obtained with or without the investment, and not on the overall level of 
profitability.324 
On the other hand, research shows that bargaining power can increase innovation as it may 
incentivize suppliers and competitors to invest.325 In the case of rival buyers competing 
downstream, Dobson and Chakraborty argue that the exertion of bargaining power by a powerful 
buyer will force these competitors to invest to combat the price advantage of the powerful buyer 
and avoid being squeezed out of the market.326 Additionally, a buyer with substantial market 
power could be willing to financially support the investments of a supplier as it could benefit 
from increased sales in the downstream market.327  
In the upstream market, suppliers facing a powerful buyer have an incentive to invest because by 
doing so they receive a larger fraction of the incremental profits generated by their investment. 
Also, if the investment decreases their marginal cost, it also reduces the value of outside supply 
options for the buyer and, therefore, reduces the bargaining power,328 for current and future 
contracts.329 Also, suppliers have an incentive to invest to increase their chances of securing a 
contract with other potential buyers in case the large customer decides to look for alternative 
suppliers and prevent becoming or being dependent on a single buyer.330  
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Lastly, bargaining power may also spur investment by sponsoring the entry of new sources of 
supply.331 This was recognized by the Commission in the Enso/Stora Decision.332 In this case, the 
Commission considered that Tetra Pak had sufficient countervailing buyer power to neutralize 
the market power of the merging undertaking as it could sponsor the development of capacity of 
one of the other suppliers in the market or sponsor entry of new undertakings to produce its 
input.333 
3.6.5 Buyer power effects on quality 
Related to investment, bargaining power can also create incentives to increase or to decrease 
quality. Battigalli, Fumagalli and Polo submit that buyer power negatively affects the incentives 
of suppliers to invest in quality improvements, particularly in the case of private labels334 and 
when investing in research and development is necessary for obtaining quality improvements.335 
As bargaining power extracts profits from suppliers, these will have little incentive to invest in 
maintaining and improving the quality of goods.336 This has a negative impact on both the buyer 
and the end consumer that acquires the goods.337 Similarly, Ezrachi and De Jong describe a 
situation in which the exercise of bargaining power affects output quality as suppliers are 
pressured “to sell at near loss”.338 In their view, in some markets, such as food retailing, if the 
final consumer cannot easily detect the drop in quality, the supplier can increase profitability by 
reducing the quality of the goods. Accordingly, they argue, the quality erosion is likely to neglect 
the positive effects of the bargaining power regarding the welfare gains in the form of lower 
purchasing prices and, therefore lead to a loss in welfare.339 
In my view, however, these theories on quality erosion may be criticized from several angles. 
Firstly, quality erosion may appear whenever there is little or no competition in the downstream 
market; however, in the presence of substantial downstream market competition it will be 
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unlikely to exist. If the supplier diminishes the quality of the products, a rational buyer that faces 
competition in the downstream market will see how consumers and its customers – who are likely 
to notice the reduction in quality – will shift their demand to other (better) suppliers. This, 
nevertheless, assumes a high degree of care from the consumer, and is debatable that this exists, 
particularly in unsophisticated markets, like day-to-day purchases. Furthermore, it is contrary to 
the interest of the powerful buyer that quality is eroded (even if difficult but not impossible to 
detect) and, therefore, the buyer is likely to set up quality control programs, as remarked by 
Dobson and Chakraborty.340 Secondly, if the supplier increases quality it diminishes the 
bargaining power of its buyer, which would allow the supplier to gain a competitive advantange 
when negotiating future contracts in better terms, and limiting the extraction of its rents. Thirdly, 
agreed quality erosion not only implies a risk of losing sales but also, if detected by competition 
authorities, being sanctioned due to entering into collusive practices prohibited by Article 
101(1)(b) TFEU.  
3.6.6 Buyer power effects on market concentration: variety and exclusion 
Lastly, EU legislation and the Commission have raised a concern regarding the effect of buyer 
power leading to further concentration in the upstream and downstream markets due to the 
waterbed effect and in line with the countervailing power theory of Galbraith. For instance, this 
was explicitly recognized regarding aggregated public procurement by the Recital 59 of the 
Directive 2014/24 on Public Procurement.341 Also, recently, the Commission has raised concerns 
regarding the pernicious buyer power effects on small and medium enterprises in the food-
retailing sector, as these small retailers and suppliers may be foreclosed and squeezed out of the 
market due to the imposition of unfair commercial practices arising from a substantial difference 
in bargaining power.342 
This negative effect on concentration due to the exercise of buyer power may take place in the 
upstream market as suppliers will look for strategies that increase their seller market power and 
negotiate terms and conditions that are more beneficial to their interest, neutralizing buyer 
bargaining power and making it more likely to merge or create commercial alliances. In the 
downstream market, if the powerful buyer passes on the bargaining benefits to end consumers in 
the form of lower retailing prices it will capture its competitor’s demand – and will increase it 
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market shares – unless these (smaller or less efficient) competitors offer either similar prices 
and/or better quality goods. Increased market concentration implies fewer competitors that may 
or may not be more efficient, and consequently less variety of goods or services.343  
A variety of similar concerns on the negative effects of buyer power on concentration and variety 
have been expressed by the US Federal Trade Commission in food retailing markets, pertaining 
to whenever the buyer acts as a gate-keeper,344 and as also discussed by Kirkwood regarding e-
books.345 Furthermore, authors like Chen argue that buyer power, if exercised against a 
monopolist, will have a positive effect on reducing end consumer prices but will decrease further 
product diversity.346  
In contrast with these negative views regarding buyer power impact and variety, recent literature 
shows that buyer/retailer bargaining power does not decrease goods/services variety or, if it does, 
not as much as supplier market power does.347 Gabrielsen and Johansen compare manufacturers 
in terms of selling market power and retailers with buyer market power and conclude that buyer 
power implies less exclusion and, therefore, allows for a greater variety of goods/services348 They 
conclude that authorities should restrain from restricting or eliminating bargaining power if 
concerned about product variety and price increase. Similarly, the former UK Office of Fair 
Trading held that the exercise of buyer power and its effects on variety are likely to be positive as 
“where downstream competition is effective, markets would typically respond to consumer 
desires for more [or less] diversity.”349 
The foregoing discussion leads to the question of whether competition policy ought to protect 
“sufficient variety” and a “healthy amount” of market players in the upstream and downstream 
market at the expense of short and medium-term efficiency and lower consumer prices. This is an 
area of buyer power economics and competition policy that is still ripe for further research. 
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In this chapter, I have analyzed the economics behind buyer power and discussed its direct and 
indirect welfare effects. I submit that buyer power is an umbrella term encompassing monopsony 
and bargaining power, different expressions of buyer power with different effects, making it an 
ambiguous concept. Furthermore, buyer power has a dual effect in competition. It will always 
impact the upstream conditions between rival buyers and suppliers, and it can additionally affect 
downstream conditions when the buyer competes as a retailer with other rival buyers, and also 
having an impact in end consumer prices and non-price competition. Therefore, any buyer power 
policy that focuses exclusively in upstream or downstream harm would be under-inclusive and 
run the risk of not fully capturing buyer power effects. Consequently, and as discussed through 
this research, buyer power analysis should adopt a dualistic approach to its upstream and 
downstream welfare effects, so as to fully capture buyer power effects and avoid risks of under 
enforcement while aiming at not over-enforcing EU competition rules.350 
Monopsony power is always inefficient because fewer goods are purchased than otherwise would 
be the case in a competitive setting, generating an allocative efficiency loss and a profit transfer 
from suppliers to the buyer. This inefficient outcome holds even if monopsony power might have 
little or no impact on end consumer prices because the monopsonist lacks downstream market 
power. Furthermore, monopsony power almost always has negative efficiency effects in terms of 
indirect effects and non-price conditions: it reduces innovation, investment, erodes quality and 
tends to increase market concentration upstream. Therefore, regarding monopsony power cases, it 
will be very likely that a conduct that involves purchases withholding will restrict competition by 
object under Article 101 TFEU or by nature in cases of unilateral behavior. 
In turn, the exercise of bargaining power tends to be welfare enhancing as it reduces input prices 
by neutralizing opposed supplier market power. Furthermore, the price reduction may be passed 
on to end consumers in the form of lower prices if there is sufficient competition where the buyer 
operates as a retailer.351 Additionally, bargaining power may have positive non-price effects, such 
as in the case of spurring investment and innovation, promoting quality and quality control, and 
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limiting variety erosion from seller market power. However, bargaining power may also be 
exerted in an anti-competitive manner to exploit suppliers and exclude rivals buyers competing in 
the upstream and that, additionally but not necessarily, compete in the downstream market as 
retailers. 
This ambiguous buyer power effect on welfare implies that competition law should steer away 
from an outdated and simplistic approach that sees buyer power cases as representations of 
monopsony power or only portraying the negative aspects of bargaining power. Also, it ought to 
recognize the largely benign effect of bargaining power and, therefore, apply a more lenient 
treatment than when compared to monopsony cases. This, however, does not imply that 
bargaining power cases should be outside the scope of competition law scrutiny.352 Also, the lack 
of certainty makes difficult to offer a ‘shortcut’ in the form of a reliable framework to capture all 
cases of buyer power conducts. Even though these models have been proposed, they are difficult 
to apply due to the assumptions they are built on.353 Another problem with this type of guidance 
for cases is that they are anchored on market structures and not conducts. The adoption of these 
form/structured based approaches to the application of the law may lead to the erroneous belief 
that what is forbidden is the existence of a ‘shape’ or type of market power distribution, when 
instead what is forbidden is the abuse of market power through conducts.  
As part of my contribution, I have analyzed the direct buyer power effects on prices and showed 
that, for both monopsony and bargaining power, whenever the buyer also enjoys substantial 
downstream market power, the risks of anti-competitive harm increase under the hourglass shape 
theory.354 This happens because if the buyer has no competitive pressure to pass on the price 
reductions obtained due to its buyer power, it will keep the supra-competitive profits that have 
been transferred from the supplier while it also employs its market power downstream vis-à-vis 
end consumers. 
Regarding indirect buyer power effects, the picture is less clear as there is not complete 
consensus as to whether buyer (bargaining) power has a positive effect regarding price for other 
buyers and suppliers (the waterbed effect), investment, quality or market concentration. This 
blurry picture makes it difficult to make generalizations that can easily be extrapolated to cases 
and used as rules of thumb in buyer power cases. Therefore, a cautious approach to buyer power 
effects (particularly bargaining power) should be adopted by analyzing the circumstances of the 
case and looking at the competition effects of the purchasing conduct, in particular when dealing 
with bargaining power cases. 
                                                          
352 Also sharing this view see: van Doorn. 
353 European Commission and others (2000); Chen ‘Buyer power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy’ (2007). 
354 This is also the opinion of Korah and O’Sullivan when stating that “[i]f the emphasis is on protecting consumers, 
there should be concern only when there is insufficient competition downstream to ensure that the benefits of buyer 
power are passed on to buyers”, in Korah and O'Sullivan, [2002], p. 53. 
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Summing up, an understanding of buyer power economics and an awareness of the limitations 
and lack of consensus in the economic literature regarding some of its effects is a necessary first 
step towards the legal analysis of buying conducts in line with the economically informed legal 
analysis adopted in this dissertation. Furthermore, this chapter is of importance as in my analysis 
of the legal regulation as at times economic-based discussions are presented, which are based on 




4 Buyer Power Through an Ordoliberal Lens* 
4.1 Introduction 
Ordoliberal ideas, in particular the ideas of Wettbewerbsordnung and Wettbewerbsfreiheit – a 
system of ordered competition and freedom to compete have been, and still are, influential,355 in 
the historical development of the European integration idea, in particular regarding the creation 
of the internal market,356 and EU competition policy.357 At its core, ordoliberalism – also known 
as the Freiburg School of Law and Economics or German neo-liberalism358 – advocates for a 
                                                          
* A version of this chapter dealing with ordoliberalism as an economic policy and its history has been published in 
the Oslo Law Review as Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui, ‘Competition Law through an Ordoliberal Lens’ 2 Oslo Law 
Review (2015) 139. The version presented here, however, focuses only on the ordoliberal aspects regarding 
competition and buyer power policy, and which were not thoroughly discussed in the previously discussion in the 
published work.  
355 See recently the Judgment of 6 October 2009 in GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others, 
Joined cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, EU:C:2009:610, para. 63. Also stressing the 
ordoliberal influence in such statement see: Peter Behrens, ‘The "Consumer Choice" Paradigm in German 
Ordoliberalism and its Impact upon EU Competition Law’ 1/14 Europa-Kolleg Hamburg Discussion Paper (2014) 1. 
See also the treatment of rebates in Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v Commission, T-286/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:547, 
and Judgment of 6 October 2015 in Post Danmark, C-23/14, EU:C:2015:651. 
356 Karel Van Miert, ‘The Future of European Competition Policy’ (1998) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1998_042_en.html> accessed 6/11/2014; Alessandro Somma, 
‘Private Law as Biopolitics: Ordoliberalism, Social Market Economy, and the Public Dimension of Contract’ 76 Law 
and Contemporary Problems (2013) 105, p. 105, who sees the influence of the “ordoliberal agenda” in EU matters as 
well as adopting measures through a rather not very democratic decision-making process. 
357 Gerber goes even further in his defense of the influence of ordoliberal thinking in EU competition law when 
stating “[t]his ordoliberal creation (competition law) has evolved into the European concept of competition law, and 
without it the develop-ment of the European Community is unimaginable.”, in David J. Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing 
the Economy: German Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and the "New" Europe’ 42 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law (1994) 25, p. 49. See, inter alia, supporting this assertion: David J. Gerber, Law and Competition 
in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford University Press 2001), in particular Chapter VII; Ian 
Rose and Cynthia Ngwe, ‘The Ordoliberal Tradition in the European Union, Its Influence on Article 82 EC and the 
IBA's Comments on the Article 82 EC Discussion Paper’ 3 Competition Law International (2007) 8, p. 8; Flavio 
Felice and Massimiliano Vatiero, ‘Ordo and European Competition Law’ <http://www.siecon.org/online/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Felice-Vatiero.pdf>, last visited 11/12/2014; Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, ‘The Conflict 
Between Economic Freedom and Consumer Welfare in the Modernisation of Article 82 EC’ 3 European Competition 
Journal (2007) 329; Ekaterina Rousseva, Rethinking Exclusionary Abuses in EU Competition Law (Hart 2010), p. 
26-32; Michal S. Gal, ‘Abuse of Dominance - Exploitative Abuses’ in Ioannis Lianos and Damien Geradin (eds), 
Handbook on European competition law: enforcement and procedure (Edward Elgar Pub. Ltd. 2013), p. 388 to 391. 
358 An alternative name is used by Peacock and Willgerodt who refer to the Ordo-Kreis (Ordo-Circle) as the group of 
scholars part of this trend of thought arguably because not all scholars following these teachings studied or taught at 
the University of Freiburg, in Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt, ‘German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market 
Economy’ in Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy, Vol. I 
(MacMillan 1989), p. 1-15. Although some refer to the Freiburg school as only covering economics, I put forth in 
this chapter that competition policy school has been enriched by both legal and economic scholars in a 
multidisciplinary perspective. Also of this opinion is Kamecke who even goes forward and claims that “Eucken's 
theoretical approach contributed more to political economy than to economic theory, and so it would probably be 
long forgotten by now if it had not been taken up by lawyers and politicians in the German postwar area”, Ulrich 
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state-regulated competitive process as a necessary instrument for the protection of individual 
economic freedom.359 Ordoliberalism, however, is not just about competition policy – nor is it 
just about competition economics. Rather, it considers the competitive process as one of the 
pillars of a holistic political economy and societal order.360  
In this dissertation, and as discussed in chapter 2, I employ ordoliberalism as an economic policy 
that will serve as a benchmark tool to contrast and criticize against the regulation of buyer 
power, but not to justify the efficiency or validity of legal rules. To do so, the legislation, 
decisions and judgments will be analyzed from an ordoliberal perspective by highlighting 
whether the legislation and case law are in line with ordoliberal ideas or whether and how they 
depart from such a policy standing. Through this contrasting exercise, this study provides a new 
perspective and allows for an (e)valuation of the EU regime on buyer power, for comparisons to 
be drawn between US antitrust law and equivalent issues, and discussion of certain elements de 
lege ferenda. Furthermore, by analyzing buyer power from an ordoliberal perspective, I am able– 
after substantive analysis of buyer power treatment – to determine whether its treatment in EU 
competition law is influenced by ordoliberal competition policy, posed as one of the research 
questions in this thesis. 
Also, ordoliberalism is a well suited analytical benchmarking tool for an evaluation and analysis 
of buyer power because, as noted by Akman:  
the main concern of Eucken was ‘complete competition’, that is competition in which no firm in a 
market has power to coerce other firms in that market. If there is competition on the supply side, 
as well as on the demand side […] then the market form of complete competition is achieved.361  
Thus, ordoliberalism looks at markets in a dualistic way: taking into account upstream and 
downstream and the full effects of a purchasing conduct. Furthermore, ordoliberalism is 
consistent with the adoption of an economically informed legal analysis methodology employed 
in this dissertation as it combines legal and economic perspectives in an interdisciplinary manner 
by translating the economic language into law without becoming “law and economics”.362 Lastly, 
ordoliberalism is a well-suited analytic instrument for this dissertation as it advocates for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Kamecke, ‘The Proper Scope of Government Viewed from an Ordoliberal Perspective: The Example of Competition 
Policy: Comment’ 157 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) (2001) 23, p. 23. 
359 Individual freedom in ordoliberal theory is understood as the freedom of entrepreneurship, namely “to engange in 
competition to seek gratification by means of voluntary exchange on free markets”, as defined by Bonefeld in 
Werner Bonefeld, ‘Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism’ 17 New Political Economy (2012) 
633, p. 638. 
360 See the views of Müller-Armack when claiming that the competitive order must act in the framework of society 
as a whole in Alfred Müller-Armack, ‘The Social Market Economy as an Economic and Social Order’ 36 Review of 
Social Economy (1978) 325, p. 327. On the central topics of Ordoliberalism, see: Manfred E. Streit, ‘Economic 
Order, Private Law and Public Policy - The Freiburg School of Law and Economics in Perspective’ 148 Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) (1992) 675. 
361 Pinar Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economic Approaches (Hart 2012), p. 58. 
362 Viktor Vanberg, ‘Freiburg School of Law and Economics’ in Peter Newman (ed), The New Palgrave Dictionary, 
Vol. 2 (1998), p. 173 
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regulation of market power in a holistic manner whenever it can curb the economic freedom of 
market participants, such as in the case of unfair purchasing practices that, in an ordoliberal 
perspective,363 ought to be regulated by competition norms lato sensu.364  
In this chapter, my aim, therefore, is to show how an ordoliberal competition policy addresses 
issue of buyer power so that the comparison between the current legal treatment and the 
regulation can be made in a way that allows the reader to determine the consistency – or 
otherwise – of the EU buyer power treatment to ordoliberal ideas. In this sense, a disclaimer 
ought to be made. Although there is existing literature dealing with ordoliberalism and, in 
particular, the influence of ordoliberal thinking in the development of EU competition law, I 
adopt a different approach when discussing the ordoliberal perspective when dealing with buyer 
power.  
This chapter does not explore the influence of ordoliberal ideas in the historical development of 
the EU and its competition policy from a historical perspective; nor does it discuss ordoliberalism 
as an economic school at large as this is a topic that I have covered substantially elsewhere.365 
There are three reasons for this limitation of scope. Firstly, there is already relevant literature 
written on the topic dealing in extenso with the influence (or lack thereof) of ordoliberalism in 
EU competition policy.366 Secondly, embarking on such a task would be outside of the scope and 
topic of this dissertation. Thirdly, and linked to the former, I employ ordoliberalism as an 
analytical tool for analysis of buyer power regulation and not the other way around; this is, 
ordoliberalism contributes to the analysis because it serves as a theoretical construct to compare 
the EU treatment to buyer power to, which in itself is a novel approach and methodological 
choice.  
I have organized the chapter as follows: section 4.2 introduces the ordoliberalism and its main 
components as an economic policy. Section 4.3 discusses competition from an ordoliberal point 
of view by analyzing which goals are protected, different types of competition, the connection of 
ordoliberalism and the “more economic approach” and the role of the state in competition 
enforcement. Section 4.4 constructs a buyer power policy from an ordoliberal perspective 
anchored on the general theory of the school to allow me to carry out the comparison of the 
regulation of buyer power with this theoretical construct. In this section, I discuss the sufficiency 
                                                          
363 F Böhm, W Eucken and H Grossman-Doerth, ‘The Ordo Manifesto of 1936’ in Alan Peacock and Hans 
Willgerodt (eds), Germany's Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution (MacMillan 1989), p. 24-25. 
364 Gormsen, ‘Article 82 EC: Where are We Coming From and Where are We Going to?’ (2006), p. 10; Rainer 
Klump and Manuel Wörsdörfer, ‘On the affiliation of phenomenology and ordoliberalism: Links between Edmund 
Husserl, Rudolf and Walter Eucken’ 18 The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought (2011), p 569. 
365 Herrera Anchustegui ‘Competition Law through an Ordoliberal Lens’ (2015). 
366 See the views of Akman who claims that ordoliberal ideas where not by and large incorporated in the drafting of 
Article 102 TFEU in Pinar Akman, ‘Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82 EC’ 29 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies (2009) 267; Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economic Approaches [2012], 
p. 55-105. See also Nazzini, [2011], p. 131-132. 
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of the current EU competition law regime and its applicability, the need to adopt a dualistic 
approach to buyer power which, in turn, also implies adopting a broader welfare and harm 
standard to competition intervention in buyer power cases. Then I discuss the leeway for 
protecting freedom to compete and distributive concerns within an ordoliberal competition policy 
lato sensu. Lastly, section 4.5 concludes the chapter by summarizing the main findings and policy 
implications of a buyer power policy grounded on ordoliberal ideas. 
4.2 Ordoliberalism in a nutshell 
Ordoliberal ideas were born in Freiburg, Germany, in the late 1920s and early 1930s amidst the 
Great Depression of 1929, the rise of the Nazi regime to power,367 and the state-planned 
economics of the Soviet Union.368 In the midst of this social and political turmoil, ordoliberals 
suggested implementing a third way369 between laissez-faire and central planning, promoting the 
existence of a strong state governing economic activity and freedom to compete.370 
Ordoliberalism, this third way between neo-liberalism and state-planned economy worked along 
the principles of preserving a large degree of laissez-faire while advocating the creation of “an 
institutional framework, which brings order to economic processes in a liberal atmosphere”.371 
This economic order is anchored on the “Freiburg Imperative”372: a societal system grounded on 
                                                          
367 Similarly, see Gerber (1994), p. 25; Matthew Cole, ‘Ordoliberalism and its influence on EU tying law’ 36 
European Competition Law Review (2015) 255. Cf with Somma (2013), p. 110-111. For a discussion of Nazism 
from an ordoliberal perspective, see: Michel Foucault and others, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1978-1979 (Palgrave Macmillan 2008), p. 109-115. 
368 Also similarly, see Oliver Marc Hartwich, Neoliberalism: The Genesis of a Political Swearword (The Centre for 
Independent Studies (CIS) 2009) 1, p. 6-7. Interestingly, the birth of ordoliberalism coincided with the birth of 
Keynesianism. 
369 Such was Rüstow’s views on ordoliberalism, an economic ideology in between capitalism and communism, 
Alexander Rüstow, ‘Zwischen Kapitalismus und Kommunismus’ in Nils Goldschmidt and Michael Wohlgemuth 
(eds), Grundtexte zur Freiburger Tradition der Ordnungsökonomik (Mohr Siebeck 2008), p. 423–448. For Eucken 
“the number of organizational forms (of the economy and society), in which the modern economy may be ordered is 
very small”, thus portraying his idea of ordoliberalism as an alternative way between capitalism and centrally 
planned economies in Walter Eucken, ‘El Problema Político de la Ordenación’ in Lucas Beltrán (ed), La Economía 
de Mercado, Vol I (Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones 1963), p. 79 (author’s translation and emphasis in 
original). See also: J Wiseman, ‘Social Policy and the Social Market Economy’ in Alan Peacock and Hans 
Willgerodt (eds), German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy, Vol I (MacMillan 1989), p. 162-163; Barry 
J. Rodger, ‘Competition Policy, Liberalism and Globalization: A European Perspective’ 6 Columbia Journal of 
European Law (2000) 289, p. 293; also using the term “third way”: Gerber (1994), p. 35. Also of this view is 
Bonefeld when stating “[t]he ordoliberal idea of a social market economy has been seen as a progressive alternative 
beyond the left and right” and “they thus saw their neoliberalism as a third way in distinction to laissez-faire 
liberalism and collective forms of political economy”, in Bonefeld (2012), p. 634; and similarly in Werner Bonefeld, 
‘German Neoliberalism and the Idea of a Social Market Economy: Free Economy and the Strong State’ Journal of 
Social Sciences (2012) 139, p. 141. See also Foucault and others, [2008], p. 119-120. 
370 Kamecke (2001), p. 24. 
371 Taken from H.G Grosskettler, ‘Designing an Economic Order. The Contribution of the Freiburg School’ in 
Donald A. Walker (ed), Perspectives on the History of Economic Thought, Vol II (1989) in Rodger (2000), p. 293. 
See also Neumann, [2001], p. 37. 
372 Term coined by Alexander Ebner, ‘The Intellectual Foundations of the Social Market Economy’ 33 Journal of 
Economic Studies (2006) 206, p. 213. 
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the regulation of the competitive order of market freedom, protection of private property and trust 
in the market-price system,373 in addition to institutional pillars governing other societal aspects 
of human life.374 Out of these concepts, as expressed by Eucken, is that the competitive price 
system is the fundamental one as it ensures an efficient outcome and use of resources.375 Eucken 
stated that achieving social order is necessary to direct society’s economic life. Such ordering 
“consists in all the forms in which it is carried out the direction of daily economic process”,376 
and the Ordnung ought to be dictated by the state, which imposes rules for the competitive 
process but respects individual freedom. 
An ordoliberal society is based upon on what I have labeled the four central themes of 
ordoliberalism:377  
i) Ordnungsökonomik – economic order – and economic freedom in the frame of an 
economic constitution;  
ii) the social market economy;  
iii) economic freedom;  
iv) Wettbewerbspolitik - competition policy.378 
 
The economic constitution, the creation of Böhm,379 is a political instrument that “defines the 
rules of the game under which economic activities can be carried out in the respective 
jurisdictions”,380 based on the ideas of a “private law society”, freedom of contract and voluntary 
transactions.381 It sets positive and negative limits on state intervention in the economy in a 
normative sense inspired in the legal traditions of the Rechtsstaat.382 These rules aim at 
enhancing private cooperation and as a result of this coordination parties will then act in a 
competitive manner increasing their economic performance and efficiency, and preserving the 
competitiveness in society.383 
                                                          
373 Such as suppressing price controls as done by Erhard in Germany the 1950s. 
374 Ebner (2006), p. 213; similarly, see Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt, ‘German Liberalism and Economic 
Revival’ in Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), Germany's Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution 
(MacMillan 1989), p. 7. 
375 Kamecke (2001), p. 24. 
376 Eucken [1963], p. 36. 
377 Herrera Anchustegui ‘Competition Law through an Ordoliberal Lens’ (2015), p. 145-152. 
378 Streit (1992), p. 678. 
379 J Tumlir, ‘Franz Böhm and the Development of Economic-Constitutional Analysis’ in Alan Peacock and Hans 
Willgerodt (eds), German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy, Vol I (MacMillan 1989), p. 136. 
380 Wolfgang Kerber and Viktor Vanberg, ‘Constitutional Aspects of Party Autonomy and Its Limits - The 
Perspective of Constitutional Economics’ in Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang Kerber and Stephen Weatherhill (eds), 
Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market (2001), p. 53. 
381 For the function of private law in ordoliberal thinking see: F. Böhm, ‘Rule of Law in a Market Economy’ in Alan 
Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), Germany's Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution (MacMillan 1989), 
p. 46-67; Tumlir [1989], p. 136; and Viktor Vanberg, ‘Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom – 
On the Normative Foundations of Competition Policy’ 09 Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik 
(2009) 1, p. 10. 
382 Gerber (1994), p. 46. 
383 Somma (2013), p. 109. 
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The concept of social market economy – Soziale Marktwirtschaft – is a key ordoliberal influence 
in the European project as it has been expressly incorporated in Article 3 TEU. This concept was 
firstly introduced by Müller-Armarck in 1946, who described it as “market freedom with social 
balance”, meaning that it was possible to combine the productive prosperity of a capitalist driven 
economy with institutions and regulations guided by the pursuance of social justice.384 In other 
words, it seeks to combine social balance with entrepreneurship and market competition to foster 
economic productivity.385 The social market economic concept is anchored on three pillars:  
i) a competition policy based on the system of Ordnungsökonomie;  
ii) the abandonment of policies that unsystematically foster state interventionism;  
iii) an economic policy based on the market economy in rejection to the central planned 
model.386  
 
Lastly, economic freedom is the other main pillar of the ordoliberal construct.387 Such freedom is 
constituted and enforced by a set of rules which are part of the legal framework that “defines 
mutually compatible private domains within which individuals are free to act, protected from 
encroachment by other private law subjects as well as from government intervention”.388 This 
understanding of economic freedom is closely linked with the idea of freedom to compete, a 
recurrent topic in EU competition law and buyer power regulation, which, as remarked by 
Eucken, the threat to economic freedom arises not only from state intervention but importantly 
also from private actors such as monopolists cartel or cartel members, making private persons 
dependent on modern private power structures.389 In itself, protecting freedom as a goal has an 
economic value but it also captures other social considerations of non-economic content that, 
nevertheless, ought to be protected.390 
Ordoliberal economic freedom cannot be understood without the existence of a regulated 
competitive economic process. Ordoliberals saw competition as the tool through which not only 
economic freedom is expressed but also protected from abuse. The following sections, dealing 
with the conception of competition in an ordoliberal perspective and buyer power through an 
                                                          
384 Streit (1992), p. 696. In similar terms, see the view of Karel Van Miert, former European Commissioner for 
Competition in Van Miert; see also Ebner (2006), p. 215.  
385 Ebner (2006), p. 216. 
386 Müller-Armack (1978), p. 327-328. 
387 Gormsen ‘The Conflict Between Economic Freedom and Consumer Welfare in the Modernisation of Article 82 
EC’ (2007), p. 331; Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economic Approaches [2012], 
p. 55. On the views of the rule of the entrepreneur, see Böhm [1989], p. 58-62; also seeing ordoliberal freedom as 
freedom of entrepreneurship, see Bonefeld (2012), p. 633-656. 
388 Vanberg ‘Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom – On the Normative Foundations of 
Competition Policy’ (2009), p. 8. 
389 W Eucken, ‘What Kind of Economic and Social System’ in Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), Germany's 
Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution (MacMillan 1989), p. 35. 
390 Vanberg ‘Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom – On the Normative Foundations of 
Competition Policy’ (2009), p. 14. 
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ordoliberal lens, link freedom with competition as a process, and discuss analytical concepts that 
give content to the economic freedom.  
4.3 Competition in an ordoliberal perspective 
Ordoliberal competition is an indigenous European competition policy that differs from the 
Harvard and the Chicago schools.391 Ordoliberalism represents a ‘third way’ when it becomes a 
competition policy that has as its main goal the protection of the freedom to compete – 
Wettbewerbsfreiheit – instead of the goal of achieving perfect or imperfect competition,392 or 
maximizing allocative efficiency.393 It proposes a general competition policy as part of society’s 
economic order based on competition law rather than advocating a micro-economic modelling for 
a case-by-case assessment, such as the neoclassical models applied to competition law cases.394 
Paraphrasing Eucken, the aim of this competitive order is to provide the legal framework upon 
which the pursuit of individual freedom is restricted solely on the freedom of others.395 
Unlike industrial organization and welfaristic competition economics, the first group of 
ordoliberal scholars did not employ the language of mathematics to express their views. Such a 
method lacking the express use of mathematics has been qualified as “an unfashionable idiom 
[…] and they may be put forward with missionary zeal which is anathema to ‘positive’ 
economics”.396 Arguably, this unusual methodology and lack of mathematical ‘evidence’ has 
                                                          
391 Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economic Approaches [2012], p. 59; this also 
appears to be the view of Van Miert, former European Commissioner for Competition, when stating that “how much 
easier it was to convince people of the value of a strong competition policy if one talked the language of the Erhard-
style social market economy rather than the language of the Chicago School”, in Van Miert. For a short discussion 
on why ordoliberal competition policy differs from the Chicago School conception of competition see Wernhard 
Möschel, ‘Competition Policy from an Ordo Point of View’ in Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), German 
Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy, Vol I (MacMillan 1989), p. 147. 
392 For more on the idea of “freedom to compete” see, inter alia: Erich Hoppmann, ‘Workable Competition - The 
Development of an Idea on the Norm for the Policy of Competition’ 13 Antitrust Bulletin (1968) 61; Vanberg 
‘Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom – On the Normative Foundations of Competition Policy’ 
(2009); Caroline Heide-Jørgensen, ‘The Relationship Between Article 101(1) TFEU and Article 101(3) TFEU’ in 
Caroline Heide-Jørgensen and others (eds), Aims and values in competition law (DJØF Publ. 2013), p. 98-99; see 
also in this chapter section 4.3.2 where this issue is discussed at length. 
393 The Chicago School claims that the sole goal of competition should be the maximization of allocative efficiency 
as discussed, for example in Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (University of Chicago 
Press 1976), p. 163-170; Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself (1978), p. 56-61. See 
very recently the Opinion of Advocate General Wahl of 20 October 2016 in Intel Corporation v Commission, C-
413/14 P, EU:C:2016:788, arguing that formalistic approaches are wrong and outdated in EU competition law when 
it comes to abuse of dominance. 
394 For Lenel, an ordoliberal belonging to the “third wave”, competition is just dealing with “a micro-economic task: 
it is to regulate the individual economic relationships in such a way that production is in line with consumers’ wishes 
at the least possible cost”, in H. O. Lenel, ‘Evolution of the Social Market Economy’ in Alan Peacock and Hans 
Willgerodt (eds), German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy, Vol I (MacMillan 1989), p. 265. 
395 Walter Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Mohr Siebeck 1952), p. 250.  
396 Peacock and Willgerodt, ‘Overall View of the German Liberal Movement’ [1989], p. 3. Cf this with the view of 
Möschel who claims that ordoliberals did use economic models, such as the traditional model of perfect competition 
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caused microeconomics to be wary of ordoliberal teachings and to see this trend of thought as 
mere politics or philosophy. Other authors, like Peacock and Willgerodt, argue that 
ordoliberalism is a “political economy unrelated to economic analysis”.397 Such types of claims, 
however, forget the historical context of their ideas and the interdisciplinary language used by the 
ordoliberals to express their views in law and economics. Furthermore, the fact that non-technical 
language was used to express their economic ideas does not preclude the fact that these analytical 
concepts are indeed anchored on economic analysis. As stressed by Gerber:  
The foremost vehicle for ordoliberal influence in shaping thought in these areas has been the new 
language it generated. This language features both a new grammar and a significantly altered 
vocabulary. The grammar - i.e., the rules that structure the language - is based on the interplay of 
economic and legal ordering concepts. Economic analysis supplies the rules necessary for the 
market to function effectively and thus provides the standards for most economic policy 
decisions.398  
On the other hand, this lack of mathematical language is probably partly accounts for why 
ordoliberal ideas have had a historical appeal for lawyers, and, in particular, judges as they tend 
to speak the language of the law, by which abstract concepts are given meaning through 
teleological interpretation. 
In the current section, I explore the ordoliberal conception of competition by analyzing the main 
postulates of this school of thought, identifying its aim, discussing the different types of 
competition and, finally, determining what ought to be the role of the state in the regulation of 
competition and as a competitor itself.  
4.3.1 Understanding ordoliberal competition 
The concepts of competition and freedom to compete – Wettbewerbsordnung and 
Wettbewerbsfreiheit – are central to ordoliberalism,399 and are considered by Peacock and 
Willgerodt to be the “most original feature of Ordo thinking on policy matters”.400 For 
ordoliberals, competition is the necessary consequence of scarcity of goods. As such, it has an 
indispensable function of coordination and social organization.401 The competitive order is the 
essence of the economy because it permits the effective functioning of the system.402 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
in Möschel [1989], p. 142. However, in my research, I have not found explicit (modern) economic modeling in the 
works reviewed, which does not imply that the models are implicit and taken into account to put forth their ideas 
397 James S. Venit, ‘Article 82: The Last Frontier - Fighting Fire With Fire?’ 28 Fordham International Law Journal 
(2004) 1157, p. 1157. In this work, Venit does not make a direct reference to any of the works of ordoliberal thinkers 
and limits himself to include a single reference by Moschel describing the focal points of ordoliberalism. 
398 Gerber (1994), p. 67 (emphasis added). 
399 Nils Goldschmidt and Arnold Berndt, ‘Leonhard Miksch (1901–1950) A Forgotten Member of the Freiburg 
School’ 64 American Journal of Economics and Sociology (2005) 973, p. 975; Foucault and others, [2008], p. 118-
119. 
400 Peacock and Willgerodt, ‘Overall View of the German Liberal Movement’ [1989], p. 9. 
401 Müller-Armack (1978), p. 325-326. 
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Consequently, while there is no doubt that the competitive market system is the appropriate tool, 
it is for the economic constitution to determine in which legal terms competition is carried out so 
that competition can be effective and efficient,403 and for an ordoliberal competition policy to 
control private and public market power to guarantee competition as process.404 Unregulated 
competition, as advocated by classical liberalism, degenerates into abuse of market power that 
curbs economic freedom and destroys itself due to the accumulation of market power.405 
Competition’s policy406 role is to counteract this self-destructive tendency of market competition. 
Ordoliberalism advocates for state-imposed economic regulation by means of competition laws. 
By adopting competition as the regulating system, ordoliberalism is a shift from the principle of 
exchange being the guiding principle of market organization.407 
For Eucken, market power concentration, monopolies, cartels and centralized planning of the 
economy ‘kill’ competition.408 Therefore, free economic competition can only exist if it is 
organized by the state in accordance with liberal principles to prevent the abuse of economic 
power.409 In other words, the invisible hand by itself is insufficient to secure proper competition, 
and a state-imposed order is required to avoid abuses of market power. This was also the stance 
of the former European Commissioner Van der Miert, who in 1997, quoting Ralf Dahrendorf, 
stated:  
Economic reforms are all very well. Privatisation, deregulation, releasing initiative are clearly 
important. Only market forces will in the end get the collapsed state economies out of the rut. But 
market forces not only have to be released, they also have to be contained by accepted and 
enforced rules of the game. The invisible hand is not sufficient. Like a football match it needs 
rules of the game and a referee. The market is not anarchy but a subtle construct of human 
ingenuity.410 
Furthermore, the competitive order policy has no value if excluded from the broader conception 
of the Ordnungspolitik.411 The ordoliberal competition policy is part “of a framework of a general 
                                                          
403 Vanberg ‘Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom – On the Normative Foundations of 
Competition Policy’ (2009), p. 7; Peter Behrens, ‘The "Consumer Choice" Paradigm in German Ordoliberalism and 
its Impact upon EU Competition Law’ 1/14 Europa-Kolleg Hamburg Discussion Paper Series (2014), p. 12. 
404 Streit (1992), p. 685. Cf with the view of Ludvig von Mises who sharply pointed out that as such, economic 
freedom does not exist and that “the market is free for as long as it does precisely what the government wants it to 
do”, Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (4th edn, 1996), p. 723–724. 
405 Peacock and Willgerodt, ‘Overall View of the German Liberal Movement’ [1989], p. 7. Cf with the view of 
Akman who argues that for ordoliberalism economic efficiency is just “an indirect and derived goal; its results 
generally from the realization of individual freedom of action in a market system” in Akman, The Concept of Abuse 
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406 For a discussion of the content of ordoliberalism as a competition policy see: Möschel [1989], p. 142. 
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408 Walter Eucken, ‘Técnica, Concentración y Ordenación de la Economía’ in Lucas Beltrán (ed), La Economía de 
Mercado, Vol. I (1950), p. 151. 
409 Somewhat similar is the view of Foucault who claims that for ordoliberals the state must govern for the market 
and not because of the market, Foucault and others, [2008], p. 121. 
410 Van Miert. 
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economic system”412 and constitutes a key element of the development of the social market 
economy as part of the ordering of economic freedom.413 It does so by focusing on the control 
and correction of price manipulation, maintaining the voluntariness of contracting,414 precluding 
market power abuse – by a sole entity or by a group of entities coordinating their behavior – 
through an administrative “monopoly office” acting as a market police.415 Regulated competition 
is a tool for the maintenance of economic order by preserving the market process as the 
foundational ground for social cohesion.416 Freedom to compete should not be restricted by legal 
rules grounded on inefficient economic grounds nor can it be left unregulated, as it would 
degenerate into unfair competition and social conflict or Vermachtung.417 Deciding whether 
“competition is restricted, whether competition is efficient or obstructive, whether or not price-
cutting contradicts the principle of the system – all these issues can only be decided by 
investigations conducted by economics in the various states of the market”.418  
However, not all ‘German-neoliberals’ fully share this idea of imposed competitive order. For 
Hayek, competition is a by-product of economic freedom of economic agents and it acts as a 
process of self-control of the players in a market performing economics activities.419 For me, 
however, competition ought to not be merely about self-control or naturally formed 
countervailing power.420 For competition to exist there must also be legal rules in place, imposed 
by the state, which discipline the exercise of market power and can guarantee that the market 
conditions are kept healthy so that the self-controlling forces of the market can be effectively 
applied.  
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4.3.1.1 Competition and economic freedom as goals themselves 
The goal of an ordoliberal competition policy is the protection of individual economic freedom to 
compete in the economic sphere and competition as such.421 By protecting the competitive 
process and economic freedom from abuse of private and public market power, the interest of 
consumers are satisfied and their wellbeing is guaranteed.422 In the words of Böhm, protecting the 
system of price competition and ensuring a “fair system by which services or assets could be 
subject to voluntary exchange agreements to ensure equivalent payment” shields individuals from 
abusive market power that attempts to subjugate and exploit them.423 Arguably, the ordoliberal 
proposition of promoting competition as a goal in itself has had a profound impact on EU 
competition policy which recognizes this goal, alongside the need to foster market integration, as 
its traditional aims.424  
However, not all scholars agree that ordoliberalism pursues protection of competition as a 
process. For instance, Kamecke holds that “Eucken did not consider freedom of economic action 
as a value in itself. As soon as freedom is in conflict with economic efficiency, he is willing to 
sacrifice the competitive market order in favor of some government action.”425 To me, this 
                                                          
421 Supporting this view, see: Hoppmann (1968), p. 62; Möschel [1989], p. 146; Foucault and others, [2008], p. 120-
121; Vanberg ‘Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom – On the Normative Foundations of 
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to Article 102 TFEU in Judgment of 16 September 2008 in Sot. Lélos kai Sia v. GlaxoSmithKline, joined cases C-
468/06 to C-478/06, EU:C:2008:504 E.C.R. [2008] I-07139; see also: Judgment of 13 July 1966 in Consten and 
Grundig v Commission of the EEC, C-56/64, EU:C:1966:41; Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, 
para. 7. See also: Böhm [1989]; Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University 
Press 2006), p. 23; Okeoghene Odudu, ‘The Wider Concerns of Competition Law’ 30 Oxford Journal of Legal 
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Law’ in Ioannis Lianos and Damien Geradin (eds), Handbook on European competition law: enforcement and 
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Goals of EU Competition Law’ 3/2013 CLES Working Paper Series (2013) 1, p. 14-15; Heide-Jørgensen [2013], p. 
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argument is circular and misses the point that, for ordoliberals, economic freedom has positive 
and negative limits imposed by the law, and that by securing economic freedom, economic 
efficiency will follow as consequence of solving the competition’s prisoner dilemma. 
Furthermore, Maier-Rigaud remarks that competition as a goal is a concept that has been 
advocated by German neoliberals and not only by early ordoliberals, with advocates such as 
Hayek, Hoppmann, Möschel and Vanberg, under different underlying assumptions.426 What these 
different waves do have in common is the fear against state action and advocating for the 
protection of economic freedom.427 This argument raises interesting issues, although it does miss 
the point that ordoliberalism is not only the work of the first or second wave of scholars but 
indeed a living economic policy that has evolved and, as it has, therefore, conceptions of the goal 
of competition policy have also changed. Furthermore, my research shows that conception of 
competition freedom as a goal was already present in the works of Eucken and Böhm.  
Economic freedom and freedom to compete ought to be protected as they are “public goods”428 
that derive from the preservation of individual freedom.429 Consequently, the prime objective of 
an ordoliberal competition policy is the protection of the competitive process – 
Wettbewerbsfreiheit – by setting a competitive standard of performance competition which 
implies adherence to the ‘constitutional rules’ and satisfying customers’ needs in accordance with 
the lawful capacities of undertakings and the securing of individual freedom.430 Provided the 
competitive process is protected and preserved, economic efficiency and social peace should 
follow. In this sense, if freedom to compete is preserved, economic efficiency is a derived 
consequence because performance competition is allowed to naturally take place, which would 
lead towards economic progress.431 Such freedom to compete, however, requires that economic 
players have equal legal standing and that economic activities are coordinated through voluntary 
contracting and exchange.432 
This conception of freedom to compete demands that private parties behave in accordance with a 
set of pre-existing rules enshrined in the economic constitution, which serves as a guarantor and 
grantor of such individual freedom.433 For Vanberg, ordoliberalism ought to pursue the protection 
of freedom to compete to generate consumer welfare as a natural consequence. In his view, 
                                                          
426 F. Maier-Rigaud, ‘On the normative foundations of competition law – efficiency, political freedom and the 
freedom to compete’ in Daniel Zimmer (ed), The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2012), p. 139-147. 
427 Ibid, p. 145. 
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429 Similarly, Maier-Rigaud [2012], p. 136. 
430 Möschel [1989], p. 142; Akman ‘Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82 EC’ (2009), p. 273. 
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economic freedom would be violated if and/or when competition authorities prohibit a conduct 
allowed by the economic constitution or when they would allow it based on economic efficiency 
considerations but without a legal provision.434 Therefore, economic efficiency arguments have to 
‘fit’ the set of rules. Prima facie this argument can be seen as formalistic or void as it is the judge 
who defines what this economic freedom is. However, the EU competition law system itself 
provides mechanisms that, if appropriately applied, solve the apparent contradiction, as is the 
case regarding Article 101(3) TFEU that allows for the consideration of economic efficiencies to 
preclude the application of a legal prohibition.  
4.3.1.2 Protecting competition as a process as economically efficient 
Protecting the competitive process is economically efficient and desirable because it prevents 
society from playing the competition’s prisoner dilemma because ‘cheating’ becomes illegal. 
Indeed, the competitive process minimizes two risks: the issue of cheating and the problem of 
under-competitive choices. Some actors will be tempted to circumvent the market’s rules to 
obtain a benefit at the expense of the other players and the rest will then choose the under 
competitive option, that is, a protectionist regime,435 which does not benefit society, to prevent 
such ‘cheating’. The prisoner’s dilemma is largely solved if the members of society adhere to a 
competitive order imposed by the state in accordance with the rule of law.436 If the rules are 
properly designed, then lawful behavior by economic players will produce an outcome that is 
economically efficient. Here lies the rational justification for an ordoliberal competition policy: it 
allows undertakings to escape the prisoner’s dilemma and punishes those agents who deviate 
from the competitive outcome by cheating the rules.437 
Another explanation supporting the efficiency of competition as a goal itself is that freedom to 
compete would be Pareto-efficient if “individual decisions have only a negligible influence on the 
market prices”.438 Accordingly, market power will be kept in check such that any significant 
detrimental effect on market prices is avoided. Alternatively, absent truly ‘free competition’ then 
it would be possible to apply ‘competition as if’ to guide the behavior of players.439 I find the 
logic of this argument unsatisfactory, in practice freedom to compete and efficient outcomes will 
not always coincide, for example, the freedom to compete will be dictated by the adoption of 
                                                          
434 Ibid, p. 10-11. 
435 Vanberg, ‘Freiburg School of Law and Economics’ [1998], p. 178. 
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legal rulings that by their nature might be sub-optimal from a welfare perspective. Also, to 
achieve a more efficient economic outcome, certain trading agreements and practices will be 
forbidden and economic freedom will therefore be limited, particularly if the decision to prohibit 
is taken ex-post. Here lies the fundamental issue of informing legal texts with appropriate 
economic foundations, the quid of a contemporary ordoliberal policy.  
Consequently, in my view, the claims that protecting competition as a goal is economically 
unjustified – vis-à-vis “efficiency oriented” aims440 – or that it protects “inefficient competitors 
which would conflict with the objective of enhancing welfare”, as perceived by Akman;441 or that 
“ordoliberalism is based on humanist values rather than efficiency or other purely economic 
concerns”442 as argued by Gormsen, appear too absolute. These arguments seem to overstate the 
fact that, occasionally, ordoliberalism goals might prevent undertakings from carrying out certain 
practices that could potentially be efficient in the short-term but, which, in a medium to long term 
dynamic efficiency setting could thwart competition. Although that could occur, as 
ordoliberalism may be prone to over-enforcement, the number of cases in which it would arise 
would be minor and justifiable, given the need for legal certainty.443 Furthermore, these criticisms 
are based on the (mis)understanding that securing economic freedom does not always coincide 
with fostering economic efficiency, from either a total or consumer perspective and protecting 
inefficient undertakings.444 Akman notes that ordoliberalism does not promote efficiency as an 
aim but as a result. This distinction, however, appears to me more dialectical than of practical 
importance, as for as long as the competitive process is free, the practical result is economic 
freedom and efficiency.445 In other words, ordoliberalism does not advocate the protection of 
inefficient competitors, nor does it promote an excessive amount of market players,446 nor does it 
                                                          
440 For a general discussion on this topic, see: Maier-Rigaud [2012], p. 132-168. 
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advocate the adoption of an interventionist industrial policy, even if occasionally protecting 
competition and economic freedom could shield some less efficient undertakings from the market 
vagaries. Far from it: ordoliberalism promotes protecting ‘competition as such’ because it is 
economically efficient in the medium and long term, even if on occasion certain practices that 
could potentially be efficient in a short term and static sense are prohibited. 
4.3.2 Types of ordoliberal competition 
Ordoliberalism distinguishes between two types of competition: performance and prevention 
competition. Performance competition447 – Leistungswettbewerb – is the ability to obtain a 
competitive advantage by producing the best goods possible at the lowest price.448 On the other 
hand, prevention competition is largely similar to what is understood by exclusionary abuses in 
contemporary EU competition law. It aims at damaging the competitors’ position without this 
implying that the undertaking has improved its competition capacity. Prevention competition 
resembles the concept of Behinderungswettbewerb, coined by Nipperdey, as it describes 
competition that prevents a rival from performing at their best capacity:449 it simply makes the 
competitor worse-off. Ordoliberalism aims to suppress prevention competition by forcing players 
to behave in accordance with pre-defined market rules. 
4.3.3 Competition as if? 
In connection with the limitation of the abuse of market power, an ordoliberal concept sometimes 
linked to interpretations made by the CJEU of Article 102 TFEU,450 and the doctrine of special 
responsibility451 is the theory of “competition as if” developed by Miksch,452 a disciple of 
Eucken.453 O’Donoghue and Padilla, mistakenly in my view, go as far as claiming that 
“ordoliberal thinking on the goal of competition law was based on notions of ‘fairness’ and that 
                                                          
447 Gerber translates this concept in a slightly different manner and uses the term “performance competition” to 
represent a similar idea, see: Gerber (1994), p. 53; Gerber, [2001], p. 253. See also recognizing these two types of 
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453 Supporting this view, see: Gerber (1994), p. 52; Ebner (2006), p. 206-223; Gormsen ‘Article 82 EC: Where are 
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Appears?’ 35 European Law Review (2010) 214.  
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undertakings with market power should behave ‘as if’ there was effective competition”.454 
Competition ‘as if’ employs the legal competition framework in setting the ‘standard conduct’ a 
dominant undertaking ought to follow whenever acting in the market. This concept is rather 
similar to the special responsibility doctrine of dominant undertakings, which imposes stricter 
limits on the freedom of an undertaking to act when compared to a non-dominant undertaking. In 
the words of the CJEU:  
an undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a recrimination but simply means that, 
irrespective of the reasons for which it has such a dominant position, the undertaking concerned 
has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on 
the common market.455 
By competing ‘as if’, undertakings had to behave as if they lacked market power and consistent 
with performance competition.456 According to Gerber, this standard would not require 
governmental intervention as it is an objectively applicable measure, which provides a clear 
answer.457 From this perspective, the concept of ‘competition as if’ appears to be formalistic and 
almost per se.  
One of the main problems, however, is that ‘competition as if’ is an impractical concept because 
competition is a discovery process, to put it in Hayekian terms.458 The competition authority 
would not always be able to anticipate how competition ‘would have been’ had parties been 
deprived of their market power. Furthermore, ‘competition as if’ opens the door to two different 
interpretations: should it be competition ‘as if’ undertakings had no substantial market power, or 
‘as if’ there were perfect competition?459 From another perspective, ‘competition as if’ is 
imprecise and promotes legal uncertainty. However, Hayek’s criticism of competition as a 
discovery process is a valid argument to any competition standard that does not employ a pure 
per se approach because any balancing act based on counterfactual evidence implies that the 
competition authority needs to foresee how ideal competition would have been. 
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Furthermore, the idea of ‘competition as if’ has also been criticized because it arguably 
contradicts economic freedom and, therefore, is not in accord with core ordoliberal ideas.460 The 
base of this argument is that ‘competition as if’ implies that a dominant undertaking ought not to 
behave as if it had market power and has a “special responsibility” of observing a much higher 
degree of care than an undertaking which lacks substantial market power. Consequently, this 
standard imposes a limitation on economic freedom. I partially agree with this criticism but argue 
that imposing limits on the behavior of a dominant undertaking does not contradict the precepts 
of ordoliberal economic freedom. What it does do is set negative limits to secure the protection of 
competition and prevent abuses of market power vis-à-vis consumers. However, I agree that a 
dominant undertaking should not be deprived of its right to exercise performance competition – 
Leistungswettbewerb – in accordance with the limits imposed by an ordoliberal competition law. 
To conclude, I propose that contemporary ordoliberal competition policy should distance itself 
from the idea of ‘competition as if’ due to its deficiencies, and rather opt for setting clear 
competitive rules defining which types of behavior ought to be captured by Missbrauchprinzip.  
4.3.4 Ordoliberalism, use of economics and the “more economic approach” 
In the last decade, the supporters of a “more economic approach” to EU competition law have 
argued against ordoliberal ideas in an “attempt to replace the protection of the competitive 
process by a welfare maximization goal in stark contrast to an Ordoliberal conception.”461 In this 
sense, some authors hold that an ordoliberal conception of competition law is outdated, 
formalistic, old fashioned or even utopian,462 and incompatible with the use of microeconomics 
and industrial organization within EU competition law, and the economically informed legal 
analysis methodology I employ in this dissertation as discussed in chapter 2, section 2.2.1. 
The proponents of such a view argue that EU competition policy (rectius the Commission’s view 
on EU competition policy)463 has departed from an ordoliberal approach to adopt a “more 
economic approach”, which is less form-based and more effect-based as also recently proposed 
by Advocate General Wahl in his Opinion in Intel Corporation v Commission;464 or, put 
differently, more “mathematic”, which allegedly confers a presumption of scientific validity; 
                                                          
460 Maier-Rigaud [2012], p. 146. 
461 Kiran Klaus Patel and Heike Schweitzer (eds), The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law (Oxford 
University Press 2013), p. 223; Giorgio Monti, ‘EU Competition Law from Rome to Lisbon - Social Market 
Economy’ in Caroline Heide-Jørgensen and others (eds), Aims and Values in Competition Law (DJØF Publ. 2013), 
p. 44-49. 
462 Such is the opinion of Venit (2004), p. 1157-1178; see also: van Doorn, p. 19. Cf with the moderate opinion of 
Gerber who claims that some ordoliberal positions are obsolete whereas others are still valid in Gerber (1994), p. 75-
83. 
463 Behrens ‘The "Consumer Choice" Paradigm in German Ordoliberalism and its Impact upon EU Competition 
Law’ (2014). 




however, these ‘more economically informed’ arguments may not always be as non-value laden 
or objective as is claimed, as also remarked by Wils.465 Also, as stressed by Hayek, economic 
modeling cannot be tested in reality because competition is a ‘discovery process’ in which the 
facts of the case are the means by which the outcome of the situation is discovered.466  
Furthermore, these claims against ordoliberalism and its lack of ‘economic sense’ have arguably 
arisen from misrepresentations, lack of knowledge of ordoliberal ideas, or by recourse to the 
works of figures such as Röpke, Miksch and Müller-Armack. These authors advocate more 
extreme versions of political interventionism, social and distributive welfare concerns, and purely 
formalistic approaches to competition policy. It must be said that these ideas, however, do not 
represent the majoritarian view among ordoliberals. Also, the attacks against ordoliberalism are 
sometimes due to the less ‘economically inclined’ teleological interpretation of the law made by 
the Courts, whereby ordoliberal ideas can be confused with the legal reasoning, rather than 
objections against ordoliberalism itself.467  
I reject such extreme views, as an ordoliberal conception of competition law is more complex 
than pure formalisms or advocacy of state interventionism. Furthermore, ordoliberalism does not 
reject the use of economic insights to solve specific cases nor to improve the quality of legal 
standards and legislation. In fact, the Ordoliberal School was a pioneer in integrating economic 
thinking into the application of law. Indeed, these positions overlook the fact that ordoliberal 
competition is part of an institutional economics policy with the aim of the achievement of 
societal order based on imposed rules governing the market and not a microeconomic trend of 
competition economics or industrial organization.468  
In contrast, I put forward that an ordoliberal conception of competition policy is neither archaic, 
nor incompatible with the use of economic theory for competition law. An ordoliberally-inspired 
EU competition policy is not necessarily at odds with a more detailed microeconomic analysis of 
competition practices; to do so would indeed be archaic and simplistic. This approach does not 
preclude the use of economic expertise to refine the praxis of competition law in the assessment 
of cases and also to model and improve the legal regime. 
However, ordoliberalism is not compatible with the advocates of a “more economic approach” 
that argue for a departure from the rule of law by adopting a case-by-case assessment based on 
                                                          
465 Wils (2014), p. 412. 
466 F.A. Hayek, ‘Competition as a Discovery Procedure’ in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the 
History of Ideas (University of Chicago Press 1978), p. 179. 
467 See for example the criticism of Venit in Venit (2004), aimed at the lack of economic a serious economic 
assessment by the CJEU in the buyer power related case Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v 
Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:343, and the subsequent appeal in Judgment of 15 
March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166. 
468 Vanberg ‘Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom – On the Normative Foundations of 
Competition Policy’ (2009), p. 13. 
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pure welfare considerations as a guiding policy instrument without the existence of more formal 
or structured rules defining the economic game.469 In other words, I disagree with claiming that a 
case-by-case assessment based on pure welfare considerations without regard to some general 
rules can improve competition and provide legal uses with a fair degree of predictability.470 If a 
more economic approach, however, is understood as advocating for the use of economic insights 
and in accordance and as allowed by the rules in place,471 then ordoliberalism agrees with such 
“more economically informed” analysis of the cases. Consequently, an ordoliberal competition 
policy agrees with what Schweitzer and Patel have qualified as a “light” approach, suggesting a 
review of the established application of competition law to be in line with economic theory so 
that “EU competition (law) can be interpreted in a more concise and unerring manner.”472 
Furthermore, indeed it is possible to combine ordoliberalism as a competition policy with modern 
microeconomics and industrial organization, provided the level of applications of economics 
within the law is correctly understood. An ordoliberal inspired policy shapes and sets the rules 
and aims of an institutional framework, whereas a neo-classical microeconomic analysis of the 
cases is the concrete application of the competition policy.473 By distinguishing these levels of 
application on a macro and micro level, it is possible to introduce economic efficiency analysis 
when deciding specific cases through the interpretation of the competition rules that are applied 
to the concrete case if such possibility is foreseen by the legislator or the judiciary, such as in the 
case of Article 101(3) TFEU. This does not mean, however, that a case-by-case economic 
approach influences competition policy, but quite the opposite: it is competition policy that 
allows for a case-by-case economic assessment. As noted by Vanberg: 
The advocates of economic freedom and Leistungswettbewerb have no reason to deny that 
comparing the prospective welfare effects of alternative rules of the market game is an essential 
prerequisite in choosing an economic constitution, and that economics can provide an important 
service by informing about the working properties of potential alternative systems of rules. What 
                                                          
469 Somewhat similar is the view of Vanberg who claims that in an ordoliberal based system “competition policy 
cannot make the right of private law subjects to exercise such freedom contingent on how economic advisors assess 
the welfare effects in particular instances, and that welfare considerations can have their legitimate place only at the 
constitutional level where the rules of the economic game are chosen”, ibid, p. 27. See also the opinion of Gormsen 
when stating that ordoliberal competition policy “is shaped by the rule of law rather than by ad hoc political 
decision-making”, in Gormsen ‘The Conflict Between Economic Freedom and Consumer Welfare in the 
Modernisation of Article 82 EC’ (2007), p. 334. 
470 See also: Vanberg ‘Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom – On the Normative Foundations 
of Competition Policy’ (2009), p. 24. 
471 This is, the analysis under Article 101(3) TFEU and the interpretation by the CJEU concerning objective 
considerations regarding Article 102 TFEU. 
472 Schweitzer and Patel distinguish three aspects of the “more economic approach”, one proposing changing the 
goals of EU competition law, another using economics to establish the relevant facts and decide accordingly, and the 
“light” version which advocates using modern economics to guide the application of the law. See more in Patel and 
Schweitzer [2013], p. 220. See also: Heike Schweitzer, ‘Recent Developments in EU Competition Law (2006–2008): 
Single-Firm Dominance and the Interpretation of Article 82’ 5 European Review of Contract Law (2009) 175. 
473 Vanberg ‘Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom – On the Normative Foundations of 
Competition Policy’ (2009), p. 10. 
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they reject is the claim that a ‘more economic approach’ can help to improve competition policy 
by informing about the specific welfare effects in particular instances.474 
Therefore, ordoliberalism is an economic school of thought that allows and advocates for the use 
of economic knowledge to guide the application of the law to guarantee, to the greatest extent 
possible, an economically coherent interpretation of law. However, ordoliberal ideas are not 
compatible with extreme views of the “more economic approach” that advocate resorting to 
economic knowledge and pure case-by-case analysis without regard to the legal construction or 
the goals of protecting competition as a process and a degree of economic freedom. Also, such a 
conception is also in line with the economically informed legal analysis method employed in this 
dissertation. 
4.3.5 The role of the state: limited role for administrative discretion 
Ordoliberals endorse the idea of a strong state restraining competition forces and securing the 
social and political pre-requisites to secure individual economic freedom – represented by the 
right of property and freedom of contracting475– which is seen as the paramount value.476 In other 
words, economic freedom needs to be restricted and protected by law from its unregulated 
exercise to guarantee its existence.477 This strong state should act as market police478 – 
Marktpolizei – and promote the idea of responsible entrepreneurship by intervening in society’s 
social, ethical and normative frameworks.479  
The role of the state as a Marktpolizei presupposes the creation of a competition authority, the 
Kartellamt, with two roles. Firstly, it determines whenever there is a breach of the rules of the 
competitive game. Secondly, by sanctioning economic actors by their wrong-doing attempts, it 
aims at restoring the competitive game.480  
In practice, achieving freedom to compete requires laws limiting the influence of both private and 
public power in the sphere of individual economic freedom, by setting an institutional and 
legislative framework. These rules limit ad-hoc decision-making and administrative discretion.481 
Ordoliberalism prefers the adoption of a set of general clauses allowing or precluding behaviors – 
in a rather ‘formalistic’ or by nature manner – while also accepting exceptions for cases 
incompatible due to economic grounds with these rules of thumb. This rather ‘formalistic’ 
                                                          
474 Ibid, p. 19 (emphasis added). 
475 Kerber and Vanberg [2001], p. 64. 
476 Bonefeld (2012), p. 634 and 638. 
477 Ibid, p. 639. 
478 The idea of a “Marktpolizei” was proposed by Rüstow and the concept included, among other aspects, the idea of 
a competition enforcement agency. For more on the concept of market police see, inter alia, Hartwich, p. 17; 
Bonefeld (2012), p. 649; Somma (2013), p. 106. 
479 Bonefeld (2012), p. 651. 
480 Hartwich, p. 17. 
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approach has been criticized for being simplistic and ungrounded on economic terms.482 What the 
criticism fails to recognize is that ordoliberalism does not preclude deviating from the formal rule 
and it does in fact permit recourse to exceptions whenever the economic outcome of the practice 
is in conflict with text of the law. The key for the ordoliberal policy, then, is the adoption of rules 
within the economic constitution allowing for such exceptions and not a practice based on pure 
economic efficiency concerns and administrative discretion without a rule allowing for it. This 
leads to the problem of how the state and its organs can remain impartial in the selection of cases 
and application of competition law. Unfortunately, no theoretical answer can be readily provided, 
apart from stating that if the set of rules are clear, pre-established and ‘neutral’ then the 
Marktpolizei should remain independent and free from political and economic pressure. This is 
not borne out in reality though; such an example can be found in the ordoliberal-inspired German 
Act Against Restraints of Competition, where the Federal Minister of Economics and Technology 
may overrule a decision by the Bundeskartellamt declaring the compatibility of a merger not only 
due to economic efficiencies but on the grounds that it is justified by “an overriding public 
interest.”483 
4.4 Buyer power policy from an ordoliberal perspective 
The exposition thus far presented paves the way for a discussion regarding how ordoliberalism 
looks at buyer power, allowing me to contrast the EU regulation of buyer power with an 
ordoliberal competition policy benchmark. To do so, specificities regarding the policy treatment 
of buyer power under an ordoliberal approach are discussed. This section sets the competition 
policy foundation through which the current EU legislation is contrasted from an ordoliberal 
perspective, as discussed in the methodology chapter 2, section 2.3, and aims at identifying and 
constructing an ordoliberal buyer power policy benchmark inspired by this economic school of 
thought. Furthermore, with this economic benchmark it is possible to analyze whether the content 
of the EU buyer power regulation, and also beyond the EU, from a legal and economic 
perspective, are similar – and to what extent – to an ordoliberal competition policy. Furthermore, 
the use of this benchmark tool is also justified as it establishes an economic ground to which the 
economically informed legal analysis, which I employ as a methodology, can be compared to.  
4.4.1 Need for buyer power specific regulation? 
Ordoliberalism advocates for state intervention in the economic sphere by setting clear rules 
directing the competitive process to secure freedom of competition. These laws are incorporated 
as part of the “economic constitution” by means of a competition law. In line with this, one of the 
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483 §42.1. of the Act Against Restraints of Competition (2014) last amended by Article 5 of the Act of 21.07.2014 
(Federal Law Gazette I, p.1066). 
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sub-research questions formulated in this dissertation debates whether from an ordoliberal 
perspective there is a need for introducing some modification to EU competition law at a 
statutory level to deal with buyer power? 
I submit that in the current state of the law, the current provisions are adequate and broad enough 
to incorporate through teleological interpretation, an ordoliberally modelled buyer power 
regulation. Interestingly, albeit not surprisingly, this is the same conclusion van Doorn recently 
reached from a consumer welfare perspective, following a ‘Chicagoan’ approach, although he 
admits that a “pure consumer welfare standard” does not fit all buyer power cases.484 What 
ordoliberalism demands, however, is an economically informed and legally consistent judicial 
treatment of buyer power. This is, the development of a clear, coherent, economically grounded 
and predictable body of EU case law that clearly distinguishes between monopsony and 
bargaining power effects and defines which type of practices under certain circumstances are an 
expression of abusive buyer market power. To facilitate this identification, I have designed this 
dissertation as studying buyer power problems anchored on theories of harm that may serve as 
guidance for courts, NCAs and practitioners to identify potentially dangerous expressions of 
buyer power. Lastly, in an ordoliberal setting, it would be ideal that it is the case law and not 
Commission’s guidance notices – i.e.: soft law – that is the legal instrument making the 
distinction.485 Nevertheless, non-binding guidance from the Commission is welcome, as it can be 
more thorough and analytical in comparison to a judicial decision.  
I am aware of the difficulty of such task and also that it is unlikely that the Courts will soon 
develop such a comprehensive, economically informed and coherent body of case law. There are 
several reasons which are the grounds for this difficulty. Firstly, the random nature of cases 
discussed at a judicial level. Secondly, the infrequency with which buyer powers hitherto have 
been litigated against the Courts. Thirdly, it may be unlikely that the Courts will render 
judgments with a detailed and specified economic content for buyer power regulation, as it may 
appear that such a task involves the evaluation of complex economic matters that may fall outside 
its revision scope.486 The task of incorporating the advocated dual legal treatment to buyer power 
                                                          
484 van Doorn. 
485 The legal impact of such guiding tools is moderate; despite they have the power to bind the Commission as it is 
not free to depart from what it has stated in its notices based on the principle of legitimate expectations, the guidance 
notices do not have the value as a binding legal source as I discuss in chapter 2. 
486 In my view, distinguishing between monopsony and bargaining power cases and choosing the appropriate guiding 
theory of harm should be considered as a manifest error in appraisal. Also, the issue of the scope of judicial review 
has been subject to an interesting development and non-consistent case law. See: Eric Barbier de la Serre, ‘Standard 
of Review in Competition Law Cases: Posten Norge and Beyond’ in EFTA Court (ed), The EEA and the EFTA 
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limited scope for reviewing complex economic matters. For these inconsistencies see, inter alia, claiming a reduced 
scope for judicial review: Judgment of 11 July 2007, Alrosa v Commission, T-170/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:220, para. 
122; Judgment of 7 February 2004 in Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, Joined cases C-204/00 P, C-
205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P, EU:C:2004:6, para. 279; Judgment of 11 July 1985 
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and the different theories of harm, nevertheless, may also be carried out by the Commission 
and/or NCAs when dealing with specific cases, as part of its function is the evaluation of 
complex economic matters. It is, then, the Commission, aside from academic work, who in 
practice should lead an economically coherent treatment of buyer power in EU competition law. 
4.4.2 A differentiated general treatment for buyer power 
This dissertation proposes that monopsony and bargaining power effects must receive a 
differentiated treatment by EU competition law, but the rules covering specificities related to 
monopsony and bargaining power effects ought to be applied uniformly regardless of the type 
(not effect) of anti-competitive behavior that the involved undertaking(s) has (or have) allegedly 
entered into. In other words, the proposed model of buyer power treatment should be applied in a 
consistent, coherent, comprehensive and uniform manner irrespective of the typology of the case 
under investigation.487 In so doing, this dissertation rejects the idea of adopting different buyer 
power policies depending on the typology of case faced by the NCA or Courts. However, I do 
acknowledge that ex-ante it would be difficult, without reviewing the facts of the case, to 
determine whether it is an exercise of monopsony or bargaining power. 
A comprehensive and generalized monopsony and bargaining theory applied across all typology 
of cases is consequent with the ordoliberal postulate of generalistic rules of uniform application 
and the form-effect proposal. Additionally, this comprehensive generalized treatment is in-line 
with neoclassical literature discussing the models of buyer power. The different models do not 
distinguish between merger cases or abuse of dominance cases, for example. In microeconomic 
terms, bargaining power will be bargaining power regardless of whether it was exercised by a 
single dominant undertaking or by a pool of undertakings acting as a sole entity in a joint exercise 
of buyer market power. 
It might appear to some that distinguishing between monopsony and bargaining power is a mere 
formalistic distinction and that it ought to be left to the case-by-case assessment of welfare 
consequences. To a certain extent, the distinction is formalistic because predictable laws require 
different theoretical constructs to differentiate economic realities. This distinction is also 
economically fundamental because monopsony and buyer power are different phenomena.  
To briefly recapitulate the proposals covered in chapter 3, sections 3.5 and 3.6, behaviors 
generating monopsony effects shall be treated as economically inefficient and undesirable 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
in Remia v Commission, C-42/84, EU:C:1985:327, para. 34. For judgments arguing that the scope is larger see: 
Judgment of 8 December 2011 in KME Germany and Others v Commission, C-389/10 P, EU:C:2011:816, para. 121; 
and from an EFTA Court perspective see: E-15/10 - Posten Norge AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2012], para. 
102, where it clearly stated that “the submission that the Court may intervene only if it considers a complex 
economic assessment of ESA to be manifestly wrong must be rejected”. 
487 One of the aims of my dissertation is to determine if this homogenous and coherent treatment applies in EU 
competition law to all types of buyer power cases. 
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whereas bargaining power effects should be treated as, almost always, procompetitive if the 
undertaking exerting it does not fit the hourglass model. On the one hand, monopsonistic 
practices ought to be considered as object restriction offenses under Article 101 TFEU and in 
breach of Article 102 TFEU, as restricting purchases with the sole aim of reducing the purchasing 
price unduly distorts competition by itself and is virtually economically unjustifiable from both a 
consumer and total welfare perspective. However, monopsony behavior might not have negative 
welfare effects (or much less) if the purchasing method incorporates a two-part tariff model.  
On the other hand, bargaining power practices will be in principle considered as pro-competitive, 
particularly if the buyer does not possess substantial market power in the downstream market 
where it carries out its subsequent economic activity. However, even in those circumstances, 
bargaining power might cause competition harm in the upstream market that affects the ability of 
buyers or suppliers to effectively compete and that, in the long run, are capable of harming end 
consumers by means of less intensity of competition and therefore higher prices, less innovation 
and quality. Furthermore, if the undertaking possesses substantial market power downstream then 
the competition authority must investigate the case in depth to determine whether bargaining 
power can be detrimental from a consumer welfare standard perspective, in addition to any kind 
of upstream anti-competitive effects. The key difference with monopsony, then is that, in 
principle, bargaining power would have the ability to reduce purchasing prices towards the 
competitive level and, therefore, be efficient in the case of bargaining power with two-part tariff 
contracts, or at least more efficient than monopsony practices with linear contracts, as I discussed 
in chapter 3, section 3.4. 
Lastly, by adopting a comprehensive and generalized monopsony and bargaining theory, I 
deliberately opt for securing legal certainty and predictability of the cases at the expense, in the 
minority of cases, of concrete justice. However, the proposed buyer power treatment is quite 
specific as it advocates for the adoption of two theories of harm for monopsony effects and four 
for bargaining power effects. Understood as such, the general policy and rule of thumb does 
distinguish among the practical scenarios, in reality. The challenge, in any event, is the correct 
assessment of the case and the subsequent application of the appropriate derived rule. 
4.4.3 Which welfare standard and which kind of harm triggers competition 
intervention in buyer power cases? 
Welfare standards and the type of welfare which seeks to be maximized by competition is a 
fundamental matter for our discipline.488 There are three basic ways of approaching this topic. On 
the one hand, we have consumer welfare or surplus, which is the difference between “the 
maximum amount that a consumer is willing to pay for a good and the amount that the consumer 
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actually pays”.489 For instance, if a buyer values a kilo of beef at €19 but pays €17 there is a 
difference of 2 euros in their favor and this represents the surplus for that specific consumer. In 
more economic terms, the consumer welfare surplus is represented by an area under the demand 
curve but which happens to be above the set price.490 Producer (supplier) surplus is defined the 
other way around, as the difference a supplier keeps between the price it is willing to sell a good 
for and the payment it has obtained. On economic terms, it is denoted as the area “above the 
marginal cost curve but below the price”, or the excess of what goods were sold for.491 Lastly, 
total surplus or social welfare is represented by the sum of both consumer and supplier surplus. 
Opting for a type of welfare standard is important because it provides guidance to competition 
authorities when it comes to determining what type of surplus the policy is aiming to maximize. 
However, in practice, the distinction is of less importance than it may seem because, for most 
cases, as remarked by Bishop and Walker, “maximising consumer welfare and maximising social 
welfare require the same outcomes”.492 
EU competition policy – arguably the Commission’s493 – seems to advocate for the adoption of a 
(short term) consumer welfare standard that triggers competition intervention based on end 
consumer harm.494 With such an approach it is assumed that the competitive outcome should be 
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490 Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 2-015. 
491 Ibid, para. 2-015. 
492 Ibid, para. 2-019. 
493 See, inter alia, in the Commission’s official documents different expressions advocating for the adoption of a 
consumer welfare standard: “[t]he objective of Article 81 is to protect competition on the market as a means of 
enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources”, Communication from the 
Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/97, para. 13; “[t]he 
objective of Article 101 is to ensure that undertakings do not use agreements – in this context, vertical agreements – 
to restrict competition on the market to the detriment of consumers” in Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 
130/1, para. 7; “[e]ffective competition brings benefits to consumers, such as low prices, high quality products, a 
wide selection of goods and services, and innovation. Through its control of mergers, the Commission prevents 
mergers that would be likely to deprive customers of these benefits by significantly increasing the market power of 
firms” in Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 8; “[…] it is competition and not competitors, that 
should be protected. Ultimately, the aim is to avoid consumer harm”, Philip Lowe, ‘Consumer Welfare and 
Efficiency – New Guiding Principles of Competition Policy?’ (13th International Conference on Competition and 
14th European Competition Day); Neelie Kroes, ‘The European Commission's Enforcement Priorities as Regards 
Exclusionary Abuses of Dominance - Current Thinking’ 4 Competition Law International (2008) 5, p. 5. For some 
literature on the topic, see: Gormsen, [2010], p. 20 to 58; Svend Albæk, ‘Consumer Welfare in EU Competition 
Policy’ in Caroline Heide-Jørgensen and others (eds), Aims and values in competition law (DJØF Publ. 2013), p. 67-
87; Behrens ‘The "Consumer Choice" Paradigm in German Ordoliberalism and its Impact upon EU Competition 
Law’ (2014). On why choosing a welfare standard matters see: Blair and Sokol (2012). 
494 For Kaplow and Shavell the concept of welfare encompasses less than the broader concept of “well-being” or 
“utility” which in addition to pure economic profit for buyers and sellers also include more diffuse concepts such as 
fairness, aesthetic fulfillment, and so forth. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare (Harvard 
University Press 2002). 
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to the benefit of consumers;495 this, as noted by Orbach, is a “phrase of great rhetorical power” 
but diffuse content.496 However, to date, the Courts have never pronounced anything regarding 
which “welfare standard” is pursued by EU competition policy. If anything, the Courts seem 
more eager to adopt a broad protecting competition as such and market structures, in general and 
for buyer power cases - as recently ratified by the CJEU in Post Danmark II -497 and particularly 
the concern for the wellbeing of weaker buyers’ situation which is clearly appreciated when 
reviewing the treatment of countervailing buyer power as discussed in extenso in chapter 10, 
section 10.8,498 and concerning imposing minimum purchasing prices (discussed in chapter 11), 
price discrimination and unfair trading practices vis-à-vis suppliers as discussed in chapter 9.499 
The discussion of the welfare standard advocated by ordoliberalism in general and for buyer 
power cases is interesting. Historically, the first wave of ordoliberals did not discuss welfare 
standards in the modern economic language.500 In my research, I have determined that, for an 
ordoliberal buyer power policy, the welfare standard employed is an aggregated consumer 
welfare standard that has been embedded, particularly, in the works of Böhm and Eucken as part 
of the concept of Leistungswettbewerb, and which takes into account consumer harm in the long 
run by pursuing dynamic efficiency in the medium and long run and not pure static short-term 
consumer surplus. More importantly, this standing further implies that an ordoliberal buyer 
power policy anchored on a dualistic treatment of buyer power cases implies that a broad harm 
standard must apply in buyer power cases; i.e. competition law intervention should not only be 
triggered whenever there is anti-competitive harm regarding end consumer surplus in the 
downstream market. 
Indeed, in Böhm’s view, the criterion distinguishing what qualifies as a permissible behavior and 
what constitutes forbidden behavior is consumer interest. Yet, Akman holds that “ordoliberal 
                                                          
495 Cf with Bork who argues that economic efficiency should be the goal of competition law in Bork, [1978]. Blair 
and Sokol argue that despite he used the wording “consumer welfare” he meant in reality “total welfare” in Blair and 
Sokol (2012), p. 476. Also arguing that Bork’s expression is confusing and meant aggregated welfare, see Carstensen 
‘Emerging Issues in Buyer Power Analysis’ (2012), p. 4. 
496 Barak Y. Orbach, ‘The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox’ 7 Journal of Competition Law & Economics (2010) 
133. 
497 Judgment of 6 October 2015 in Post Danmark, C-23/14, EU:C:2015:651, para. 26. 
498 Cf with the position of the US Supreme Court in Antitrust matters, less concerned with the market structure or 
freedom to compete in the upstream market and more with end results when holding that “[l]ow prices benefit 
consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten 
competition” in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 238 340. (1990), p. 340. 
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the preferred welfare standard. Cf this with the views of Vanberg who considers that the debate should not be 
focused on which welfare standard to use but rather on the protection of economic freedom and the need to 
distinguish whether the discussion is to be centered at the constitutional level or at the sub-constitutional level of 
policy choices in Vanberg ‘Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom – On the Normative 
Foundations of Competition Policy’ (2009). 
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ideas are inconsistent with the ‘consumer welfare’ approach.”501 In a similar fashion, Gormsen 
argues that protecting economic freedom and consumer welfare are incompatible and that 
consumer welfare is not a motivation for economic freedom in the slightest degree.502 Other 
views suggest that ordoliberalism supports total welfare standard “as the result of a truly 
competitive process”, as expressed by Behrens,503 or that it supports a soft-total welfare standard 
and that it was an influential precedent for the position of the Chicago School in such matters.504 
However, firstly, for ordoliberalism, consumer welfare is not only a director of the decisions of 
economic actors but also the justifiable economic interest of economic activity. Secondly, 
holding, as Bonefeld seems to suggest, that ordoliberal ideas were influential in the development 
of the Chicago School is historically inaccurate as, even today, ordoliberal ideas are largely 
unknown – or misunderstood – in the English-speaking world.505 
The ordoliberal ‘aggregated consumer welfare’ is a compromise between the pure consumer 
welfare standard and a full total welfare standard that tries to strike a balance between consumer 
protection and protection of competition as a process. This compromise is reached by 
understanding that, for ordoliberalism, the consumer shall not only be the end consumer in the 
downstream market but also other consumers (buyers) in the competitive process, as well as 
suppliers vis-à-vis powerful buyers.506 In addition, the protection of the consumer’s interest 
should be medium/long-term oriented and not purely short-term driven,507 because protecting the 
competitive process prevents harm to end consumers and reduction of their welfare. The focus is 
therefore on achieving dynamic efficiency that goes beyond pure static allocative efficiency. For 
Böhm, one of the characteristics of the private law society is that “not only is the satisfaction of 
consumer needs well above the average for the members of the wealthy class but also they are 
offered totally different possibilities of productive activity within society”.508 He claims that 
                                                          
501 Akman ‘Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82 EC’ (2009), p. 268. 
502 Gormsen ‘The Conflict Between Economic Freedom and Consumer Welfare in the Modernisation of Article 82 
EC’ (2007), p. 330-331 and 343. 
503 Behrens ‘The "Consumer Choice" Paradigm in German Ordoliberalism and its Impact upon EU Competition 
Law’ (2014), p. 27 to 32. 
504 Such is the interpretation of Bonefeld of Foucault’s view on ordoliberalism as Vitalpolitik, see: Bonefeld (2012), 
p. 633-656; Bonefeld (2012), p. 139-171. 
505 Also stressing the fact that ordoliberal ideas have not been broadly published in English see: Behrens ‘The 
"Consumer Choice" Paradigm in German Ordoliberalism and its Impact upon EU Competition Law’ (2014), p. 17. 
506 This mid approach also appears to be the one taken by the CJEU in Post Danmark II when dealing with 
efficiencies defenses but not market harm when stating that “it is for the dominant undertaking to show that the 
efficiency gains likely to result from the conduct under consideration counteract any likely negative effects on 
competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets” in Judgment of 6 October 2015 in Post Danmark, C-
23/14, EU:C:2015:651, para. 49, and see also para. 69 (emphasis added). See also stating that consumer is not only 
the final one Albæk [2013], p. 75. 
507 Bundeskartellamt ‘Buyer Power in Competition Law - Status and Perspectives’ (2008), p. 13. See discussing how 
to determine medium and long term welfare in dynamic efficiency terms: Vikas Kathuria, ‘A Conceptual Framework 
to Identify Dynamic Efficiency’ 11 European Competition Journal (2015) 319. 
508 Böhm [1989], p, 59. 
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consumer concerns are “the sole directly justifiable economic interest”.509 Consequently, if the 
consumer’s interest and satisfaction are the justifiable economic interest there is little doubt that 
the economic efficiency of a market behavior shall be tested by using a consumer welfare 
standard as a benchmark or reference tool.510 Also, the concept of performance competition – 
Leistungswettbewerb511 – recognizes consumer welfare standard as the yardstick tool for 
measuring the competitive outcome. Leistungswettbewerb describes the idea of competition 
among undertakings for the production of better services and products for consumers.512 In this 
regard, market order seeks to assure “that the only road to business success is through the narrow 
gate of better performance in service of the consumer and not through many back doors of unfair 
and subversive competition”.513 For Vanberg, establishing the Leistungswettbewerb standard 
implies adopting rules that would make consumers’ preferences the “ultimate controlling force in 
the process of production.”514 Thus, ordoliberal thinking without employing the same 
microeconomic language as contemporary competition economics also advocates for an idea of 
“consumer sovereignty” with the aim of achieving consumer welfare. 
On the other hand, the ordoliberal construct argues for a broader welfare approach because it 
pursues the protection of the competitive process, which implies a concern for the wellbeing of 
the competitive structures and the balancing of gains and losses among all parties, including 
suppliers vis-à-vis powerful buyers.515 A focus anchored exclusively on short-term consumer 
welfare may lead to a “disproportionate focus on the selling side of the market and an under 
appreciation” of buyer power risks, which is at odds with the protection of the freedom to 
compete and competition as such.516 This, however, should not be understood as protection of 
inefficient undertakings that deserve no competition protection as this implies less efficient use of 
resources and welfare loss. 
4.4.3.1 Which type of harm is needed to trigger the application of competition law? 
Related to the former and the aggregated consumer standard is the question of which type of 
harm or in which market must harm exist to trigger the application of competition law in buyer 
                                                          
509 F. Böhm, ‘The Non-State (“Natural”) Laws Inherent in a Competitive Economy’ in W. Stützel, et alia (ed), 
Standard Texts on the Social Market Economy (1992), p. 107. 
510 For a thorough discussion of the ordoliberal ideas of “consumer choice” see: Behrens ‘The "Consumer Choice" 
Paradigm in German Ordoliberalism and its Impact upon EU Competition Law’ (2014). 
511 As noted by Gerber, the concept of Leistungswettbewerb was firstly coined by Nipperdey – not an ordoliberal 
himself - in 1930 to distinguish the idea of performance competition that later evolved in the ordoliberal thinking to 
represent consumer’s preference as the coordinator of the production process, Gerber (1994), p. 53. 
512 Vanberg, ‘Freiburg School of Law and Economics’ [1998], p. 177. 
513 Wilhelm Röpke, A Humane Economy (Third Edition edn, ISI Books 1998), p. 31. 
514 Vanberg ‘Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom – On the Normative Foundations of 
Competition Policy’ (2009), p. 15. 
515 Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust 
Policy’ (2010), p. 23. 
516 Ibid p. 46. See also: Carstensen ‘Emerging Issues in Buyer Power Analysis’ (2012), p. 4. 
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power cases. For ordoliberalism, and connected with the interest in protecting competition as a 
process and the economic freedom of market participants, competition law intervention in buyer 
power cases is warranted even if there is no downstream end consumer harm, because buyer 
power distortions in the upstream market affect competition as a process and market participants’ 
economic freedom.517 
This broader ordoliberal approach to the competition harm required to trigger the application of 
the law is of practical importance. A posture that advocates for triggering competition law only 
upon the existence of end consumer harm focuses its analysis on pure downstream competition 
considerations and, likely, purely static efficiency concerns.518 According to such a perspective, if 
the buying conduct has no direct end consumer harm – regardless of the impact it might have in 
the competitive process in the upstream market – competition intervention would not be 
necessary. Such is the approach, as will be discussed in this thesis, that is taken in the US and that 
seems to be preferred by the Commission pursuant the “more economic approach”. 
Instead, a broader approach to competition harm implies that competition law will be applicable 
in buyer power whenever, in addition to the short-term wellbeing of end consumers, 
ordoliberalism looks at the interest of all consumers and suppliers in the production chain. 
Furthermore, the analysis is not anchored on a static efficiency concern but rather the medium 
and long-term consequences for the competitive structure upstream and downstream, as well as 
implications connected to economic freedom. This is so because a limited protection of 
producers’ interest against anti-competitive conducts generated by buyer power is compatible 
with the protection of competition and efficiency, as remarked by Jones, from a US antitrust law 
perspective.519 Protecting competition as such, economic freedom and the competitive process 
serves consumers in the medium and long-term as market concentration is kept in check, markets 
are healthy and market power does not erode the benefits of the market economy. 
A similar position to this compromised approach has been suggested recently by Kirkwood, who 
argues that: 
[t]he purpose of antitrust law – of competition law – is to combat conduct that both diminishes 
competition and reduces consumer welfare. For this reason, the fundamental goal of antitrust law 
is best described as protecting ‘consumers from anticompetitive conduct – conduct that creates 
market power, transfers wealth from consumers to producers, and fails to provide consumers with 
compensating benefits.520  
                                                          
517 “The buyer power cases are, overall, more consistent with the proposition that the concern of antitrust law is 
primarily with preserving and protecting the competitive process than with some specific economic theory of 
efficiency”, Carstensen ‘Emerging Issues in Buyer Power Analysis’ (2012), p. 4. 
518 See expressing concern about an excessive focus on static efficiency within the end consumer welfare: Bishop 
and Walker, [2010], para. 2-019. 
519 William K Jones, ‘Concerted Refusals to Deal and the Producer Interest in Antitrust’ 50 Ohio State Law Journal 
(1989) 73, p. 89. 
520 Kirkwood (2014), p. 30 (emphasis added). 
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This broader approach to competition intervention against abuses of buyer market power is also 
consistent with the adoption of a dualistic approach to buyer power effects, as it captures in full 
the outcome of the buyer power exercise and allows for an adequate analysis of the full buyer 
power effects on competition as such and not solely on behalf of the affected markets.  
Another benefit of this broader approach to competition intervention, anchored on harm to the 
competition process, is that it avoids risks of under enforcement in terms of a pure end consumer 
harm standard, because it captures instances where the anti-competitive effect occurs in the 
upstream and which may not have an impact on the downstream market in the short-term or, also, 
simply because the undertakings are not downstream competitors. 
This broader approach to the triggering of competition intervention whenever the harm affects the 
competitive structure in either the upstream and downstream market, even if the conduct may not 
have a direct detriment to end consumer’s conditions in the short run, which is advocated by 
ordoliberalism, also finds support in the EU case law, as expressly recognized by the CJEU in T-
Mobile Netherlands and Others521 and also in TeliaSonera Sverige.522 If the harm does affect the 
competitive structure and competition as such, then the ordoliberal welfare approach argues that 
such conduct does indeed warrant competition intervention, even if there is no short-term 
detriment to consumer conditions.523 Such an intermediate solution appears to be the one taken by 
the Courts for buyer power cases, as expressed by Ezrachi and Ioannidou:  
In the context of buyer power, most interesting are statements from the European Court which 
widen the goals of competition policy to include market structure and the process of competition. 
Such statements may support intervention even when buyer power does not directly harm 
consumers but does adversely affect upstream producers.524 
It must be stressed, however, that not any type of upstream consumer harm will trigger the 
application of competition law from an ordoliberal perspective. There are some buyers and 
suppliers that when facing buyer market power would be exploited and excluded because these 
undertakings are not efficient undertakings and for the market and competition as a whole they 
are better outside of the market, or when the situation involves a pure issue of profit distribution 
among parties, such as is the case of must unfair purchasing practices as I discuss in chapter 9. 
Intervention is warranted when upstream competition is endangered because there are cases of 
unjustified and spread exclusion or (efficient) supplier are exploited in a way that are forced 
outside of the market. This could also happen whenever the exertion of buyer market power has 
an adverse impact in innovation, quality or product diversity in the medium and long term. In all 
                                                          
521 Judgment of 4 June 2009 in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, C-8/08, EU:C:2009:343, para. 36-37. 
522 Judgment of 17 February 2011 in TeliaSonera Sverige, C-52/09, EU:C:2011:83, para. 22. 
523 Bundeskartellamt ‘Buyer Power in Competition Law - Status and Perspectives’ (2008), p. 13. Arguing that this 
posture can be derived from the EU case law in buyer power cases see also: Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 73. 
524 Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 73. 
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these cases competition law is triggered because the harm to competition as such has the potential 
to harm end consumers in the medium and long term. 
In this dissertation, I will evaluate whether such a compromised solution that appears to be in-line 
with ordoliberal thinking is employed by the Courts, even if it is employed with the aim of 
protecting weaker buyers to avoid excessive market concentration that may have an impact in the 
competitive structure of the market.525 
Consequently, and as a rule of thumb, as part of its ordoliberal buyer power policy, this 
dissertation will employ an aggregated consumer welfare standard (as understood in this section) 
as a compromise regarding the concern of the wellbeing of the consumer’s interest and the 
competitive structure of the market. Furthermore, ordoliberalism takes a broader approach to 
harm that does not require short term-end consumer harm to trigger the application of EU 
competition law in buyer power cases. I employ these two factors, a broader harm standard and 
the use of an aggregated consumer welfare standard, as the comparative threshold to evaluate 
whether or not a behavior is compatible with EU competition law and an ordoliberal inspired 
competition policy. 
4.4.4 Freedom to compete  
The ordoliberal understanding of competition as a process that allows for the achievement of 
economic freedom implies protection of the freedom of contract and voluntary transactions.526 As 
expressed by Hoppmann, competition fosters individual initiative by allowing suppliers to freely 
determine which offer from which buyer they want to accept.527 This implies that, for 
ordoliberalism, in terms of deciding whether to opt for a short term more economically efficient 
alternative that erodes sufficient possibility of choice and economic freedom (for example by 
limiting the amount of market players and thus substantially reducing variety), or a short term 
less economically efficient outcome that preserves sufficient possibility of choice for the 
individual, the latter would be the preferred option.528 In other words, preserving freedom of 
choice is understood as ‘economically efficient’ in a medium and long-term perspective because 
it secures an arguably greater degree of economic freedom and voluntariness on contracting 
preventing the social Vermachtung. However, this view should not be taken to the extreme; such 
an example of extreme views among the second wave of ordoliberals is Röpke’s conception of 
                                                          
525 Cf with Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 238 340. (1990), 340. 
526 Böhm, ‘Rule of Law in a Market Economy’ [1989], p. 46-67; Tumlir [1989], p. 136; and Vanberg ‘Consumer 
Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom – On the Normative Foundations of Competition Policy’ (2009), p. 
10. Stressing the relation between freedom of choice and protecting the market structure see Behrens ‘The 
"Consumer Choice" Paradigm in German Ordoliberalism and its Impact upon EU Competition Law’ (2014), p. 23. 
527 Hoppmann (1968), p. 62. 
528 Peacock and Willgerodt, ‘German Liberalism and Economic Revival’ [1989], p. 7; Behrens ‘The "Consumer 
Choice" Paradigm in German Ordoliberalism and its Impact upon EU Competition Law’ (2014), p. 23. 
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‘small is beautiful’ by suggesting that undertakings ought to be of small and medium size as the 
concentration of market power is inherently evil.529  
I disagree with this extreme ordoliberal view as the law should not protect inefficiency or 
small/weaker undertakings because this trend is a not only shared by a minority among 
ordoliberals but also it better represents the ideas of sociological liberalism, a connected but not 
an ordoliberal school. When determining the appropriate degree of freedom of choice, medium 
and long-term efficiency considerations must be taken into account. Thus, a proportionality or 
rule of reason test ought to determine whether an efficient behavior that significantly restricts 
choice is allowed or not because respecting freedom of choice cannot be equivalent to protecting 
inefficient market players.530 This also appears to be the position of figures such as Böhm and 
Eucken who would have sought a legislative solution that would not aim to protect small and 
inefficient undertakings from market dynamics, while not allowing a ‘winner takes all situation’ 
either. To paraphrase Böhm, the key lies in, recognizing competition as an instrument to satisfy 
consumer needs and choice in a medium and long-term perspective. This moderate view inclined 
towards the protection of economic freedom appears to be the criterion adopted by the Courts 
regarding buyer power regulation in general and in particular in the case of countervailing buyer 
power and buyer power exclusion as discussed in chapters 10 and 7, respectively, and the case of 
positions of relative dominance and dependence under national laws when dealing with unfair 
purchasing practices, as discussed in chapter 9. 
One problem when it comes to the freedom to compete as a competition aim in buyer power 
cases is that, due to its abstract nature it is very difficult to measure in welfare terms or to 
implement the proportionality test suggested above, as it is difficult to balance the values of 
economic freedom and Therefore, this is an area that is ripe for further research. 
This implies that an ordoliberal view of the regulation of buyer power will consider as prevention 
competition – and therefore preclude or forbid the behavior of an undertaking (or group of 
undertakings) that disproportionally eliminates supply options in the medium or long term due to 
an increase in concentration and squeeze effects, regardless of whether or not they are sufficiently 
competitive. This will hold true, despite such behavior possibly being short-term consumer 
welfare enhancing. Nevertheless, as explained in chapter 3, section 3.3 such situations will only 
tend to arise whenever the buyer acts irrationally or under pure monopsony cases, situations that 
are rare in practice. 
                                                          
529 Gerber (1994), p. 37. This also appears to be the view of O'Donoghue and Padilla when stating that “[t]his 
reflected a view that small and medium sized enterprises were important to consumer welfare and they should 
receive some protection from the excesses of market power”, in O'Donoghue and Padilla, The Law and Economics of 
Article 82 EC [2006], p. 9. 
530 Such is the opinion of Akman when claiming that: “Ordoliberalism protects the competitive process to achieve 
individual economic freedom and this can result in protecting inefficient competitors which would conflict with the 
objective of enhancing welfare” in Akman ‘Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82 EC’ (2009), p. 268-269. 
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4.4.5 Redistributive concerns? 
Re-distributive concerns in competition policy are the subject of an interesting debate within 
ordoliberalism that also plays an important part for buyer power when dealing with exploitative 
unfair purchasing practices. I discuss this at length in chapter 9.  
In general, ordoliberals were interested in a society where welfare considerations and re-
distribution of wealth is part of the economic and political system. As noted by Gerber, “[i]t is 
important to recognize that the deepest wellsprings of ordoliberal thought were humanist values 
rather than efficiency or other purely economic concerns.”531 However, the Wettweberbsordnung 
may entail that some disparities in the distribution of wealth based on each one’s economic 
productivity. This, in turn, implies that those which are more productive are better off.532 An 
analysis of the work of Eucken highlights that economic freedom does not necessarily produce a 
fair outcome; it just tends to be efficient. In this sense, Eucken “calls for redistributive measures 
whenever the outcome of the market system is socially unacceptable”.533 Ordoliberalism 
advocates for a progressive tax system that balances the distortions produced by the competitive 
process.534  
The discussion, then, is not whether an ordoliberal society should possess wealth distribution 
mechanisms, but rather whether competition law should be the mechanism for such an end. For 
me the answer is clear: competition law should not be the tool used to re-distribute wealth.535 The 
function of competition ought to be the maximization of wealth so that other better-suited tools 
can redistribute the wealth within society. 
In reviewing the ideas of first or second-wave ordoliberals, I have found no evidence to support 
an interpretation that suggests that competition law is (one of) the mechanism(s) used for wealth 
redistribution. Quite the contrary, however, this does not appear to be the view of Peacock and 
Willgerodt at all, as they interpret ordoliberal competition policy as giving room for proposals 
that may even “include support for a redistribution of income which cannot be justified 
‘scientifically’. For instance, in this view it would not worry Ordo-liberals if anti-monopoly 
                                                          
531 Gerber (1994), p. 36 and identically in Gerber, [2001], p. 239. 
532 Friedrich A. Lutz, ‘Objeciones al Orden de la Competencia’ in Lucas Beltrán (ed), La Economía de Mercado, vol 
I (Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones 1963), p. 268. 
533 Kamecke (2001), p. 26 (emphasis added). Cf with Foucault in Foucault and others, [2008], p. 142-143, who claim 
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534 Lutz [1963], p. 274. 
535 Christopher Townley, ‘Is there (Still) room for Non-Economic Arguments in Article 101 TFEU Cases?’ in 
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policy were to have both allocative and distributional effects, even if the latter cannot be 
objectively evaluated”.536 
I disagree with the interpretation of ordoliberal competition law as a redistributive mechanism 
and this is clear in my analysis of unfair purchasing practices in chapter 9. Instead, I argue, in a 
holistic ordoliberal oriented competition policy, lato sensu, there should be room for 
redistributive mechanisms in-line with the Social Market Economy but outside of competition 
law – sensu stricto.537 In other words, other legal disciplines or administrative mechanisms – such 
as the application of a redistributive tax mechanism, labor law legislation that sets minimum 
standards but not a minimum wage, and educational policies are better suited tools for 
distributing the wealth generated by the competitive process, while competition law should be 
focused on fostering the economically efficient outcome that later on is to be distributed by other 
mechanisms. In short, EU competition law should be oriented towards achieving welfare 
maximization, not welfare distribution. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed competition from an ordoliberal perspective in general, to enable me 
to then go on to identify and construct a theory explaining how ordoliberalism would regulate 
buyer power. As discussed in chapter 2, I employ ordoliberalism as a competition policy 
benchmark to contrast whether or not the current legislation in the EU – partially the US – adopts 
a similar pattern in its regulation. And, in cases where there is divergence, then determine where 
this divergence lies and the reasons behind this. By adopting such an informed methodological 
choice, the evaluations and suggestions are internally coherent and testable against the theoretical 
background. 
In my discussion, I have presented the key elements of competition in an ordoliberal perspective, 
particularly regarding the goals of the protection of competition as a process and as economically 
efficient. Furthermore, the chapter also shows how ordoliberalism offers an indigenous 
perspective to the analysis of this topic under a European competition policy that has shaped – 
and continues to shape – the law and practice of competition regulation. I also addressed issues 
regarding the views on different types of competition, as well as discussing whether or not 
‘competition as if’ is a real accepted ordoliberal standard. The section also dealt with the 
compatibility of ordoliberalism with the use of modern microeconomics and industrial 
organization theory and showed how ordoliberal competition is not against an 
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inter/multidisciplinary approach to either competition law application or theory. However, the 
application of economic knowledge should not replace the legal goals of EU competition policy 
and should be circumscribed to guiding case decision-making and suggesting changes to the 
current legal standards and legal interpretations by the Courts. Therefore, using ordoliberal theory 
is not opposed to the economic analysis of the law and is consistent with my economically 
informed legal analysis. 
This chapter has also embarked on a novel and ambitious aim of identifying and creating an 
ordoliberal general theory for the treatment of buyer power anchored on the general ordoliberal 
foundations that seek to protect competition as such, and the parties’ economic freedom with the 
aim of achieving a medium and long-term aggregated consumer welfare. This is possible because 
ordoliberalism seeks to control the exercise of market power either from buyers or sellers in the 
upstream and/or downstream market because it affects ‘competition as such’. 
This construction has allowed me to determine that, under the current EU legislation, an 
ordoliberal competition policy does not require new specific provisions to control the exercise of 
buyer market power, as the current instruments are sufficiently applicable. Furthermore, the 
objective of ordoliberalism of installing a competitive market order and protecting competition as 
a process requires the adoption of a dualistic approach to buyer power: ordoliberalism will keep 
in check instances of the exercise of monopsony power and bargaining power, and it will also 
necessitate the scrutiny of buyer market power effects in both the upstream and downstream 
market. In connection with this, an ordoliberal approach to buyer power does not seek to 
maximize short-term consumer welfare standard in a static sense and only intervenes in the 
market if there is evidence of downstream consumer harm. An ordoliberal buyer power policy 
anchored on a dualistic approach and protection of the market structure would adopt a broader 
aggregated consumer welfare standard, which aims to balance the interest of end consumers and 
other market participants to achieve consumer wellbeing in the medium and long term by 
protecting competition as such. This, in turn, implies that, for ordoliberalism, competition harm 
that occurs outside the downstream market vis-à-vis end consumers is still a source of concern 
and constitutes sufficient reason to intervene and sanction or prevent the wrongdoing because 
buyer power effects in the upstream market may also negatively impact the competitive process 
as a whole. Also, this chapter discusses to which extent the protection of freedom to compete and 
re-distribute is an issue of concern in terms of an ordoliberal treatment to buyer power. In these 
two cases, however, the answer is that even if they are a source of concern, competition law 
sensu stricto is not the most adequate tool to remedy these issues because other regulatory 




In sum, an ordoliberal approach to buyer power, as laid out in this chapter, allows me to compare 
the current EU buyer power regulation against this benchmark to determine whether the existing 
treatment is consistent with an ordoliberal approach and the extent to which it is. This, 
furthermore, opens the way for a discussion of why and how the adopted solutions by the Courts 
and the Commission deviate from this benchmark. Finally, by resorting to ordoliberalism, an 
indigenous European competition policy, it is possible to create a sharp contrast to the buyer 
power regulation in the US antitrust system and see if the different policy schools that have 



















5 Market Definition in Buyer Power Cases: Revisiting 
the Traditional Methodologies 
5.1 Introduction 
EU competition law has not devoted particular attention to the development of a coherent and 
detailed methodology for defining buyer markets,538 instead, it has resorted to the mere reversal 
of selling-oriented market definition to evaluate purchasing-oriented cases. A suitable 
explanation for the lack of a buyer-oriented market definition methodology is twofold: the 
relatively few buyer power cases in EU competition law, and the lack of literature and discussion 
concerning the need for a specific buyer power market definition methodology. Consequently, 
attempts by international institutions, including the Commission, and literature in general 
regarding the adoption of a proper methodology defining buyer markets are limited. In this 
section, I propose revising the current market definition methodologies and suggestions for buyer 
power market definitions. My central contribution is the proposal of a dualistic approach to 
buyer’s market definition that fully captures buyer market power and its effects in the upstream 
and downstream markets by defining the market in which the buyer acquires its input and the 
market in which it sells its output. 
The justification of this dualistic approach to buyer-market definition is that buyer power cases 
invariably have repercussions on the upstream and downstream markets, as remarked upon by 
Steiner,539 or have a horizontal and vertical effect, as postulated by Buttà and Pezzoli.540 Buyer 
power directly affects the competitive conditions between suppliers and buyers in the upstream 
market and may positively or negatively impact the downstream market and the relations between 
the buyer-retailer, its competitors and end consumers, as discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis.541  
Furthermore, there are other reasons that justify adopting a different approach to the definition of 
relevant buying markets and, therefore, revisiting the existing methodologies. As Carstensen 
expressed, buying markets and buyers’ incentives differ from seller markets:542 in a transaction 
                                                          
538 A similar view is expressed by Füller when stating: “[t]he problems of seller power mirrored in buyer power: 
However, European practice has heretofore not yet developed a coherent concept for defining buyer markets”, in J. 
Füller, Market Definition in Günther Hirsch, Frank Montag and Franz Jürgen Säcker, Competition Law: European 
Community Practice and Procedure: Article-by-Article Commentary (Sweet & Maxwell 2008), p. 449. See also: 
Carlton and Israel (2011); Buttà and Pezzoli (2014). 
539 Robert L. Steiner, ‘Vertical Competition, Horizontal Competition and Market Power’ 53 The Antitrust Bulletin 
(2008) 251. 
540 Cf with Buttà and Pezzoli (2014), p. 161, who name these effects vertical and horizontal. 
541 Carstensen ‘Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor Progress on an Important Issue’ (2012). 
542 Carstensen, ‘Buyer Power and Merger Analysis–The Need for Different Metrics’; Peter C. Carstensen, ‘Buyer 
Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among Suppliers’ 53 The 
Antitrust Bulletin (2008) 271; Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive 
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the buyers are the ones deciding what, when, how much, how and from whom an input is bought, 
enjoying a discretionary power that sellers usually lack. This implies that a buyer (or several 
coordinated buyers) may enjoy substantial purchasing power (although not necessarily 
dominance) from smaller market shares compared to sellers,543 as evidenced by the Commission 
in Rewe/Meinl544 and Carrefour/Promodès.545 Also, the product market definition and the market 
power assessment tools ought to take into account these differences, as when the traditional 
seller-oriented metrics are merely reversed, the analysis may lead to the erroneous conclusion 
that substantial buyer power does not exist when in reality it does or vice versa. 
In this chapter, I explore the concept of market definition from the perspective of a buyer and 
consider the dualistic approach proposal by answering the following research sub-questions:  
i. Is the definition of purchasing relevant markets different from seller-oriented cases? 
ii. If this is the case, what is the source of the difference?  
iii. Is it necessary to revisit the existing methodologies applicable to the definition of 
purchasing markets?  
iv. If so, how; what does this revision consist of and how should buyer market power be 
defined?  
v. What are the shortcomings of these methodologies? 
 
To address these questions, this chapter is organized as follows: section 5.2 discusses the concept 
of market definition and its role in the different realms of EU competition law. Section 5.3 
contains my proposal of a dualistic market definition for purchasing markets and discusses what 
the methodology changes necessary to apply the dualistic approach to buyer-oriented cases are, 
going further than a mere reverse than the selling-oriented cases. In section 5.4, the core of this 
chapter, I discuss how buyer product-market definition is carried out by revisiting the most 
important concepts, legal instruments and existing methodologies in the EU and abroad. Section 
5.5 concludes the chapter with a summary of the findings and sets the ground for a discussion of 
buyer market power assessment in chapter 6. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Realities, and Antitrust Policy’ (2010), p. 17; Carstensen ‘Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: 
Minor Progress on an Important Issue’ (2012). 
543 See also supporting this interpretation: Dobson (2004-2005); Pranvera Këllezi, ‘Abuse below the Threshold of 
Dominance? Market Power, Market Dominance, and Abuse of Economic Dependence’ in Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, 
Beatriz Conde Gallego and Stefan Enchelmaier (eds), Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New 
Enforcement Mechanisms? (Springer 2008), p. 83; Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal 
Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust Policy’ (2010), p. 6; Buttà and Pezzoli (2014), p. 165. 
544 Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 101. 
545 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 164/5, 
French public version, paras. 52-55. 
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5.2 Market definition 
Market definition is a tool that identifies and defines the boundaries of competition and 
competitive relations between undertakings546 by determining what the competitive constraints 
faced by undertakings involved in a competition case are.547 Doing so facilitates understanding of 
the case and allows for the determination of an undertaking’s market power548 and the assessment 
of the anti-competitive effects of the conduct under scrutiny.549 Furthermore, market definitions 
can be applied regardless of the nature of the case; i.e.: they apply to buyer and seller oriented 
cases and are applicable across all areas of competition law, albeit with different degrees of 
relevance and minor adjustments between the cases. 
Furthermore, market definition follows a structural approach in EU competition law where the 
relevant product and geographical markets firstly define, in order to then assess, the 
undertaking’s market power and determine whether or not it is dominant or whether a 
concentration would lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position,550 as clarified 
by the CJEU in Continental Can,551 and consequently adopted by the Commission in its 
guidelines and case practice.552 In the dualistic approach to buyer market power definition, this 
structural approach is maintained first by determining the product market, and then by 
                                                          
546 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 2; see also Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 10. Also highlighting the characteristic 
of a tool see: Harris and Jorde (1984); Faull and Nikpay, [1999] para. 1.136; Jonathan B. Baker, ‘Market Definition: 
An Analytical Overview’ 74 Antitrust Law Journal (2007), 129; Dennis W. Carlton, ‘Market Definition: Use and 
Abuse’ 3 Competition Policy International (2007) 3; Füller in Hirsch, Montag and Säcker, [2008], p. 437. 
547 Areeda, Hovenkamp and Solow, [1995], p. 225; Mika Oinonen, Does EU Merger Control Discriminate Against 
Small Markets Companies?: Diagnosing the Argument with Conclusions (Kluwer Law International 2010), p. 236; 
OECD, ‘Policy Roundtables: Market Definition’ (2012). 
548 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 2; Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2004), 
p. 101; Carlton (2007), p. 5; Bellamy and others, [2013], para. 4.001; Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition 
law (8th ed. edn, Oxford University Press 2015), p. 29; Louis Kaplow, ‘Market Definition’ in Roger D. Blair and D. 
Daniel Sokol (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Vol. 1 (Oxford University Press 
2015), p. 345; European Commission Market Definition in a Gloablised World, (2015), p. 1. 
549 Gregory J. Werden, ‘The Relevant Market: Possible and Productive’ April 2014 Antitrust Law Journal Online 
(2014) 1. 
550 Harris and Jorde (1984), p. 4; Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 1.128; Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and 
Practice [2004], p. 101; Roger J. Van den Bergh and Peter D. Camesasca, European Competition Law and 
Economics: A Comparative Perspective (Sweet & Maxwell 2006), p. 76; Franz Jürgen Säcker, The Concept of the 
Relevant Product Market: Between Demand-Side Substitutability in Supply-Side Substitutability in Competition Law 
(Peter Lang 2008), p. 13; C. J. Cook and C. S. Kerse, EC Merger Control (Sweet & Maxwell 2009), p. 216; 
Oinonen, [2010], p. 150; Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 25; OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Market 
Definition’ (2012), p. 26; Jones and Sufrin, [2014], p. 60. 
551 Judgment of 21 February 1973 in Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company v Commission, C-
6/72, EU:C:1973:22, para. 32. 
552 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5. 
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determining the relevant geographical market. This successive structure is to avoid undertakings 
switching to substitute products and other locations, as remarked by Crocioni.553 
In addition to the structural approach to market definition in EU competition law, authors like 
Jones and Sufrin, as well as Oinonen, have emphasized that the approach is also indirect.554 I 
interpret this as implying that there are alternative methods to directly assess an undertaking’s 
market power without first defining the relevant market. In the case of buyer power, the Buyer 
Power Index by Blair and Harrison,555 and Blair and Lopatka556 represents such an approach and 
is discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
5.2.1 Market definition: scope of application and time focus 
Market definition plays a role in all spheres of EU competition law, with major or minor 
importance, and with either a backward or forward-looking role, depending on the type of case. 
In the following, I briefly discuss the main differences in the analysis among the areas of EU 
competition law as this is also reflected in buyer power cases. 
Concerning agreement cases, market definition plays a lesser role and the Commission may find 
an infringement of Article 101 TFEU without arriving at a full definition of the relevant 
market.557 Practice shows that, in most cases, it is implicitly assumed that if the infringement is 
anti-competitive by object the market definition is not needed as neither market power 
requirement nor anti-competitive effects ought to be present, although it can be assumed that they 
exist, as confirmed by the CJEU in Expedia.558 However, as confirmed by the CJEU in CB v 
Commission, in an object infringement the assessment must pay attention to the “content of its 
provisions, its objectives and the economic and legal context of which it forms a part”, which 
implies a minimal economic assessment of the case, leaving the door open for an interpretation 
that requires a basic market definition.559 Furthermore, also concerning anti-competitive 
                                                          
553 Pietro Crocioni, ‘The Hypothetical Monopolist Test: What it can and cannot tell you’ 23 European Competition 
Law Review (2002), p. 355. 
554 Oinonen, [2010], p. 153; Jones and Sufrin, [2014], p. 61. 
555 Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 54-67. 
556 Blair and Lopatka (2008). 
557 Bellamy and others, [2013], para. 4.006. 
558 Judgment of 13 December 2012 in Expedia, C-226/11, EU:C:2012:795, para. 35; Füller in Hirsch, Montag and 
Säcker, [2008], p. 440; also of this opinion is Vogel when stating “supervisory authorities traditionally consider that, 
by its mere existence, an agreement implies that the parties intend to coordinate or consolidate their monopoly 
power. So defining the relevant market is not as important in the law on restrictive agreements as it is for the rules of 
on dominant positions”, Louis Vogel, European Competition Law (Law Lex 2012), p. 55; see also: Hanno 
Wollmann, ‘Horizontal Restraints of Competition’ in Günter Hirsch, Franz Montag and Franz Jürgen Säcker (eds), 
Competition Law: European Community Practice and Procedure (Thomson - Sweet & Maxwell 2008), p. 495. In 
US antitrust law the solution is somewhat similar, except for violations that are per se illegal, any other type of 
antitrust offence requires the plaintiff to plead and prove the relevant market; see for more: American Bar 
Association, Market Definition in Antitrust (American Bar Association ed, 2012), p.2. 
559 Judgment of 11 September 2014 in CB v Commission, C-67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204, para. 53; cf with Summary of 
Commission Decision of 1 October 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the 
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agreements by object, the CJEU dismissed an allegation in Toshiba concerning the applicability 
of the geographical market and confirmed the General Court’s finding that even if not active in 
the EEA geographic market (because the agreement shared markets) the undertaking was a 
competitor engaged in an agreement restrictive of competition by object and should have been 
fined, without a detailed relevant market analysis.560 
However, with regard to agreements that may be anti-competitive due to their effects561 a more 
detailed or a comprehensive market definition would be made as the Commission must prove an 
appreciable or perceptible effect on trade between Member States, as demanded by the General 
Court in Compagnie générale maritime and Others v Commission and European Night Services 
and Others v Commission, and ratified by the CJEU in Delimitis.562 The assessment, therefore, 
would have as it “sole purpose of defining the relevant market, in order to apply Article 101(1) 
TFEU, is to determine whether the agreement in question may harm trade between Member 
States and has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
the common market”.563 Therefore, in agreements anti-competitive by effects there is a broader 
role for market definition with regard to the extent of the effects of it.564 
Concerning Article 101(3) TFEU as an efficiency defense, the relevant market definition is 
necessary to establish whether, in a given situation, the fourth condition laid down in Article 
101(3)(b) TFEU is met, although not for the other three cumulative conditions.565 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/C.39181 — Candle Waxes) [2009] OJ C 
295/17, taken from the unabridged version, para. 279. 
560 Judgment of 20 February 2016 in Toshiba Corporation v Commission, C-373/14, EU:C:2016:26; Judgment of 21 
May 2014, Toshiba v Commission, T-519/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:263. 
561 Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 28. 
562 Judgment of 28 February 1991 in Delimitis v Henninger Bräu, C-234/89, EU:C:1991:91, para. 16, in which the 
CJEU requires determining the relevant market in the assessment of the compatibility of exclusive supply 
agreements with Article 101 TFEU; Judgment of 28 February 2002, Compagnie générale maritime and Others v 
Commission, T-86/95, ECR, EU:T:2002:50, para. 116; Judgment of 15 September 1998, European Night Services 
and Others v Commission, T-374/94, ECR, EU:T:1998:198, para. 93 and ss, where the General Court annulled the 
Commission’s decision based on the absence of the analysis of the relevant market and the inclusion of the market 
shares of the involved undertaking; see also: Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the 
applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation 
agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 43. In the literature, see: Lennart Ritter and W. David Braun, European 
Competition Law: A Practitioner's Guide (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2004), p. 24; Ivo Van Bael and Jean-
François Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community (4th edn, Kluwer Law International 2005), p. 132. In 
US antitrust law some type of cartel cases courts require showing that the defendant has a certain amount of market 
power, see: Hovenkamp, [2005], p. 80.  
563 Judgment of 27 September 2012, Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission, T-357/06, ECR, EU:T:2012:488, 
para. 135. 
564 Judgment of 27 September 2012, Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission, T-357/06, ECR, EU:T:2012:488, 
para. 137; Judgment of 6 July 2000, Volkswagen v Commission, T-62/98, ECR, EU:T:2000:180, para. 230; Judgment 
of 8 July 2004, Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission, T-44/00, ECR, EU:T:2004:218, para. 132. 
565 Judgment of 19 March 2003, CMA CGM and Others v Commission, T-213/00, ECR, EU:T:2003:76, para. 226; 
and ratified in Judgment of 27 September 2012, Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission, T-357/06, ECR, 
EU:T:2012:488, para. 138. 
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In dominance cases, market definition is a prerequisite, as “before an abuse of a dominant 
position is ascertained, it is necessary to establish the existence of a dominant position in a given 
market, which presupposes that such a market has already been defined”.566 Thus, dominance 
does not occur in abstracto but in concreto. Its purpose is determining whether the undertaking 
under investigation is dominant and is conducted for past and on-going conducts.567 
For concentration cases, “a proper definition market of the relevant market is a necessary 
precondition for any assessment of the effect of a concentration in competition” as held by the 
CJEU in Kali und Salz,568 in order to identify in a systematic manner the immediate competitive 
constraints facing the merging entity,569 and to help determine its compatibility with the common 
market.570 Unlike in the cases of agreements and dominance, market definition in concentration 
cases is forward looking.571 
Market definition in concentration cases adopts a different time horizon572 because its goal is 
prospective as given that it aims at predicting whether a given merger or acquisition is likely to 
significantly impede effective competition post-merger as required by the Merger Control 
Regulation.573 Extraordinarily, however, there may be dominance or agreement cases where the 
                                                          
566 Judgment of 6 July 2000, Volkswagen v Commission, T-62/98, ECR, EU:T:2000:180, para. 230. 
567 Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 30. In US antitrust law for cases under the scope of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C., market definition is employed to determine the existence of market 
power; see: Carlton (2007), p. 3. 
568 Judgment of 31 March 1998 in France and Société commerciale des potasses and de l'azote and Entreprise 
minière and chimique v Commission, Joined cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 EU:C:1998:148, para. 222 and 143; see 
reiterating this approach in a buyer power related case in Judgment of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission, T-
342/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:146, para. 19. 
569 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 10. 
570 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1, Article 2.3; Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under 
the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 1. 
571 Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 30. 
572 “The different time horizon considered in each case might lead to the result that different geographic markets are 
defined for the same products depending on whether the Commission is examining a change in the structure of 
supply, such as a concentration or a cooperative joint venture, or examining issues relating to certain past behavior”, 
Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] OJ 
C 372/5, para. 12; also highlighting the different approach that market definition ought to employ depending on 
whether the harm is prospective or retrospective, see: Bellamy, Child and Roth, [2001], para. 6.094; Ritter and 
Braun, [2004], p. 25; Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice [2004], p. 105; Baker (2007), p. 389; Cf with 
Vogel, [2012], p. 389. 
573 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1; see also stressing the fact that in mergers the market definition is 
forward looking: Judgment of 25 October 2002, Tetra Laval v Commission, T-5/02, ECR, EU:T:2002:264, para. 251; 
see a similar opinion in US antitrust law in Gavil, Kovacic and Baker, [2008], p. 491; on the assessment of present 
and future market power, see: Areeda, Hovenkamp and Solow, [1995], p. 235. 
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investigated conduct has been planned but not executed and where the analysis of its potential 
effects is also forward looking.574 
The fundamental distinction between prospective and retrospective analysis is the determination 
of the appropriate comparison price.575 In retrospective cases, the analysis focuses on the ‘but-
for-price’,576 the price that would have prevailed in the conduct’s absence.577 Therefore, the 
Small but Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in Price test (SSNIP test) has to be compared 
to this ‘as-if’ price to avoid making the relevant market too large,578 and the difficulty lies in 
determining what the hypothetical price would have been.579 In prospective cases, the analysis 
does not compare a hypothetical price, but takes into account the current prevailing price in the 
market,580 unless there are grounds to believe that after the concentration prices will likely be 
reduced. Also, prospective cases tend to adopt a broader market analysis because it takes into 
account future competitive conditions whereas retrospective analysis should not.581 
Despite these differences between past and future-oriented methodologies, particularly in 
concentration cases, the Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (EU Horizontal Mergers 
Guidelines) refers to the Notice on Market Definition as the instrument guiding the methodology 
for defining the relevant market, as some considerations pertinent to the relevant markets “may 
also be of importance for the competitive assessment of the merger”.582 
5.3 Buyer power market definition: a dualistic approach 
The majority of the market definition case law, soft law and literature refers to seller-oriented 
cases and when carrying out my research I found very little literature and guidance concerning 
the methodologies applicable to buying markets. Accordingly, I identified a gap in knowledge 
concerning buyer market definition. 
                                                          
574 Also remarking upon this possibility is Carlton when expressing that “if the bad act has not yet taken effect, the 
current price can be used as the benchmark price”, in Carlton (2007), p. 20. 
575 Baker (2007), p. 159-160; Carlton (2007), p. 19. 
576 The ‘but-for-price’ idea looks conceptually akin to the “competition as if” concept developed by Miksch and 
discussed in chapter 4, section 4.3.3. 
577 Motta does not use the ‘but-for-price’ standard but rather the ‘competitive price’, which in my view is even more 
difficult to assess in practice, in Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice [2004], p. 105. 
578 Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice [2004], p. 105. 
579 The case of the Cellophane fallacy is well known, regarding the conceptual error made by the US Supreme Court 
by overlooking the fact that firms that are already exercising market power may impose current prices that, if 
increased any further, would make the price increase unprofitable, in United States v. E.I. du pont de Nemours & 
Co., 351 U.S. 377 [1956]. 
580 Baker (2007), p. 159. 
581 Ritter and Braun, [2004], p. 25. 
582 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 10. 
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I submit that the traditional seller-oriented methodologies need to be adjusted for the analysis of 
purchasing relevant markets to avoid shortcomings and erroneous results. This revision demands 
taking into account the structure of competition in purchasing markets to adjust the traditional 
approach to market definition and consider the relation between upstream and downstream 
competition in buyer power cases, as remarked upon by the Basque NCA, and by the work of 
Bedre-Defolie and Caprice when analyzing merger effects among buyers.583 However, and 
following the case law, revisiting the buying market definition methodologies may not imply a 
total departure from the Commission’s method of defining product and geographic markets as 
held in British Airways v Commission by the General Court.584 
In buyer power cases, and unlike as held by the US Supreme Court, not “all competitive effects 
are, by definition, horizontal”,585 as buyer power cases tend to reflect a combination of both 
vertical and horizontal effects in the upstream and downstream markets as the reflection of the 
economics of buyer power. Therefore, and following Carstensen’s views, “buyer power analysis 
requires metrics that measure both power and effects grounded in the economic realities of the 
buying side of the market place.”586 Otherwise, merely reversing seller side methodologies or 
omitting buyer power specificities will lead to errors when performing a market definition for a 
buying undertaking.587 
In spite of this, some buyer power literature focuses solely on one of the effects of buyer market 
in the market definition phase by analyzing only the upstream effects.588 In my view, this 
perspective is incomplete because the buyer power cases are mainly assessed as examples of 
monopsony power and the transfer of wealth between suppliers and buyers in a static setting, 
while leaving the buyer power effects on downstream competition unattended. Therefore, the 
approach overlooks those effects and the fact that bargaining power may be beneficial because 
                                                          
583 Competencia (April 2009), p. 18; Özlem Bedre-Defolie and Stéphane Caprice, Merger Efficiency and Welfare 
Implications of Buyer Power (2011) p. 1. 
584 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, paras. 89-117; see also remarking upon the buyer market definition orientation of the case: Jones 
and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials [2011], p. 312-314. 
585 Bus. Electr. Corp. v. Sharp Electr. Corp. 485 U.S. 717 (1988), p. 730. 
586 Carstensen, ‘Buyer Power and Merger Analysis–The Need for Different Metrics’, p. 2; see also Carstensen 
‘Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor Progress on an Important Issue’ (2012), p. 777-778. 
587 See also the criticism by a report published by the Office of Fair Trading and elaborated by RBB Economics 
when stating that “[w]e would not advocate turning the hypothetical monopolist test on its head and attempting to 
define a market by applying a ‘hypothetical buyer group test’, i.e. asking whether a hypothetical buyer group could 
profitably sustain prices below competitive levels”, in Office of Fair Trading, The Competitive Effects of Buyer 
Groups (2007) para 1.77. 
588 Focusing mostly exclusively on the upstream market analysis see, inter alia: Ioannis Kokkoris, ‘The Concept of 
Market Definition and the SSNIP Test in the Merger Appraisal’ 26 European Competition Law Review (2005) 209; 
Kokkoris (2006); Bundeskartellamt Buyer Power in Competition Law - Status and Perspectives, Bonn (2008), p. 5; 
Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 62; Kokkoris and Shelanski, [2014], p. 422-426. Areeda, Hovenkamp and Solow 
propose that “monopsony power can be estimated in the conventional antitrust way by defining a relevant buyer’s 
market and then estimating the defendant’s share of it”, in Areeda, Hovenkamp and Solow, [1995], p. 53. 
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the price reductions obtained in the upstream market are passed on to end consumers 
downstream. Furthermore, a pure upstream market definition approach is inconsistent with the 
emphasis placed by the Commission, the US Courts and part of the literature concerning the type 
of harm and anti-competitive effects required in the downstream market to trigger the application 
of competition law to buyer power abuse. This trend, however, seems to be changing and a 
dualistic approach to buyer power market definition is apparently gaining momentum.589  
5.3.1 The dualistic approach and its content 
Following the previous discussion, I propose that the relevant market definition of buyer power 
cases must be made in both the procurement market (upstream market) as well as in the retailer 
market (downstream market), and not solely in the upstream market. This proposal comes as a 
synthetization of the case evolution as shown in the Commission’s practice concerning merger 
cases,590 the practice of some NCAs such as the Bundeskartellamt when dealing with abuse of 
economic dependence,591 my analysis of buyer power economics and a review of the literature. 
Also, it draws inspiration from the guidance and practice of the UK’s NCA.592 My aim with this 
proposal is to improve the existing methodology by incorporating facets derived from buyer 
power and integrating the criticism of the literature. 
A dual market definition implies using different methodologies in defining two interrelated 
markets,593 which, as noted by Dobson, is a complex exercise because it ought to consider the 
multiple contexts in which the undertaking operates.594 However, unlike the model of Steiner, my 
                                                          
589 See the dual approach suggested by the OECD and the contribution of some of its MS when distinguishing 
between monopsony and bargaining power for a market definition in OECD (2012). 
590 In Sovion/Südfleisch the Commission explicitly performed a market definition for the purchase of pigs and cattle 
and then proceeded to carry out a market definition concerning the sale of fresh meat to fully evaluate the buyer 
power effects of the proposed concentration in Commission Decision of 21/12/2005 declaring a concentration to be 
compatible with the common market (Case No COMP/M.3968 - Sovion/Südfleisch) according to Council Regulation 
(EC) No 139/2004 [2005]; see also: Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be 
incompatible with the common market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
[1997] OJ L 110/53; Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 4064/89 (Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1; non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 164/5. See also remarking that in these cases “the European 
Commission stressed that due to the interconnection between input and output markets, the increase in buyer power 
could reinforce market power on the output market and this harm consumer welfare” in van Doorn, p. 167; Ezrachi 
and Ioannidou (2014), p. 76. 
591 Bundeskartellamt, B2-58/09 Edeka Konditionenforderungen - Verstoß gegen das "Anzapfverbot", 3 July 2014. 
The decision was appealed and revoked by the Düsseldorf Appellate Court in the Decision of 18 November 2015 
EDEKA/Plus-Übernahme due to errors concerning the determination of whether suppliers were dependent on its 
buyer – although not concerning the dualistic market analysis approach. 
592 See the UK’s Contribution, jointly prepared by the now extinct Competition Commission and Office of Fair 
Trading, in OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 229-243, and my discussion in 
Section 5.4.5.2. 
593 Also noting the interrelation between markets in buyer power cases see: Pera, available at: 
http://www.gop.it/doc_pubblicazioni/40_hjv4kr3vun_eng.pdf. 
594 Dobson [2009], p. 103. 
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approach does not imply a single market definition for both upstream and downstream markets, 
but two different but connected assessments: one for the upstream market and another for the 
downstream market.595 Also, my dualistic approach is a holistic proposal as it is suitable to all 
market definitions across all areas of EU competition law, rather than for specific type of 
cases.596 
My dualistic approach follows the structural methodology adopted by EU competition law. 
Firstly, the relevant purchasing and retailing markets will be determined in terms of product and 
geographic spheres, initially defining the upstream market and then the downstream market in 
succession. In this study, I only address the methodologies and problems related to the definition 
of the upstream markets because the methodology describing the market definition for a selling 
undertaking by applying the hypothetical monopolist test is well described in the literature and 
falls outside of the scope of this dissertation.597 
Unlike traditional seller markets – in particular in the case of exploitative abuses – most buyer 
power cases involve an effect in the upstream (purchasing market) and the downstream (selling 
market) because the undertaking that acquires goods from its suppliers will sell or transform this 
input in its downstream market activity vis-à-vis a (most likely) final consumer.598 This implies 
that buyer power market definition must analyze both the upstream and downstream markets to 
fully assess the market impact of the exercise of buyer power.599 Once this analysis is carried out, 
competition authorities will evaluate whether the conducts under investigation involve an 
exercise of monopsony or bargaining power to then proceed to assess the extent of the 
undertaking’s buyer market power. 
However, the dualistic approach has to devote special consideration to the identity of the 
geographical and product markets evaluated as these might not necessarily coincide. For 
example, regarding geographical markets, the upstream market for the purchase of raw timber 
might be local, where a small producer competes with a multinational undertaking, while the 
downstream market is different because the local producer sells its output again locally while the 
                                                          
595 Steiner (2008). 
596 See also: Van Bael and Bellis, [2005], p. 147. 
597 For some interesting discussions suggesting the adoption of other methodologies or revisiting the current ones 
see, inter alia: Simon Baker and Andrea Lofaro, ‘Buyer power and the Enso/Stora decision’ 21 European 
Competition Law Review (2000) 187; Crocioni (2002); Kokkoris (2005); John Vickers, ‘Market Power in 
Competition Cases’ 2 European Competition Journal (2006) 3; Adriaan ten Kate and Gunnar Niels, ‘The Relevant 
Market: A Concept Still in Search of a Definition’ 5 Journal of Competition Law and Economics (2009) 297; OECD 
‘Policy Roundtables: Market Definition’ (2012), p. 59-79. 
598 Also supporting this view of the competitive risks in the upstream and downstream market in relation to 
purchasing agreements see: Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive 
Realities, and Antitrust Policy’ (2010); Ezrachi (2012), p. 66; Bundeskartellamt Summary of the Final Report of the 
Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector, (2014). 
599 Somewhat similarly and stressing the need to examine buyer power effects in the upstream and downstream 
market see: Pera, p. 16. 
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multinational undertaking sells its goods in an international market. The same could arise from a 
product-oriented perspective: the input market is the same as undertakings compete in the 
purchasing of oil but in the downstream market they do not compete as they produce different 
derivatives: gasoline or plastic, for example. In these cases of lack of identity, the interrelation of 
the upstream and downstream market is less than when full identity exists, this has an impact on 
the assessment of the case and conducts, and may lead to instances in which the undertakings 
involved do not compete with each other.600 Therefore, in such cases, the dualistic approach and 
the interlink between upstream and downstream markets must be tailored to suit the facts of the 
case. 
5.3.2 Justification of the dualistic approach 
The adoption of the dualistic approach in EU competition law is justified by economic and legal 
grounds and it is an adequate tool to be employed in buyer power cases as a whole because it 
captures both monopsony and bargaining power effects by looking at the market consequences in 
all related markets upstream and downstream. The rationale behind this is intuitive and, citing the 
OECD:  
if the buyer power comes from its gate keeping role, then what is more important than its shares of 
purchases in the upstream market is its market power and hence market share in the relevant 
downstream market. Identifying buyer power requires precise and careful market definition of the 
relevant downstream product and geographic markets to identify market power in distribution 
services provided by the buyer.601 
From an economic perspective, the dualistic approach to buyer power is justified because the 
incentives and economics of buying markets are different from selling-oriented markets. In 
buying markets the purchaser is the one that leads and makes the key decisions, as well as being 
different in respect to the fact that the buyer does not make a direct profit from acquiring goods 
whereas a seller does when selling a good.602 Also, buyer power effects have implications in the 
upstream market and also affect the downstream market competitiveness and ultimately the end 
consumer,603 particularly, albeit not exclusively, if the undertaking possesses substantial 
downstream market power fitting the ‘hourglass shape’ as described in chapter 3, section 3.5.1.1. 
                                                          
600 Cf with van Doorn that suggests that in cases of lack of geographical identity the markets are not related in van 
Doorn, p. 77. 
601 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 22. 
602 Carstensen ‘Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor Progress on an Important Issue’ (2012), 
p. 791. 
603 Zhiqi Chen, ‘Buyer power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy’ 22 Research in Law and Economics (2007), p. 
20. Making a similar remark in the case of buyer cartels see: Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: 
Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust Policy’ (2010), p. 11; also stressing this point for markets in 
the vertical chain see: Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 92. In a US antitrust law perspective, it has been held 
that in the case of input markets, courts have explicitly considered the impact of downstream products in defining the 
upstream input market, see: American Bar Association, Market Definition in Antitrust [2012], p. 50; Brookins v Int’l 
Motors Contest Ass’n, 219 F.3d 849, (8th Cir. 2000), p. 853-854. 
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This is because demand in the upstream purchasing market is usually a derived demand from the 
demand for the final product.604  
Furthermore, the dualistic approach captures all buyer power effects. In the upstream market it 
is able to capture exploitative effects vis-à-vis suppliers in the form of unfairly low purchasing 
prices, to determine the effects of a buyers’ cartel or capture unfair purchasing prices effects on 
suppliers, topics discussed in chapters 8 and 9 of this dissertation. Also, a dual approach captures 
exclusionary effects in the upstream market between rivals that compete for the acquisition of an 
input as well as being able to capture whenever exclusion takes place or is strengthened in the 
downstream when the rivals compete as retailers, as discussed in chapter 7. Also, the dualistic 
approach allows competition authorities to identify and assess the effects of buyer power over end 
consumers in the downstream markets.  
Also, the dualistic approach allows authorities to determine if the buying undertaking fits the 
hourglass shape by using both upstream and downstream market power as a good indication of 
the possible welfare implications of buyer power exercise as discussed in chapter 3, section 3.5. 
Additionally, from a legal perspective, the dualistic approach finds support in the current state of 
EU competition law. The General Court has tacitly recognized the need for a dualistic approach 
to buyer power cases in British Airways v Commission.605 In this case, the General Court and 
later the CJEU confirmed that it was in breach of Article 102 TFEU the granting of loyalty 
enhancing supracompetitive bonuses of a buyer to its suppliers with the aim and effect of 
foreclosing its competitors in a related downstream market where they competed as providers of 
air passenger transport.606 The dualistic approach rationale for buyer power cases was supported 
as the General Court held that “competition law concentrates upon protecting the market structure 
from artificial distortions because by doing so the interests of the consumer in the medium to 
long term are best protected”.607 It does so by taking into account the buyer power competitive 
effects in markets in which the buying undertaking carries out its economic activity. 
More explicitly, however, has been the recognition of the need for a dualistic approach in the 
regulation and particularly in the Merger Control Regulation when making explicit reference to 
the need for assessing the outcome of the operation in a holistic manner and taking into account 
constraints and consequences upstream and downstream market: 
                                                          
604 Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 92; American Bar Association, Market Definition in Antitrust [2012], p. 
51. 
605 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343; Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166. 
606 I discuss in detail the leverage of buyer market power as an exclusionary form of buyer market power abuse in 
chapter 7, section 7. 
607 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 264; see also Judgment of 21 February 1973 in Europemballage Corporation and Continental 
Can Company v Commission, C-6/72, EU:C:1973:22, para. 26. 
129 
 
[…] [i]n making this appraisal, the Commission shall take into account: 
(a) the need to maintain and develop effective competition within the common market in view of, 
among other things, the structure of all the markets concerned and the actual or potential 
competition from undertakings located either within or outwith the Community 
(b) the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial power, the 
alternatives available to suppliers and users, their access to supplies or markets, any legal or other 
barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services, the interests of the 
intermediate and ultimate consumers, and the development of technical and economic progress 
provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition.608 
This recognition has also been integrated into the Commission’s practice,609 as it is also reflected 
in some of the Commission’s reports, which argue that “[i]t is important to take into 
consideration the two different dimensions of the retail sector [upstream buying and downstream 
retailing], in order to properly situate it in the broader supply chain and fully understand the role 
it plays in the European economy”.610 
However, the reception of the dualistic approach is timid when it comes to the Commission’s soft 
law instruments. My analysis shows that when a dualist approach has been adopted, such as in 
the Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements,611 and the Commission Notice on Guidelines on 
Vertical Restraints (Guidelines on Vertical Restraints),612 the approach has been a moderated but 
is not a fully comprehensive one. 
In the Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements, the Commission correctly points out that a 
purchasing agreement – and in general buyer power – affects two markets: the purchasing market 
and the selling market.613 According to the Commission, the definition of the relevant purchasing 
market is mandatory to assess the competitive effects in the upstream market power by following 
the principles described in the Notice on Market Definition and adopting the Buyer’s SSNIP test, 
discussed below. It states that in addition to this market definition, “if parties are (…) competitors 
                                                          
608 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1, Article 2.1(a) and (b) (emphasis added). 
609 Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 76; see the opinion of Ezrachi and Ioannidou, who argue that 
in this case the Commission was required “to adjust its analysis of the relevant markets as the transaction on the 
buyer side affected both the downstream retail market as well as the upstream procurement market” in Ezrachi and 
Ioannidou (2014), p. 76. 
610 European Commission, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food Sector 
(2014), p. 45. 
611 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, paras. 197-199.  
612 See the concern for competitive effects upstream and downstream market power in the case of exclusive supply in 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 194; see also the dualistic approach concerning relevant 
market for calculating the 30% market share threshold under the Block Exemption Regulation in the Guidelines on 
Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1 paras. 87-95; see also: Jochen Ehlers, ‘Vertical Restraints’ in Günter Hirsch, 
Franz Montag and Franz Jürgen Säcker (eds), Competition Law: European Community Practice and Procedure 
(Thomson - Sweet & Maxwell 2008) para. 2.3.073. 
613 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 197. 
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on one or more selling markets, those markets are also relevant for the assessment” and their 
definition ought to be made in accordance with the traditional methodologies, as put forward by 
the proposal of the dualistic approach.614 This partial approach by the Commission is a timid one 
because the downstream analysis shall be made only whenever parties are competitors and is not 
necessary in the other circumstances. Precisely, to determine if parties are competitors, it is 
necessary to carry out some market definition and conclude in which markets undertakings 
compete. Furthermore, anti-competitive harm by buyers may have an impact on downstream 
consumers even if parties are not direct competitors in the downstream market, particularly in the 
medium to long-term. Indeed, it is sensible to think that if parties to a purchasing agreement are 
also competitors, the anti-competitive risks are increased due to a risk of coordination in the 
downstream market. However, in my view, the dual approach ought to be carried out even if 
parties are not direct competitors, in order to take into account the related market structures. 
Therefore, the Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements provide a partial and limited improvement 
to the approach to buyer power market definition but this is nevertheless insufficient, casuistic 
and not a general statement regarding all types of buyer power cases and it would be advisable 
for this to be the case. 
Three other considerations justify the proposal for a dualistic approach to buyer market 
definition. First, dual market definitions are analogous to other multimarket definitions carried 
out in EU competition law, as explicitly recognized in Tetra Pak v Commission,615 the dual 
measurement of the market share for the application of Article 3 of the Block Exemption 
Regulation in the upstream and downstream market,616 as well as in cases dealing with tying and 
bundling,617 refusals to deal,618 and aftermarkets.619 When assessing these practices, the 
                                                          
614 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 199. 
615 “Analysis of the markets in the milk-packaging sector thus shows that the four markets concerned, defined in the 
Decision, were indeed separate markets.”, Judgment of 6 October 1994, Tetra Pak v Commission, T-83/91, ECR, 
EU:T:1994:246, para. 73. 
616 Article 3, Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [2010] 
OJ L 102/1; Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 88.  
617 See for example: Judgment of 12 December 1991, Hilti v Commission, T-30/89, ECR, EU:T:1991:70, where the 
General Court found the existence of three product markets; Judgment of 17 September 2007, Microsoft v 
Commission, T-201/04, ECR, EU:T:2007:289, paras. 912-944, where the General Court concluded that operating 
system software and media players are separate products in different markets. 
618 See, for example, stressing the ability of undertakings to affect two markets (and therefore also the need to 
evaluate them) in Commission Decision of 21 December 1993 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 86 of the 
EC Treaty (IV/34.689 - Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink - Interim measures) [1994] OJ L 15/8; see discussing the 
two interrelated markets that are evaluated sometimes as a single market in cases of refusal to deal/essential 
facilities: Temple-Lang J, ‘The Principle of Essential Facilities in European Community Competition Law - The 
Position Since Bronner’ (2000) 1 Journal of Network Industries 375, p. 378; Pitofsky R, Paterson D and Hooks J, 
‘The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law’ (2002-2003) 70 Antitrust Law Journal 443, p. 458-461. 
619 Judgment of 31 May 1979 in Hugin v Commission, C-22/78, EU:C:1979:138, where the CJEU found the 
existence of separate markets for cash register machines, reparation services and aftermarkets for spare parts; 
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Commission defines both the tying and the tied relevant markets as necessary pre-requisites.620 
Second, the adoption of an economically informed methodology is also another factor that is 
consistent and compatible with the suggestion of a dualistic and tailored buyer-oriented approach 
to buyer market power definition. Third, a dual market definition is in line with ordoliberal theory 
and the objective of protecting the competition as such and the competitive market structure, as 
recognized by the CJEU in GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others,621 
with similar arguments found in buyer merger cases, as noted by Ezrachi and Ioannidou,622 and a 
broader standard regarding buyer power anti-competitive harm as discussed in chapter 4, section 
4.4. 
5.4 The relevant purchasing market 
In this section, I discuss the current approaches to defining the relevant purchasing market by 
analyzing the most relevant aspects contemplated in the different Commission’s guidelines and 
other authoritative sources, as well as stressing the methodologies’ shortcomings. Additionally, 
my analysis adopts a generalist perspective and is applicable to agreement, dominance and 
merger cases, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Also, I focus the discussion on the product 
market definition dimension and do not deal in extenso with the geographic market dimension, as 
the methodology is neither particularly relevant nor modified by my proposal of a dualistic 
approach and can follow the standard treatment given in seller-side cases.623 
5.4.1 Conceptualizing the relevant market 
Defining the relevant market aims at identifying which products or services (product market) are 
close substitutes for one another within a geographical area in which conditions of competition 
are sufficiently homogeneous (geographic market) that other rival undertakings operate as a 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Judgment of 15 December 2010, CEAHR v Commission, T-427/08, ECR, EU:T:2010:517, where the General Court 
decided that the manufacture and repair and maintenance service for luxury watches are separate markets and 
annulled the Commission Decision based on its erroneous finding on a sole market; and Judgment of 14 November 
1996 in Tetra Pak v Commission, C-333/94 P, EU:C:1996:436, where it was discussed whether machinery for 
packing and cartons were related products. 
620 Rose and Ngwe (2007), p. 11; see also: Nicolas Gauss and Alison Oldale, Market Definition, Vol. 5 (F. Enrique 
González-Díaz and Robbert Snelders eds, Claeys and Casteels 2013), para. 1.83. 
621 “Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the Court has held that, like other competition rules laid down in the 
Treaty, Article 81 EC aims to protect not only the interests of competitors or of consumers, but also the structure of 
the market and, in so doing, competition as such”, Judgment of 6 October 2009 in GlaxoSmithKline Services and 
Others v Commission and Others, Joined cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, 
EU:C:2009:610, para. 63. 
622 Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 73. 
623 For a general discussion of geographic market definition see, inter alia: Oinonen, [2010], p. 264-288; Richard A. 
Posner and William M. Landes, ‘Market Power in Antitrust Case’ 94 Harvard Law Review (1980) 937; for a short 
discussion of geographic market definition in buyer power cases dealing with food retailing see: Bundeskartellamt 
‘Sektoruntersuchung: Lebensmitteleinzelhandel’ (2014). 
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competitive constraint on the behavior of suppliers and/or buyers of those goods.624 It serves both 
to assess monopsony and bargaining power cases because it follows a similar approach as the 
framework upon which the investigation is constructed. Furthermore, it also helps determine 
which other undertakings are active in the market and affected by the buying behavior. Based on 
the relevant market findings, market size and market share can be calculated owing to their 
sales/purchases of the relevant products in the relevant area,625 and therefore the undertaking(s)’s 
market power can be assessed.626 
The relevant market is usually defined by application of the hypothetical monopolist test – also 
known as the SSNIP test – based on the measurement of demand substitutability as the most 
common, but not exclusive approach.627 Supply substitutability is also taken into account when it 
is timely and effective to do so.628 The SSNIP test answers whether a market is a collection of 
specific goods in a particular geographic location such that a single undertaking would be able to 
increase prices profitably for a considerable period of time.629 As such, a relevant market is worth 
monopolizing because monopolization allows a price increase to a profitable behavior.630 
However, the SSNIP test does not determine whether the undertaking(s) has had significant 
market power, is dominant or whether a concentration could significantly impede effective 
competition; this is left to market power assessment, which I discuss in chapter 6.  
Several alternatives for a proper buyer-oriented market definition have been proposed in the soft 
law and literature. The majority of these have in common the adoption of a “hypothetical 
monopsonist test” – that I denominate the Buyer’s SSNIP test – a modified version of the 
standard assessment. This implies that the analysis adopts the seller’s point of view and asks what 
the competing uses for its output are, and which other channels or buyers will acquire its output 
rather than asking what products are substitutable for consumers.631 As such, the emphasis is 
placed on whether suppliers have alternative distribution channels for their output or whether 
they face an inelastic supply curve.632 The following paragraphs discuss and assess the different 
proposals incorporated in authoritative sources. 
                                                          
624 Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice [2004], p. 102; Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 29; 
Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials [2011], p. 63. 
625 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 53; Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 4-003. 
626 Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 1.144; Oinonen, [2010], p. 296. 
627 Crocioni (2002), p. 354; Säcker, [2008], p. 15-28 and 63-65; Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 38. 
628 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, paras. 20-21. 
629 Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice [2004], p. 102-103; Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 4-005; 
OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Market Definition’ (2012). 
630 Bishop and Walker, [2010], paras. 4-005-006. 
631 Bundeskartellamt ‘Buyer Power in Competition Law - Status and Perspectives’ (2008), p. 5; Blair and Harrison, 
[2010], p. 62. 
632 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2. for a discussion on the elasticity of supply. 
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5.4.2 The Commission’s view on Buying Market Definition 
The methodology for defining the relevant market, including the Buyer’s SSNIP test, in EU 
competition law has been mostly developed and incorporated in different Commission’s 
Guidelines that have received the endorsement of the General Court.633 Of special importance is 
the Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of the 
Community competition law (Notice on Market Definition), published in 1997.634 Due to the 
importance and the level of detail of the Notice on Market Definition, the remainder of this 
section discusses its content in extenso. 
The Notice on Market Definition is applicable to agreements, dominance and concentration 
cases, albeit with certain limitations.635 It draws inspiration from the ideas developed by the case 
law and US antitrust experience when defining relevant markets,636 and provided EU competition 
law with a ‘modernized’ and more economically influenced approach to market definition than 
before.637 The Notice on Market Definition adopts the hypothetical monopolist test as the main 
methodology for defining the relevant market and clarifies the methodology adopted by the 
Commission in the determination of the relevant market in the enforcement of EU competition 
law. For buyer power cases, the Notice on Market Definition suggests the adoption of the reverse 
of the seller-side test (the Buyer’s SSNIP test) and does not distinguish in terms of whether the 
test applies to monopsony and/or bargaining power cases. 
Despite its longevity, the Notice on Market Definition has not been replaced and its main 
principles are still applied by the Commission and accepted by the Courts, although it has been 
                                                          
633 “In order to evaluate the merits of the applicants’ arguments, both in principle and in the specific circumstances of 
this case, it is necessary to place them in the theoretical framework adopted by the Commission in the Notice on 
market definition for the purposes of determining competitive constraints”, Judgment of 1 July 2010, AstraZeneca v 
Commission, T-321/05, ECR, EU:T:2010:266, para. 86; see also: Judgment of 15 December 2010, CEAHR v 
Commission, T-427/08, ECR, EU:T:2010:517, para. 68-70; Judgment of 29 March 2012, Telefónica and Telefónica 
de España v Commission, T-336/07, ECR, EU:T:2012:172, para. 113; Judgment of 17 September 2007, Microsoft v 
Commission, T-201/04, ECR, EU:T:2007:289, para. 484; Judgment of 9 September 2009, Clearstream v 
Commission, T-301/04, ECR, EU:T:2009:317, para. 50. 
634 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5. 
635 See para. 10 of the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, which refer to the Notice on Market Definition for 
guidance in the assessment of the competitive constraints faced by the merging entity. Also of this opinion are Cook 
and Kerse, [2009], p. 218; Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials [2014], p. 65. 
636 The SSNIP test was firstly incorporated in the US 1982 Merger Guidelines as “the market definition used by the 
Department can be stated formally as follows: ‘a market consists of a group of products and an associated geographic 
area such that (an the absence of new entry) a hypothetical, unregulated firm that made all the sales of those products 
in that area could increase its profits through a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price (above 
prevailing or likely future levels)’”, US Department of Justice Merger Guidelines [1982], footnote 6, available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11248.htm; also highlighting the influence of US antitrust law experience and the 
approach “taken by antitrust authorities in the US” see: Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials [2014], p. 67; Whish and Bailey, [2015], p. 27. 
637 Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials [2014], p. 65. 
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partially updated by more specific and area-centered Commission communications.638 The EU 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines make explicit reference to the Notice on Market Definition as the 
instrument providing guidance when defining the relevant market.639 In the case of agreements 
between purchasing undertakings, the Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements provides an updated 
and detailed account of the methodology defining relevant purchasing markets when assessing 
purchasing agreements.640 These instruments largely follow the principles described in the Notice 
on Market Definition but also provide an update and a fairly detailed account of how to define 
relevant purchasing markets.641 
The Notice on Market Definition divides the relevant market methodology for a product and 
geographic dimension. Once this is done, competition authorities should assess two types of 
competitive constraints for determining the relevant market: demand and supply substitution, the 
key analytical aspects for determining a relevant market.642 The following subsections analyze 
these constraints from a buyer power perspective. 
5.4.2.1 Demand substitution: Buyer’s SSNIP test 
Demand substitution constitutes the most immediate, important and effective disciplinary 
constraint on the pricing and market strategy of a buyer or seller of a good,643 as also 
acknowledged by the General Court in Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission.644 As 
the starting point of the methodology for defining the relevant product market, its function is to 
determine which available products are seen by the consumers as interchangeable to satisfy a 
need;645 an example would be whether or not limes compete with lemons in the citrus fruit 
market. 
                                                          
638 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to technology transfer agreements [2014] OJ C 89/3, paras. 19-40; Guidelines on 
Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, paras. 86-95; Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the 
applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation 
agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, paras. 112-126, 155-156, 197-199, 229, and 261-262. 
639 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 10. 
640 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, paras. 194-199. 
641 Van Bael and Bellis, [2005], p. 146-147. 
642 Potential competition, the third competitive constraint indicated by the Notice on Market Definition is generally 
not taken into account at this stage of the process of market definition but rather later on when the market power 
assessment is made. See: Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law [1997] OJ C 372/5, para. 14; Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 4-011. 
643 Van Bael and Bellis, [2005], p. 135. 
644 Judgment of 29 March 2012, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, T-336/07, ECR, 
EU:T:2012:172, para. 113; see also: Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law [1997] OJ C 372/5, para. 13. For an economic discussion on demand substitution see: 
Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 4-011; Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 31-37. 
645 Baker (2007), p. 132; Säcker, [2008], p. 30. 
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For buyer power cases, a re-interpretation of what I shall call ‘reverse demand substitution’646 
should describe the ability of suppliers to switch from one buyer to another as a response to a 
decrease in the relative purchasing price for their outputs.647 This interpretation of the reverse 
demand substitution was employed by the Commission in Rewe/Meinl when it was stated that: 
“[t]he position is different, however, when it comes to defining procurement markets. Here, the 
critical factors are the producers’ flexibility in changing output and the alternative outlets open to 
them.”648 In addition to the switching factor due to a price decrease, the reverse demand 
substitution should take into account the switching costs of suppliers to find alternative buyers, as 
remarked by the Bundeskartellamt.649  
Furthermore, according to the Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements reverse demand substitution 
is anchored on the concept of substitutability as “the suppliers’ alternatives are decisive in 
identifying the competitive constraints on purchasers”.650 Substitutability exists according to the 
CJEU in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission when “there is a sufficient degree of 
interchangeability between all the products forming part of the same market in so far as a specific 
use of such products is concerned”.651 The substitutability of a good ought to be assessed 
depending on the case; in seller-side cases it has to be assessed from a consumer’s perspective as 
settled by the EU in United Brands v Commission652 as well as by the Commission in the Notice 
on Market Definition.653 In a buyer power case, therefore, substitutability ought to be defined 
                                                          
646 Term coined by the author. 
647 See also: Ritter and Braun, [2004], p. 395; also suggesting the application of a reverse of the demand 
substitutability test see: Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 6.321; Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of 
the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 6. 
648 Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 76. 
649 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 6. 
650 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 198. 
651 Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, para. 28 in fine; 
the same wording has been ratified recently by the General Court and the CJEU in several occasions; see also: 
Judgment of 15 December 2010, CEAHR v Commission, T-427/08, ECR, EU:T:2010:517, para. 67.  
652 Judgment of 14 February 1978 in United Brands v Commission, C-27/76, EU:C:1978:22, paras. 12-35, wherein 
the CJEU decided that from the consumer’s point of view bananas constitute a significantly different product market 
from other fruits. 
653 “A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or 
substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use”, 
Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] OJ 
C 372/5, para. 7 (emphasis added); and recently ratified by the General Court in Judgment of 29 March 2012, 
Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, T-336/07, ECR, EU:T:2012:172, para. 113; and Judgment of 28 
April 2010, Amann & Söhne and Cousin Filterie v Commission, T-446/05, ECR, EU:T:2010:165, para. 59; see also: 
Lawrence Wu and Simon Baker, ‘Applying the Market Definition Guidelines of the European Commission’ 19 
European Competition Law Review (1998) 273; Füller in Hirsch, Montag and Säcker, [2008], p. 438-439; For 
common mistakes defining which products are substitutes among each other see: Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, 
[2011], p. 27-29. 
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from a supplier’s perspective and will determine not which products are substitutes but instead 
which distribution channels are substitutes amongst each other.654  
Therefore, the reverse demand substitution determines which other buyers compete with the 
undertaking under investigation for the acquisition of a specific input.655 In other words, if buyers 
are plentiful and suppliers have other distribution channels to resort to, there is no compulsion to 
surrender to the buyer power of a specific purchaser.656 For example, in a market for the purchase 
of beef, reverse demand substitution represents all the different sales channels a buyer has to 
offer its goods: these could be food retailers (supermarkets), restaurants, hotels or even direct end 
consumers. However, these alternative buyers might not be direct competitors in the downstream 
market. Therefore, reverse demand substitution does not determine which other buyers compete 
as a retailer with the buyer under investigation because they might use the acquired input for 
different outputs.657 
The Notice on Market Definition and the Commission’s practice reveal that the main factors 
assessed when determining demand substitution are product characteristics, its intended use and 
price.658 However and from a buyer-oriented perspective, the fact that distribution channels share 
similar characteristic or are intended for a similar use is not a necessary condition for the 
distribution channels to be considered as demand substitutes with respect to each other as 
clarified by the Notice on Market Definition.659 Whether the products satisfy its consumer’s 
needs will be determined by deciding if they are substitutes from a supplier’s perspective.660 for 
                                                          
654 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 17 (in fine); Carstensen ‘Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor Progress on 
an Important Issue’ (2012), p. 782. 
655 Van Bael and Bellis, [2005], p. 146; Cosmo Graham, EU and UK Competition Law (Pearson Education Limited 
2010), p. 25. 
656 Galbraith, [2010], p. 116. Stressing the importance of alternative purchasers in buyer power cases, see: Ritter and 
Braun, [2004], p. 35. 
657 Carstensen ‘Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor Progress on an Important Issue’ (2012), 
p. 810. 
658 “An analysis of the product characteristics and its intended use allows the Commission, as a first step, to limit the 
field of investigation of possible substitutes”, Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the 
purposes of Community competition law [1997] OJ C 372/5, para. 36; see also: Van Bael and Bellis, [2005], p. 136-
138; Oinonen, [2010] p. 244; cf with the opinion of Ten Kate and Niels who suggest that demand substitution must 
take into account three factors: internal substitution, external substitution and demand reduction. Following this 
proposal and adapting it to a buyer power scenario, internal substitution measures the likelihood that suppliers of 
products within the relevant market resort to different buyers in the same product market pursuant to a decrease in 
the purchasing price. External substitution would measure the ease with which suppliers will switch to the production 
of another product due to the decrease in purchasing price. Lastly, supply reduction would measure the degree to 
which suppliers stop producing the product that suffered the decrease in purchasing price without switching its 
production to another good or service, ten Kate and Niels (2009), p. 312-313. 
659 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 36. 
660 This was the case for the comparison between tampons and sanitary towels, which were deemed not substitutes 
despite having the same purpose, in Commission Decision of 21 June 1994 declaring a concentration to be 
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example, whether the supplier has been required to meet a specific need for a buyer or it exists a 
technical specification precluding them from selling the output to other buyers with other 
needs.661 Additionally, the price indicator employed – prevailing or but-for price – is relevant in 
determining the reverse side substitution as it permits the application of the Buyer’s SSNIP test. 
To assess the reverse demand substitution, the Notice on Market Definition employs the SSNIP 
test,662 which is mostly demand-side oriented.663 For buyer power cases, however, it suggests the 
application of the Buyer’s SSNIP test.664 The Notice on Market Definition expressly states that: 
[t]he equivalent analysis (SSNIP test) is applicable in cases concerning the concentraiton [sic] of 
buying power, where the starting point would then be the supplier and the price test serves to 
identify the alternative distribution channel or outlets for the supplier’s product. In the application 
of these principles, careful account should be taken of certain particular situations as described 
within paragraphs 56 or 58.665  
Paragraph 17 of the Notice on Market Definition suggests applying what I denominate as the 
Buyer’s SSNIP test by adopting the supplier’s point of view. The methodology then requires 
decreasing in a small and permanent manner the purchasing price level to test whether there are 
alternative distribution channels or outlets that would acquire the supplier’s goods.666 With this 
price decrease, the degree of reverse demand substitution can be analyzed.667 A similar 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (IV/M.430 - Procter & Gamble/VP 
Schickedanz (II)) [1994] OJ L 354/32, para. 42. 
661 Ritter and Braun, [2004], p. 35. 
662 SSNIP stands for “small but significant and non-transitory increase in price”. The SSNIP test was introduced in 
1982 in the US with the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The SSNIP test remains in force in the last version of the US 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines [2010], p. 8-13; in the EU the test developed by the Commission is slightly different: 
“a hypothetical small (in the range of 5% to 10%) but permanent relative price increase in the products and areas 
being considered”, Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law [1997] OJ C 372/5, para. 17; see also the OECD report on the differences between the test in: 
OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Market Definition’ (2012), p. 30-31. 
663 “The discussion above [referring to the general discussion on market definition] is predicated on markets defined 
on the supply side. However, it is also possible to define markets on the demand side, that is, in terms of what is 
being bought”, Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials [2014], p. 81. 
664 The Buyer’s SSNIP test is a name adopted by the author as it clearly defines what the methodology is. Other 
authors have adopted a different denomination, for example Kokkoris that adopts the SSNDP (Small but Significant 
Non-Transitory Decrease in Prices) in Kokkoris (2006) and Kokkoris and Day (2009), which is in turn based on the 
previous work by Commission and others (2000). 
665 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 17 (in fine). 
666 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 17. 
667 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 17; a similar point is made by Blair and Harrison when stating that “[i]f buyers respond quickly to 
the efforts of another buyer to depress prices by increasing purchases when prices fall, they must be included as part 
of the defendant’s market”, Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 63. Also in the same line is the methodology proposed by 
Kokkoris of the SSNIP test which assesses “whether suppliers would refuse to supply a buyer in the presence of a 
permanent five to ten percent reduction in the price the buyer would pay for the suppliers’ products, so as the price 
reduction to be unprofitable for the buyer”, in Kokkoris (2006), p. 147; see also the proposal by Chen who describes 
the hypothetical monopsonist test as “[a] relevant market is defined as the smallest group of products and the 
smallest geographic area in which a sole profit-maximizing buyer (a ‘hypothetical monopsonist’) would impose and 
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methodology is also adopted in the Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements, which suggest 
measuring demand substitution by examining the suppliers’ reaction to a small but non-transitory 
(as opposed to permanent) price decrease,668 as one of the methodologies that could be employed 
for purchasing market definition. The Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements, however, do not 
expressly mention any other alternatives to determining the markets but seem to accept other 
methodologies as valid, such as perhaps the Buyer Power Index, discussed in chapter 6. 
The application of the Buyer’s SSNIP test will ask whether, after a non-transitory decrease in the 
range of five to ten percent in purchasing prices, sellers are able to switch to other buyers and 
make the decrease in price non-profitable for the buyer.669 It will not be profitable if suppliers are 
able to find alternative buyers or switch production to another good or service.670 If buyer’s 
substitution is enough to make the price decrease unprofitable then additional buyers and 
geographical areas are included in the relevant market and the price decrease test is applied to 
them.671 Competition authorities will continue adding buyers or areas until the set of buyers and 
geographic area is such that a small, non-transitory decrease in relative prices would be profitable 
for a hypothetical monopsonist.672 
Importantly, and something that merits attention in the analysis, under the Buyer’s SSNIP test, the 
relevant market might be composed of buyers belonging to different downstream markets as the 
input acquired can have different uses.673 Or, as Chen points out, relevant upstream markets are 
not necessarily aligned with the relevant downstream markets as they can be quite differentiated 
regarding the products included.674 For example, the product market for purchasing fresh oranges 
might include juice and ice-cream producers that compete for the input but are not competitors in 
the downstream market. Also, it must be taken into account that generally there are usually more 
buyers than suppliers of a good or service – because the same good can be used for different 
means or user types – and, therefore, the evaluation concerning the amount of buyers in a market 
should bear this in mind. For these reasons, it is necessary that competition authorities do not 
evaluate competing buyers focused solely on those that are downstream competitors at the same 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
sustain a significant and non-transitory price decrease below its normal level” and focusing on the ability of the seller 
to find alternative buyers in Chen ‘Buyer power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy’ (2007), p. 29. 
668 The wording employed by the Commission in the Notice on Market Definition speaks of “permanent” and 
“lasting change”. In contrast with the wording used in the Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on 
the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation 
agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 198; non-transitory is understood as a period of usually one or two years whereas 
permanent is understood as a long-term price variation. See: Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 45-46. 
669 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 17. 
670 Van Bael and Bellis, [2005], p. 146. 
671 Similarly, but from a seller’s perspective: Crocioni (2002), p. 335; ten Kate and Niels (2009), p. 301. 
672 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 17; for a similar explanation see: Kokkoris (2006), p. 148; Graham, [2010], p. 26. 
673 Canadian contribution in OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 143. 
674 Chen ‘Buyer power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy’ (2007), p. 30. 
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time.675 otherwise, the market definition runs the risk of making the relevant market larger than it 
actually is. Unfortunately, the Notice on Market Definition does not take this situation into 
account. 
Additionally, the price level to be applied in the Buyer’s SSNIP test varies depending on the case 
at hand. In general, the prevailing market price would be the starting point, particularly for 
concentration cases. In cases of unilateral behavior, however, the prevailing price might have 
been determined in the absence of effective competition, as discussed in the cellophane fallacy.676 
In these cases, the price level that should be taken into account is the price that would have 
existed under a competitive market, which is difficult in practice.  
In this sense, the Notice on Market Definition seems to consider the prevailing price as the 
competitive and applicable price level for buyer power cases in general, but in doing so it may 
overlook the reverse cellophane fallacy.677 The reverse cellophane fallacy claims that if the 
prevailing price is taken into account by using estimated demand elasticities, instead of making 
the market too broad, the market definition becomes too narrow and “the potential for the 
exercise of market power is likely to be overstated”.678 This occurs, for example, if the prevailing 
price is too low, making other goods (or distribution channels) appear to be weaker substitutes 
when they are really not.679 Therefore, in buyer power cases the reverse cellophane fallacy may 
lead to the erroneous conclusion that a buyer that pays a low price has substantial market power 
when in reality this is not the case.  
Furthermore, the Notice on Market Definition remarks that when determining demand 
substitution special attention should be paid to secondary markets and chains of substitution.680 
The examples given by the Notice on Market Definition are not related to buyer power cases 
although this does not imply that these effects cannot occur in buyer power scenarios.  
                                                          
675 See also the opinion of Carstensen when referring to substitutability from an input perspective in Carstensen 
‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust Policy’ (2010), p. 19. 
676 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 19; discussing the cellophane fallacy in some detail see: George A. Hay, ‘Market Power in 
Antitrust’ 60 Antitrust Law Journal (1991-1992) 807. 
677 Luke M. Froeb and Gregory J. Werden, ‘The Reverse Cellophane Fallacy in Market Delineation’ 7 Review of 
Industrial Organization (1992) 241; discussing the reverse cellophane fallacy in regulated markets see: Debra J. Aron 
and David E. Burnstein, ‘Regulatory Policy and the Reverse Cellophane Fallacy’ 6 Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics (2010) 973; see also: Jerry A. Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak, ‘A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the 
Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks’ 109 The Yale Law Journal (1999) 417. 
678 Froeb and Werden (1992), p. 241. 
679 Aron and Burnstein (2010), p. 975-976. 
680 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, paras. 17 and 56-58; for an economic discussion of aftermarkets, see: Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, 
[2011], p. 87-89. 
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Secondary markets or aftermarkets (not to be confused with two-sided markets)681 present the 
dilemma of determining whether the main product and its spare parts or consumables are part of 
the same market or constitute different markets, as car windscreens would be for cars.682 When 
carrying out buyer power analysis of secondary markets, therefore, it is necessary to take into 
account the “constraints on substitution imposed by conditions in the connected markets”,683 such 
as, for example, compatibility issues. A buyer power example of a secondary purchasing market 
would be when a large buyer acquires specialized industrial machinery with a long lifespan from 
a provider at a competitive price. The supplier, rather small in comparison to the buyer, commits 
its total production capacity to satisfy the demand of machinery spares and replacement parts for 
the large buyer, becoming dependent on that buyer and having an inelastic supply curve. To 
exploit the supplier, the large buyer would exert its market power on the spare and replacement 
parts market by paying a purchasing price below competitive levels. If the market is broadly 
defined including the industrial machinery and the spare and replacement parts, the buyer would 
appear to have less buyer power than if the market definition is made with the spare and 
replacement parts market as the focus. 
Lastly, chains of substitution are problematic as they might lead to the definition of a relevant 
market where the product or geographic areas at the market limits are not substitutes for each 
other.684 The example provided by the Notice on Market Definition defines the geographic 
market when transport costs are a significant issue as the pricing of the goods might be 
constrained by the chain substitution effect, leading to a definition of a different market.685  
5.4.2.2 Supply substitution – supply buyer substitution 
Supply substitution is the second competitive constraint assessed when determining the relevant 
market according to the Notice on Market Definition and the CJEU’s case law derived from 
                                                          
681 Two-sided markets, nevertheless, are important for buyer power cases, in particular regarding buyer power in 
public procurement regulated markets in the case of central purchasing bodies, as pointed out by Sánchez Graells in 
Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules [2011], p. 54-55. A two-sided market is when 
two distinct groups of customers have inter-related demand and the groups impose positive externalities. One 
example of such a two-sided market is newspapers that sell advertisement space and information; another example is 
credit cards connecting retailers and consumers, as discussed in Judgment of 30 June 2016, CB v Commission, T-
491/07, ECR, EU:T:2012:633, and appealed before the CJEU in Judgment of 11 September 2014 in CB v 
Commission, C-67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204; for a description of the basic economics of two-sided markets see, inter 
alia, Carlton (2007), p. 25-26; Bishop and Walker, [2010], paras. 3.042-3.045; OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Market 
Definition’ (2012); Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 89; American Bar Association, Market Definition in 
Antitrust [2012], p. 437-469. See also: Gauss and Oldale, [2013], paras. 1.109-1.112. 
682 Van Bael and Bellis, [2005], p. 148-149. 
683 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/55, para. 56. 
684 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 57. 
685 Kokkoris (2006), p. 146. 
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Continental Can686 and Michelin I.687 Supply substitution defines the capacity of other suppliers 
(or buyers) to switch to the production (or purchasing) of the monopolized good in the short term 
without incurring significant additional costs or risks in response to small and permanent changes 
in relative prices.688 Therefore, in a buyer power case, supply substitution – which I refer to as 
supply buyer substitution – would measure the ability of non-current buyers of an input that due 
to the price decrease now decide to purchase it.  
This means that in a buyer power case, supply buyer substitution measures a different variable 
than selling-side supply substitution and this is not its reverse.689 Supply buyer substitution would 
measure the response of other buyers that were not originally purchasing the good that, in 
response to the reduction of the purchasing price, decide to acquire the input, but not take into 
account that other suppliers would be producing the same input. This purchasing behavior is a 
reaction to the perceived new profit maximizing opportunity,690 and the additional purchases will 
discipline the behavior of the buyer under investigation as new buyers become competitors for 
the underpriced input. An example illustrates this effect: buyer “A” located in the region of 
Cognac in France is a monopsonist buyer of the grape Ugni Blanc for the production of the liquor 
Cognac,691 due to a non-transitory decrease in the purchasing prices of Ugni Blanc, buyer “B”, a 
red wine producer also located in Cognac, decides to acquire Ugni Blanc to also start producing 
Cognac. Owing to its expertise in the production of grape-based alcoholic beverages, geographic 
location and spare capacity, “B” can effectively and immediately start buying grapes for Cognac 
production, thus being a supply-sided constraint vis-à-vis “A”. 
As in the case of supply substitution, buyer substitution should not be overestimated when 
assessing competitive pressure from other buyers.692 Additionally, buyer substitution is a less 
                                                          
686 Judgment of 21 February 1973 in Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company v Commission, C-
6/72, EU:C:1973:22, para. 33 and ss, where the CJEU consider that potential competitors were able to switch their 
facilities to the production of cans to determine a market for light metal packaging. 
687 “[…] an examination limited to the objective characteristics only of the relevant products cannot be sufficient: the 
competitive conditions and the structure of supply and demand on the market must also be taken into consideration.”, 
Judgment of 9 November 1983 in Michelin v Commission, C-322/81, EU:C:1983:313, para. 37; Judgment of 21 
October 1997, Deutsche Bahn v Commission T-229/94, ECR, EU:T:1997:155, para. 37. 
688 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, paras. 20-23; see also: Van Bael and Bellis, [2005], p. 138-139; Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 4-012; 
Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 68-74; for a US antitrust law perspective, see Hovenkamp, [2005], p. 108-
113. 
689 Cf with Kokkoris who seems to use a traditional definition of supply substitution in buyer power cases in 
Kokkoris (2006), p. 147. 
690 Crocioni (2002), p. 355. 
691 The CJEU dealt with a buyer power-related case in Judgment of 30 January 1985 in BNIC v Clair, C-123/83, 
EU:C:1985:33, in which the main issue dealt with fixing minimum purchasing prices to limit the buyer power of 
purchasers of white grapes. For the analysis of this case see in this dissertation chapter 11, section 11.2. Cognac is 
variety of brandy produced in the Cognac region of France from specific grapes, among them the Ugni Blanc. 
Cognac is a denomination of origin and protected since 1909 in France. 
692 See for supply substitution: Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011] p. 71-74. 
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immediate constraint and assessment tool when compared to reverse demand substitution and 
requiring less of an analysis of additional factors to be taken into account.693 
Unlike demand substitution, supply substitution is future oriented.694 When assessing, it is 
necessary to grant it adequate importance to avoid making the market definition too narrow or too 
broad, as remarked by Oinonen.695 If supply substitutability is not taken into account or its impact 
minimized, the market definition may become too narrow as potential sources of competitive 
constraint are disregarded. On the other hand, if too much emphasis is placed on supply 
substitution, the market definition may become too broad as, depending on the market, many 
undertakings could begin to switch their production. This latter concern is especially important in 
buyer power cases as traditionally there are more buyers than sellers in a given market and a non-
traditional buyer of a good may desire to upon seeing the reduction in the input’s purchasing 
price. 
These inherent problems of supply substitution have led to some critical voices concerning its 
appropriateness when performing the buyer’s market definition. Baker, in the sphere of US 
antitrust, argues that supply substitution should not be taken into account at the stage of market 
definition but instead at a later stage because “it can be both difficult and confusing to ask one 
analytical step, market definition, to account for two economic forces, demand and supply 
substitution.”696 In contrast, in EU competition law, the Commission’s practice and the Notice on 
Market definition assess supply substitutability in the market definition phase.697 Part of the 
reasoning behind this is that, as argued by Motta, “there is no reason to delay the moment at 
which substitutes on the supply side are considered. Immediate consideration of the existing 
competitive constraints will save time and help the investigation.”698 
To minimize risks concerning the assessment of supply substitution in buyer power cases, the 
Notice on Market Definition and the Courts remark that it would only be taken into account 
whenever the switching effects are “equivalent to those of demand substitution in terms of 
effectiveness and immediacy”.699 Absent the factors of timeliness and effectiveness, supply 
substitution will be considered only when dealing with market power assessment. The General 
Court clarified in Clearstream v Commission that timely and effective means that “suppliers are 
                                                          
693 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 14. 
694 Säcker, [2008], p. 37. 
695 Oinonen, [2010], p. 257-258. 
696 Baker (2007), p. 134. 
697 Oinonen, [2010], p. 263. 
698 Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice [2004], p. 104. 
699 Judgment of 29 March 2012, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, T-336/07, ECR, 
EU:T:2012:172, para. 113. See also: Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law [1997] OJ C 372/5, paras. 20-21; Füller in Hirsch, Montag and Säcker, [2008], p. 438-
439; Säcker considers that supply substitutability also includes current competitors in Säcker, [2008] p. 37. 
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able to switch production to the relevant products and market them in the short term without 
incurring significant additional costs or risks in response to small and permanent changes in 
relative prices”.700 To be effective, buyer substitution would require several variables, among 
others, the market should have sufficient spare production capacity and flexibility, lack of 
barriers to expansions, buyers should have flexible contractual commitments with their current 
sellers, little risk of defensive or retaliative strategies and no need to significantly adjust tangible 
and intangible assets.701 Also, supply substitution would be timely if it is within six months or up 
to one year, as suggested by Motta.702 Consequently, supply substitution will be irrelevant if the 
supplier’s ability to change its production does not affect the involved undertaking’s position in 
the market.703 
5.4.3 Shortcomings of the current buyer-oriented methodology 
As it stands in EU competition law, my evaluation of the Buyer’s SSNIP test reveals some 
deficiencies that ought to be remarked upon in when it comes to future policy chances. Some of 
my criticisms address, and stem from, the SSNIP test methodology in general and not only the 
Buyer’s SSNIP test. In the following paragraph, I, however, address the problems I identified 
from a buyer’s perspective only so that competition authorities are aware of them and take them 
into consideration when dealing with a buyer power market definition pursuant to the Buyer’s 
SSNIP test. 
The Notice on Market Definition takes a simplistic and uni-dimensional approach to buyer power 
definition as it only contemplates defining the upstream market while neither requiring nor 
suggesting an additional market definition in the downstream market.704 In failing to do so, the 
analysis does not consider the competitive effects of buyer power in the downstream market and 
only looks at the effects upstream. Not looking at the effects in the downstream market is at odds 
with the implementation or use of a broader standard to buyer power anti-competitive harm and 
the ordoliberal concern of protecting competition as such. Furthermore, a pure upstream market 
analysis also disregards the direct end consumer harm, which, it will be discussed in Parts VI and 
V of this thesis, are the center of concern for US antitrust and, to a lesser extent, the Commission. 
Nevertheless, the case law, as illustrated by British Airways v Commission,705 which I discuss 
below in connection with the importance of a dualistic market definition. 
                                                          
700 Judgment of 9 September 2009, Clearstream v Commission, T-301/04, ECR, EU:T:2009:317, para. 50. 
701 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 20; Kokkoris (2006), p. 147; Säcker, [2008], p. 38-39. 
702 Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice [2004], p. 103. 
703 Füller in Hirsch, Montag and Säcker, [2008], p. 444. 
704 The same opinion was given by the now extinct Competition Commission and Office of Fair Trading of the UK in 
the UK’s Contribution in OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 231. 
705 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343; and Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166. 
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The Commission’s buyer power market definition methodology may lead to situations in which 
the relevant market found is narrower than the real one. As a consequence, the buyer under 
investigation may appear to have more market power than it actually does. This effect occurs as 
the Commission’s Buyer’s SSNIP test inquires whether a hypothetical purchasing undertaking 
would make more profit if the purchasing prices were 5-10 percent lower than the current level 
and not if a hypothetical monopsonist would reduce the purchasing price by the same amount, as 
it is done in US antitrust.706 Furthermore, the Notice on Market Definition does not indicate 
whether the reduction in purchasing prices should be performed in terms of one price, some 
prices or all prices in the candidate market.707 Daljord, Sørgard and Thomassen suggest that this 
should be done on a case-by-case assessment depending on the market’s characteristics.708 
Also, the application of a decrease in purchasing price in the range of 5-10 percent by a 
hypothetical monopsonist may well have a greater impact on the supplier than when compared to 
an increase in price for end consumers, especially if the supply curve is inelastic, and because 
large buyers might represent a higher proportion of the sales of a supplier than is the case when 
end consumers act individually. Therefore, as is discussed when it comes to dealing with unfair 
purchasing prices, a lesser decrease in price might still have a strong effect on the quantity 
supplied and the search for alternative buyers by the seller, if the suppliers depend on the buyer. 
Think, for example, of the agriculture sector, a purchasing price decrease by a supermarket chain 
of 4 percent can still have a powerful effect on the supplier’s response to the change in price 
because the farmer will usually face a very inelastic demand curve (for instance, the commodities 
it sells perish quickly if not properly refrigerated or seasonal factors)709, the supermarket is a 
necessary trading partner and/or because the profit margins are quite small. This concern has 
been expressed in somewhat analogous terms by the Commission by reference to the “threat 
point” which is discussed in detail in the section dealing with market power assessment.710 The 
threat point was defined as the ratio of purchases that a buyer represents for a seller upon which 
the loss of this client will endanger the supplier’s operability and which has been deemed to exist 
whenever a buyer represents 22% of the sales of a supplier, as discussed by the Commission in 
several merger cases.711 
                                                          
706 A similar criticism from a demand-side oriented perspective is found in: Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 4-006. 
707 Øystein Daljord, Lars Sørgard and Øyvind Thomassen, ‘The SSNIP Test and Market Definition with the 
Aggregate Diversion Ratio: A Reply to Katz And Shapiro’ 4 Journal of Competition Law and Economics (2008) 
263. 
708 Ibid. p. 263. 
709 David L. Baumer, Robert T. Masson and Robin Abrahamson Masson, ‘Curdling the Competition: An Economic 
and Legal Analysis of the Antitrust Exemption for Agriculture’ 31 Villanova Law Review (1986), 187. 
710 See Section 1.4.2. Also referring to the threat point concerning the Carrefour/Promodès Decision see, Ezrachi and 
Ioannidou (2014), p. 81.  
711 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 164/5, 
French public version, paras. 52-55; Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 101. 
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An additional shortcoming is that the market definition resulting from the Buyer’s SSNIP test 
may be composed of a smaller number of undertakings, both on the supply side and on the 
demand side, than when compared to a relevant market with final consumers.712 Consequently, 
the undertakings’ market share will be rather large and the HHI level will tend to be concentrated, 
in either the supplier’s side, the demand, or both. This is a factor that should be kept in mind 
when assessing the undertaking’s market power and which should not be over or underestimated. 
Furthermore, the case law concerning buyer power abuse or dealing with countervailing buyer 
power as an efficiency defense can be misleading because in some of these cases the market 
shares and concentration thresholds were very high, which may erroneously lead one to think that 
buyer power cases are always represented by very high market shares indexes.713 For example, 
the countervailing buyer power cases of Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission,714 Irish 
Sugar v Commission715 and Tomra and Others v Commission,716 represent cases in which the 
levels of market concentration and market shares were extremely high. 
In contrast with this tendency, substantial buyer power has said to arise when there is low 
concentration and market shares levels; in British Airways v Commission the CJEU confirmed 
that British Airways was a dominant undertaking with a market share of 39.7% of the total tickets 
sold by travel agents in the downstream market.717 British Airways v Commission is a 
breakthrough in cases of dominance due to the low market share threshold and the fact that in 
                                                          
712 Bundeskartellamt ‘Buyer Power in Competition Law - Status and Perspectives’ (2008), p. 5. 
713 Cf with the concentration thresholds in the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, paras. 19-21, where two 
scenarios are distinguished: first, concentrations below 1,000 HHI do not merit extensive analysis (unconcentrated 
markets); second, it is unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns in a merger with a post-merger HHI 
between 1 000 and 2 000 and a delta below 250, or a merger with a post-merger HHI above 2 000 and a delta below 
150 (moderately concentrated markets). 
714 In this case the HHI was of 8,150 and the undertaking’s market share was 90%, which indicates an almost 
monopsonistic position by Imperial Chemical Industries in Judgment of 25 June 2010, Imperial Chemical Industries 
v Commission, T-66/01, ECR, EU:T:2010:255; and Commission Decision of 19 December 1990 relating to a 
proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/33.133-A: Soda-ash - Solvay, ICI) [1991] OJ L 152/1, para 1. 
715 In Irish Sugar v Commission the market shares and HHI were also very high, ranging between 90% and 88% of 
the market and 8100 and 7225 HHI; see: C-497-99 P - Irish Sugar v Commission, EU:C:2001:393 E.C.R. [2001] I-
05333; T-228-97 - Irish Sugar v Commission, EU:T:1999:246 E.C.R. [1999] II-02969; and Commission Decision of 
14 May 1997 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty (IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar 
plc) [1997] OJ L 258/1. 
716 In Tomra and Others v Commission the HHI varied considerably, ranging from 5625 up to a maximum of 9025 in 
accordance with the provided figures and the market share ranged from 70% to 95%; see, Judgment of 19 April 2012 
in Tomra and Others v Commission, C-549/10 P, EU:C:2012:221; Judgment of 9 September 2010, Tomra Systems 
and Others v Commission, T-155/06, ECR, EU:T:2010:370; and Summary of Commission Decision of 29 March 
2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and Article 54 of 
the EEA Agreement against Tomra Systems ASA, Tomra Europe AS, Tomra Systems BV, Tomra Systems GmbH, 
Tomra Butikksystemer AS, Tomra Systems AB and Tomra Leergutsysteme GmbH (Case COMP/E-1/38.113 — 
Prokent/Tomra) [2008] OJ C 219/11, para. 11. The full version of the Decision can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38113/38113_250_8.pdf, last visited 21May 2014. 
717 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343; Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166. 
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most buyer power cases the market share percentage of the dominant undertaking has been far 
higher. However, British Airways was found to be a necessary trading partner and also enjoyed 
substantial downstream market power, which may be one of the factors why it was considered to 
be a dominant undertaking. Also, in the merger assessments of Carrefour/Promodès, and 
Rewe/Meinl, substantial relative buyer power was said to exist between a buyer and a supplier 
when the former represented 22% of the supplies; however, in both this cases, as I discuss in 
chapter 9, the concentrations were cleared pursuant to commitments. 
Additionally, the Canadian Competition Bureau has pointed out that the relevant product market 
stemming from the Buyer’s SSNIP test may include products that, from the buyer’s perspective, 
are unrelated or not substitutes, which may also contradict the case law.718 This raises the 
question of whether the substitutability of products in buyer power cases should be defined 
through the relevant use given to it by the buyer or the supplier.719 Traditionally, when facing a 
decrease in purchasing price, suppliers may switch their production towards another good or 
service, which does not entail incurring substantive costs;720 for example, a citrus farmer may 
start to produce mandarins instead of oranges. The problematic aspect of this would be that the 
market definition outcome will include both mandarins and oranges in the relevant product 
market, which is incorrect from a buyer’s perspective. 
In my view, to answer this problem, concerning the substitutability/interchangeability of goods in 
the upstream product market, it should be assessed from the supplier’s perspective and not from 
the buyer’s perspective: also taking into consideration “the structure of supply and demand on the 
market, and competitive conditions”.721 This shift in the perspective in terms of the 
substitutability was made even clearer in CEAHR v Commission, where it was stated that “[t]he 
interchangeability or substitutability is not assessed solely in relation to the objective 
characteristics of the products and services at issue, but the competitive conditions and the 
structure of supply and demand on the market must also be taken into consideration”.722 This 
interpretation is made by means of analogy to seller cases in which it is the end consumer who 
                                                          
718 Canadian contribution in OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 144-145; Cf with 
C-27/76 - United Brands v Commission, EU:C:1978:22 E.C.R. [1978] 00207, para. 22; C-6/72 - Europemballage 
Corporation and Continental Can Company v Commission, EU:C:1973:22 E.C.R. [1973] 00215, para. 32. 
719 Füller in Hirsch, Montag and Säcker, [2008], p. 441. 
720 Canadian contribution in OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 144-145. 
721 “For this purpose, therefore, an examination limited to the objective characteristics only of the relevant products 
cannot be sufficient: the competitive conditions and the structure of supply and demand on the market must also be 
taken into consideration”, in Judgment of 9 November 1983 in Michelin v Commission, C-322/81, EU:C:1983:313, 
para. 37; Judgment of 21 October 1997, Deutsche Bahn v Commission T-229/94, ECR, EU:T:1997:155, para. 54. 
722 Judgment of 15 December 2010, CEAHR v Commission, T-427/08, ECR, EU:T:2010:517, para. 67; see also: 
Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 91. 
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judges the substitutability/interchangeability between products, as settled by the CJEU in United 
Brands v Commission,723as well as by the Notice on Market Definition.724  
Furthermore, the simplified Buyer’s SSNIP test has been criticized by the former UK Office of 
Fair Trading because if a supplier is forced to price below competitive levels this would imply 
that “the supplier would not earn a normal profit over the long term and so would be better off 
leaving the industry”.725 This criticism reveals two shortcomings of the methodology. First, a 
mere upstream market definition only captures monopsony effects and not bargaining power 
effects. Second, the Notice on Market Definition is not explicit when it comes to stating if the 
decrease in the purchasing price is or is to be above or below the competitive level. The 
differences are well illustrated by the quote here: if below the competitive levels, the supplier will 
be forced out of the business to avoid losses; if still within competitive levels, then the supplier 
will remain in the industry. 
Additionally, my analysis shows that applying the current approach of the Buyer’s SSNIP test 
requires determining what the current or competitive purchasing price is, this is a challenging 
exercise, particularly regarding the latter aspect. It is especially difficult in buyer power cases 
because prices in intermediate markets are not readily available to end consumers or the general 
public, even in cases where they are not protected under confidentiality clauses.726 This would be 
particularly relevant in cases of private litigation, as happens in the US, because neither the 
supplier nor the buyer have incentives to reveal their price or costs to competitors and will indeed 
use confidentiality clauses to protect prices. In other cases, and as remarked by Carstensen, 
transactions are entered into as one-on-one sales where buyer and seller have some flexibility to 
determine prices ad hoc.727 However, this difficulty would be less in cases of public enforcement 
as agencies have right to access this confidential information, diminishing the risks for not 
finding adequate price levels. 
Finally, the purchasing market definition ought to consider that purchasing contracts in some 
industries, such as manufacturing input markets, are typically of long duration, as opposed to the 
                                                          
723 Judgment of 14 February 1978 in United Brands v Commission, C-27/76, EU:C:1978:22, para. 12-35, wherein the 
CJEU decided that from the consumer’s point of view the product market for bananas constitutes a significantly 
different product market from other fruits. 
724 “A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or 
substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use”, 
Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] OJ 
C 372/5, para. 7 (emphasis added); and recently ratified by the General Court in Judgment of 29 March 2012, 
Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, T-336/07, ECR, EU:T:2012:172, para. 113; and Judgment of 28 
April 2010, Amann & Söhne and Cousin Filterie v Commission, T-446/05, ECR, EU:T:2010:165, para. 59. 
725 Office of Fair Trading, The Competitive Effects of Buyer Groups, para 1.77 (emphasis added). 
726 Joe Harrington, “The Current State of the Theory of Collusion: Unexplained Phenomena and Unexplored 
Directions” (BECCLE Competition Policy Conference). 
727 Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust 
Policy’ (2010), p. 19.  
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majority of contracts among sellers and final consumers, which are typically (although not 
always) a one-time deal. Consequently, this has to be factored in when determining an 
appropriate “non-transitory” or “permanent” period when performing the Buyer’s SSNIP test.728 
5.4.4 The hypothetical monopsony test: the OECD alternative 
The OECD has proposed a methodology for market definition that centers its attention on 
monopsony cases.729 The proposed methodology — the hypothetical monopsonist test — is 
drafted in general terms, providing guidance in terms of agreement, dominance and merger cases. 
In my view, the hypothetical monopsonist test is a more detailed, refined and modern 
methodology than the one which is proposed in the Notice on Market Definition by the 
Commission. The differences, however, are not many. 
The hypothetical monopsonist test identifies the “smallest set of products in the smallest 
geographic area such that a hypothetical monopsonist of those products in that area would be able 
to depress prices by a small but significant and non-transitory amount.”730 Therefore, it is similar 
to the standard hypothetical monopolist test.731  
In this test, the product market is defined as the productive assets over which a buyer could 
exercise monopsony power as it determines the smallest group of goods that can be profitably 
monopsonized by a hypothetical monopsonist by withholding demand to lower purchasing prices 
below competitive levels.732 To do so, the key lies in recognizing the existence of alternative 
channels for the seller, which is analogous to the Buyer’s SSNIP test discussed above.733 The 
more alternative buyers there are, the less monopsony power the undertaking has. For bargaining 
power cases, the OECD does not provide an explicit methodology for defining the relevant 
market; however, the hypothetical monopsonist test can be employed as well to measure the 
existence and extent of bargaining power in its measurement, I discuss this in more detail in 
chapter 6. 
The methodology would indicate that a buyer necessarily has limited monopsony power when it 
is proven that the sellers can easily find other buyers. The OECD distinguishes 3 cases:  
i) Other buyers that acquire the input for different uses than the undertaking under 
investigation; 
                                                          
728 American Bar Association, Market Definition in Antitrust [2012], p. 55-56. 
729 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 34-42. 
730 Ibid, p. 34. 
731 For a thorough discussion on the hypothetical monopolist test see inter alia: Gregory J. Werden, ‘The 1982 
Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm’ 71 Antitrust Law Journal (2003) 253; 
Malcolm B. Coate and Jeffrey H. Fischer, ‘A Practical Guide to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Market 
Definition’ 4 Journal of Competition Law and Economics (2008), 1031; Bishop and Walker, [2010], p. 111-124; 
Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 37-56. 
732 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 34. 
733 Ibid, p. 34. 
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ii) Other buyers located in different geographic areas that acquire the input for similar 
uses as the undertaking under investigation;  
iii) And lastly, other buyers for whom the assets can be used to make a different 
input.734 
 
The OECD also suggests applying two different price levels when carrying out the test. If the 
case is retrospective, the price level used would be the competitive one. If, on the other hand, the 
case is prospective then the price level used would be the current price, unless it is reasonable to 
expect that the price for the input is going to rise.735 This clarification concerning the price levels 
to be used constitutes an improvement compared to the vague rule on price levels set in the 
Notice on Market Definition.736 Importantly, the OECD does not suggest what the range of the 
price decrease should be, arguably due to the different approaches in the EU and US competition 
methodologies. 
In sum, the hypothetical monopsonist test proposed by the OECD constitutes an improvement to 
the Buyer’s SSNIP test suggested in the Notice on Market Definition. Furthermore, the fact that 
the test is expressly oriented to monopsony cases does not mean it cannot be applied to 
bargaining power ones. However, the test and its results would not indicate if the buyer power 
exerted is monopsony or bargaining power; what it does is to define the boundaries in which the 
undertaking’s conduct is to be analyzed. Lastly, despite its specificity, the hypothetical 
monopsonist test does not expressly indicate the need to perform a dual relevant market 
definition, as I propose. 
5.4.5 Buyer’s market definition in some Member States 
Some NCAs of the EU Member States have also engaged in efforts to refine the existing tools 
regarding buyer’s market definition. In the following section, I briefly discuss the proposals put 
forth by the German Bundeskartellamt and the former UK Office of Fair Trading. 
5.4.5.1 Ability of suppliers to switch to alternative sale opportunities 
The Bundeskartellamt has proposed a structural approach regarding the definition of relevant 
purchasing markets that is centered on the analysis of the ability of suppliers to switch to 
alternative sale opportunities, which is in line with, and appears to be inspired by, the 
Commission’s and the OECD’s methodologies. This Buyer oriented market definition “focuses 
on the products the supplier is offering or would be able to offer without any significant 
problems. With these products in view it has to be asked which (alternative) sales channels could 
                                                          
734 Ibid, p. 34 
735 Ibid, p. 34 
736 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 19. 
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be services in an economically viable manner”.737 The Bundeskartellamt approach, however, 
does not explicitly contemplate the application of a Buyer’s SSNIP test; although, in determining 
whether the supplier would be able to offer its products without any significant problems it seems 
to apply it. Lastly, an aspect not covered by this approach, concerns the level of prices to be used 
as a basis of the test, which is not specified, nor is it identified with the decrease in percentage 
that will be used. 
5.4.5.2 A dualistic approach to buyer markets 
In the UK, the Guidance Notice on Market Definition of the former Office of Fair Trading sets 
the methodology applicable when determining the relevant market in an investigation.738 The 
Notice does not contain any direct mention of how to determine relevant buying markets, 
although it follows the Commission Notice on Market Definition and builds upon it,739 I interpret 
this as meaning that the Buyer’s SSNIP test is the pertinent one to be applied. 
Nevertheless, the UK’s contribution in the OECD Roundtable on Monopsony and Buyer Power 
of 2009 provides further and more detailed information regarding buyer market definition for 
both monopsony and bargaining power.740 The contribution rightly points out that measuring and 
defining markets for buyer power cases is not straightforward, as most buyer power theories of 
harm741 involve an undertaking with market power upstream and downstream, the proposal 
suggests that it might “be necessary to define and analyse markets at a number of different levels 
in the supply chain”.742 This solution appears to condition the dualistic approach to the existence 
of a theory of harm that involves competitive issues in both markets. Although this is a step in the 
right direction, in my view there is no need to make such a pre-condition as all buyer power 
problems will have some downstream implication, as discussed in chapter 3, sections 3.5 and 3.6. 
This methodology distinguishes between three different scenarios when defining the relevant 
market in buyer power cases. Firstly, in the case of countervailing buyer power, buyer power is 
seen as “a potential, benign, constraint on the exercise of supplier market power [i.e. 
countervailing buyer power], buyer power will be assessed within the supply market of 
                                                          
737 Bundeskartellamt ‘Buyer Power in Competition Law - Status and Perspectives’ (2008), p. 5 (emphasis added). 
738 Office of Fair Trading, ‘Market Definition: Understanding Competition Law’ (2004), the now Competition and 
Markets Authority makes the disclaimer, however, that the Guidance Notice was retained unammended and, 
therefore, does not reflect the changes in the case law, legislation or practice. 
739 Office of Fair Trading, ‘Market Definition: Understanding Competition Law’ (2004); also stressing the common 
ground between the guidelines, see Graham, [2010], p. 23. 
740 See the UK’s Contribution, jointly prepared by the now extinct Competition Commission and Office of Fair 
Trading, in OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 229-243. 
741 For a general discussion on theories of harm and EU competition law see: Hans Zenger and Mike Walker, 
Theories of Harm in European Competition Law: A Progress Report (Jacques Bourgeois and Denis Waelbroeck eds, 
Bruylant 2013) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2009296. 
742 UK Contribution, jointly prepared by the now extinct Competition Commission and Office of Fair Trading, in 
OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 229 (emphasis added).  
151 
 
concern”.743 Examples of such supply market concerned definitions are found in EU competition 
law practice, I discuss this in detail in chapter 10, turning to cases such as Nestlé/Perrier744 and 
Enso/Stora;745 however, in these types of cases, the assessment of countervailing buyer power is 
made at the market power assessment and not at the relevant market definition stage. Secondly, 
when buyer power is seen as abusive, the markets to be defined will depend on whether the 
abusive behavior is exclusionary or exploitative. If exploitative, the methodology stresses that the 
“[d]ownstream markets would be defined in the normal way using the hypothetical monopolist 
test and then the degree of potential buyer power is assessed in this context”.746 If the conduct is 
exclusionary, it may be necessary to define several markets, depending on which the exclusion 
takes place in. Lastly, if buyer power is exercised in one market but has consequences on another, 
for example due to leverage,747 then assessment must be made in both these markets.748  
This proposed approach to buyer power market definition is case-by-case oriented and dependent 
on which effects are presumed by the theory of harm and used as a starting point, along with the 
need to carry out several market definitions, both of these factors constituting positive 
improvements. However, the contribution does not provide a detailed account of the process itself 
pertaining to defining the relevant market from a buyer’s perspective. Additionally, this approach 
might be criticized for being too case specific and for compromising legal certainty, as it is based 
on theories of harm as a starting point. I believe, however, that this proposal does not 
compromise legal certainty if the three alternatives are properly understood and applied in a 
consistent manner. Furthermore, the employment of a theory of harm to guide the design of the 
case is common practice among competition authorities and, therefore, not a source of real 
concern. 
5.4.6 Buyer’s market definition in US Antitrust law 
The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines of 2010 were first developed in 1982 and introduced the 
hypothetical monopolist test into the arena of competition law, in order to determine the relevant 
market.749 The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines are drafted for merger cases, however, the US 
courts and literature have also found them relevant in clarifying the methodology for cartel and 
                                                          
743 Ibid, p. 239. 
744 Commission Decision of 22 July 1992 relating to a proceeding under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.190 - Nestlé/Perrier) [1992] OJ L 356/1. 
745 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9. 
746 UK Contribution, jointly prepared by the now extinct Competition Commission and Office of Fair Trading, in 
OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 239.  
747 For a discussion of leveraging buyer market power see chapter 7, section 7.7. 
748 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009). 
749 For an overview of the main changes introduced by the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines see: Richard A 
Feinstein, ‘2010 Revisions to the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ 7 Competition law International (2011) 6. 
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monopolization cases.750 As in EU competition law, these guidelines are not binding on the 
Courts but are helpful in providing an analytical framework to evaluate the case.751 Due to their 
importance, and the comparisons I draw to buyer power aspects of certain US antitrust issues I 
discuss the Guidelines in brief. 
5.4.6.1  Market definition in US Antitrust law: some generalities 
The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines incorporate a thorough methodology regarding market 
definition and clarified that establishing market definition in merger cases does not need to be the 
first step in the assessment,752 thereby breaking with more than 50 years of precedent, as 
remarked by Coate and Fischer.753 Instead, the antitrust agencies may resort to assessing 
competitive effects in a direct manner. Like the EU Notice on Market Definition, the relevant 
market assessment is made through the hypothetical monopolist test, and also entails a product 
and geographic market dimension.754 Unlike the Notice on Market Definition, however, the US 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines only take into consideration demand substitution as a constraint 
factor, defined as the customer’s ability to substitute one product for another in response to an 
increase in price or a corresponding non-price change, such as reduction in quality or service.755 
Supply substitutability will only be considered at the market power assessment stage as part of 
the identification of market participants and possible entrants, regardless of whether the entry is 
timely and effective.756 
5.4.6.2 Buyer’s market definition in US Antitrust law 
An entire Section of the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines is devoted to dealing with mergers of 
competing buyers (Section 12).757 To evaluate buyer market power, the US Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines adopt “essentially the framework […] for evaluating whether a merger is likely to 
enhance market power on the selling side of the market”.758 As with the Notice on Market 
Definition and the OECD’s hypothetical monopsonist test, the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
focus is on determining whether there are alternatives available to sellers when facing a decrease 
                                                          
750 For a similar opinion on the relevance of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in monopolization cases see: 
Hovenkamp, [2005], p. 129; Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, 2nd 
Edition (Hart Publishing Ltd 2011), p. 304-317.  
751 American Bar Association, Market Definition in Antitrust [2012] 6; State v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 926 F. 
Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), para. 359. See also: Hovenkamp, [2005], p. 129-134. 
752 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), p. 7; American 
Bar Association, Market Definition in Antitrust [2012], p. 7-8. 
753 Malcolm B. Coate and Jeffrey H. Fischer, ‘Is Market Definition still Needed After all these Years’ (2014) p. 1. 
754 For a through discussion of the test in US antitrust law, see: Areeda, Hovenkamp and Solow, [1995], p. 284-307. 
755 US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines [2010], p. 7. 
756 Gavil, Kovacic and Baker, [2008], p. 492.  
757 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines [2010], p. 32; for a 
detailed analysis of this section see Carstensen ‘Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor Progress 
on an Important Issue’ (2012). 
758 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines [2010], p. 32. 
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in the price paid by the hypothetical monopsonist.759 The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines do 
not expressly distinguish between monopsony power effects or bargaining power effects and 
neither does it provides a thorough analysis as when compared to selling-oriented 
methodology.760 However, like all other methodologies, it can be applied in both cases. 
Analogous to the standard seller-side methodology, the hypothetical monopsonist test is applied 
as part of the product and geographic market analysis. When it is conducted, the market shares of 
the merging parties are calculated, and the market power is then assessed. Buyer market power 
will not be a significant concern when suppliers have “numerous attractive outlets for their goods 
or services”.761 On the contrary, should this not be the case then the creation of buyer power is 
“likely to lessen competition in a manner harmful to sellers”.762 
To summarize, the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide a similar, albeit more detailed, 
approach as that of the Notice on Market Definition when defining the relevant buying market in 
a partial manner. It proposes performing a hypothetical monopsonist test to determine the market 
power solely upstream capturing mostly monopsony effects.763 As with the Commission’s Notice, 
no additional downstream relevant market analysis is suggested, which leads to an incomplete 
picture of the effects of buyer power cases, which, to me, is a deficiency. 
5.5 Conclusions concerning the relevant market 
This first chapter on buyer market definition has illustrated the importance of revisiting 
traditional views concerning purchasing market definition due to the particularities of purchasing 
markets that distinguish them from standard selling-side cases. My contribution shows that buyer 
power markets are different because the incentives, dynamics and economics of purchasing 
respond to different factors, which require specific methodologies and reinterpretation of 
traditional concepts when defining relevant markets. 
Therefore, I submitted that buyer power cases and their market definitions should be anchored on 
a dualistic market definition methodology for all buyer power cases, and not limited to a selection 
of them. The dualistic approach allows for the measurement of both monopsony power and 
bargaining power, covering buyer power effects as a whole in the upstream and downstream 
                                                          
759 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines [2010], p. 33. 
760 Carstensen ‘Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor Progress on an Important Issue’ (2012), 
p. 781. 
761 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines [2010], p. 33; Feinstein 
(2011), p. 9. 
762 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines [2010], p. 33 
(emphasis added). 
763 See also the literature review carried out by Carlton, Coleman and Israel concerning the US Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines and the fact that most authors speak about it capturing monopsony cases by that it can be used for buyer 
power in general: Carlton, Coleman and Israel, [2015], p. 537-539. 
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markets. Furthermore, this proposal goes one step further than the traditional reverse approach 
advocated by the Notice on Market Definition because it lacks detail and a one side-approach is 
simplistic. This implies that, for the market definition and the subsequent assessment of the 
undertaking’s market power, the analysis must be made in both the upstream and downstream 
markets in which the undertaking conducts its economic activity. 
A dualistic approach fully captures the buyer power implications pursuant to conduct that might 
be perceived as anti-competitive. The dual approach’s function when defining relevant markets is 
to serve as the starting point to assess the competitive effects of the behavior of an undertaking 
vis-à-vis its suppliers (upstream) and rival buyers, and vis-à-vis end consumers and rival buyers 
that compete as retailers (downstream). Thus, it grants a complete overview of the exploitative 
and exclusionary effects of buyer power in all related markets. Moreover, it has been shown that 
not only the literature and the soft law instruments issued by the Commission but also the EU 
case law increasingly support the adoption of this dualistic approach, particularly in the case of 
merger assessment,764 but also in the case of dominance with buyer power implications in 
downstream markets. 
Regarding the relevant market definition, I submit that a mere reversal of the SSNIP test – the 
Buyer’s SSNIP test – and the current view in the Commission’s soft law is insufficient; instead, 
certain adjustments and re-interpretations of traditional concepts such as demand substitution and 
buyer substitution should be made. In this chapter, I analyzed the standing methodologies 
adopted in the Commission’s soft law and other institutions, at both the national and international 
level. The analysis shows that there has been a gradual development towards a dualistic 
approach from the traditional and insufficient reverse side approach anchored on a pure upstream 
market definition, towards a more integrative one, as is reflected in the Merger Control 
Regulation, the OECD and, importantly, some influential NCAs. However, the development at 
the EU level of the methodology for defining relevant purchasing market is still insufficient and 
requires adjustment. 
Some of these pure reverse methodology deficiencies have been taken into account and addressed 
by other authoritative sources, in the form of Guidance Papers from the Commission, the OECD 
and some EU and US NCAs. These authoritative sources modernize the previous state of the soft 
law and are a good step in the right direction towards a dualistic approach to buyer power cases. 
Nevertheless, most of them are still too timid, as they only tend to capture half of the picture, by 
only focusing on the upstream market definition, or applying dualistic definitions in some but not 
all cases.  
                                                          
764 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1, Article 2.1.(a) and (b) (emphasis added). 
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Therefore, in buyer cases, the market definition should resort to a dualistic approach that involves 
several important aspects. Firstly and most importantly, the market definition must be done in 
both markets where the undertaking carries out its economic activity. In the upstream market 
where it purchases its goods and exerts buyer market power vis-à-vis its suppliers or with a 
foreclosure effect regarding competing buyers. Furthermore, an additional market definition 
should be made in the downstream definition to fully capture the downstream competitive effects 
of buyer market power vis-à-vis end consumers, with greater relevance when undertakings also 
compete as retailers. For the upstream market, I have shown that competition authorities should 
resort to more than a mere reverse application of selling-oriented methodologies. To do so, two 
important factors should be assessed differently than in selling side cases. With regard to demand 
substitution, the assessment should be focused on the concepts of reverse demand substitution to 
determine the ability of suppliers to switch to alternative buyers in case the purchasing price 
decreases. With regard to supply buyer substitution, it should be assessed if other buyers that 
were not originally purchasing the good decide to acquire the input in response to the reduction 
of the purchasing price. 
Also, I raised some problems with the current methodology and the dualistic approach connected 
to buyer market definitions that should be kept in mind when carrying out the assessment. For 
example, the fact that a decrease in purchasing prices in buyer markets might have a larger 
impact than in selling ones and, therefore, the indexes could perhaps be re-evaluated, or that 
purchasing markets might be defined more narrowly than they should, making the undertaking 
more powerful, or concerning which perspective to take into account to assess the 
substitutability/interchangeability of goods in a buyer power case.  
In this chapter, I discussed not only these problems but also how to re-interpret the assessment in 
buyer market definition. The changes proposed do not require a complete change of the existing 
methodologies nor proclaiming that buyer market definitions are entirely different and 
disconnected from selling-oriented cases, but what they propose is taken into account buyer 
power dynamics and adopt a dualistic approach to the assessment. I have also identified that my 
suggestions for methodological development have also been steadily but still not decisively 
integrated in the in the EU soft law as well as in other MS with important examples in Germany 
and the UK. However, I think that the move towards it should be more decisive. This is an area in 
which I acknowledge that more academic and administrative development is necessary and in 
which my dualistic approach and observations are an additional step in that direction. 
In sum, an additional downstream market definition is required to properly assess the market 
power and competitive effects of the buying undertaking’s behavior. In this chapter, I have 
highlighted that the dualistic approach may encounter deficiencies that have to be taken into 
account when performing the case-by-case assessment. The dualistic approach is not perfect, but 
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6 Buyer Market Power Assessment 
6.1 Introduction 
Once the relevant market product and geographic markets have been defined, competition 
authorities will assess the market power of the undertaking(s) involved in the investigation to 
determine the economic effects of the investigated conduct. In this chapter, I discuss the 
assessment of buyer market power from an active perspective, in opposition to the passive 
measurement in cases of countervailing buyer power, which is discussed in much more detail in 
chapter 10 as a neutralizing force of seller market power. Therefore, in this chapter I look into the 
research questions probing how is buyer power assessed and when does substantial buyer power 
(but not necessarily dominance) arise? 
I put forward that the measurement of market power in buyer-side cases also ought to follow the 
dualistic approach to buyer market definition to fully capture the specificities of the exercise of 
buyer power and its repercussions in the upstream and downstream markets. This is done by 
taking into account the competitive structure of buying markets and interpreting the relation 
between them as suggested by the Commission.765 Also, another important finding of this chapter 
is that substantial buyer power seems to arise in lower market share thresholds when compared to 
selling side cases, at least in terms of bilateral relations; i.e.: between a specific buyer and a 
supplier, due to the existence of dependence, and which is decisive factor when studying unfair 
purchasing practices, discussed in chapter 9. 
To structure my analysis, I have drafted this section as follows. In section 6.2 I discuss market 
power and its assessment at large. This is followed by an analysis of the specificities of buyer 
market power assessment in a dualistic manner in section 6.3. I then deal, in section 6.4, with the 
methodology and tools employed in EU competition law to measure the amount of market power 
a buyer has: market shares, market concentration, unavoidable trading partners and dependence, 
and gate-keeping. These assessment tools are quantitative indicators that guide the decision-
making body in determining whether or not an undertaking possesses market power. In my 
discussion, I evaluate them from a buyer-oriented perspective and follow the dualistic approach 
to market definition. This is followed, in section 6.5, with a discussion of direct methodologies 
for assessing buyer market power, while section 6.6 concludes with a discussion of the chapter’s 
findings. 
                                                          
765 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 12. 
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6.2 Market power assessment 
The market power assessment phase allows for the measurement of an undertaking’s market 
power and is carried out once the relevant market has been defined; consequently, its accuracy 
relies on the appropriateness of such market definition.766  
Market power, in the neoclassical economics sense, is the capacity of an undertaking to profitably 
sustain prices above – or below, in buyer power cases767 – competitive levels, or restrict output or 
quality by charging a price above – or below – marginal costs.768 In more practical terms and 
following Hay’s definition, market power expresses the idea of the “potential for consumers to 
suffer injury through the actions of a single firm or a group of firms acting in concert”.769 
Therefore, there are three main elements connected to market power:  
i) its exercise will reduce output or input;  
ii) the price increase or decrease must be profitable in a medium and short term;  
iii) market power is usually exercised relative to the benchmark of effective 
competition.770 
  
Additionally, market power can be possessed by selling and buying undertakings without 
changing its nature, what changes is the way that is exercised: by increasing or lowering prices 
below the competitive levels, respectively. 
In opposition to the neo-classical concept, Monti identifies three other definitions of market 
power.771 A first alternative definition inquires whether the undertaking has a greater commercial 
strength than others in the market, such as in the case of economic dependence regarding buyer 
power.772 A second definition, inspired in post-Chicago economics, conceptualizes market power 
as the ability of an undertaking to devise strategies that harm rivals (exclusionary power) to then 
profitably raise or decrease prices (exploitative power). Lastly, market power can be defined as a 
jurisdictional concept, for example, as using market share thresholds to create safe harbors 
precluding the application of EU competition rules, such as the de minimis doctrine or the block 
                                                          
766 Posner, [1976], p. 125; Hyman and Kovacic (2004), p. 26. 
767 Highlighting the need for the increase or decrease of prices remain profitable, see: Posner and Landes (1980), p. 
937. 
768 Office of Fair Trading, ‘Assessment of Market Power: Understanding Competition Law’ (December 2004). A 
similar definition is proposed in Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 3-001. See also: Areeda, Hovenkamp and Solow, 
[1995], p. 109; Hovenkamp, [2005], p. 80; Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 116. 
769 Hay (1991-1992), p. 808. 
770 Bishop and Walker, [2010], p. 53-61. 
771 Monti, [2007], p. 124-127; and the same idea but proposed as four concepts of dominance see: Giorgio Monti, 
‘The Concept of Dominance in Article 82’ 2 European Competition Journal (2006) 31, p. 31. For the discussion of 
different definitions of market power in US antitrust law see, inter alia: American Bar Association, Market Power 
Handbook: Competition Law and Economic Foundations [2012], p. 1-11. 
772 For the discussion of economic dependence as a market power assessment tool, see infra section 6.4.1.4. 
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exemption regulations.773 In this dissertation, I employ the neo-classical definition of market 
power unless otherwise stated. 
Furthermore, undertakings have different degrees of market power (including bargaining 
power),774 with monopoly and monopsony power being the extreme case for selling and buying 
cases, respectively.775 As no real market is perfectly competitive, all undertakings have a certain 
degree of market power,776 even if this may imply that they are pricing below average costs.777 
This is important because the fact that a buyer has some degree of buyer power does not imply 
that the undertaking is dominant, as remarked by Posner and Landes,778 and which is a 
requirement for the application of Article 102 TFEU. 
In this chapter, the center of my discussions is the assessment of buyer market power and I will 
not deal with the assessment of selling market power, even though my proposal for the dualistic 
approach to buyer market definition includes also doing an assessment of the undertaking’s 
selling market power, both because it is outside of my research scope and because it is well 
discussed in the literature. 
6.3 Buyer market power: dual market power assessment 
Following my dualistic approach proposal to buyer market definition, buyer power assessment 
must also be made in the two markets in which the undertaking under investigation carries out its 
economic activity as a buyer and seller, respectively. This dualistic approach to buyer market 
power is also shared by other authors like Faull, and Nikpay, who, in quite similar terms referring 
to joint purchasing agreements argue that “[a]ny effects on competition must be assessed on two 
categories of market. First, the market or markets with which the joint purchasing arrangement is 
directly concerned, that is, the relevant purchasing market or markets. Secondly, the selling 
market or markets, that is, the market or markets downstream where the parties to the joint 
                                                          
773 See: Communication from the Commission — Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not 
appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De 
Minimis Notice), [2014] OJ C 291/1, paras. 2 and 12. See also the Judgment of 13 December 2012 in Expedia, C-
226/11, EU:C:2012:795, paras. 23-29 in which the CJEU considers it as non-binding neither for the NCAs nor the 
courts of the Member States. 
774 Hay (1991-1992), p. 813-814; Christopher Cook and Ruchit Patel, Abuse of Dominance under Article 102 TFEU, 
Vol. 5 (F. Enrique González-Díaz and Robbert Snelders eds, Claeys and Casteels 2013), para. 2.84; Kirkwood 
(2014), p. 54. 
775 Thomas D. Morgan, Cases and Materials on Modern Antitrust Law and its Origins (4th edn, West Publishing 
Company 2009), p. 75. Van den Bergh and Camesasca, [2006], p. 75. 
776 Monti, [2007], p. 124. 
777 Hay (1991-1992), p. 813. 
778 Posner and Landes define monopoly power as a high degree of market power in Posner and Landes (1980), p. 
937. For a discussion on the need of this distinction see: Hay (1991-1992), p. 818-819. 
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purchasing agreements are active as sellers”.779 The dual approach, however, applies to all buyer 
power cases and not to some of them. 
Adopting a dualistic approach implies that market power assessment considers the case 
particularities and captures its effects on all the related markets. Therefore, the assessment ought 
to determine if in addition to buyer power the undertaking enjoys significant selling power to 
then analyze the competitive effects of the behavior in both markets. If the assessment of buyer 
market power only factors the effects in the upstream market, the analysis would only take into 
account welfare effects upstream and wealth transfer between the supplier and buyer and the rival 
buying undertakings, but would not capture any welfare effects in the downstream market vis-à-
vis end consumers and rival buyers that act as retailers. Therefore, to assure consistency with a 
broad standard for buyer power anti-competitive harm intervention and capture effects in all 
related markets, a dual approach is necessary. Therefore, I submit that buyer market power 
assessment must measure the undertaking’s purchaser buyer power and its seller power and then 
assess the relation between them and the final outcome of the competitive effects.780  
This, however, should not be interpreted as implying that a dual analysis also requires dual 
dominance or substantive market power in both markets to trigger competition intervention. It is 
sufficient for a buyer to have substantial market power in the upstream market to be considered 
dominant, or for its market power is sufficient to have current or future anti-competitive effects; 
therefore, for substantial buyer power to exist there is no need for additional downstream market 
power. The existence of the latter is an additional factor for the assessment of conduct’s impact 
but not a requirement.781 
One of the chapter’s findings is that buyer (bargaining) power may be effectively exerted at lower 
levels of market power in comparison to seller side from a buyer with respect to its suppliers, 
especially if there is an asymmetrical relation between them.782 Nevertheless, that buyer power 
can effectively be exercised at lower thresholds and have competitive effects (particularly in a 
bilateral manner) does not imply that buyer power dominance increases at lower thresholds when 
                                                          
779 Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 7.364; see also: Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 6.320. 
780 Somewhat similar but regarding the valuation of the economic welfare effects of buyer power was the idea 
expressed in European Commission and others (2000), p. 4. 
781 “Peraltro, appare opportuno porre in evidenza che l'art. 3 della legge n. 287/90, che vieta l'abuso di posizione 
dominante, già contempla la possibilità di intervenire nei confronti di un'impresa la quale, benché non dotata di una 
posizione dominante nella vendita dei propri prodotti, tuttavia detenga una posizione dominante dal lato della 
domanda nei confronti dei propri fornitori, in assenza di alternative economicamente significative per questi ultimi”, 
(“Moreover, it is appropriate to highlight that Article 3 of the Law n. 287/90 that forbids the abuse of a dominant 
position, contemplates the possibility of intervening against the actions of an undertaking which, even if it does not 
have dominance with regard to the sales of goods as a retailer, has a dominant position with regard to its suppliers in 
the upstream market, in the absence of economically meaningful alternatives for the latter” (author’s translation), in 
Opinion of June 20, 1995 of the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Subfornitura Industriale (1995). 
782 Also supporting this see: Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 6.338; American Antitrust Institute [2008], p. 104; 




compared to selling side dominance. What it does imply is that buyer power can be used 
exploitatively vis-à-vis individual suppliers at a lower level because they might be economically 
dependent on the buyer. This has been confirmed, for example, in the Commission’s practice 
regarding the finding of a “threat point”783 in some large food retailer mergers or in the case of 
relative dominance or dependence, as discussed in detail in chapter 9 dealing with unfair 
purchasing practices.784 
The main reason accounting for how substantial buyer power is able to arise on lower market 
share thresholds when compared to seller side power and create competitive concerns – even if 
not always caught by EU competition rules – is that the buyer is the ‘decider’ of the transaction, 
as in the one making the key decisions.785 This is particularly the case concerning bargaining 
power.786 By being the one setting the pace, the buyer has more negotiation/power strength, even 
if the supplier is also large, as confirmed by the Bundeskartellamt.787 
Additionally, I have identified a substantive difference in the levels of market power needed to 
effectively exercise monopsony and bargaining power. Effective monopsony power exercised 
during a non-transitory period requires that the buyer possesses a substantially large degree of 
market power that is akin to or greater than being dominant in the market, a position also shared 
by the American Antitrust Institute.788 This, however, is not shared by Carstensen, who claims 
that “monopsony arises at lower market shares and so is more pervasive” (than seller power).789 I 
disagree with this with regard to monopsony power. In my view, monopsony power and the 
withholding effect can only exist profitably and for a substantial period of time if an undertaking 
is vastly dominant and where there are significant entry barriers to the purchasing market. The 
case law, economics of monopsony power and its sources, as discussed in chapter 3 of this 
dissertation, corroborate this. 
Contrarily, substantial bargaining power can be exercised effectively at lower thresholds, and 
even in the absence of dominance, with or without anti-competitive effects,790 for instance 
                                                          
783 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 164/5, 
French public version, paras. 52-55; Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) [1999] OJ L 274/1, para. 101. 
784 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 13. 
785 Carstensen ‘Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor Progress on an Important Issue’ (2012), 
p. 783. 
786 Doyle and Inderst (2007), p. 215; Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, 
Competitive Realities, and Antitrust Policy’ (2010), p. 6. 
787 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 14. 
However, if the supplier enjoys a strong product, then its seller power raises even vis-à-vis strong buyers because the 
buyer also is dependent on the supplier, a situation discussed with dealing with mutual dependence below. 
788 American Antitrust Institute [2008], p. 104. 
789 Carstensen ‘Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor Progress on an Important Issue’ (2012), 
p. 799. 
790 Also suggesting that substantial buyer power may arise in the presence of relatively small market shares see 
Doyle and Inderst (2007), p. 215. 
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whenever a supplier depends on a buyer, as confirmed by the Commission’s finding in food 
retailing cases where when a buyer represented 22% of the profits of a supplier, that supplier 
depends on the buyer and said buyer had substantial buyer power vis-à-vis that party.791 
Nonetheless, the fact that a party is dependent on a buyer does not mean that the buyer as a whole 
has a dominant position because dominance is an erga omnes concept. An undertaking is 
dominant in the market vis-à-vis all suppliers and other retailing competitors; therefore, it is not 
sufficient to conclude that a buyer is dominant because it has substantial buyer power in relation 
to some but not most of its suppliers. When that happens then the undertaking enjoys a relative 
dominant position, a concept that exists in some national legislations, as discussed in chapter 9, 
section 9.6 of this dissertation, but not in EU competition law. The discussion regarding up to 
what extent and how situations that arise from the unilateral exercise of buyer market power of an 
undertaking that is not dominant in the traditional EU competition law terms is carried out in 
chapter 9 of this dissertation, dealing with the imposition of unfair purchasing practices. 
6.4 Measuring the buying’s undertaking market power 
Buyer power arises from different sources, as discussed in chapter 3, and the extent of it is 
measured by means of different assessment tools, regardless of whether it is monopsony or 
bargaining power. In this section, I analyze the five assessment tools that case law and 
authoritative sources have identified as the most relevant in the determination of buyer market 
power, namely: market shares, market concentration, alternative supply sources, gate-keeping 
role, and dependence. These factors in conjunction represent by and large the synthetization of 
buyer power sources. The assessment tools are not exclusive to buyer market power measurement 
and are also frequently used for seller-side cases. 
In my opinion, in the assessment phase of buyer power, competition authorities do not require 
making a distinction between monopsony and bargaining power cases, in contrast to some 
opinions that suggest this distinction is made in this competition stage.792 In my view, the 
distinction regarding whether a conduct involves monopsony or bargaining power is 
fundamental, but should be made before the assessment of buyer power whenever determining 
the sources and behavioral forms. This is because buyer power sources explain buyer market 
power’s origin, whereas these assessment tools quantify its degree. However, and as held through 
this thesis, what should be distinguished from the outset is whether the market power exercised is 
in the form of monopsony effect or bargaining power effect. That which determines whether the 
                                                          
791 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 164/5, 
French public version, para. 52 (translation by the author). See also mentioning this 22% threshold as part of the 
“threat point” theory Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 81; and Këllezi [2008], p. 70-71, who links the threat point to 
dependence. 
792 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 42; Office of Fair Trading, The 
Competitive Effects of Buyer Groups. 
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effect is one of monopsony or of bargaining power is not the existence of buyer power, but the 
characteristics of the behavior. Furthermore, there is no need to make a distinction between 
bargaining and monopsony power at the assessment stage because the assessment tools I discuss 
below can be indistinctively applied to both types of buyer power. 
6.4.1 Market shares  
Market shares are a useful first indication but not a precise proxy for market power, as repeatedly 
clarified by the CJEU, for both buyer and seller side cases.793 The larger the market shares of a 
buyer in the upstream market, the more likely it is that it has substantial buyer market power.794 
Econometric findings by the Bundeskartellamt confirm this intuition: the larger the purchasing 
volumes of an undertaking, the greater the impact on negotiated conditions and, thus, its buyer 
power.795 Therefore, market shares above 50% act as a rebuttable presumption of (buyer) market 
power in accordance with the AKZO presumption,796 but not of prices above (or below) marginal 
costs,797 and help competition authorities by serving as a screening device798 to determine the 
existence of substantial market power and dominance.799  
In a dualistic approach to buyer power cases, the market shares of the investigated undertaking(s) 
will be calculated both in the upstream and downstream market.800 Importantly, in the upstream 
market, the market share computation should include all buyers and not only those buyers that 
also compete downstream with the involved undertaking.801 For example, in the case of a 
                                                          
793 Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, paras. 39-41; 
Judgment of 30 January 2007, France Télécom v Commission, T-340/03, ECR, EU:T:2007:22, para. 100. Also 
expressed in the Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, 
para. 13. Also applicable in concentration cases as stated in the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers 
under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 14; see 
also a US antitrust law perspective Ernest Gellhorn, Stephen Calkins and William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Law and 
Economics in a Nutshell (Thomson/West 2004), p. 132-140; American Bar Association, Market Power Handbook: 
Competition Law and Economic Foundations [2012], p. 93. 
794 See chapter 3, sections 3.3 and 3.4 for buyer power sources. Similarly, see: Guidelines on Vertical Restraints 
[2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 116; European Commission and others (2000), p. 9; Doyle and Inderst (2007), p. 215; 
Ezrachi and De Jong (2012), p. 258. 
795 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 10. 
796 Judgment of 3 July 1991 in AKZO v Commission, C-62/86, EU:C:1991:286, para. 60; Hay (1991-1992), p. 822; 
see also: Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 6.314. Cf with Carlton’s critical view of market share’s suitability, who 
claims that “the definition of a market and the use of market shares and changes in market shares are at best crude 
first steps to begin an analysis. I would use them to eliminate frivolous antitrust cases when shares are low, but 
would use them cautiously for anything else”, in Carlton (2007), p. 3. 
797 Werden (2014), p. 4. 
798 Carlton (2007); Monti, [2007], p. 124-127. 
799 Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, para. 39; similarly, 
see: Hay (1991-1992), p. 821; Areeda, Hovenkamp and Solow, [1995], p. 243; Motta, Competition Policy: Theory 
and Practice [2004], p. 117; Cook and Kerse, [2009] 235, p. 235; Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 124. 
800 Monti, [2007], p. 143. 
801 Chen ‘Buyer Power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy’ (2007), p. 18. 
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purchasing market for oil, the computation must include buyers that acquire oil to process it into 
gasoline and buyers that acquire oil and process it as plastic.802 
The Notice on Market Definition defines the Commission’s methodology for market share 
computation and bases it on the sales of the products in the relevant area.803 In a buyer power 
case, this would be represented by the proportion of the relevant product acquired by the involved 
undertaking.804 In practice, this is calculated through companies’ estimates, and industry studies 
carried out by consultants or trade associations. If the data is not available, then the Commission 
requests the information directly from the undertaking(s) investigated. Other indicators, however, 
can be used to provide useful information for the calculation and valuation of market share, such 
as: capacity, the number of players in bidding markets, units of fleet as in aerospace, or the 
reserves held in case sectors such as mining.805 
Important shortcomings must be borne in mind, with regard to market share analysis.806 Firstly, 
as market shares are directly derived from the market definition, any flaws in the determination 
of the latter will impact the outcome of the market share estimation. Secondly, the market shares 
interpretation must be made in its relative context and not in abstracto, reflecting the 
circumstances of the case.807 Thirdly, market share analysis does not involve analysis of barriers 
to exit or entry because it is a static exercise and, therefore, lacking in depth concerning future 
competition. Fourthly, and as noted by Hay, market share analysis is retrospective, whereas 
market power is dynamic because “the degree of market power enjoyed by a firm depends on 
how much business it will lose to rivals if it attempts to raise prices above competitive levels.”808 
6.4.1.1 Standard thresholds 
Concerning the application of Article 102 TFEU, the CJEU has established in AKZO v 
Commission that a finding of 50% market share constitutes a rebuttable presumption for the 
                                                          
802 Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust 
Policy’ (2010), p. 19. 
803 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 53. Market shares can be calculated regarding sales, quantity, amount of suppliers, capacity, etc. 
Hovenkamp points out that other data can be used in the computation of market shares, such as revenue, units of 
output manufactured, units of output sold, capacity or a mix of these variables. If markets are competitive, using any 
of these indicators will tend to give the same result; see: Hovenkamp, [2005], p. 122. 
804 European Commission and others (2000), p. 19. 
805 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] 
OJ C 372/5, para. 54. 
806 Raising these issues see, inter alia: Hay (1991-1992), p. 821-822; Oinonen, [2010], p. 169-170; Niels, Jenkins and 
Kavanagh, [2011], p. 123-124. 
807 Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, paras. 40-41; see 
also: Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 14. 
808 Hay (1991-1992), p. 821-822. 
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existence of dominance.809 The Commission has stated that dominance is unlikely if the 
undertaking’s market share is below 40%, unless specific circumstances make competitor’s 
constraint ineffectively.810 However, in British Airways v Commission, a buyer power case, 
dominance was found with a market share below 40%, which I discuss at length in the 
subsequent section.811 
In concentration cases, market shares are used for determining whether the concentration could 
lead to a significant impediment of effective competition, particularly, but not exclusively, due to 
the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.812 Hence, competition risks can be triggered 
even absent dominance, and some buyer power cases, particularly at the national level as I 
discuss in chapter 9, confirm that buyer power may trigger competition concerns even in 
relatively low market shares scenarios or when a buyer is powerful vis-à-vis its suppliers in a 
bilateral situation. The Commission takes into consideration market shares of the merging firms 
pre and post-merger to evaluate the impact of the operation. The practice in buyer power cases 
shows that mergers between two or more buyers may significantly impede competition, if no 
proper commitments are entered into, even if the parties have substantially less than 40% of 
market share post-merger vis-à-vis its suppliers, as happened in the buyer mergers of 
Kesko/Tuko,813 Rewe/Meinl814 and Carrefour/Promodès.815  
Additionally, market shares are also used as an indicator for delineating ‘safe harbors’ inside of 
which agreements and concentrations are deemed as falling outside of the prohibitions because of 
their non-significant effect on trade between MS.816 Concerning the latter, the Commission has 
                                                          
809 Judgment of 3 July 1991 in AKZO v Commission, C-62/86, EU:C:1991:286, para. 60. Contrast this with the US 
antitrust case law that holds that it is doubtful that market shares as high as 60% or 70% are enough to determine 
monopolization cases, see: United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945). 
810 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 14; 
see also for concentration cases a similar view on the applicable thresholds in the Guidelines on the assessment of 
horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 
31/5, para. 17. 
811 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166; Judgment of 17 
December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:343, para. 211; 
Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 - 
Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1, para. 41. 
812 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1, Article 2.3; Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the 
Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 17. 
813 Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53, taken from 
the unabridged version. 
814 Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) [1999] OJ L 274/1; Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under 
the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 17. 
815 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 164/5, 
French public version, paras. 52-55. 
816 Judgment of 9 July 1969 in Voelk v Vervaecke, C-5/69, EU:C:1969:35, 5/7. 
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held that even object agreements among undertakings that have a combined market share of 5% 
of the relevant market are not capable of appreciably affecting trade and falling outside Article 
101(1) TFEU.817 In the case of anti-competitive agreements by their effects the Commission in its 
De Minimis Notice has stated that an agreement will not appreciably affect competition if: i) it is 
entered into by competing undertakings with an aggregate market share not exceeding 10% of the 
relevant market; and ii) it is entered into by non-competing parties, none of which not exceed a 
market share of 15% in its respective relevant market.818 For concentrations there is a rebuttable 
presumption that operations in which the combined undertakings’ market share does not exceed 
25% either in the common market or in a substantial part of it are not liable to impede effective 
competition.819 
6.4.1.2 Thresholds under buyer power cases 
In the case of buyer power, and in particular bargaining power, the case law and the 
Commission’s practice reveal that bargaining power may raise competitive concerns under lower 
market share thresholds than when compared to seller side cases. However, as discussed above, 
this does not imply that effective buyer market power implies dominance, although it may 
indicate that buyers enjoy a preferential bilateral position vis-à-vis their suppliers, which allows 
them to effectively exercise their buyer power. This appears to be the case for all spheres of 
competition law: agreements, dominance and concentration cases.  
Bargaining power can be exercised without the undertaking being dominant, as pointed out by 
the literature.820 This implies that an undertaking may enjoy substantial market power with 
relatively low market shares. The conundrum posed by this situation is that a non-dominant buyer 
may unfairly exercise buyer market power that against its suppliers, if it were dominant would be 
captured by EU competition laws, but as the buyer is not dominant, its purchasing conduct falls 
outside of the scope of EU competition law in most occasions, as I discuss in chapter 9.821 The 
same, however, does not hold true for monopsony cases. For monopsony power to be applied in a 
profitable and non-transitory manner, the existence of a sole buyer (or few and arguably very 
large buyers) is required. In other words, it is unlikely that monopsony power may exist in the 
                                                          
817 Commission Notice — Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 
[2004] OJ C 101/81, para. 52. 
818 Communication from the Commission — Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably 
restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis 
Notice), [2014] OJ C 291/1, para. 8. 
819 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1, recital 32. 
820 Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced 
Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 637-639; Chen ‘Buyer Power: Economic Theory and 
Antitrust Policy’ (2007), p. 31; Buttà and Pezzoli (2014), p. 165. 
821 See also: raising this concern and suggesting that a possible solution should be the implementation of unfair 
competition law in Pera; see also highlighting the little room for application of abuse of dominance in buyer power 
cases and the adoption of ad-hoc solutions: Buttà and Pezzoli (2014). 
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absence of dominance. Therefore, the assessment and evaluation of buying side market shares 
should reflect these particularities. 
Concerning dominance and as mentioned supra, in the exceptional822 case of British Airways v 
Commission, the CJEU confirmed the General Court’s Judgment that an undertaking with a 
market share of 39.7% in the downstream market of the sale of airline tickets, and also a high but 
undisclosed market share in the upstream market of the purchasing of travel agencies services 
may be in a situation of dominance with respect to its competitors.823  
The main issue of the case, which I discuss concerning buyer power leveraging in chapter 7, 
section 7.7, was the granting of supra-competitive bonuses to travel agents based on the volume 
of airline tickets sold to clients by British Airways and whether or not this was an abuse of its 
dominant position in the service of air passenger transportation. The General Court found that a 
market share even as low as 39.7% for the air ticket sales handled by IATA as a travel agency 
coordinator was still enough to find British Airways a dominant undertaking, by assessing the 
large market shares of BA as a purchaser of travel agency services and as a provider of air 
transport, as well as comparing “the ratio between the market share held by the undertaking 
concerned and that of its nearest rivals”.824 The General Court reasoning seems to factor in a 
dualistic approach to buyer market power and market power leveraging because even though the 
dominance of British Airways was to be assessed in its condition as a purchaser of services,825 the 
“economic strength which BA derives from its market share is farther reinforced by the world 
rank it occupies in terms of international scheduled passenger-kilometres flown, the extent of the 
range of its transport services and its hub network”,826 all characteristics of British Airways as a 
seller in the downstream market and not in the upstream market as a buyer.  
Because of its strength in both the upstream and downstream market and, therefore, substantial 
market power in both markets, the General Court concluded that: 
BA is therefore wrong to deny that it is an obligatory business partner of travel agents established 
in the United Kingdom and to maintain that those agents have no actual need to sell BA tickets. 
BA's arguments are not capable of calling into question the finding, in recital 93 of the contested 
                                                          
822 As noted by Whish and Bailey and confirmed by my research on buyer power matters, the decision represents 
“the first (and only) occasion on which an undertaking with a market share of less than 40 per cent has been found by 
the commission to be in a dominant position under Article 102”, in Whish and Bailey, [2015], p. 193. 
823 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166; Judgment of 17 
December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:343, para. 211; 
Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 - 
Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1, para. 41. 
824 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 210. 
825 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 191. 
826 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 212. 
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decision, that BA enjoys a particularly powerful position in relation to its nearest rivals and the 
largest travel agents.827 
A buyer oriented interpretation of British Airways v Commission offers a good explanation as to 
why the CJEU confirmed the finding of dominance at such lower threshold levels when 
compared to the standard dominance presumptions for seller-side cases.828 Whenever a buyer of 
travel agency services also possesses substantial seller market power regarding air passenger 
transportation it has dual market power, upstream and downstream fitting the hourglass shape. 
When an undertaking fits the hourglass shape, the competitive risks posed by buyer power are 
increased as the buyer exerts buyer and seller market power concomitantly, one reinforcing the 
other. An analysis of the case indicates that both the Commission and the Courts were concerned 
with the foreclosing effect that buyer power through fidelity-enhancing rebates had in the 
downstream market, in addition to the risks of anti-competitive effects among travel agents’ 
competition. This connection between market power in the upstream and downstream markets 
was caused by the leveraging of it: if British Airways offered conditions to its travel agents that 
were so attractive, the travel agents were mainly going to sell airline tickets to end consumers of 
British Airways rather than those of its competitors. By British Airways being able to control this 
distribution channel of sales by capturing the supply of travel agency services to airlines, it was 
able to strengthen its dominance in the downstream market as an airline carrier. 
However, British Airways v Commission and its finding on dominance on such low market share 
thresholds is an extraordinary case. Therefore, and due to the lack of further case law reaffirming 
this position, it is difficult to conclude whether this constitutes an isolated decision, whether 
buyer power dominance can be found on lower market share thresholds, or if other circumstances 
of the case, such as the stringent and formalistic approach the Courts have with regard to rebates 
had an influence in the case. 
In my view, a conservative approach to the finding of dominance at such low market share 
thresholds such be adopted, even if by doing so the Commission and the Courts recognized the 
likelihood and broader extent of the anti-competitive effects generated by an hourglass 
undertaking exerting buyer market power. Therefore, the correct interpretation of this 
considerably low market share threshold has to be restrictive and not be applied to all seller cases 
or all buyer power cases. The 40% market share threshold may in principle be a reference for 
buyer power cases where the investigated undertaking also possesses substantial downstream 
market power. In those cases in which a buyer does not possess substantial downstream market 
power, I argue that, in the absence of guidance from the case law, the contrast to other buyer 
                                                          
827 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 217 (emphasis added). 
828 Judgment of 3 July 1991 in AKZO v Commission, C-62/86, EU:C:1991:286, para. 60. 
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power with very high market shares,829 and based on buyer power economics, finding a buyer to 
be dominant with a market share as low as 40% would lead to instances of over-enforcement, 
particularly concerning bargaining power. 
This conservative approach to a lower dominance threshold as the rule of thumb for all buyer 
power cases appears also to be the Commission’s view when arguing that its “experience 
suggests that dominance is not likely if the undertaking's market share is below 40% in the 
relevant market.”830 
Nevertheless, this conservative approach regarding the finding of dominance and the application 
of competition law has been partially challenged by statutory national law provisions establishing 
relative dominant positions and, especially by recent modifications of national competition laws 
specifically designed to address an imbalance in the food retailing industry, as I discuss in further 
detail in chapter 9.831 These national competition policy choices that trigger the application of 
dominance under low market share thresholds as allowed by Article 3.2 of the Regulation 1/2003 
do not find support in the EU case law and are not followed by the majority of MS. 
From a comparative perspective, the contrast with US antitrust law of adopting very low market 
share thresholds for finding absolute or relative dominance is striking; in the US the case law has 
clarified that cases of monopolization/monopsonization can only arise if the market shares are 
around 70% but not below.832 Thus, in the US antitrust law appears to sanction monopsony 
practices while leaving bargaining power issues less attended by antitrust rules, whereas in EU 
competition law both bargaining power and monopsony power appear to be under much tighter 
scrutiny. 
In addition to dominance thresholds, market shares are also used regarding the creation or 
strengthening of substantial buyer market power through concentrations that may significantly 
impede effective competition and the creation of buyer power through buyer agreements among 
undertakings. 
Regarding concentration cases, the Commission’s practice, particularly in the case of food-
retailing, sheds some light on what proportion of the supplier’s sales may be sufficient for a buyer 
to exercise significant buyer power that may lead to a significant impediment to competition and 
                                                          
829 Such is the example of Irish Sugar v Commission, where Irish Sugar was found to have abused its dominance as 
purchaser of water transport services by demanding its suppliers not offer sugar transportation services to its 
competitors. In this case, Irish Sugar enjoyed a very large market share in the Irish market for sugar, of 90% and 
88% throughout the period of investigation. Commission Decision of 14 May 1997 relating to a proceeding pursuant 
to Article 86 of the EC Treaty (IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar plc) [1997] OJ L 258/1, partially ratified by the 
General Court in Judgment of 7 October 1999, Irish Sugar v Commission, T-228/97, ECR, EU:T:1999:246. 
830 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 14. 
831 For a detailed discussion of these lower thresholds applicable to the food retailing sector see chapter 9, section 
9.6.1. 
832 United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945). 
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a situation of economic dependence for its supplier.833 In this context, economic dependence of a 
supplier to a buyer does not necessarily imply that the buyer is dominant in the purchasing 
market. Dependence should be regarded as a relative concept that describes an asymmetrical 
relation between two parties where the economic viability of the dependent party is tied to the 
existence of the commercial relationship,834 whereas dominance is an objective concept that does 
not involve a bilateral relation.835 
In Rewe/Meinl836 and Carrefour/Promodès,837 these two concentration assessments regarding 
food retailing were declared compatible thanks to the submission of commitments that palliated 
the buyer-power related anti-competitive concerns.838 In the case of Carrefour/Promodès, it was 
concluded that the merged undertaking, that would have 25-35% of market share in the 
downstream market,839 could exercise upstream buyer power if it were able to reach a “threat 
point” [taux de ‘menace’].840 This threat point, calculated at 22% of the profits earned by a 
supplier pursuant to a series of sector and case specific surveys, was said to create a situation in 
which the supplier would be dependent on a buyer as the “loss of a customer (with that market 
share) would threaten the very existence of their business”.841 The Commission concluded that, 
when a buyer exceeds such a threshold in the turnover of one of its suppliers, the latter is found to 
be in a de facto situation of “economic dependence”.842  
Importantly, and a factor that may easily be overlooked, is that this 22% does not represent the 
undertaking’s market shares in the purchasing market but instead represents the ratio of sales that 
                                                          
833 Economic dependence is discussed as a buyer market power assessment tool in chapter 6, section 6.4.3.2 and 
chapter 9. 
834 European Commission ‘Tackling Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business food supply chain’ (2014), 
p. 11.  
835 Pera, p. 17; see also suggesting a similar idea but distinguishing between buyer power and bargaining power – 
which in reality is dependence: European Competition Network (2012), para. 73. 
836 “The Commission asked producers above what proportion of turnover, with a given customer could not be 
switched to other sales channels without difficulty. It transpired that on average 22% of turnover is the say, of one 
branded goods producer who makes ‘must figure above which a customer can be replaced only at carry’/products, as 
Rewe/Billa and Meinl risk losing the cost of very heavy financial losses, if at all”, Commission Decision of 3 
February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (Case No IV/M.1221 - 
Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 101. 
837 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 164/5, 
French public version, paras. 52-55. 
838 See also: discussing the buyer power aspects of these two cases: van Doorn, p. 163-164. 
839 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 164/5, 
French public version, para. 60. 
840 See also discussing the existence of this “taux de menace” for this case: Këllezi [2008], p. 82. 
841 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 164/5, 
French public version, para. 52 (translation by the author); see also: mentioning this 22% threshold as part of the 
“threat point” theory Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 81 and Këllezi [2008], p. 70-71, who link the threat point to 
dependence. 
842 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 164/5, 




a buyer signifies for a particular buyer. However, this situation was not isolated concerning a 
single supplier of a single product (which qualifies as an individual market) but happened in at 
least ten of the markets affected by the merger.843 In practice this may imply that even a buyer 
with a small total purchasing market share may still have relative buyer power vis-à-vis a 
particular supplier but not general buyer power and at least for concentration assessments relative 
buyer power may be an issue that can, along with other circumstances, imply that the operation is 
not compatible with the internal market. 
In connection to food retailing and buyer market shares that may indicate substantial buyer 
market power vis-à-vis suppliers, the literature suggests even lower thresholds. For instance, Pera 
has suggested other indicative figures; if the shares are between 20% and 10%, buyers have a 
“strong negotiating power to retailers”, and below 10% “there would not be an asymmetric 
situation”.844 Also, in the UK the now extinct UK Competition Commission suggested adopting a 
supplier’s turnover of only 8% to represent the threat point.845 This 8% ceiling appears to be quite 
low and, as Dobson remarks, this threshold limit was chosen without the report providing any 
explanation.846  
In the US in an exceptional and much criticized case, an even stricter approach was applied also 
concerning a concentration in the food-retailing sector. In United States v. Von’s Grocery Co, the 
US Supreme Court held that a merger between two retailers who controlled only 7.5% of the food 
retailing market was a violation of §7 of the Clayton act, as the firms were the most successful in 
food retailing and were in a market characterized by the decline of the existence of small retailers 
and the significant absorption of small firms by larger ones.847 The US Supreme Court based its 
findings on the fact that §7 of the Clayton act had “sought to preserve competition among small 
businesses by halting a trend toward concentration in its incipiency, and, thus, the courts must be 
alert to protect competition against increasing concentration through mergers especially where 
concentration is gaining momentum in the market”. Therefore, even such low market shares were 
able to generate sufficient buyer power that can be used in an exclusionary way to the detriment 
of rival buyers. This decision, not surprisingly, has been subject to stern criticism as an example 
of excessive interventionism that characterized US antitrust law enforcement prior to the ‘1970s 
Revolution’ and the influence of the Chicago School.848 Because of the shift in Antitrust 
                                                          
843 van Doorn, p. 164. 
844 Pera. 
845 UK Competition Commission (2000), paras. 2.588 to 2.596. 
846 Dobson [2009], p. 119. 
847 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), p. 274-279. 
848 See for example the strong wording used by Justice Stewart when dissenting from the Judgment by the majority 
of the Court when holding that: “[t]he sole consistency that I can find is that, in litigation under § 7, the Government 
always wins” in Dissenting Opinion by Justice Stewart in United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), 
at 301. See also criticizing the decision from a buyer power perspective: Joshua Wright, ‘Von's Grocery and the 
Concentration-Price Relationship in Grocery Retail’ 48 UCLA Law Review (2001) 743; Richard Scheelings and 
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enforcement priorities, the case is still good law as cases under such low thresholds are no longer 
prosecuted, as remarked by FTC Commissioner Wright.849 However, and despite the shift, Von’s 
Grocery shows that in buyer power merger cases the creation of supplier’s dependence (and 
buyer induced exclusion) raises competition concern on both sides of the Atlantic, despite the 
existence of low market shares as a buyer. 
These suggested relative low thresholds for concentration cases derived from Commission’s 
practice reinforce the proposition that substantial relative buyer market power (i.e. between one 
buyer and its supplier) may arise with lower market shares than when compared to seller power 
because of the special conditions of purchasing markets. I, however, am critical of suggesting that 
the Commissions’ threshold of 22% should be used as a general rule in concentration cases. 
There are several reasons for this. In none of these cases, the low market share threshold implied 
that the involved undertakings’ concentration would lead to a significant impediment of effective 
competition; in fact the two merger cases, where 22% of supplier’s profit from a single buyer was 
used as a reference were declared compatible pursuant commitments. Secondly, these decisions 
are connected to a narrow sector, food retailing, where the undertakings participating tend to have 
substantial market power both upstream and downstream market, fitting the hourglass 
description, and the sample is very small, with only two cases. Additionally, these are non-
binding Commission Decisions neither ratified nor dismissed by the Courts. Furthermore, this 
ratio of 22% does not represent the undertaking’s total market share in the purchasing market but 
just a ratio of sales-purchases between a buyer and a specific supplier; thus it is a relative 
measure of buyer power but not absolute. Lastly, adopting such threshold levels regardless of the 
upstream and downstream market competitive circumstances may lead to erroneous results. In 
other words, these thresholds have to be compared with the suppliers’ own market shares and 
determine whether or not there is a disparity in the ratio of purchases-profit represented by a 
buyer to a seller.  
This cautious approach to buyer market shares also has a basis in the EU case law. In 
Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, the General Court concluded that the proportion 
of sales a buyer represents taken as an isolated factor does not necessarily imply that the buyer 
has substantial (countervailing) buyer power even if this seller accrues on its own 20-30% of the 
seller’s turnover. This absence of substantial (countervailing) buyer power was due to the 
existence of other buyers that “organised in buyer groups [were] capable of obtaining supplies in 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Joshua D Wright, ‘Sui Generis: An Antitrust Analysis of Buyer Power in the United States and European Union’ 39 
Akron Law Review (2006) 207; see also the opinion of Wright suggesting that this case is probably one of the “worst 
Antitrust decisions that is good law” in Joshua Wright, ‘What is the Worst Antitrust Decision That is Good Law?’ 
(2008) <http://truthonthemarket.com/2008/07/22/what-is-the-worst-antitrust-decision-that-is-good-law/> accessed 
March 4th, 2016. 
849 Wright, ‘What is the Worst Antitrust Decision That is Good Law?’. 
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significant volumes, towards which CVK could if necessary steer its production”.850 If a seller 
has other alternative buyers to turn to, the bargaining power of its current customers is reduced 
and therefore there is no dependence among the parties. 
Lastly, concerning agreements among buying undertakings, the Commission in its Guidelines on 
Horizontal Co-Operation Agreements has also established a dual market share threshold that acts 
as an iuris tantum presumption that the parties to the agreement lack substantial anti-competitive 
buyer market power. Also, and unlike the food retailing cases, the market shares are considered 
in relation to the general markets and not the relative buyer power between the purchasing parties 
and a single supplier.  
According to the Guidelines on Horizontal Co-Operation Agreements, if the parties to the 
agreement have a combined market share threshold not exceeding 15% on the purchasing market, 
as well as a combined market share not exceeding 15% on the selling market (or markets), it is 
unlikely that substantial buyer market power exists and also, even if it does, it is also likely that 
the conditions for the application of Article 101(3) TFEU will be met;851 i.e.: the purchasing 
agreement is an example of efficient bargaining power. If one of the market shares thresholds is 
above 15%, the Commission’s view is that this “does not automatically indicate that the joint 
purchasing arrangement is likely to give rise to restrictive effects on competition”;852 instead a 
case-by-case assessment ought to be made.853 
Recapitulating the use of market shares as buyer power threshold indicators, the case law and 
Commission’ practice reveals that in buyer power cases the dualistic approach is largely followed 
as the market shares are computed in the upstream and downstream markets, albeit with lack of 
full consistency regarding this practice. Also, it confirms that substantial buyer power may arise 
even if the market share is relatively low in comparison to seller-side cases (i.e. below 30% of the 
                                                          
850 Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64, 
para. 233. 
851 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 208; see also 
suggesting the adoption of a 15% threshold for the safeguarding of buyer alliances in US antitrust law Carstensen 
‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust Policy’ (2010), p. 44. 
852 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 209. 
853 In contrast, in US antitrust law, with respect to joint purchasing arrangements among health care providers, it is 
suggested that a much higher threshold is adopted when stating that the “Agencies will not challenge, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, any joint purchasing arrangement among health care providers where two conditions 
are present: (1) the purchases account for less than 35 percent of the total sales of the purchased product or service in 
the relevant market; and (2) the cost of the products and services purchased jointly accounts for less than 20 percent 
of the total revenues from all products or services sold by each competing participant in the joint purchasing 
arrangement”, US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy 
in Health Care, Washington D.C. (1996). For a critical view of this threshold see: Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus 
Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust Policy’ (2010). 
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sales of its supplier).854 In the particular case of dominance, the case law indicates that a buying 
undertaking may abuse its dominance as a buyer if its market share threshold is above 39.7%. As 
I discussed, I do not think this conclusion should be the same for seller side cases nor buyer 
power in general, and that is why the interpretation of British Airways v Commission must be 
restrictive. Finally, and as remarked by Doyle and Inderst, when determining the prima facie 
existence of buyer power through market shares thresholds “this should not be done in isolation 
from the potential theory of harm that would be (subsequently) applied”;855 otherwise the use of 
isolated thresholds may lead to incorrect results. 
6.4.1.3 Market share valuation 
Once the market shares have been calculated it is necessary to interpret them. As held in 
Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, the valuation of market shares is one of the most important 
factors when assessing the market power of an undertaking.856 Market share valuation is a 
dynamic exercise that shall be made on a case-by-case basis and its importance varies from 
market to market, in according to the structure of these, as well as whether they have been held 
for some time by the same undertaking.857 Echoing this, the Commission has stated that the 
valuation of market shares shall be made “in the light of the relevant market conditions, and in 
particular of the dynamics of the market and of the extent to which products are differentiated”.858  
For buyer power cases, this entails that assessment of market shares ought to incorporate the 
specific buying market dynamics and conditions to fully capture buyer power effects in the 
upstream and downstream markets and as discussed supra.859 Hence, a case-by-case approach to 
value market shares should be adopted by competition authorities by factoring the sources of 
buyer market power, market conditions and the size of the markets shares, and not purely using 
threshold indicators. Also, I suggest that the valuation should compare the buyer’s market shares 
                                                          
854 Pera, p. 14. 
855 Doyle and Inderst (2007), p. 215 (italics in the original). 
856 Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, para. 39 in fine. 
857 Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, paras. 40-41; see 
also: in this same line American Bar Association, Market Power Handbook: Competition Law and Economic 
Foundations [2012], p. 104-105. 
858 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 14 
(emphasis added); see also the work of Chen when stating that “[a] large retailer may not be able to obtain below-
normal prices from a supplier if it has to compete aggressively against other retailers for the supplier’s products. The 
key to the existence of buyer power, therefore, is not the relative size, but whether there is vigorous competition, 
either actual or potential, for the supplier's products”, in Chen ‘Buyer Power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy’ 
(2007), p. 30. 
859 Also of this opinion is Kokkoris, who states that: “[b]uyer concentration can provide an indication of the buyer 
power, but cannot be definitive. The structure of the buyer and the seller markets must also be taken into account”, in 
Kokkoris (2006), p. 148. 
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with its competitors and suppliers in the upstream and downstream markets,860 as a buying 
undertaking is more likely to be dominant if its suppliers and competitors are relatively weak.861 
By doing so, and contrasting the market shares and welfare effects in both markets, all buyer 
power effects are taken into consideration, as advocated by the dualistic approach. Additionally, I 
propose that when assessing the markets shares of the investigated buying undertaking, in 
addition a valuation of the relative selling power of suppliers in the upstream market should also 
be taken into account. If suppliers are relatively powerless, there is further evidence of the 
existence of buyer power. 
6.4.2 Market concentration 
Another widely used market power assessment tools are indexes of market concentration.862 They 
offer information concerning the relative size and strength of the market participants helping 
determining the extent of an undertaking’s market power.863 Market concentration is directly 
linked to market shares as it is calculated by the sum of the squares of the market share of the 
undertakings that purchase or sell a good in the relevant market, thus giving proportionately 
greater weight to the larger market share,864 in accordance to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI).865 The HHI is obtained by summing the squares of the individual market shares of all 
firms included in the formula and expressed as HHI = .  
Market concentration measures how concentrated a market is, which is particularly useful when 
assessing the compatibility of a proposed concentration.866 Therefore, it is usually but not 
exclusively employed in merger cases to measure market concentration because it allows 
                                                          
860 European Commission DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
Exclusionary Abuses, Brussels (2005), para. 31; see: the opinion of Monti who openly criticizes the interpretation of 
the Commission of the case law by narrowing exceptional circumstances to the market shares of rivals in Monti ‘The 
Concept of Dominance in Article 82’ (2006), p. 49. 
861 Office of Fair Trading (2004), p. 7. 
862 See also briefly analyzing buyer concentration as a measure to determine the extent of buyer power: Faull and 
Nikpay, [1999], paras. 6.315-6.316. 
863 Hovenkamp, [2005], p. 518; Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 128. 
864 Janusz A. Ordover and Robert D. Willig, ‘The 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: An Economic 
Assessment’ 71 California Law Review (1983) 535; U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines [2010], para. 18. 
865 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 16; see also: Gavil, Kovacic and Baker, [2008], p. 500-501. 
866 Different market concentrations ranges have been proposed by NCAs for concentration assessment using the HHI 
index. For example the US HMG consider a market unconcentrated when the HHI is below 1,500; the market will be 
moderately concentrated markets if the HHI is between 1,500 and 2,500, and lastly the market will be highly 
concentrated if the HHI is above 2,500.866 The equivalent thresholds are slightly lower in the EU: i) concentrations 
below 1,000 HHI do not merit extensive analysis (unconcentrated markets); ii) it is unlikely to identify horizontal 
competition concerns in a merger with a post-merger HHI between 1,000 and 2,000 and a delta below 250, or a 
merger with a post-merger HHI above 2,000 and a delta below 150 (moderately concentrated markets). Despite the 
fact that neither the Notice on Market Definition nor the Guidance Notice on Article 102 TFEU make explicit 
references to market concentration, this parameter is used in the analysis of dominance cases as well in this 
dissertation; see also: Cook and Kerse, [2009], p. 236. 
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determination of the likelihood of coordinated (tacitly or explicitly) behavior.867 The rationale is 
that, the more concentrated the market, the easier it will be for firms to coordinate their behavior 
and reap monopoly/monopsony profits.868 In dominance cases, on the other hand, an elevated 
market concentration may indicate the existence of a dominant position or the possibility of a 
collective dominant position.869  
However, market concentration does not indicate whether or not the market is competitive,870 
even if concentration levels are high, as noted by Hyman and Kovacic.871 Non-coordinated 
oligopsonist markets may be fiercely competitive if the leading undertakings are of equivalent 
size and equally efficient.872 However, when one firm is much larger than the others, this is likely 
to be conducive to ‘price leadership’ as noted by Hovenkamp.873 For buyer power cases, 
however, it seems unlikely that a phenomenon such as purchasing price leadership may arise, as 
this would imply that the large buyer must pay a lower price for the input. Were this to happen 
then the smaller buyers, in paying slightly more, would deprive the larger buyer of the input. 
In EU competition law, market concentration indexes have been employed on very few 
occasions. However, the General Court found them to be of use in helping determine the 
existence of substantial buyer power, as held in Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, 
where it is stated that the “degree of concentration of buyers on the market means that their 
limited number may be capable of reinforcing their bargaining power vis-à-vis the supplier”.874 
Lastly, a factor that should be taken into account for buyer power cases when evaluating market 
                                                          
867 Oinonen, [2010], p. 158; also this is the opinion of Kokkoris and Shelansky regarding buyers’ markets in 
Kokkoris and Shelanski, [2014], p. 427. 
868 Oinonen, [2010], p. 158-159. 
869 The topic of collective dominance and its regulation by means of either or Article 102 TFEU or the EU Merger 
Control Regulation is one of the most controversial aspects of EU competition law and plenty of literature abounds 
in this field of the law. For further reading see, inter alia: Barry J. Rodger, ‘The Oligopoly Problem and the Concept 
of Collective Dominance: EC Developments in the Light of U.S. Trends in Antitrust Law and Policy’ 2 Columbia 
Journal of European Law (1995-1996) 25; Giorgio Monti, ‘The Scope of Collective Dominance under Article 82 EC’ 
38 Common Market Law Review (2001) 131; Warren S Grimes, ‘The Sherman Act's Unintended Bias Against 
Lilliputians: Small Players' Collective Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power’ 69 Antitrust Law Journal 
(2001), 195; Sigrid Stroux, ‘Collective Dominance under the Merger Regulation: A Serious Evidentiary Reprimand 
for the Commission’ 27 European Law Review (2002) 736; Dehtmers (2005); Simon Baxter and Frances Dethmers, 
‘Collective Dominance under EC Merger Control - After Airtours and the Introduction of Unilateral Effects is there 
Still a Future for Collective Dominance?’ 27 European Competition Law Review (2006) 148; Nicolas Petit, 
Oligopoles, Collusion Tacite et Droit Communautaire de la Concurrence (Bruylant 2008); Ronny Gjendemsjø, 
Oligopolproblemet: Om Anvendelsen av TFEU Artikkel 101 og 102 på Koordinerte Priser i et Oligopol 
(Universitetet i Bergen 2011); Elhauge and Geradin, [2011], p. 960-981; Nazzini, [2011], p. 359-388; Whish and 
Bailey, [2015], p. 607-618. 
870 Bishop and Walker, [2010], p. 70. 
871 Hyman and Kovacic (2004), p.26. 
872 Hovenkamp, [2005], p. 518; see also the criticism to the value of market concentration measures in Gavil, 
Kovacic and Baker, [2008] p. 505-506. 
873 Hovenkamp’s proposition is made with a selling undertaking in mind, rather than a buyer undertaking, in 
Hovenkamp, [2005], p. 518. 




concentration is that, even in relatively unconcentrated markets, it may be possible to exercise 
bargaining power (although arguably not monopsony power). 
6.4.3 Unavoidable trading partner and dependence 
Two of the most important buyer market power measurement tools are the concepts of 
unavoidable trading partner and dependence. By and large, if a buyer constitutes an unavoidable 
trading party for its suppliers then the latter will be in a situation where their economic viability 
depends on maintaining the buyer as a client, even if the competitive conditions are not 
particularly profitable. In the absence of any contractual relation to that buyer, the supplier will 
have to leave the market in the long run. In this section, I discuss these two assessment tools from 
a buyer-oriented perspective.875 This discussion sets the background for the last two tools with 
which to measure buyer market power: gate-keeping and alternative supply sources, which are 
intrinsically related to the doctrines covered here. 
6.4.3.1 Unavoidable trading partner 
The doctrine of an unavoidable trading partner, established by the CJEU in Hoffmann-La Roche v 
Commission, has played a particularly relevant role in the assessment of buyer market power.876 
The CJEU defined that an undertaking is an unavoidable trading partner when it “has a very large 
market share and has held it for some time”.877 When an undertaking is an unavoidable trading 
partner, at least from a seller-perspective, customers are forced to obtain at least part of their 
demand from the dominant undertaking. Thus, suppliers of an unavoidable trading partner may 
also be dependent on it.878 However, the unavoidable trading partner doctrine, in contrast with the 
dependence doctrine, is an erga omnes and objective privileged position. In other words, when an 
undertaking is an unavoidable trading partner it is vis-à-vis the generality of its suppliers and 
customers, unlike the case of dependence, which is a relative concept. 
Being an unavoidable trading partner grants the undertaking a “non-contestable” share, against 
which competitors are not able to “compete for the full supply of a customer, but only for the 
portion of the demand exceeding the non-contestable share”, as recently confirmed by the 
                                                          
875 Cf with the view that “[a]t most, the consideration that a company may be an ‘unavoidable trading partner’ will 
assist the Commission in identifying the relevant parameters – outside market shares – that are relevant for a finding 
of dominance in the particular industry under examination (e.g., barriers to entry linked to a must stock brand, 
barriers to entry raised by the control of essential assets, etc.), i.e. the factors that make customers dependent upon 
the allegedly dominant player”, Damien Geradin and others, The Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law 
(College of Europe 2005), p. 13-14. 
876 Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, para. 41. Ratified 
more recently in Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v Commission, T-286/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:547, paras. 91-93. 
877 Judgment of 16 March 2000 in Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and Others v Commission, C-395/96 P, 
EU:C:2000:132, para. 132. 
878 Këllezi [2008], p. 75. 
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General Court in Intel v Commission.879 This is, “the portion of a customer’s requirements which 
can realistically be switched to an undertaking’s competitor in a dominant position in any given 
period”.880 Therefore, unavoidable trading partners have a freedom of action that is akin to, or 
even greater than, that of a dominant undertaking.881 
In order to determine if an undertaking is an unavoidable trading partner, Advocate General 
Kokott has remarked that is necessary to carry out a market shares comparison of said 
undertaking with other market participants either in the upstream and downstream market,882 an 
opinion which is in line with the dualistic approach to buyer market power. In addition to this, I 
submit that, from a buyer power perspective, the analysis must determine whether suppliers are 
dependent on the buyer because it constitutes an unavoidable trading partner,883 which implies 
that suppliers are willing to concede better terms to the buyer in order to retain the opportunity to 
sell to it owing to buyer’s significance to the supplier.884 Such a position of an unavoidable 
buying trading partner might be earned as a result of advertising, marketing and/or product 
differentiation or having a ‘must stock’ product.885  
If a buying undertaking is an unavoidable trading partner, its suppliers will also be dependent on 
it.886 The reverse also holds true, if the supplier is the unavoidable trading partner then the buyer 
                                                          
879 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v Commission, T-286/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:547, para. 92. According to Jessen, 
an unavoidable trading partner has been found in most of the relevant rebate cases: Anders Fløjstrup Jessen, The 
Effect-Based Approach to Rebates: Is the Theory of Raising Rival's Costs the Answer? (2015), p. 13; see also: Joshua 
D. Wright, ‘Simple but Wrong or Complex but More Accurate? The Case for an Exclusive Dealing-Based Approach 
to Evaluating Loyalty Discounts’ (Bates White’s 10th Annual Antitrust Conference). 
880 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v Commission, T-286/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:547, para. 92. 
881 “Very large market shares are in themselves, and save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a 
dominant position. An undertaking which has a very large market share and holds it for some time, by means of the 
volume of production and the scale of the supply which it stands for – without those having much smaller market 
shares being able to meet rapidly the demand from those who would like to break away from the undertaking which 
has the largest market share – is by virtue of that share in a position of strength which makes it an unavoidable 
trading partner and which, because of this alone, secures for it, at the very least during relatively long periods, that 
freedom of action which is the special feature of a dominant position”, Judgment of 25 June 2010, Imperial 
Chemical Industries v Commission, T-66/01, ECR, EU:T:2010:255, para. 265. An identical and previous formulation 
is found in Judgment of 17 December 2009, Solvay v Commission, T-57/01, ECR, EU:T:2009:519, para. 277. 
882 “Because of its much higher market share, a dominant undertaking is normally, so far as other market participants 
are concerned, an unavoidable trading partner”, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 23 February 2006 in 
Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2006:133, para. 52. 
883 Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 
- Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1, para. 32. Also commenting on this aspect of the case, see: Këllezi 
[2008], p. 78-79. 
884 Office of Fair Trading Assessment of Market Power: Understanding Competition Law, London (2004), p. 24; see 
also: Doyle and Inderst (2007), p. 213; International Competition Network Unilateral Conduct Workbook Chapter 3: 
Assessment Of Dominance The Hague, Netherlands (2011), para. 106. 
885 Summary of Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/C-3/37.990 — Intel) [2009] OJ C 227/13. 
886 Also considering that an unavoidable trading partner creates vertical dependence see: Jan Bernd Nordemann, 
‘Buying Power and Sophisticated Buyers in Merger Control Law: The Need for a More Sophisticated Approach’ 16 
European Competition Law Review (1995) 270, p. 273; see in respect to merger cases: Ulrich Schwalbe and Daniel 
Zimmer, Law and Economics in European Merger Control (Oxford University Press 2009), p. 154. 
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loses its relative bargaining power. This was the case in GE/Honeywell, where the Commission 
considered that the exercise of buyer power vis-à-vis a dominant seller was limited by the 
imbalance in the commercial relationship because GE was an unavoidable trading partner.887 The 
same was point raised in Syniverse/Mach, where the merged entity would become an unavoidable 
trading partner making it “unlikely that customers can resist its attempts to increase prices or 
decrease quality in NRTRDE”,888 rendering the exercise of countervailing buyer power 
insufficient. The merger was ultimately declared compatible due to the divestiture of essentially 
the entirety of Mach’s DC and NRTRDE businesses. Recently, in Intel the Commission argued 
that as Intel was a necessary trading partner and its argumentation of countervailing buyer power 
“ignores the fundamental element in its relationship with OEMs, namely the fact that it is an 
unavoidable trading partner for them: OEMs depend on Intel for what is the most important 
single hardware component in their computers. As such, Intel is a must-stock brand.”889 Thus, 
buyers were not able to neutralize the behavior of Intel as they were dependent on it and they 
lacked buyer power.890 
Therefore, the fact that a buyer is an unavoidable trading partner will confer upon it substantial 
buyer power vis-à-vis all suppliers, also if a supplier is an unavoidable trading partner then the 
buyers will see their ability to exercise buyer power curtailed. 
6.4.3.2 Dependence 
Dependence is another assessment tool employed to determine whether a buyer enjoys substantial 
buyer power vis-à-vis a particular supplier. Consequently, the state of dependence is a relative 
concept as a supplier may or may not be dependent regarding a buyer (or group of joint buyers), 
albeit not necessarily to others.891 For the market power assessment, dependence is an important 
factor because its existence reveals the ability of a buyer to obtain better terms and conditions 
from a supplier. Therefore, its existence is a source of buyer market power and it can help in 
                                                          
887 Commission Decision of 3 July 2001 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market and 
the EEA Agreement Case COMP/M.2220 — General Electric/Honeywell [2004] OJ L 48/1, para. 227. See the 
commentary of the case by Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 91-92. 
888 Summary of Commission Decision of 29 May 2013 declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.6690 — Syniverse/Mach) [2014] OJ C 60/7, para. 54. 
889 Summary of Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/C-3/37.990 — Intel) [2009] OJ C 227/13, taken from the 
unabridged version, para. 886. 
890 Summary of Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/C-3/37.990 — Intel) [2009] OJ C 227/13, taken from the 
unabridged version, para. 894. See criticizing the argumentation by the commission Cook and Patel, [2013] para 
2.83. 
891 Also supporting the notion that dependence is a relative concept in opposition to dominance see: 
Bundeskartellamt ‘Buyer Power in Competition Law - Status and Perspectives’ (2008), p. 6; using the term “relative 
economic dependence”; see: Oinonen (2014). See also discussing dependence and buyer power: Ioannis Lianos and 
Claudio Lombardi, Superior Bargaining Power and the Global Food Value Chain. The Wuthering Heights of 
Holistic Competition Law? (2016), p. 21-24. 
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determining how large or important it is with respect to a single supplier: the more dependent a 
supplier or a group of them, the more buyer market power an undertaking has. 
A supplier may be in a state of dependence with respect to its buyer (or vice versa), which grants 
the non-dependent party the ability to exercise substantial bargaining power with regard to the 
other. In that sense, dependence is also relative because its degree of intensity varies from 
relation to relation, as confirmed in Kesko/Tuko.892  
In the case of buyer power, as described by Galbraith, dependence puts “the seller in a state of 
uncertainty as to the intentions of a buyer who is indispensable to him”.893 Therefore, its 
existence will be a strong indicator of substantial bargaining power and, consequently, its 
assessment is one of the most relevant elements to consider when measuring the degree of buyer 
power enjoyed by an undertaking, as noted by Këllezi.894 
An example may illustrate the concept: if a provider of sugar cane in a MS sells 85% of its sugar 
production to a single processing undertaking with very large market shares as a seller in the 
downstream market, the fact that this buyer threatens to switch to alternative suppliers or simply 
stop buying sugar may lead to the supplier’s financial failure.895  
Furthermore, dependence rises among buyers and sellers, and sellers and buyers, as illustrated in 
IMS Health,896 and JCI/FIAMM, where buyers were dependent on the supply of batteries but the 
suppliers were not dependent on these purchases, as this sub-market accounted for only a third of 
the total turnover of the battery business.897 Nevertheless, dependent buyers are less frequent 
                                                          
892 Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53, taken from 
the unabridged version, para. 150. See also: Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 79. 
893 Galbraith, [2010], p. 108. 
894 Këllezi [2008], p. 78-79 and 82. 
895 This example is loosely model on Judgment of 10 July 2001 in Irish Sugar v Commission, C-497/99 P, 
EU:C:2001:393. Also stressing that losing a contract may imply the loss of financial viability, Dobson and Inderst 
(2008), p. 340. 
896 “[…] account must be taken of the fact that a high level of participation by the pharmaceutical laboratories in the 
improvement of the 1 860 brick structure protected by copyright, on the supposition that it is proven, has created a 
dependence by users in regard to that structure, particularly at a technical level. In such circumstances, it is likely 
that those laboratories would have to make exceptional organisational and financial efforts in order to acquire the 
studies on regional sales of pharmaceutical products presented on the basis of a structure other than that protected by 
the intellectual property right. The supplier of that alternative structure might therefore be obliged to offer terms 
which are such as to rule out any economic viability of business on a scale comparable to that of the undertaking 
which controls the protected structure”, Judgment of 29 April 2004 in IMS Health, C-418/01, EU:C:2004:257, para. 
29. 
897 Summary of Commission Decision of 10 May 2007 declaring a concentration compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.4381 — JCI/FIAMM) [2009] OJ C 241/12; taken 
from the unabridged version, paras. 407-413. This degree of dependence was satisfied in the Commission’s view for 
example by recourse to the threats made by one of the parties to FIAT, one of its battery buyers, of stop deliveries if 
the higher purchasing prices were not accepted. 
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because in buying markets the supplier is generally far more dependent on its customers than vice 
versa.898 
However, dependence may exist even if an undertaking is not dominant and/or not an 
unavoidable trading partner, nor that a concentration would necessarily lead to a significant 
impediment of effective competition,899 as confirmed in the concentration cases Rewe/Meinl, and 
Carrefour/Promodès, where the Commission approved the concentration followed by the 
submission of commitments that alleviated the competitive risks posed by the operation, despite 
the existence of buyer dependence that was said to exist based on the ‘threat point’ of 22%.900 
The commitments addressed the buyer dependence indirectly as it was ordered to divest some 
stores that represented alternative buyers for the suppliers who would have been less dependent 
on the single entity. Nevertheless, only when the supplier depended on at least 50% of its profit 
has a buying concentration been found to be anti-competitive, as in Kesko/Tuko,901 I discuss this 
in detail in chapter 9, section 9.4.3. Also and as I discuss in greater detail in chapter 9, 
                                                          
898 Dobson (2004-2005), p. 531. 
899 Cf with Këllezi who argues that in dominance cases “the central point was nevertheless the examination of the 
economic dependence of a number of suppliers, which affirms the importance of the analysis of the bilateral 
relationships between the new entity and its customers: in merger control, a dominant position can be found if the 
new entity will be capable of behaving independently of its customers, even if it cannot be held capable of ignoring 
its competitors but only enjoys a more comfortable position than they do. The Commission’s approach, finally, 
shows that under ‘exceptional circumstances’, – the most important of which is the presence of economically 
dependent customers – even (very) low market shares may indicate the existence of a dominant position.”, in Këllezi 
[2008], p. 82. 
900 “Lors de son enquête, la Commission a demandé aux fournisseurs d’indiquer à partir de quel pourcentage de leur 
chiffre d’affaires ils considéraient que la perte d’un client représenterait une menace pour l’existence même de leur 
entreprise. La moyenne des réponses obtenues fait apparaître un seuil de 22%. Ce seuil de 22% avait été également 
retenu dans l’affaire Rewe/Meinl18. Il convient de noter que les réponses recueillies auprès des fournisseurs font 
apparaître des différences selon les groupes de produits considérés. Par exemple, en moyenne, les fournisseurs du 
groupe ‘liquides’ ont ainsi indiqué que la perte d’un client représentant plus de 24% de leur chiffre d’affaires risquait 
de mettre en péril la survie de leur entreprise. Pour les fournisseurs d’épicerie sèche, ce taux de menace se situe aux 
alentours de 22%. D’une manière générale, les taux mentionnés par les fournisseurs se situent aux alentours de 20-
22%. Les données obtenues de l’enquête doivent bien évidemment être nuancées (pour certains groupes de produits, 
le nombre de réponses obtenues est en effet trop faible pour constituer un échantillon représentatif). A priori, on 
pourrait en déduire que lorsqu’un distributeur dépasse un tel seuil dans le chiffre d’affaire d’un de ses fournisseurs, 
ce dernier se retrouve de facto en situation de ‘dépendance économique’”, in Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 164/5, French public version, para. 52; 
see also: Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 (Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 101, where it was held that “[t]he Commission asked 
producers above what proportion of turnover, with a given customer could not be switched to other sales channels 
without difficulty. It transpired that on average 22% of turnover is the say, of one branded goods producer who 
makes ‘must figure above which a customer can be replaced only at carry’/products, as Rewe/Billa and Meinl risk 
losing the cost of very heavy financial losses, if at all.” See suggesting this threshold: College of Europe and Centre 
for European Policy Studies (2012), p. 62. 
901 The Commission considered that the concentration would create an entity with too high a degree of buyer power 
creating a dependency of suppliers to the buyer, and also imposing too high entry barriers for potential competition. 
Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market 




dependence is not only an indicator or measurement tool of buyer market power, but a problem in 
itself that can be exploited by imposing ‘unfair purchasing conditions’.902 
The issue, then, is determining how and why dependence takes place. There are several factors to 
take into account and the pertinent factors to be considered may vary from case to case.903 The 
main factor is the proportion a buyer represents for a seller. The larger the proportion a buyer 
represents for the total sales of a seller (and in accordance its profitability), the more powerful the 
buyer becomes,904 as confirmed by the case law in Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v 
Commission.905 With regard to the proportion of sales or a buyer’s importance to a supplier, 
dependence measures the relative economic harm that each party will suffer in the event that 
there is failure to reach an agreement.906 As expressed in KE KELIT v Commission “the bonds of 
economic dependence existing between participants in an agreement is liable to affect their 
freedom of initiative and decision, the existence of those bonds does not make it impossible to 
refuse to consent to the agreement which is proposed to them”.907 The more dependent a party is 
on another, the more it will be willing to cede part of its profits to secure the contract.908 For this 
reason, the financial capacity of both undertakings plays a role that ought to be assessed by 
competition authorities.909  
Also, dependence can be measured in terms of the innovation and adjustments costs that a 
supplier has entered into to satisfy the specific needs of a buyer, which may not be useful for 
                                                          
902 See also raising this point: Këllezi [2008], p. 55. 
903 See for example under French Law that dependence – which also requires a degree of dominance – is triggered 
under four accumulative conditions: notoriety of the brand, ratio of sales, importance of the buyer’s market share in 
the market and lack of business partner alternatives as discussed by Nollet in Luce Nollet, ‘France: Anti-Competitive 
Practices’ 24 European Competition Law Review (2003) N116, and in length in chapter 9, section 9.6.3, of this 
dissertation. 
904 Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust 
Policy’ (2010), p. 30. 
905 Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64, 
para. 233; Doyle and Inderst (2007), p. 213; OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 
40; Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust 
Policy’ (2010), p. 30. 
906 Dobson (2004-2005), p. 533. 
907 Judgment of 20 March 2002, KE KELIT v Commission, T-17/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:73, para. 48. See discussing 
dependence between a parent company and its subsidiary: Judgment of 12 July 1979 in BMW Belgium v 
Commission, C-32/78, EU:C:1979:191, para. 36. Also clarifying that dependence is not a valid argument to claim 
that an undertaking was to be involved in a cartel see: Judgment of 27 September 2012, Ballast Nedam Infra v 
Commission, T-362/06, ECR, EU:T:2012:492, para. 104. 
908 See also supporting this the Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro of 16 June 1994 in Judgment of 15 December 
1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, 
EU:C:1994:249 [1994], section 18, I – 5658. Similarly, see: Alla Pozdnakova, ‘Buyer Power in the Retail Trading 
Sector: Evolving Latvian Regulation’ 30 European Competition Law Review (2009) 387. 
909 Kokkoris and Day (2009), p. 187. 
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other parties, or where there may be no other buyers, as remarked by Lianos and Lombardi and 
the former UK Office of Fair Trading.910  
Other factors to consider regarding the existence and extent of dependence are the existence of 
exclusive supply agreements, charging structures that are not obviously related to the cost 
structure of the goods specified,911 the lack of substitutes for the supplier912 or if other supply 
sources are eliminated,913 the fact that supplier owns well-known brands or ‘must stock’ products 
as remarked in Nestlé/Perrier,914 the contractual relation length as stressed in Enso/Stora,915 or 
when the buyer is a necessary trading partner because of its privileged position upstream and 
downstream, as discussed in by the Commission in Virgin/British Airways and ratified by the 
General Court.916  
However, a state of dependence or ‘rapport captif’ does not necessarily imply, at least in the case 
of a cartel member, that the supplier is not able to allocate their products to a different buyer, in 
accordance to Car Glass.917 This means that the degree of dependence is reduced or negated by 
entering into a collusive outcome with the aim to “circumvent their customers by colluding” with 
other suppliers.918 Thus, dependent suppliers will be incentivized to either enter into a selling 
alliance or forming a cartel to reduce their dependence and create opposing seller bargaining 
countervailing power against a powerful buyer, a topic that I discuss in chapter 3, which is 
discussed in the US antitrust by Kirkwood.919  
                                                          
910 Lianos and Lombardi, p. 22. See also: Office of Fair Trading, The Competitive Effects of Buyer Groups, para. 7.6. 
911 European Commission and others (2000), 19; Kokkoris and Day (2009), p. 179. 
912 As decided in a French National case Décision n° 05-D-44 du 21 juillet 2005 relative à des pratiques mises en 
œuvre par le groupe La Provence (anciennement dénommé Le Provençal) dans le secteur de la publicité dans la 
presse quotidienne régionale à Marseille, Autorité de la Concurrence, para. 24, available at: 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/05d44.pdf. 
913 Commission Decision of 22 July 1992 relating to a proceeding under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.190 - Nestlé/Perrier) [1992] OJ L 356/1, para. 89. German Federal Court, Rossignol [1975], BGH 
NJW 1976, 801, translation in English available at: https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-
translations/german/case.php?id=1488. 
914 Commission Decision of 22 July 1992 relating to a proceeding under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.190 - Nestlé/Perrier) [1992] OJ L 356/1, para. 83. 
915 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, where it was 
found that Enso’s trading partnership with a supplier had lasted for more than 40 years. 
916 Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 
- Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1, paras. 32 and 47; “[i]t necessarily follows that those agents substantially 
depend on the income they receive from BA in consideration for their air travel agency services”, Judgment of 17 
December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:343, para. 216. 
917 Summary of Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.125 — Car glass) 
[2009] OJ C 173/13, taken from the unabridged version, para. 441. 
918 Summary of Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.125 — Car glass) 
[2009] OJ C 173/13, taken from the unabridged version, para. 437. 
919 Kirkwood (2014). 
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It could also be that, due to particular circumstances of the case, both parties are dependent on 
each other in a state of ‘mutual interdependence’. In these cases of ‘mirror market structure’, 
parties are unable to play off each other because their bargaining power is neutralized. This was 
the case in Enso/Stora, where the Commission found a symmetrical market structure upstream 
and downstream that created a relation of ‘mutual interdependence’ between the merging entities 
and the largest purchaser.920 The mutual dependence was caused by the long-term relationship, 
and the unlikeliness of switching commercial parties, and the proportion of sales and purchases 
they represented to each other. This element of mutual dependence was seen as an indication of 
sufficient countervailing buyer power to neutralize any risks of post-merger exercise of 
pernicious market power by the merging entity. The existence of ‘mutual interdependence’ was 
later reviewed by the Courts in Imperial Chemical v Commission,921 where the plaintiff 
unsuccessfully alleged that there was ‘mutual interdependence’ because of a perception of a 
community of shared interests between itself and its customers.922 The General Court dismissed 
the countervailing buyer power argument923 based on the fact that the applicant did not support 
the assertions concerning the existence of countervailing buyer power with evidence and did not 
show that its customers were “able to counterbalance its market power”.924 Thus, there was no 
interdependence, but rather dependence from the buyers to the seller.  
6.4.3.3 Relation between the unavoidable trading partner doctrine and dependence 
Furthermore, the buyer power case law shows that there is a link between the fact that an 
undertaking is an unavoidable purchasing trading partner and suppliers’ dependence on it, as 
discussed in Irish Sugar v Commission,925 and Virgin/British Airways,926 and as confirmed by the 
General Court in British Airways v Commission.927 The connection between these two factors, 
therefore, further helps in determining the extent of the undertaking’s buyer market power and 
                                                          
920 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9. 
921 Judgment of 25 June 2010, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, T-66/01, ECR, EU:T:2010:255. 
922 See also the discussion of interdependence between oligopsonist competitors, which was a central issue in the 
assessment of the Airtours concentration by the General Court in Judgment of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission, 
T-342/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:146; see also Judgment of 31 March 1998 in France and Société commerciale des 
potasses and de l'azote and Entreprise minière and chimique v Commission, Joined cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 
EU:C:1998:148. 
923 Judgment of 25 June 2010, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, T-66/01, ECR, EU:T:2010:255, paras. 
276-277. 
924 Judgment of 25 June 2010, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, T-66/01, ECR, EU:T:2010:255, para. 
277. 
925 Commission Decision of 14 May 1997 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty 
(IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar plc) [1997] OJ L 258/1, para. 17. 
926 Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 
- Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1, paras. 32 and 47 (emphasis added). 
927 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 217. 
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upon the existence of an undertaking that is an unavoidable trading partner it follows that 
suppliers are dependent on it. 
6.4.4 Gate-keeping  
Linked to the unavoidable trading partner doctrine is the ability of a buyer to enhance its market 
power if it is able to act as a gate-keeper by controlling access to the downstream market.928 A 
gate-keeper or bottleneck position929 exists when the buyer possesses a privileged position for the 
distribution of goods or services in the upstream or downstream markets. Thanks to this ability to 
control access to markets and as held by the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC):  
a retailer is so important a part of the retail market that its refusal to carry a product will, by itself, 
make it too costly for the supplier to effectively enter. The supplier may be held below minimum 
efficient scale in manufacturing, or may be unable to advertise efficiently in the mass media. In 
those circumstances the buyer stands as a gatekeeper to the retail marketplace.930  
Gate-keeping, therefore, is present in retailing industries or where distributors of goods to end 
consumers play an important role, as clarified and by the UK Competition Commission931 and the 
Bundeskartellamt.932 
Because of these characteristics, gate-keeping is more likely to exist in specific markets such as 
retailing, or those in which to reach end consumers firms require an intermediary undertaking. 
Also, gate-keeping appears if the product sold is not in demand in any other markets but only 
demanded by a particular one. For example, in the case of raw materials gatekeeping is unlikely 
to occur because the same input can be used in several industries, as is the case with oil employed 
in energy production and plastics. 
                                                          
928 Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 6.334; Grimes ‘Buyer Power and Retail Gatekeeper Power: Protecting 
Competition and The Atomistic Seller’ (2004-2005); Doyle and Inderst (2007), p. 213; Dobson and Inderst (2008), p. 
340; Pozdnakova (2009), 388. Undertakings may also be gatekeepers as well as sellers, particularly if they have the 
control of IP rights as confirmed in Commission Decision of 11 October 2000 declaring a concentration to be 
compatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement (Case No COMP/M.1845 — AOL/Time Warner) 
[2001] OJ L 268/28, para. 25. 
929 Bottleneck positions are frequently invoked in cases dealing with refusals to deal or essential facilities. For 
literature dealing with this in the EU see, inter alia: Gregory J Werden, ‘The Law and Economics of the Essential 
Facility Doctrine’ 32 Saint Louis University Law Journal (1987-1988) 433; Phillip Areeda, ‘Essential Facilities: An 
Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles’ 58 Antitrust Law Journal (1989) 841; Hans Henrik Lidgard, ‘Unilateral 
Refusal to Supply: an Agreement in Disguise’ 6 European Competition Law Review (1997) 352; Christopher 
Stothers, ‘Refusal to Supply as Abuse of a Dominant Position: Essential Facilities in the European Union’ 22 
European Competition Law Review (2001) 256; Valentine Korah, ‘The Interface Between Intellectual Property and 
Antitrust: The European Experience’ 69 Antitrust Law Journal (2002) 801; Csongor István Nagy, ‘Refusal to Deal 
and the Doctrine of Essential Facilities in US and EC Competition Law: a Comparative Perspective and a Proposal 
for a Workable Analytical Framework’ 32 European Law Review (2007) 664. 
930 U.S. Federal Trade Commission, (2001), p. 58. 
931 Competition Commission - UK (2008), para. 9.7. 
932 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), 12, 
which refers to this phenomenon as “bottleneck”. 
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Gate-keeping, however, is also likely to be exercised by buyers not under the scope of application 
of EU competition law and not part of the retailing markets, such as the case of contracting 
authorities under the scope of public procurement. These entities act as administrators of business 
opportunities by regulating the entrance into public procurement markets acting as a market 
controller and having a potential for competition distortion, as noted by Sánchez Graells.933 
Furthermore, for a buyer to be a gate-keeper it must possess downstream market power, as noted 
by the OECD,934 otherwise, its presence would not be required or significant to distribute goods 
to end consumers. This would be the case of a buyer acting as a reseller and who is key to 
allowing market penetration of the supplier’s product, as occurs in food retailing.935 Therefore, its 
market power downstream leverages and enhances its upstream market power, justifying a 
dualistic approach to these types of cases. Additionally, if the undertaking acts as a gate-keeper, 
the analysis of market power downstream is even more important than its market power upstream 
as a buyer, because of the effects on competition as such and a broader standard regarding buyer 
power anti-competitive harm.936 
Gate-keeping has been subject to scrutiny in several instances by the Commission, particularly 
when dealing with retailing concentrations.937 In Procter & Gamble/Gillette, the Commission 
found that powerful buyers that control access to the end consumer “perform an important 
‘gatekeeper’ function for suppliers since they serve as a ‘one-stop-shop’ for the parties’ 
products.938 If a retailer refused to carry a brand of the parties, the brand would risk disappearing 
from the customers’ awareness.”939 Therefore, if the buyer acts as a gate-keeper, its suppliers will 
be constrained to keep the commercial relation with it – even to the extent of accepting less 
favorable conditions – to avoid incurring significant losses pertaining to the product in the end 
market, as a reaction to end consumers not obtaining the ‘must stock’ good.  
Furthermore, in the food retailing concentration case, Kesko/Tuko, that concluded declaring the 
operation incompatible with the internal market gatekeeping was relevant to assess the extent of 
the undertaking’s future buyer power. The Commission found that “gate-keeper effect,” along 
with the large market shares of the merged entity as buyer and retailer created serious anti-
                                                          
933 Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules [2015], p. 58. 
934 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 22. 
935 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 13. 
936 Office of Fair Trading, The Competitive Effects of Buyer Groups, para. 1.21; OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: 
Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 42. 
937 See also raising the issue of buyer power in retailing industries: Gorrie (2006). 
938 Also stressing the distribution function played by gate-keeper buyers see: Vogel (1998), p. 11. See also discussing 
this case and the gate-keeping ability: Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 88-89. 
939 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.3732 — Procter & Gamble/Gillette) [2005] OJ C 
239/6, public version, para. 125. 
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competitive risks, both for upstream and downstream competition.940 For the suppliers, in this 
case, it was necessary to achieve an agreement with the proposed party, as the only way to 
guarantee shelf-space in retail outlets, representing at least 55% of the Finnish market,941 as also 
remarked by Ezrachi and Ioannidou.942 Furthermore, as gatekeepers Kesko/Tuko would have been 
an indispensable channel of distribution for suppliers to reach end consumers, reinforcing its 
buyer market power. Owing to this factor, and the need of suppliers to secure a contract with the 
gate-keeper (also an unavoidable trading partner), the assessment concluded that suppliers would 
be in a position that could have been abused by the proposed entity through exploitative prices 
(such as those which I discuss in chapter 8). Also, the fact that the proposed concentration would 
create or reinforce a gate-keeping position was seen as leading to the possibility of a “spiral 
effect”, a type of waterbed effect (as I discuss in chapter 3, section 3.6.1), negatively affecting 
prices among rival buyers.943 Therefore, the spiral effect was deemed to generate a situation in 
which the merged party would have been able to obtain lower purchasing prices than its 
competitors, allowing them to drive them out of the market and raise barriers to entry, as also 
noted by Ezrachi and Ioannidou.944 However (as I discussed in chapter 3, section 3.6.1), the 
existence of the waterbed effect and the spiral effect have been questioned by more recent 
economic findings, which perhaps would have changed the outcome or the justification of the 
assessment if taken into account at that time. 
Lastly, in Unilever/Sara Lee Body Care, the Commission analyzed, and found as insufficient, the 
effects of the interaction between food and cosmetic product retailers (supermarkets and 
drugstores) and their position in the downstream market as gate-keepers.945 The merging parties 
argued that the operation would not lead to a price increase because of the countervailing buyer 
power of its customers that acted not only as buyers but also controlled market access and 
competitors supplying private label products. In their view, these gate-keeper buyers 
(supermarkets and drugstores) were able to exercise countervailing buyer power by threatening to 
delist the supplier's secondary brand,946 refusing to stock new variants of the leading brand or 
                                                          
940 Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53, taken from 
the unabridged version, para. 133. I discuss this case in further detail in chapter 9, section 9.4.3. 
941 Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53, taken from 
the unabridged version, para. 133. 
942 Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 79. 
943 Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53, taken from 
the unabridged version, para. 153; Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 79. 
944 Ibid, p. 79. 
945 Summary of Commission Decision of 17 November 2010 declaring a concentration compatible with the internal 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.5658 — Unilever/Sara Lee Body Care) [2012] 
OJ C 23/30. See also: Ezrachi [2014], p. 438. 
946 Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], paras. 5.890-5.891. 
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reducing the number of stock-keeping units.947 The Commission rejected these arguments and 
found that in the post-merger structure, the bargaining power of these gate-keeper buyers would 
not have been sufficient to mitigate the likelihood of price increases; however, the concentration 
was approved as the offered commitments sufficiently mitigated the competition concerns.948 
From the case law, I conclude that, to determine if a buyer is a gate-keeper and what 
consequences not securing a contract may entail for suppliers, several factors are to be taken into 
account:  
i) whether the supplier has to access end consumers through inferior sale channels, for 
example, a weaker distributor;949  
ii) whether the supplier forgoes substantial economies of scale or network effects;950  
iii) if the buyer counts for a large share of the purchases in the upstream market;951  
iv) the existence of much smaller buyers acting in the same market;952  
v) the presence of entry barriers preventing upstream entry and circumventing the 
powerful buyer by sponsoring new distribution channels. 
6.4.5 Alternative supply sources 
Alternative supply sources are the last assessment tool I have identified in the measurement of 
buyer market power as confirmed by the case law and other authoritative sources, as discussed 
below. Measuring alternative supply sources describe whether a party does or does not have 
substantial bargaining power, as suggested by the OECD and the OFT.953 Also, alternative 
supply sources is a very useful tool when determining the sufficiency of countervailing buyer 
power, as clarified by the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines.954 Nevertheless, in the case of 
monopsony power, threatening to switch to alternative supply sources is not a particularly 
important or relevant factor when it comes to determining the extent of buyer market power 
                                                          
947 Commission Decision of 17 November 2010 declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market and 
the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.5658 — Unilever/Sara Lee Body Care) [2012] OJ C 23/30; 
taken from the unabridged version, para. 200. 
948 Commission Decision of 17 November 2010 declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market and 
the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.5658 — Unilever/Sara Lee Body Care) [2012] OJ C 23/30, 
taken from the unabridged, para. 44. 
949 Office of Fair Trading, The Competitive Effects of Buyer Groups, para. 1.21; Kokkoris and Day (2009), p. 180. 
950 Office of Fair Trading, The Competitive Effects of Buyer Groups, para. 1.21. 
951 Gorrie (2006), p. 218. 
952 Office of Fair Trading, The Competitive Effects of Buyer Groups, para. 1.21; OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: 
Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 42. 
953 Office of Fair Trading ‘Assessment of Market Power: Understanding Competition Law’ (2004), p. 24; Office of 
Fair Trading, The Competitive Effects of Buyer Groups; OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ 
(2009), p. 42. See also suggesting that alternative supply and procurement channels are a key element in the 
assessment of bargaining power models see: Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry 
into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 9. 
954 A source of buyer power “would be if a customer could credibly threaten to resort, within a reasonable timeframe, 
to alternative sources of supply”, Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 65 (emphasis added). 
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because the withholding effect will take place regardless of outside options for the buyer. Thus, 
threatening to acquire input from a different supplier does not capture this effect. 
If the buyer can credibly threaten to switch, or switch to, “alternative suppliers, sponsor new 
entry, or self-supply without incurring substantial costs” within a reasonable timeframe,955 it will 
be a buyer power indicator. In the absence of credible alternative supply sources, buyers may lack 
substantial buyer power and may even be dependent on the supplier, as is the case in 
Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission.956 Therefore, the more alternative supply 
sources the buyer has, the more bargaining room vis-à-vis its supplier when it comes to obtaining 
better trading terms, and vice versa, and the more buyer market power it has.957 This means that 
alternative supply sources are measured by reference to the buyer’s options; unlike the 
measurement of demand side substitutability, which I discuss in chapter 5, section 5.4.2.1, the 
analysis is centered on alternative supply sources for the buyer and not alternative buyers for the 
seller. Also, measuring alternative supply sources is different from buyer substitution in the sense 
that, for the latter, the capacity of new buyers to timely and effectively start purchasing the input 
is measured. 
The existence of alternative sources has been employed by the Commission and the Courts when 
measuring the extent of buyer market power, on several occasions. In most of these cases, the 
analysis of alternative sources of supply is directly linked to the ability of a buyer to exercise 
countervailing buyer power, as recognized by the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines,958 and the 
General Court in Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission.959 This, however, does not 
imply that an analogous analysis should not be made when resorting to cases of active use of 
buyer market power. 
In Tomra and Others v Commission, the Commission expressly remarked that alternative supply 
sources are one of the two alternative conditions for buyer power to exist.960 However, a broader 
                                                          
955 Office of Fair Trading, The Competitive Effects of Buyer Groups, para. 1.21; and replicated in OECD ‘Policy 
Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 42. See also this indicator in Network (2011), para. 103. 
956 Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64, 
para. 231. 
957 See also stressing this, from a suppliers’ perspective, how a merge that eliminates alternative buyers increase the 
buyer power of a powerful firm in Bundeskaterllamt, Case summary from 6 July 2015: Prohibition of acquisition of 
Kaiser´s Tengelmann outlets by Edeka, B2-96/14 (English version), p. 1, appealed and revoked by the German 
Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy under § 42 of the German Competition Act based, inter alia, on 
the protection of working positions that would be absorbed by Edeka. 
958 “Countervailing buyer power in this context should be understood as the bargaining strength that the buyer has 
vis-à-vis the seller in commercial negotiations due to its size, its commercial significance to the seller and its ability 
to switch to alternative suppliers”, in Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 65. 
959 Judgment of 9 July 2007, Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, T-282/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:203, para. 
210. 
960 The second condition being “that customers are able to sponsor new entrants”, Summary of Commission Decision 
of 29 March 2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and 
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view was given by the General Court in Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, in 
expressing that there were more than two conditions for the existence and measurement of buyer 
market power, but insisting that alternative sources of supply and market concentrations were one 
of its fundamental sources.961 The General Court went on by stating that buyer power can be 
exercised by an undertaking vis-à-vis its suppliers, “if those customers have the ability to resort 
to credible alternative sources of supply within a reasonable time if the supplier decides to 
increase its prices or to make the conditions of delivery less favourable.”962 Therefore, the likelier 
this is, the greater the buyer market power. 
In Irish Sugar v Commission, a defense claiming countervailing buyer power was rejected by the 
Commission and ratified by the General Court because, inter alia, the customers of Irish Sugar, 
despite having some degree of buyer power, were said to be dependent of Irish Sugar because of 
the lack of sufficient alternative supply sources due to the exclusionary tactics employed by Irish 
Sugar.963 The Commission’s argumentation links dependence with the lack of alternative supply 
sources, as the lack of the former strengthens the supplier’s dependence vis-à-vis the buyer. The 
fewer alternative supply sources, the less a buyer can threaten a supplier with switching their 
purchase orders to a competitor. 
Lastly, in Alrosa v Commission, the issue of limiting access to alternative supply sources by a 
dominant purchaser was dealt with by the General Court. The controversy did not deal with 
alternative sources of supply but, instead, concerned a dominant buyer’s conduct in seeking to 
limit access of other buyers to alternative supply sources to exclude rival buyers (as I discuss in 
chapter 7, section 7.3). This is an indirect way of achieving buyer market power because it limits 
the buyer market power of its rivals.  
In this case, the Commission adopted a Commitment Decision in which De Beers, at the time the 
largest rough diamond buyer and supplier in the world,964 agreed to not purchase rough diamonds 
from Alrosa – also a diamond-buyer and supplier – as the purchasing relation between them 
reduced access to a “viable source of alternative supply of rough diamonds for potential 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Article 54 of the EEA Agreement against Tomra Systems ASA, Tomra Europe AS, Tomra Systems BV, Tomra 
Systems GmbH, Tomra Butikksystemer AS, Tomra Systems AB and Tomra Leergutsysteme GmbH (Case COMP/E-
1/38.113 — Prokent/Tomra) [2008] OJ C 219/11, taken from the unabridged version, para. 89. Arguably, the 
alternative conditions pointed out by the Commission are part of the strategic advantages. Cf with Ezrachi and 
Ioannidou, who are of the opinion that there are two types of sources of buyer power: i) dominance or ii) strategic 
advantages, in Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014). 
961 Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64, 
para. 232. 
962 Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64, 
para. 230. 
963 Commission Decision of 14 May 1997 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty 
(IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar plc) [1997] OJ L 258/1, para. 107. 
964 De Beers, up to date, is also the largest undertaking in the world market of rough diamond. 
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consumers”.965 Furthermore, the purchasing from De Beers to Alrosa could hinder the “second 
biggest competitor from competing fully with De Beers”.966 The Commission found that this 
purchasing relation eliminated alternative supply sources (Alrosa) to other diamond-buyers and, 
therefore, approved the Decision based on commitments offered by De Beers not to buy from 
Alrosa so the provision of “third parties with an alternative source of supply” was possible.967 
The General Court found that if a dominant buyer nullifies supply alternatives for other buyers, 
these lose any bargaining power they could have and access to input. Hence, if a purchaser in a 
dominant position “reserve(s) to itself the whole of Alrosa’s production exported outside the CIS 
(such practice) could, even if the latter consented, constitute an abuse in the context of their 
relations.”968 To prevent such abuse, a suitable alternative for the General Court would have been 
to prohibit parties from entering into exclusive purchasing agreements or reserving a material part 
of the purchases for the dominant undertaking, but without necessarily prohibiting all purchases 
from a party to a supplier indefinitely.969 On appeal, however, the CJEU reverted the General 
Court’s Judgment as it found that in the case of Commitment Decisions, the extent of the 
principle of proportionality is substantially lower than in not committed decisions.970 
6.5 Alternatives to buyer market definition 
In opposition to the structural and indirect analysis of relevant buying markets, the literature 
evidences different methods for directly measuring (buyer) market power. There is lack of 
academic consensus regarding the suitability of direct market power assessment and, from a legal 
standpoint, none of these methodologies have been endorsed by the legislation, the case law or 
soft law.971 In this section, I discuss two methodologies suggested for the direct measurement of 
buyer market power: the Lerner Index and the Buyer Power Index. 
6.5.1 The Lerner Index 
The Lerner Index allows for direct market power assessment in both seller and buyer markets 
based on the elasticities of supply and demand of an undertaking,972 having an intuitive economic 
                                                          
965 Commission Decision of 22 February 2006 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/B-2/38.381 — De Beers) [2006] OJ L 205/24, para. 1. 
966 Commission Decision of 22 February 2006 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/B-2/38.381 — De Beers) [2006] OJ L 205/24, para. 1. 
967 Judgment of 11 July 2007, Alrosa v Commission, T-170/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:220, para. 119. 
968 Judgment of 11 July 2007, Alrosa v Commission, T-170/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:220, para. 127 (emphasis added). 
969 Judgment of 11 July 2007, Alrosa v Commission, T-170/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:220, para. 128. 
970 Judgment of 29 June 2010 in Commission v Alrosa, C-441/07 P, EU:C:2010:377. 
971 Monti ‘The Concept of Dominance in Article 82’ (2006), p. 34. 
972 The Lerner Index was first developed Abraham Ptachya Lerner, ‘The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement 
of Monopoly Power’ 1 The Review of Economic Studies (1934) 157; Roger J. Van den Bergh and Peter D. 
Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative Perspective (Intersentia 2001), p. 94-95. 
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appeal.973 The Lerner Index represents the price-marginal cost margin and is defined as  
and also equates the inverse of the price elasticity of the demand of the firm and it is represented 
as .974 
The Lerner Index provides a measure of market power based on the elasticity of the goods 
commercialized by the undertaking by determining its residual demand.975 First, it describes the 
ability of an undertaking to raise its price above short marginal costs, and secondly that market 
power is inversely related to the elasticity of demand that an undertaking faces. If price elasticity 
is very high, then the price-marginal cost margin will be low and vice versa.976 In simpler terms, 
the Lerner Index will indicate how much, as a percentage, the demand of good “A” will decrease 
if the price of it increases by 1%.977 The more elastic the demand is, the lower the market power 
of the undertaking will be.978 
A reverse Lerner Index could be employed to directly assess the market power of a buying 
undertaking. In this case, the elasticity will determine the change that takes place when the buyer 
decreases its purchasing price and how this affects the quantity supplied by undertakings in the 
input market. The less a decrease in price decreases the quantity supplied to the undertaking, the 
more market power the undertaking has. 
Despite its simplicity and intuitive appeal, the Lerner Index has not been adopted as the 
methodology for market definition due to several criticisms. Firstly, estimating the competitive 
price is complex,979 and so is estimating the marginal cost.980 Secondly, the Lerner Index 
indicates the deviation of price from marginal cost at the current output, but not necessarily the 
deviation from the competitive price.981 Thirdly, it is considered incorrect to equate marginal 
costs to the competitive price, and the Lerner Index assumes that high costs preclude dominance 
while high costs are precisely inherent to monopoly/monopsony power.982 Fourthly, the Lerner 
Index only holds true for an undertaking producing a single product but most undertakings 
produce more than one product. Fifthly, the Lerner Index supposes that firms are choosing their 
prices to maximize short-term profits instead of long-term profits, and which is usually not the 
                                                          
973 Schwalbe and Zimmer, [2009], p. 51. See also: Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 131-132. 
974 Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 3-037. 
975 Hovenkamp, [2005], p. 134. 
976 Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 3-037. 
977 OECD, ‘Policy Roundtables: Market Definition’ (2012), p. 25. 
978 The intuition is simple: if demand decreases little in comparison with the price increase, then the firm is dominant 
as it pricing conduct has an appreciable effect in the market price. 
979 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Market Definition’ (2012), p. 26. Also stressing the difficulty of calculating 
elasticities see Malcolm B. Coate and Jeffrey H. Fischer, ‘Is Market Definition still Needed After all these Years’ 
(2014), p. 13. 
980 Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice [2004], p. 116; Schwalbe and Zimmer, [2009], p. 57. 
981 Areeda, Hovenkamp and Solow, [1995], p. 118-119. 
982 Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice [2004], p. 116. 
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strategy adopted by firms.983 Lastly, direct market definition might, occasionally, be more 
accurate but it improves accuracy at the expense of legal certainty.984 
6.5.2 Buyer Power Index 
The Buyer Power Index (BPI) is a methodology for the direct measure of buyer market power, 
based on the reverse application of the Lerner Index,985 developed by Blair and Harrison,986 and 
Blair and Lopatka.987 It describes the deviation between the competitive outcome and the amount 
purchased by the monopsonist based on the elasticity of supply.988 The BPI could represent an 
attractive tool for measuring buyer power as it “suggest[s] a way of thinking about buying power 
that is easy to understand and useful in application”.989 However, its application, like the Lerner 
Index, is not as simple as it sounds. 
The BPI is anchored on pure monopsony cases where the monopsonist will determine the 
quantity of goods it aims to buy, where the marginal product curve or value of the marginal 
product intersects the marginal factor cost (VMP=MFC). This assumption allows the BPI, 
described by the formula  to “measure… the responsiveness of the quantity supplied to 
changes in price. As ε rises, the firm’s monopsony power declines”.990 In less technical terms, the 
more buyer power the undertaking has, the less alternative buyers the sellers will have to offer 
their products to. 
The BPI determines the buyer power of a dominant non-monopsonistic buyer, this is a dominant 
undertaking that imposes monopsonistic losses but is not the only buyer. The buying competitors 
are assumed in this model to take the price that the dominant buyer pays as the market price 
maker.991 These fringe buyers will buy input until their demand equals the set price. To maximize 
its profit, the dominant buyer will adjust its purchase so that it buys a quantity “Q*df where mfc 
equals , which determines price equal to w* from the residual supply. As a price of w*, 
sellers will provide q*, which is equal to the sum of  and ”.992 
Therefore, according to the model, the BPI for a dominant buyer is derived in the following 
expression: 
                                                          
983 Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 3-039. 
984 OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Market Definition’ (2012), p. 13. 
985 Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 6.313. 
986 Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 54 to 67. 
987 Blair and Lopatka (2008). 
988 Blair and Harrison, [2010] p. 54 to 67; OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 32-
34; Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 7.393. 
989 Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 64. 
990 Ibid, p. 55. 
991 Ibid, p. 56. 
992 Ibid, p. 56. 
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 = =  
The amount of BPI will depend on the overall elasticity of supply (ε) and the elasticity of demand 
(n) for the fringe competitors as well as the dominant buyer’s market share.993  
Simplifying the economic discussion, the BPI bases the market power of a dominant undertaking 
on two main variables: elasticities and market shares. In the proposed model, if all else remains 
constant, buyer power will increase as the market share of the dominant firm also increases.994 I 
have found that this is both intuitively appealing and also consistent with the case law and 
practice of buyer power cases studied in this dissertation regarding the assessment of market 
shares. 
In the BPI, the elasticity of supply measures the response on the quantity offered by suppliers 
when there is a change in purchasing price. The more elastic the supply is, the less the BPI. As 
“the quantity supplied becomes more responsive to changes in price, the large buyer’s power 
falls. This is because the suppliers can redirect the efforts to other products where prices may be 
higher”.995 As the elasticity of fringe demand of the smaller buyers, increases, the buying power 
of the dominant undertaking tends to fall. The intuition behind this is that “any reduction in price 
implemented by the dominant buyer’s curtailed purchases is tempered by the enhanced purchases 
of the fringe. The more responsive they are to price decreases, the more difficult it is for the 
dominant buyer to make such a decrease stick”.996 If all three variables point in the same 
direction, it is arguably quite easy to determine the existence of substantial buyer power. When 
the market shares are large, supply is inelastic and fringe demand is also inelastic, then the BPI 
index is expected to be high.997 
Criticism against the BPI 
In general, most criticisms formulated against the Lerner Index can be applied by analogy to the 
BPI, as both mechanisms are based on the relation between elasticity and market share.998 Firstly, 
as remarked by Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, the BPI applies to monopsony power cases but it is not 
useful in situations of bargaining power, which limits its practical application unless a major 
revision is applied to it, making it a very narrow tool,999 which then goes against my proposal of a 
dualistic approach to buyer power cases. Secondly, the BPI sacrifices legal certainty in an attempt 
to promote a case-by-case accuracy. However, the large amount of data that is required to 
                                                          
993 Ibid, p. 58. 
994 Ibid, p. 58. 
995 Ibid, p. 58. 
996 Ibid, p. 59. 
997 Ibid, p. 67. 
998 For the criticism against the Lerner Index see in this same chapter, section 6.5.1. 
999 Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 7.389. 
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determine the BPI of a case makes prediction and planning of future behavior by undertakings 
difficult. Thirdly, an accurate assessment of elasticities of supply and demand is a difficult 
practical exercise, as also remarked by Faull and Nikpay.1000 Fourthly, no authoritative legal 
source (either soft or hard law) suggests or endorses the application of the BPI. Lastly, Blair and 
Harrison do not provide a hierarchy of importance between the variables to consider. This leads 
to the question of which factor should prevail in case of a discrepancy between them? The 
balancing order is not clear and a different hierarchy might lead to different outcomes for the 
very same case. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This second chapter dealing with the assessment of buyer power as part of the buyer market 
power definition builds upon and farther develops the dualistic market approach suggested in 
chapter 5. In this chapter, however, I have stressed the fact that substantial buyer market power – 
although not necessarily dominance – may rise at lower market shares and concentration levels 
that are lower than on seller-side cases. This holds true for the exercise of effective bargaining 
power; however, in the case of monopsony power, a very large amount of buyer power is needed 
(and, therefore, usually represented by very large market shares as well) for it to be exerted in a 
non-transitory manner. This ability to exercise effective buyer power at a lower threshold than 
compared to seller market power has been confirmed by the Commission’s practice, the case law 
and the literature, and is related to the fact that the buyer usually has the ability to dictate the 
terms of the discussion and – if there are other sources of supply – walk away to take another 
offer, thereby bestowing the buyer with an advantageous bargaining position. The ability to exert 
substantial and effective buyer (bargaining) power at lower market share thresholds is also 
connected to the fact that these buyers may enjoy privileged positions – such as acting as a gate-
keeper or being an unavoidable trading partner – which may imply that suppliers are dependent 
on them and lead to the imposition of unfair purchasing practices (as I discuss in chapter 9). 
Concerning the dualistic approach for the market power assessment, I submitted that this 
measurement looks at the undertaking’s market power upstream and downstream, fully capturing 
the competitive effects of the behavior in question. By adopting this approach, it is possible to 
fully assess the undertaking’s market power as a buyer and retailer and therefore appropriately 
determine the welfare implications of the buyer power exercise. This approach, therefore, does 
not limit itself to assessing buyer market power only in the upstream market – the traditional 
focus of monopsony theory – but it integrates the effects downstream reflecting bargaining power 
effects. By adopting this approach, the assessment takes into account “the relevant market 
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conditions, and in particular of the dynamics of the market and of the extent to which products are 
differentiated”,1001 in accordance with EU competition law. 
Also, I inquired what the adequate tools to assess the market power of a purchasing undertaking 
are and concluded that it is possible to resort to the traditional methodologies employed in selling 
side cases, such as market shares, market concentration, and entry and exit barriers; however, not 
only is required re-orienting the way that these tool are employed. Additionally, it is also 
important to resort to other buyer power specific sources: whether the undertaking is either an 
unavoidable trading partner and/or suppliers are dependent on it, based on whether the buyer acts 
as gatekeeper downstream market, and if buyers have alternative supply sources. I also found that 
these measurement tools are connected to the sources of buyer power, however, they do not 
determine the existence of buyer power, but rather its degree, something which is not always 
clearly distinguished by the case law and Commission’s practice.  
I have also discussed the use of market share thresholds for buyer power cases. Concerning 
dominance, I discussed whether the test for buying undertakings has to be symmetrical to seller-
oriented cases. In light of the relatively small amount of relevant case law, with the exception of 
British Airways v Commission,1002 it is difficult to give a definitive answer, if under the current 
state of the law, the abuse of a dominant purchasing position has a lower threshold than abuse of 
a selling dominant position. In my view, and in accordance with the economics of buyer power, a 
lower threshold for dominance may be resorted to in a restrictive approach for those cases where 
the buyer also enjoys substantial market power in the related downstream market, fitting the 
hourglass shape due to the higher anti-competitive effects of the conducts in the market. This, 
however, should not be interpreted as meaning that whenever there is substantial buyer power in 
the upstream and the downstream market, there is a presumption that the conduct is in breach of 
Article 102 TFEU. However, and as I will discuss further in chapter 9, the developments of 
competition law regulation in some MS, have led to the application of lower thresholds for 
unilateral buying conduct and also to cover situations like relative dominance or abuse of 
economic dependence. 
Furthermore, in addition to the tools for indirect measurement of buyer market power, I discussed 
two alternatives for the direct measurement of buyer market power: the reverse Lerner Index and 
the BPI. These indicators could be resorted to as alternative or complementary tools to reinforce 
the analysis of the relevant market and the market power assessment. However, in my view, these 
tools, from a legal perspective, have not been recognized by the case law, neither as soft law nor 
                                                          
1001 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 14 
(emphasis added). 
1002 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343; and Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166. 
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strong authoritative sources, nor have they been employed as part of the Commission’s practice 
in buyer power cases this far. Therefore, they should be used with caution. 
All in all, as a summary of my discussion concerning both buyer market definition and buyer 
market power assessment, neither the case law, nor the soft law in EU competition law have 
placed a special emphasis regarding buyer side cases. Furthermore, most of the analysis and 
methodologies are based on reverse of selling sides practices or are still underdeveloped buyer 
power oriented approaches. However, the Commission’s guidance instruments and the case law 
have gradually started to recognize the distinction in defining buying markets vis-à-vis selling 
markets, although in order to satisfactorily incorporate and update the instruments to fully capture 
a dualistic market definition approach to buyer power cases, work remains to be done. In my 
view, farther developments are still needed in the realm of EU competition law in order to 
integrate buyer power specific tools and metrics for determining relevant buyer markets and, 













7 Exclusionary Buyer Power  
7.1 Introduction to Part IV and buyer power exclusion 
This Part IV of the dissertation constitutes the core of this study as it deals with the conducts and 
theories of harm through which buyer power is exerted in the upstream and related downstream 
market where the buyer(s) carries out it (or their) economic activity. Therefore, these chapters 
look at buyer power from an active perspective and how it can trigger competition concerns by 
discussing different conducts that exclude rivals or exploit suppliers. Hence, my aim in Part IV is 
to provide a substantiated answer to the research questions: In which circumstances or type of 
cases does buyer power pose competitive risks that ought to be tackled by EU competition law? 
What do these ‘theories of harm’ look like and what is the legal regime applicable to such 
conduct?  
This first chapter of Part IV deals with buyer power exclusion and how purchasing behaviors may 
foreclose rival buyers in the upstream market (or rival retailers in the downstream market) by 
resorting to their buyer power exercised vis-à-vis suppliers. 
Buyer power can be employed anti-competitively by coordinated buyers, or a single buyer1003 to 
foreclose1004 competitors or prevent entrance of new rivals into the purchasing market to protect 
and/or expand its market power, distorting the competitive process and market structure.1005 
Exclusionary buyer power by a dominant undertaking or through buyer coordination raises issues 
                                                          
1003 Exclusionary buyer power employed by a group of undertakings acting in collaboration from an economic point 
of view is analytically similar to the behavior of a single dominant firm. In this section, to facilitate discussion and 
avoid repetition, I center the analysis on the exclusionary effects of buyer power exercise through the analysis of 
mostly conducts exerted by a dominant undertaking. This, however, does not preclude a group of undertakings for 
being liable to breach Article 101 TFEU when entering into agreements with a foreclosing effect. For some literature 
regarding exclusionary conducts in general see, inter alia: Eleanor M. Fox, ‘What is Harm to Competition? 
Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect’ 70 Antitrust Law Journal (2002) 371; John Vickers, ‘Abuse of 
Market Power’ 115 The Economic Journal (2005) F244; Neelie Kroes, ‘Tackling Exclusionary Practices to Avoid 
Exploitation of Market Power: Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Policy Review of Article 82’ 29 Fordham 
International Law Journal (2005) 593; Eirik Østerud, Identifying Exclusionary Abuses by Dominant Undertakings 
under EU Competition Law: The Spectrum of Tests (Kluwer 2010); Rousseva, [2010]; John Temple-Lang, ‘How can 
the Problems of Exclusionary Abuses under Article 102 TFEU be Resolved?’ 2 European Law Review (2012) 136. 
1004 Anticompetitive foreclosure is defined by the Commission as “a situation where effective access of actual or 
potential competitors to supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the conduct of the dominant 
undertaking whereby the dominant undertaking is likely to be in a position to profitably increase prices to the 
detriment of consumers” in Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] 
OJ C 45/7, para. 19. 
1005 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 6; 




of harm related to “increased prices, reduced output, product quality or variety, or innovation, 
market allocation, or anti-competitive foreclosure”,1006 due to the effects of the conduct on rival 
buyers that may also compete as retailers in a horizontal manner, unlike buyer power exploitation 
that is a mostly vertical issue. Consequently, the regulation of exclusionary buyer power may 
result in the application, separately or jointly, of both Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU,1007 or 
lead to a merger operation among competing buyers to be declared incompatible with the internal 
market. In this chapter my analysis is concerned with how buyers foreclose rivals in the upstream 
or downstream market, I do not discuss, in the case of agreements or tacit collusion the ways in 
which several buyers would coordinate their behavior horizontally to foreclose rival buyers. I 
have excluded this modality of specific foreclosure because there are no relevant cases in EU 
competition law and because its treatment would be that of a cartel that has the aim of excluding 
rivals to a necessary input and, therefore, likely to constitute a breach of Article 101(1) TFEU by 
object as buyer cartels’ have been found to be in general in EU competition law and as I discuss 
from an exploitative perspective in chapter 8.6. 
Buyer power exclusion has the particularity of being able to generate a dual effect as it may 
foreclose competing undertakings in either the upstream market as rival buyers and/or the 
downstream market as rival retailers (if in addition to competing for the input, the undertakings 
compete for the output market). In most instances, however, the exclusion occurs when 
undertakings compete in both markets as buyers and retailers as the buyer leverages its 
purchasing power to capture downstream market power in some form akin to input (vertical) 
foreclosure,1008 which also may explain why there seems to be a standing that considers that 
buyer power exclusion is anti-competitively only upon end consumer harm. However, as I 
discuss in this chapter, this is not the case in EU competition law because exclusionary buyer 
power conducts trigger the application of the law even absent consumer harm whenever there is 
an anti-competitive effect in the upstream market among undertakings that do not compete as 
retailers, which implies a broader harm standard and which is in line with my interpretation of a 
dualistic approach to buyer power. 
                                                          
1006 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 201. 
1007 The joint application of both Article 101 and 102 TFEU was confirmed by the GC in Judgment of 30 September 
2003, Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission, joined cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98, 
EU:T:2003:245 E.C.R. [2003] II-03275, para. 1447. 
1008 Regarding the economics of vertical foreclosure see, inter alia: Oliver Hart and Jean Tirole, ‘Vertical Integration 
and Market Foreclosure’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1990) 205; Karl M. Meessen, ‘The Conflict over 
Vertical Foreclosure in Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Law: Comment’ 160 Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (2004) 97; Marie-Laure Allain, 
Claire Chambolle and Patrick Rey, ‘Vertical Integration, Innovation and Foreclosure’ IDEAS Working Paper Series 
from RePEc (2010) 1; Roman Inderst and Tommaso Valletti, ‘Incentives for Input Foreclosure’ 55 European 
Economic Review (2011) 820; Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘Robert Bork and Vertical Integration: Leverage, Foreclosure, 
and Efficiency’ 79 Antitrust Law Journal (2014) 983. 
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In this chapter, I discuss how buyer power can have an exclusionary effect in either the upstream 
and/or downstream market and which different conducts and theories of harm exist to explain the 
different exclusionary scenarios. Hence, this chapter answers the research question: What is the 
legal treatment granted to behaviors by buyers that may exclude rivals either in an input or 
output market?  
To answer this research question, I have identified and grouped exclusionary buyer power 
conducts under different theories of harm which will be subject to detailed discussion in this 
chapter, even though they may sometimes be indistinguishable in their effects from an economic 
perspective as they revolve around increasing a rival’s cost. To do so, I have structured the 
chapter as follows: firstly, I discuss in section 7.2 how buyer-induced exclusion works and its 
capacity to foreclose rivals in the upstream and/or downstream markets. Then, in section 7.3 I 
study how input foreclosure operates by means of exclusive supply obligations. I next address the 
issue of overbuying as a theory of harm where buyers over-acquire an input to restrict access to 
rival buyers and increase their costs, in section 7.4. This is followed in section 7.5 by an analysis 
of concentrations that may lead to vertical foreclosure and have negative vertical effects on 
competition. Section 7.6 deals with purchasing price discrimination as an exclusionary 
mechanism and compares the legal treatment given in EU competition law with the regulation 
under US antitrust law under the Robinson-Patman Act. Subsequently, market power leverage in 
an input market to affect downstream competition is discussed in section 7.7, in which I analyze 
British Airways v Commission, one of the most relevant buyer power cases and where the Courts 
found a buyer to be liable pursuant to abusing its dominant purchasing market position. Section 
7.8 discusses the ‘squeeze to buy’ theory in which exploitation is carried out with an exclusionary 
aim, while section 7.9 questions the application of the ‘as efficient buying competitor test’ for 
buyer power cases, and is followed by a discussion in section 7.10 regarding which type of harm 
triggers competition application in exclusionary buyer power cases. Section 7.11 concludes the 
chapter with a discussion of the findings. 
7.2 How does buyer-induced exclusion work? 
Exclusionary buyer-induced abuses are the most pernicious and common anti-competitive 
practices1009 because they hamper current and future competition, as remarked by the 
Commission in Sovion/Südfleisch,1010 and require a larger degree of intervention from authorities 
                                                          
1009 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 7. 
1010 For the Commission Buyer power (monopsony) may significantly impede competition when “it is likely to lead 
to a reduction in output of the final products or the foreclosure of competitors of the merged entity” in Commission 
Decision of 21/12/2005 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market (Case No 




as they are not self-correctable by market forces.1011 They consist in using buyer market power 
vis-à-vis a supplier to increase the purchasing costs of a rival and, therefore, put the latter in a 
competitive disadvantage in the upstream market that may also have an additional downstream 
market effect. Exclusionary conducts are not self-correctable because whenever a undertaking 
increases its rival’s costs it drives market prices of an input upwards, which would make the 
entrance of new rival buyers unattractive, as also remarked by Blair and Lopatka.1012 Therefore, it 
comes to no surprise that buyer power exclusion are the most concerning type of behaviors and a 
prioritized area of scrutiny for the Commission,1013 and as well as recognized in the US 
antitrust.1014 
In general terms, the buyer power exclusion aims at making “market entry very difficult or 
impossible for competitors (other buyers) of the undertaking in a dominant position, and 
secondly, of making it more difficult or impossible for its co-contractors to choose between 
various sources of supply or commercial partners”, as stressed by the CJEU in British Airways v 
Commission.1015 Unlike buyer power exploitation, the anti-competitive conduct has a primary 
effect on a competing undertaking (either a buyer in the input market or a retailer in a related 
downstream market) on a horizontal level, but not vis-à-vis supplier or end consumers on a 
vertical level. 
Exclusionary buyer power in an upstream market affects rival buyers by putting them at a 
disadvantage when acquiring an input by increasing their costs and using their market power 
against suppliers to that end.1016 Therefore, all buyer-induced exclusionary tactics have a 
commonality: their aim and strategy is to raise rivals’ costs to gain upstream and, more 
importantly, downstream market power, as explained by Salop and Krattenmaker, as well as by 
Scheelings and Wright.1017 By increasing its rivals’ costs, the buyer gains a competitive 
advantage in the upstream market because if the exclusion succeeds in the medium and long term 
there would not be any other buyers and, therefore, it can later exercise exploitative buyer power 
vis-à-vis suppliers. Additionally, and when the buyer competes with their rivals also as a retailer, 
                                                          
1011 This has been explicitly recognized and ratified by the Commission through its Communication from the 
Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (O.J. 24.2.2009 C45/7). 
1012 Blair and Lopatka (2008), p. 467. 
1013 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (O.J. 24.2.2009 C45/7), para. 
20. 
1014 American Antitrust Institute [2008], p. 97. 
1015 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 68. 
1016 Morten Hviid and Matthew Olczak, ‘Raising Rivals’ Fixed Costs’ 23 International Journal of the Economics of 
Business (2016) 19. 
1017 Krattenmaker and Salop (1986); Scheelings and Wright (2006), p. 215. Also generally, see: David T. Scheffman 
and Richard S. Higgins, ‘Raising Rivals' Costs’ in Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of International Antitrust Economics, vol 2 (Oxford University Press 2015). See also discussing the effectiveness of 
raising rivals’ costs in term of fixed costs: Hviid and Olczak (2016). 
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it gains an advantage in the downstream market because these retailers cannot compete in terms 
of price (as their costs are higher), do not have access to sufficient input to efficiently produce an 
output, or simply completely lack the desired input – a ‘must stock’ product – that end consumers 
desire. In other words, exclusionary buyer power is often used to leverage market power from the 
upstream market to the downstream (or vice-versa) as occurred in British Airways v 
Commission,1018 or by exercising pressure on suppliers that are dependent on the powerful buyer 
to discriminate other rival purchasers, as discussed in the US in Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. F.T.C.1019 
Consequently, exclusionary buyer power tactics may affect both upstream and downstream 
markets – jointly or separately – because of the dualistic nature of buyer power, and also because 
firm(s) engaged in exclusionary conducts will attempt to increase both their buyer and seller 
power at the same time,1020 which is consistent with the hourglass shape theory discussed in more 
detail in chapter 3. Also, as noted by Hylton, a firm able to exercise market power both upstream 
and downstream will be further incentivized to engage in exclusionary conduct,1021 creating a 
dangerous circle of anti-competitive conducts that will be exerted with exploitative effects vis-à-
vis suppliers (monopsony) and end consumers (monopoly).  
Now, what kind of costs are increased in cases of buyer power exclusion? In principle the 
straightforward answer would be the marginal cost of an additional unit of input. However, Hviid 
and Olczak have recently demonstrated that an exclusionary tactic will aim at increasing marginal 
costs but can also attempt to increase fixed costs by, for instance, gold-platting legislation “to 
remove so-called red tape of regulators” in highly regulated industries, or vexious litigation.1022 
Therefore, these authors suggest not only focusing on the traditional marginal cost but also advise 
looking at increases in fixed costs as well. In my view, Hviid and Olczak’s proposal is sound and 
helpful for understanding buyer power exclusion, particularly because both would be helpful 
indicators and, additionally, the effects on an increase of a fixed cost (and also sunk), will tend to 
have a greater effect on the wellbeing of a competitor (or motivate the entry of a newcomer) 
because fixed costs will not vary as much as marginal costs and, therefore be more likely to enter 
market conditions in more a permanent fashion. 
However, determining whenever a conduct that appears exclusionary is unlawful is a difficult 
task, even if one knows which kind of costs are to be assessed. Behaviors that may seem 
exclusionary, such as purchasing price discrimination, may be efficiency enhancing and pro-
                                                          
1018 Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 
- Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1; Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 
December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:343; Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-
95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166. 
1019 TOYS "R" US, INC. v. Federal Trade Commission, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000). Also making a similar 
statement see: Kirkwood ‘Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement’ (2012), p. 1488 and 1509. 
1020 See also making a similar claim: van Doorn, p. 129. 
1021 Hylton, p. 1. 
1022 Hviid and Olczak (2016), p. 29. 
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competitive. Thus, as remarked by Østerud and Rousseva, there is no single test to determine the 
lawfulness for all exclusionary conducts, neither for buyer nor seller cases.1023 In the case of 
exclusionary buyer power, the uncertainty regarding what the legal standard to regulate these 
conducts should be is even greater due to the lack of cases that can guide and predict the outcome 
of competition law. This chapter aims at synthetizing and clarifying how buyer-induced exclusion 
occurs and what constitutes adequate legal treatment applicable to buyer-induced exclusion.  
Furthermore, buyer-induce exclusion also takes the form of input foreclosure, which is an 
important form of exerting buyer market power to the detriment of rivals that is used to raise the 
rival’s costs. Input foreclosure takes place whenever a powerful buyer aims at hampering or 
eliminating access to a required input to a rival buyer,1024 reducing its rival’s ability to compete in 
either the upstream or – more usually – a related downstream market.1025 This input can either be 
a raw material required for the elaboration of a final product, for example, timber logs employed 
in paper production; or a finished good, such as processed beef to be resold to end consumers by 
food retailers. Furthermore, I distinguish between two types of input foreclosure: the type that 
increases rivals’ costs (partial foreclosure), and the kind that downright eliminates access to the 
input (total foreclosure). Both types make it harder for competitors to obtain supplies of the input 
under similar prices as those obtained by the powerful buyer, and therefore render the excluded 
suppliers less attractive to end consumers – because their sale prices are also pushed upwards – or 
force them out of the market.1026 However, input foreclosure will be only effective if there is 
substantial buyer (bargaining) power. Absent substantial buyer power input foreclosure strategies 
are unlikely to have a significant influence on the upstream trading conditions as suppliers will 
not be forced to comply with the requirements of the buyer as there are other alternatives of 
demand.1027 
My analysis has identified different means through which input foreclosure is carried out and, 
due to their importance and differences between the conducts, I have opted to analyze them in 
different modalities: exclusive supply obligations, overbuying, concentrations leading to input 
foreclosure, purchasing price discrimination, and foreclosure of an input by means of granting 
supracompetitive bonuses. In the following sections, I discuss these theories of harm, as well as 
the case of squeeze to buy, as an independent theory that increases rival’s costs but does not 
involve input foreclosure. 
                                                          
1023 Østerud, p. 3; Rousseva, [2010], p. 327-352. 
1024 See discussing incentives related to input foreclosure on a vertical merger: Inderst and Valletti (2011). 
1025 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 29. See also: Scheelings and Wright (2006), p. 213. 
1026 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 31; Scheelings and Wright (2006), p. 216; Schwalbe 
and Zimmer, [2009], p. 363. 
1027 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 35. 
205 
 
7.3 Exclusive supply obligations 
In this section, I discuss how a buyer, through the use of exclusive supply obligations, may be 
capable of foreclosing rival buyers from efficient sources of input. To do so, I discuss these types 
of vertical relations in the realm of agreements, dominance and concentrations. 
Through an exclusive supply obligation a buyer agrees with (or forces) its supplier(s) that the 
latter shall sell its output only or mainly to the buyer, creating a relation of exclusivity or semi-
exclusivity between the parties that may be captured by Article 101(1) TFEU, or by Article 102 
TFEU, if the buyer is a dominant undertaking.1028 The reverse situation also leads to an exclusive 
supply obligation: a powerful buyer or group of coordinated buyers may threaten its (or their) 
suppliers to stop purchasing input from them if they sell to a different buyer.1029 Furthermore, the 
literature distinguishes two types of exclusivity supply agreements with exclusionary effects. 
Firstly, a powerful buyer may impose a ‘naked’ exclusivity supply obligation to its supplier(s) 
forcing them to exclusively sell all their production to the powerful buyer, or to refrain from 
selling to any other party.1030 Secondly, exclusive supply obligations may be forced upon or 
agreed by suppliers by granting incentives or ‘bonuses’1031 to ensure that the supplier 
concentrates most of its sales to a single buyer, for example, by granting some type of 
preferential purchase conditions.1032  
Exclusive supply agreements, however, may also be conducts that enhance and improve 
competition because they allow for the generation of efficiencies among the cooperating 
undertakings.1033 These vertical agreements may incentivize firms to invest in the development of 
new products (hold up problem),1034 avoid free riding situations,1035 promote economies of scale 
for the buyer and supplier alike regarding distribution and administrative expenditure, or 
guarantee sources of supply.1036 Because of these benefits and its efficiency-enhancing nature, 
                                                          
1028 “Thus an agreement notified by an undertaking in a dominant position, such as an exclusive supply agreement, 
may constitute not only an agreement prohibited by Article 85(1) of the Treaty but also an abuse prohibited by 
Article 86 of the Treaty”, Judgment of 30 September 2003, Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission, joined 
cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98, EU:T:2003:245 E.C.R. [2003] II-03275. See also suggesting the exclusionary 
effect of exclusive supply obligations: Carstensen ‘Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The 
Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among Suppliers’ (2008), p. 307-310. 
1029 Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 163. 
1030 Krattenmaker and Salop use the ‘naked’ term only to denote this second meaning in Krattenmaker and Salop 
(1986), p. 235.  
1031 Using this term to refer to benefits granted by exclusive supply agreements see the Advocate General Kokott’s 
Opinion on 14 April 2011 in Judgment Solvay v Commission, C-109/10 P -, EU:C:2011:256, para. 76. 
1032 Bellamy and others, [2013], para. 7.065. 
1033 See also raising this issue: Østerud, p. 63; Bellamy and others, [2013], para. 7.081. 
1034 Bellamy, Child and Roth, [2001], para. 7-076. 
1035 Bellamy, Child and Roth, [2001], para. 7-040; Ritter and Braun, [2004], 304. 
1036 Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 3.186. For a detailed discussion of the economic efficiencies generated by 
vertical agreements in general see: Korah and O'Sullivan, [2002], p. 1-46. See also for the economics of exclusive 
dealing: Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 6-028 and ss; Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 237-238. 
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exclusive supply agreements entered into by non-dominant buyers may benefit from the 
application of the Block Exemption Regulation if under the required thresholds or, if not, also 
satisfy the efficiency analysis requirement under Article 101(3) TFEU. In the case of dominant 
buying undertaking that imposes an exclusive supply obligation on its suppliers, it is possible for 
the plaintiff to demonstrate that the obligation is not anti-competitive if the conduct is objectively 
justified and efficient pursuant to an objective justification1037 analysis under the scope of Article 
102 TFEU.  
Nonetheless, exclusive supply obligations may raise anti-competitive foreclosing effects if the 
buyer uses its buyer power to put its competitors at a disadvantage in two ways. Firstly, it may 
prevent or hinder access of competing buyers to a necessary input – for example, a particular 
tailored-made intermediate, good or a well-known trademark. Or/and secondly, a powerful buyer 
may increase its rivals’ costs by securing exclusive supply from the most efficient sellers and, 
hence, putting an upward pricing pressure on their competitors and leaving them in a less 
competitive situation in the downstream market regarding end consumers.1038 Exclusive supply 
obligations may also have an exploitative effect in some cases and may generate monopsony 
abuses, as I also discuss in chapter 8. Once a supplier is tied through an exclusive supply 
agreement, the buyer may abuse its buyer power – and even monopsony power as there is a 
single buyer – to obtain lower selling prices through threats or by withholding demand in an 
exploitative manner vis-à-vis its exclusive supplier. 
Furthermore, exclusive supply agreements may foreclose current and future competing buyers by 
making market entry very difficult or impossible for other buyers, or by making it more difficult 
or impossible for its suppliers to choose between various commercial (buying) partners, for 
instance, by granting loyalty enhancing bonuses, as discussed in British Airways v 
Commission,1039 or because suppliers depend on the buyer for their economic viability, as 
analyzed in De Beers.1040 Regarding existing competitors exclusive supply is likely to increase 
                                                          
1037 “[…] although the fact that an undertaking is in a dominant position cannot deprive it of its right to protect its 
own commercial interests if they are attacked, and that such an undertaking must be conceded the right to take such 
reasonable steps as it deems appropriate to protect those interests”, Judgment of 16 September 2008 in Sot. Lélos kai 
Sia v. GlaxoSmithKline, joined cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, EU:C:2008:504 E.C.R. [2008] I-07139, para. 50. See 
also: Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 28-
31. 
1038 Krattenmaker and Salop (1986), p. 234; Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the 
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 36; Carstensen 
‘Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among Suppliers’ 
(2008), p. 307-308. 
1039 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 68. See also: 
Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 
82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 19. 
1040 Commission Decision of 22 February 2006 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/B-2/38.381 — De Beers) [2006] OJ L 205/24; Judgment of 11 July 
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rival’s costs, particularly if they are smaller than the buyer, for two reasons. First, as remarked by 
Krattenmaker and Salop, weaker buyers will have to negotiate with less efficient undertakings, 
driving buyers’ costs upwards.1041 Second, weaker buyers would also be cut off from a source of 
supply and, therefore, will see their bargaining power reduced as there are fewer alternative 
suppliers and, therefore, buyers are now less able to obtain favorable conditions from the 
remaining sellers. For future competitors, exclusive supply obligations may act as an entry barrier 
as they will make it more difficult, costly, or even impossible for newcomers to get access to an 
input due to the lack of available suppliers and, therefore, may decentivize firms from entering 
the purchasing market. 
Importantly, buyer induced exclusive supply agreements should not be mistaken with exclusive 
supplier agreements imposed by a seller, even though the Courts and the literature use the terms 
indistinctively. I have found evidence of this interchangeable use – and rather imprecise 
terminology – in the buyer-power related dominance cases: Imperial Chemical Industries v 
Commission,1042 Tomra Systems and Others v Commission;1043 the buying related merger of 
General Electric v Commission,1044 and the non-buyer power case Intel v Commission.1045 In a 
supplier-induced exclusive supply agreement, however, it is the seller and not the buyer that 
exerts market power vis-à-vis its buyers by limiting or precluding the buyer from choosing a 
different supplier; thus, in practice, such agreements are another form of selling-side exclusive 
dealing.1046 
7.3.1 Assessment of exclusive supply agreements under Article 101 TFEU 
Exclusive supply agreements between buyers and sellers may be captured by Article 101(1) 
TFEU.1047 However, the general rule applicable to these agreements is that they are covered by 
the Block Exemption Regulation if parties that have entered into it are within the 30% market 
share threshold in the upstream and downstream markets and if the buyer is also below 30% in 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
2007, Alrosa v Commission, T-170/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:220, paras. 53-55. This Judgment was appealed and 
repealed by the CJEU in Judgment of 29 June 2010 in Commission v Alrosa, C-441/07 P, EU:C:2010:377. 
1041 Krattenmaker and Salop (1986), p. 236. 
1042 See for example using the term ‘exclusive supply’ to refer to exclusive dealing obligations where a supplier 
forces its buyer(s) to acquire all input from them in Commission Decision of 13 December 2000 relating to a 
proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (COMP/33.133-D: Soda-ash — ICI) [2003] OJ L 10/33, further 
appealed before the General Court under Judgment of 25 June 2010, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, T-
66/01, ECR, EU:T:2010:255. 
1043 Judgment of 9 September 2010, Tomra Systems and Others v Commission, T-155/06, ECR, EU:T:2010:370. 
1044 Judgment of 14 December 2005, General Electric v Commission, T-210/01, ECR, EU:T:2005:456. 
1045 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v Commission, T-286/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:547. 
1046 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 33-
36; see discussing exclusivity supply agreements from a seller’s perspective: Østerud, p. 63-69; Whish and Bailey, 
[2015], p. 722-727; Rodger and MacCullogh, [2015], p. 205-206. 
1047 In US antitrust law this would be captured under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
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the retailing market,1048 even if combined with other non-hardcore vertical restraints,1049 and in 
particular input or output price fixing.1050 Below such margins, exclusive supply agreements are 
less prone to competition risks as efficiencies generated would trump any anti-competitive 
effects, and hence the reason for the exemption. Outside the Block Exemption Regulation’s 
scope, exclusive supply agreements may be declared lawful if found to satisfy the requirements 
of Article 101(3) TFEU, which further reinforces the proposal by this dissertation that buyer 
(bargaining) power tends to be mostly pro-competitive. Therefore, an agreement of exclusive 
supply entered into or forced by an undertaking with a market share above 30% as either a buyer 
or retailer is subject to scrutiny.1051 
To carry out the competitive analysis of these types of exclusive supply agreements, the 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints offer important and detailed guidance.1052 The assessment is 
anchored on three main aspects: market shares of buyers and sellers in the upstream and 
downstream market, length of the contracts, and the type of good that is sold exclusively. In this 
subsection, I discuss these three assessment elements. 
According to the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, the competitive risks that may be generated 
by an exclusive supply agreement depend on the position of the buyer in both the upstream and 
downstream market. This reasoning is in line with the dualistic approach to buyer power cases 
proposed in this dissertation where the buyer power welfare effects depend on both upstream and 
downstream conditions. For the Commission, the extent of undertaking’s buyer power will 
determine its ability to force suppliers to enter into exclusive supply agreements. However, the 
Commission only seems to consider that anti-competitive effects will trigger if the same buyer 
also has market power in the downstream market when stating that: 
The market share of the buyer on the upstream purchase market is obviously important for 
assessing the ability of the buyer to ‘impose’ exclusive supply which forecloses other buyers from 
access to supplies. The importance of the buyer on the downstream market is however the factor 
which determines whether a competition problem may arise. If the buyer has no market power 
downstream, then no appreciable negative effects for consumers can be expected.1053 
Although I concur with the first premise (the capacity to induce exclusive supply) of the 
Commission, I disagree with the narrow approach that only considers downstream effects in 
                                                          
1048 Whish and Bailey, [2015], p. 684. 
1049 Article 2.1 and Article 3 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of 
Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and 
concerted practices [2010] OJ L 102/1; Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 193. 
1050 Judgment of 11 September 2008 in CEPSA, C-279/06, EU:C:2008:485. For a discussion of this case see: Paolo 
Giudici, ‘The CEPSA Case’ 5 European Review of Contract Law (2009) 159. 
1051 In the US, the Supreme Court found that exclusive supplying services of movies where distributors of motion 
pictures had an exclusivity agreement with 40% for theaters for a period over one year was in breach of Section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act as an “unfair method of competition” in Federal Trade Commission v. Motion 
Picture Advertising Svc. Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 392 (1953). 
1052 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, paras. 192-202. 
1053 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 194. 
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competition to be of importance. While it is true that in most cases of buyer power exclusion the 
buyer competes with its rival buyers also as a retailer, there are also cases in which buyers only 
compete for an input and not an output. In these cases were competition only exist in the 
upstream market, the Commission’s approach whereby it seems to only intervene in the presence 
of end consumer harm, runs the risk of being under-inclusive for instances of monopsony power 
or anti-competitive harm in the upstream market, and failing to fully take into account the 
dualistic effects of buyer power.1054 As discussed in chapter 3, section 3.5, if the buyer faces 
strong competition downstream it has to pass on the benefits it has received from its suppliers and 
the exclusivity to its end consumers in the form or higher output and/or lower prices. However, 
the same cannot be said in the case of monopsony power upstream (or exploitative bargaining 
power) absent downstream market power, or when rival buyers only compete for the input but 
not in a downstream market as the output they produce is different. If a monopsonist has secured 
an exclusive supply deal with its supplier(s) and faces competition in the downstream market, 
even though it will not be able to exercise downstream market power vis-à-vis end consumers 
there will still be a deadweight loss generated in the upstream market due to the withholding 
effect necessary to decrease a purchasing price vis-à-vis its suppliers. Nevertheless, as set forth in 
this dissertation, pure monopsony cases are scarce and, hence, this could explain why the 
Commission seems to overlook these instances.  
Furthermore, the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints remark that when the buyer is dominant in the 
downstream market an exclusive supply obligation with this hourglass-shaped undertaking are 
likely become an object restriction of competition as these agreements “may easily have 
significant anti-competitive effects”,1055 which draws parallels with the current case law on 
Article 102 TFEU, discussed below. The Guidelines on Vertical Restraints do not expressly 
determine what the situation is when the buyer is only dominant in the upstream market, even if it 
does remark that the buyer market is obviously important to determine the ability to foreclose 
other buyers to access to supply.1056 In my view, if the undertaking is dominant upstream and 
downstream then, in line with the proposals of the hourglass shape, the risks for anti-competitive 
foreclosure increase and, therefore, the practice should also be treated as an object restriction of 
competition. If, however, the dominant buying undertaking faces strong downstream competition 
it is likely to be an indication that downstream competitors have their own supply source and, 
therefore, are not prone to foreclosure by the dominant undertaking, or that the upstream market 
definition is narrower than the downstream market definition – where the buying side is local 
whereas the selling side is national or worldwide, for example. If that is the case, exclusivity 
                                                          
1054 Also suggesting that pure downstream market power to be taken into account appears as too strict, see: Bellamy, 
Child and Roth, [2001], para. 7-046. 
1055 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 194. 
1056 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 194. 
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supply effects on welfare would be counteracted by the competitive pressure of other retailing 
firms and should be assessed as an effect based restriction of competition.  
Additionally, the length of an exclusive supply agreement is an indicator of its possible 
foreclosing effects. In the case of agreements among non-dominant undertakings, the 
Commission uses as a rule of thumb a maximum length of five (5) years. If the exclusive supply 
is above five years, the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints considers that such agreements are not 
likely to satisfy the requires of Article 101(3) TFEU as the foreclosing effects are likely to trump 
any efficiencies that an exclusive supply agreement may bring, taking a strict stand. Nevertheless, 
in certain situations exclusive supply agreements beyond five years may be compatible with EU 
competition law because of the nature of investments required, market structure and combination 
with other type of agreements,1057 or due to a transitional period.1058 In the case of agreements 
shorter than five years, the rule of thumb is that these agreements would be presumed to be 
efficient, and, in case of doubt, it is necessary to conduct an effect-based analysis to balance the 
competitive and pro-competitive effects of the agreement.1059 However, other aspects, for 
example considerations regarding the recoupment period of a supplier to recoup its investment 
and avoid hold-up problems, as well as the fidelity effects on end-consumers and/or type of 
buyers, should also be factored in when determining the maximum length of these types of 
agreements. 
Lastly, to determine the compatibility of an exclusive supply agreement, the Commission will 
evaluate the type of input involved. If the goods are homogenous or they are an intermediate 
product, the chances of foreclosure diminish as suppliers can adjust to changes in demand with 
more ease and there are more opportunities to find substitute products.1060 If the goods are 
differentiated, or for final consumers the risk of exclusionary buyer power abuses is higher, 
particularly if there are entry barriers or the competing buyers are small in comparison to the 
large buyer, as these smaller buyers will probably lose access to a particularly desired good by 
end consumers.1061 
As a conclusion, under EU competition law and the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, exclusive 
supply agreements are considered to be pro-competitive and efficiency enhancing if entered into 
by undertakings with a market share below 30% in the upstream and downstream markets, 
therefore, benefiting from the Block Exemption Regulation. This lenient treatment is in-line with 
buyer (bargaining) power economics and relevant economic literature dealing with vertical 
                                                          
1057 See also regarding a preliminary ruling dealing with a twenty years supply obligation agreement which, in 
reality, was an exclusive dealing obligation imposed by the supplier to the buyer in Judgment of 2 April 2009 in 
Pedro IV Servicios, C-260/07, EU:C:2009:215. 
1058 Judgment of 11 September 2008 in CEPSA, C-279/06, paras. 60-62. 
1059 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 195. 
1060 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 199. 
1061 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 199. 
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agreements. Even above these thresholds, an exclusive supply agreement is to be treated as an 
effect-based restriction of competition – unless the downstream undertaking is dominant – and 
can satisfy the requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU. Such an approach reinforces the idea that 
buyer power facing strong competition downstream is likely to be efficiency enhancing. 
However, the current treatment assumes that buyers also compete in the downstream market and 
does not cover instances where there is only competition for the input market and not the 
downstream market. Accordingly, the guidance must be re-adjusted for cases in which buyer 
exclusion may occur regardless of downstream competition. 
7.3.2 Exclusive supply agreements imposed by a dominant buyer 
Imposing exclusive supply agreements is not an easy task, even for dominant undertakings, 
which explains the reduced amount of cases dealing with imposition of buyer-induced exclusive 
supply agreements.1062 Suppliers will, unless offered supracompetitive purchasing conditions,1063 
resist attempts to be cut off from alternative sources of demand and, therefore, will employ their 
countervailing selling power to neutralize the buyer power of the purchasing undertaking.1064 
Thus, as suggested by the Commission, exclusive supply agreements by dominant buyers would 
only tend to occur in cases of “weak suppliers and strong buyers”, particularly if suppliers are 
dependent on the buyer or the buyer is a necessary trading partner.  
If a dominant buying undertaking imposes exclusive supply agreements on their suppliers, such 
conduct may be in breach of Article 102 TFEU(a)(c) or even (d), depending on the content of the 
exclusivity agreement and, importantly, the scope its effects, i.e.: the foreclosing effect must 
affect a significant proportion of rival firms and have a duration that is sufficient to generate a 
competitive disadvantage for rivals.1065 If the suppliers are dependent on the powerful buyer, this 
might be because the buyer constitutes a necessary trading partner (as a gatekeeper-distributor) 
for them to reach end consumers, or because there are no other viable purchasing options when it 
comes to acquiring a necessary amount of volume for the suppliers to be economically viable. If 
this is the case, the likelihood of the foreclosing effect is increased, as suppliers fear the buyer’s 
                                                          
1062 Also stressing this for selling side cases: Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the 
Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 34 
1063 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 34. 
1064 See making a somewhat similar statement concerning the use of buyer power vis-à-vis suppliers: Bellamy, Child 
and Roth, [2001], para. 7-045. 
1065 Judgment of 19 April 2012 in Tomra and Others v Commission, C-549/10 P, EU:C:2012:221, paras. 37-45, 
upholding the Judgment by the General Court in Judgment of 9 September 2010, Tomra Systems and Others v 
Commission, T-155/06, ECR, EU:T:2010:370, paras. 238-246; Communication from the Commission — Guidance 
on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct 
by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 36. Also supporting this position see: Østerud, p. 67-69. 
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retaliation and would accept being tied to a single buyer.1066 Concerning the duration, a similar 
approach as with the agreement under Article 101 TFEU applies. The longer the exclusive supply 
obligation, the more likely the foreclosing effect for both existing and future buying competitors 
will also be greater.1067 
Because of the lack of substantial buyer power cases dealing with exclusive supply, the 
Commission and the Courts are likely to analogically use the strict treatment provided by the case 
law, and, to a minor extent if any, the Commission’s soft law,1068 in particular, Suiker Unie and 
Others v Commission1069 and Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, where the CJEU held that: 
An undertaking which is in a dominant position on a market and ties purchasers — even if it does 
so at their request — by an obligation or promise on their part to obtain all or most of their 
requirements exclusively from the said undertaking abuses its dominant position within the 
meaning of Article [102] of the Treaty, whether the obligation in question is stipulated without 
further qualification or whether it is undertaken in consideration of the grant of a rebate.1070 
Furthermore, in Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, a case dealing with selling side 
exclusivity agreements but with some relevance for the discussion to countervailing buyer as a 
defense,1071 the General Court held that a dominant undertaking that engages in an exclusivity 
agreement with its commercial partners is in breach of Article 102 TFEU as such exclusivity 
obligations have a foreclosing effect that “are incompatible with the objective of undistorted 
competition within the common market, because they are not based on an economic transaction 
which justifies this burden or benefit but are designed to deprive the purchaser (or the supplier in 
buyer power cases) of or restrict its possible choices of sources of supply and to deny other 
producers access to the market”.1072 
Therefore, in the absence of specific buying-oriented cases, it is highly likely that the Courts 
would resort to the reverse application of the precedents regarding seller imposed exclusivity 
agreements due to the risks of foreclosure for buying cases with them. The only difference 
between them being which contractual party is the one that has its freedom of choice limited. 
Such analogical treatment would be justified due to the similarities in the foreclosure effects and 
                                                          
1066 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 36. 
1067 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 36. 
1068 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, paras. 33-
36. 
1069 Judgment of 16 December 1975 in Suiker Unie and Others v Commission, C-40/73, EU:C:1975:174. 
1070 Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, para. 89 
(emphasis added). 
1071 I deal with countervailing buyer power and this case in chapter 10. 
1072 Judgment of 25 June 2010, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, T-66/01, ECR, EU:T:2010:255, para. 




the fact that it would grant legal certainty by making the outcome predictable by the parties in the 
absence of any buyer power specific case law or Commission’s practice. Hence, dominant buyers 
that impose exclusivity supply agreements to their suppliers are likely to be in breach of Article 
102 TFEU. This approach was tangentially explored by the Courts in the single example of a 
conduct imposing exclusive supply obligations by a dominant buyer in De Beers – Alrosa.1073 In 
this case, the Commission preliminary found that a purchasing scheme between Alrosa and De 
Beers, the two largest diamond producer companies in the world, based on a buyer induced 
imposition of exclusive supply from Alrosa to De Beers could foreclose competing buyers of 
diamonds in the intermediate market.  
De Beers, an undertaking dominant as a purchaser and retailer (hence hourglass shaped), and its 
competitor Alrosa were both active in the upstream of supply/purchase of rough diamonds and 
the downstream market of selling processed diamonds. Through the exclusive supply agreement, 
De Beers would guarantee that Alrosa’s production would be sold exclusively to it and, therefore, 
competing buyers would have been deprived of an efficient supplier. This would have implied an 
increase in their purchasing costs that could lead to their market foreclosure as they were put at a 
competitive disadvantage when compared to De Beers. For the Commission, this ‘willing-buyer-
willing-seller agreement’ “had the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of 
competition existing in the market or the growth of that competition and of maintaining De 
Beers’ control over the rough diamonds market” due to its exclusionary effect, and also hindered 
the ability of Alrosa to compete as a retailer in the downstream market.1074 Consequently, this 
exclusionary agreement could be contrary to Article 102 TFEU, even if the exclusive supply was 
accepted by the seller, as remarked by the General Court.1075 This exclusive supply agreement, as 
stressed by Advocate General Kokott, was perceived as though it could “have detrimental 
consequences for the market structure and ultimately also for consumers”,1076 as there is a 
“danger that by buying up the production of the other producer, the dominant undertaking 
influences sales and thus ultimately also prices on the relevant market, to the detriment of 
consumers.”1077  
                                                          
1073 This case is well known due to its impact regarding the application of the proportionally principle in commitment 
decisions, Commission Decision of 22 February 2006 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/B-2/38.381 — De Beers) [2006] OJ L 205/24; Judgment 
of 11 July 2007, Alrosa v Commission, T-170/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:220; Judgment of 29 June 2010 in Commission v 
Alrosa, C-441/07 P, EU:C:2010:377. 
1074 Commission Decision of 22 February 2006 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/B-2/38.381 — De Beers) [2006] OJ L 205/24, para. 30. 
1075 Judgment of 11 July 2007, Alrosa v Commission, T-170/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:220, para. 127. 
1076 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Judgment of 29 June 2010 in Commission v Alrosa, C-441/07 P, 
EU:C:2009:555, para. 122. 
1077 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Judgment of 29 June 2010 in Commission v Alrosa, C-441/07 P, 
EU:C:2009:555, para. 122. 
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To address the concerns that arose from the ‘willing-buyer-willing-seller agreement’ and 
minimize its foreclosing effects, the Commission accepted a unilateral commitment offered by 
De Beers in which it agreed to gradually decrease the value of purchases of diamonds from 
Alrosa.1078 The commitments offered aimed at solving a competition problem in the downstream 
market, by forcing Alrosa to supply diamonds to other buyers and preventing the existence of an 
exclusive supply agreement requiring De Beers to not buy rough diamonds from Alrosa in the 
future; i.e.: restricting the ability of using buyer power to affect downstream market conditions. 
Therefore, and even if the Courts did not expressly pronounce concerning the legality of the 
agreement, it can be seen that these type of buyer-imposed agreements by a dominant 
undertaking do trigger the application of EU competition law. 
In the US, exclusive supply agreements imposed by a powerful buyer have been held to be in 
breach of antitrust law, in particular §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and §15 of the 
United States Code. In Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. F.T.C, the 7th Circuit of Appeals upheld a decision by 
the FTC in which it found that Toys “R” Us – a large retailer specialized in toys – had abused its 
buyer power by entering into boycotting agreements with toy manufacturers so that these did not 
sell products to other toy retailers on the condition that the other Toys “R” Us suppliers would do 
the same.1079 Rival buyers were foreclosed as Toys “R” Us was able to control the kind of goods 
that were sold to its rivals (i.e.: those toys not wanted by Toys “R” Us), making them, therefore, 
less attractive for end consumers of highly differentiated goods.1080 Such practice aimed at 
preventing losing its preferential downstream position as a toy retailer vis-à-vis warehouse clubs 
who benefit from their large storage business model to sell toys at low prices.1081 Also, these 
agreements with manufacturers prevented rival buyers from exercising price pressure against 
Toys “R” US, as retailers in the downstream market were unable to effectively use their buyer 
power to lower further prices for end consumers.1082 Furthermore, the exclusive supply and 
boycott agreement also prevented end consumers from carrying out price comparison between 
the goods, as Toys “R” Us forced manufacturers to not sell toys identical to those sold to Toys 
“R” US to rival buyers toys.1083 Consequently, the FTC found that the agreements had led to a 
reduction of output sales from ten toy manufacturers to warehouse clubs, which caused those 
                                                          
1078 Commission Decision of 22 February 2006 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/B-2/38.381 — De Beers) [2006] OJ L 205/24, para. 44. 
1079 TOYS "R" US, INC. v. Federal Trade Commission, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000), 930; Noll (2004-2005), p. 623. 
See the discussion of the case by Scherer, testifying expert economist on behalf of the Federal Trade Commission, in 
F.M. Scherer, ‘Retailer -Instigated Restraints on Suppliers' Sales: Toys "R" US (2000)’ in John E. Kwoka and 
Lawrence J. White (eds), The Antitrust Revolution (Fifth Edition edn, Oxford University Press 2009), 441-455. 
1080 Toys are not interchangeable goods because their end consumers (kids) generally demand a specific one and do 
not readily accept alternative substitutes. 
1081 TOYS "R" US, INC. v. Federal Trade Commission, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000), 931. 
1082 Scherer [2009]. 
1083 Ibid, p. 444. 
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buyers to be unable to compete in terms of lower prices, and deprived them of toys desired by 
end consumers.1084 
By the time of the Appeal, Toys “R” Us had a market share of 20% of the whole US toy retailing 
market, and, in some urban areas, it enjoyed of market shares between 35% and 49%. Because of 
its strong position as a buyer, the Court of Appeal affirmed that Toys "R" Us enjoyed market 
power upstream and downstream, like an hourglass shaped undertaking. The Judgment held that 
“TRU is a critical outlet for toy manufacturers. It buys about 30% of the large, traditional toy 
companies' total output and it is usually their most important customer”.1085 In other words, 
suppliers were dependent on Toys “R” Us as it represented about 30% of their sales – a situation 
similar to the “threat point” evaluated by the Commission merger retailing cases – and suppliers 
were not able to find alternative demand sources.1086 The Courts of Appeal upheld in full the 
analysis by the Federal Trade Commission that found such agreements had an exclusionary and 
boycotting effect that was per se illegal under the rule enunciated in Northwest Wholesale 
Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery Printing Co.1087 Hence, the conduct was not exempt under 
an efficiency analysis, and the vertical agreements were in breach of the cartel prohibition of the 
§1 of the Sherman Act.1088  
By analyzing the treatment in Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. F.T.C., a parallel can be traced to cases of 
exclusive supply agreements imposed by means of anti-competitive agreements among 
undertakings with a foreclosing effect (boycott), and unjustifiable exclusive supply agreements 
imposed by dominant buyers. Both regimes prevent large buyers from leveraging their market 
power as a buyer to foreclose rival buying firms that compete in a related downstream market. 
However, the approach taken is somewhat different as these buyer-induced agreements qualify 
under US law as ‘agreements’ under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, and not only as unilateral behavior. 
If had a European approach been taken to Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. F.T.C., the outcome to the case 
would probably have been different due to the structure and applicability of EU competition law 
when compared to US antitrust. Firstly, the application of unilateral behavior under Article 102 
TFEU would have proven to be impossible or highly unlikely because the market shares of the 
buyer in either the upstream or downstream market would have been quite different to the levels 
required to declare the undertaking dominant. Therefore, it would have been unlikely that the 
Commission and/or the Courts would have found an abuse of dominant position through 
                                                          
1084 TOYS "R" US, INC. v. Federal Trade Commission, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000), 937. Kirkwood ‘Powerful 
Buyers and Merger Enforcement’ (2012), p. 1509 
1085 TOYS "R" US, INC. v. Federal Trade Commission, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000), 930. 
1086 See chapter 6, sections 6.4.3 and chapter 9 dealing with supplier dependence and the threat point theory used by 
the Commission. 
1087 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985). 
1088 TOYS "R" US, INC. v. Federal Trade Commission, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000), 933. 
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unilateral behavior. Interestingly, though, the US Courts resorted to the issue of dependence, a 
figure that is adopted by some MS in their national legislation to tackle buyer power abuses 
below traditional dominance thresholds, and which I discuss in detail in chapter 9.  
This would then lead to the possibility of finding the agreement anti-competitive under Article 
101(1) TFEU. Under such a possibility the case would have to be analyzed as a possible vertical 
restriction of competition and, therefore, in principle theoretically under the scope of the Block 
Exemption Regulation.1089 In this sense, it would have to be determined if the suppliers in an 
aggregate would have had more than 30% of the toy’s manufacturer market. If that would not 
have been the case, then the agreements in Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. F.T.C., could have potentially 
benefited from the Exemption of Article 2.1 of the Block Exemption Regulation, unless it would 
qualify as a hardcore restriction of competition in accordance to Article 4, which it does not 
because these exemptions are designed for cases in which it is the buyer the one that is 
restricted.1090 Hence, in principle should the type of agreement as the one discussed in Toys "R" 
Us, Inc. v. F.T.C., have been under the scope of application of the Block Exemption Regulation, 
the case would have been exempted from EU competition law, in an unusual case of a less strict 
treatment of buyer power than when compared to the US antitrust law. If, on the other hand, the 
case due to the market shares would not have been under the scope of the Block Exemption 
Regulation because it exceeded the thresholds, it would be likely to be captured under Article 
101(1) TFEU, the assessment the Commission and the Courts may perhaps have found that by 
Toys “R” Us agreeing with their suppliers not to sell certain type of toys to other retailers it was 
entering into an agreement restrictive of competition by object. 
7.3.3 Conclusions regarding exclusive supply 
From the preceding discussion and the little case law available, it can be concluded that exclusive 
supply agreements may raise anti-competitive effects due to their ability to foreclose rival buyers 
and may also serve as a starting point for exploitative buyer power vis-à-vis suppliers. These 
exclusivity supply obligations can be entered into by means of agreements that may be under the 
scope of Article 101 TFEU. In these cases of coordination between the buyers and the suppliers, 
the main rule is to consider them unproblematic and likely to be efficiency enhancing if the 
                                                          
1089 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [2010] OJ L102/1. 
1090 See for these situations to be exempted under the Block Exemption Regulation Article 4(b) of the Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [2010] OJ L102/1. See also: Commission staff 
working document - Guidance on restrictions of competition "by object" for the purpose of defining which 
agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice, accompanying communication from the Commission - Notice 
on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice), [C(2014) 4136 final], Brussels, 25.6.2014, SWD 




parties are not dominant — as either buyers or retailers — and if the agreements are under five 
years’ duration and do not deal with particularly tailored goods. However, I have also highlighted 
that the Commission seems to adopt a narrow approach to competition concerns regarding 
exclusive supply agreements, as it places its emphasis on situations in which the foreclosure 
upstream also has effects in the downstream markets. While this is indeed the priority and most 
cases would comply with this premise, it is also important to remark that pure upstream 
foreclosure can also take place among non-competing buyers in the downstream market, which 
should not be disregarded. 
Concerning dominant buyers that engage in exclusive supply obligations, the case law confirms 
that these undertakings are likely to be in breach of Article 102 TFEU by nature,1091 as such 
unjustified agreements imposed by a dominant undertaking thwart the competitive process and 
market structure, foreclosing rival buyers, being contrary to the protection of the suppliers’ 
economic freedom, and, ultimately, to the detriment of end consumers.1092 These concerns and 
reasons given by the case law are quite in line with an ordoliberal approach to buyer power, 
particularly when dealing with the protection of the competitive process, rivalry and market 
structure. Such a stand of EU competition law may be criticized for not emphasizing the 
efficiency of the practice sensu stricto, particularly regarding short-term consumer welfare. 
Nonetheless, as indicated earlier, treating supply agreements as a breach of Article 102 TFEU 
still allows room for efficiency considerations as part of an objective justification analysis giving 
room for dominant buying undertakings to justify the existence of exclusive supply obligations. 
These efficiency remarks would be likely to be accepted if the buyer is dominant in the upstream 
market but faces strong competition in the downstream market, as the likelihood of foreclosure 
will then be limited, as discussed when dealing with the assessment under Article 101 TFEU, and 
the pro-competitive effects of the exclusivity may trump the negative welfare consequences of 
them.  
In practice, however, it is likely that if the Commission follows its Enforcement Guidelines on 
Article 102 TFEU – as it should -, it will adopt a less restrictive approach to buyer induced 
exclusive supply agreements by dominant undertakings, which is in line with economics dealing 
with vertical restraints. This will be the case if these conducts do not have a significant distorting 
impact on the downstream market and consumer welfare (of intermediary and final consumers, 
and particularly the latter) rather than on protection of suppliers’ economic freedom or market 
                                                          
1091 See the discussion of whether the language employed by the Courts creates a per se prohibition Whish and 
Bailey, [2015], p. 724. Calling this an “object restriction” see: Østerud, p. 65. 
1092 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Judgment of 29 June 2010 in Commission v Alrosa, C-441/07 P, 
EU:C:2009:555, para. 122. See remarking the value of protection of the competitive process under Article 102 TFEU 
and linking it to the British Airways case: Wils (2014), p. 418. 
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structure.1093 Hence, in my view, in the future one is unlikely to see a sharp increase of exclusive 
supply cases by dominant buyers being prosecuted or cases where buyers only compete upstream 
and not downstream, which may risk issues of under-enforcement in buyer power cases, although 
this is also unlikely to be the case. 
7.4 Overbuying 
‘Overbuying’1094 is the equivalent – but no mirror –1095 of predatory pricing when carried out by a 
buying dominant undertaking or a group of coordinated buyers. Through overbuying, the 
undertaking will increase the amount it pays for its input above the competitive level in an effort 
to exclude other buyers from access to it and foreclose them by recourse to a form of vertical 
foreclosure, as labeled by Hemphill and Wu.1096 The buyer can do this either by increasing the 
purchasing price it pays (by overbidding),1097 or buying more input than necessary (hoarding), as 
occurred in the US antitrust case of input price bid rigging, Reid Bros. Logging Co. v Ketchikan 
Pulp Co and American Tobacco v United States.1098 Either of these two conducts would increase 
the buyer’s rivals costs if the marginal cost of each purchased good has an upward slopping 
curve, i.e.: the more input acquired, the higher the cost of the next unit.  
By overbuying, a predatory buyer incurs in a short-term sacrifice (by raising its costs) in order to 
then obtain a benefit in the medium/long term once competitors have left the market through 
recoupment by exercising its buyer (monopsony or monopoly) power.1099 Hence, in cases of 
                                                          
1093 This is the approach used in the case of exclusive selling obligations under the Communication from the 
Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 34. 
1094 Using the same term see: Salop (2004-2005). Other authors use the term “predatory bidding” to refer to the same 
conduct see, inter alia: Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards 
for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005); van Doorn, p. 101. 
1095 See also supporting this claim, inter alia: Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke 
Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005); Richard O. 
Zerbe Jr, ‘Monopsony and the Ross-Simmons Case: A Comment on Salop and Kirkwood’ 72 Antitrust Law Journal 
(2004-2005) 717; Hylton. Cf with the opinion of the US Supreme Court when stating that “[p]redatory-pricing and 
predatory-bidding claims are analytically similar” in Weyerhaeuser Company, v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber 
Company, Inc., in 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007), IV A, 8; Salop (2004-2005). 
1096 C. Scott Hemphill and Tim Wu, ‘Parallel Exclusion’ 122 The Yale Law Journal (2013) 1182, p. 1203-1204. 
1097 Carstensen ‘Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among 
Suppliers’ (2008), p. 288. 
1098 Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1983); American Tobacco Co. v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), see discussing this case: Hemphill and Wu (2013), 1203-1024. See a similar theory of 
harm for overbuying: Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 38-39. 
1099 Lars Henriksson, ‘Predatory Foreclosure and EC Competition Law’ 3 Europarättslig tidskrift (2008) 689, p. 689; 
Hylton, p. 1; Carstensen ‘Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of 
Discrimination Among Suppliers’ (2008), p. 288. 
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overbuying, suppliers are not exploited — quite the contrary, they receive a supra-competitive 
bonus as they are paid more than the competitive price.1100  
Therefore and because of the exclusionary effect of rival undertakings that compete as buyers and 
sellers alike, overbuying will tend to have a dual market effect. In the upstream market, it 
excludes rival buyers (horizontal effect), and once they exit the market it will allow the buyer to 
also reap monopsony profits vis-à-vis suppliers (vertical effect). In the downstream market (if 
undertakings compete as retailers), if the overbuying has successfully excluded rivals this would 
grant the undertaking monopoly power vis-à-vis consumers and the ability to exploit them.1101 
Therefore, upon successful overbuying the undertaking will have market power upstream as a 
buyer and downstream as a seller, like the hourglass shape concept introduced in this 
dissertation. However part of the literature argues that whenever a buyer overbuys an input it 
would (unless it hoards that input) increase its output production, drop its retailing price or 
increase production to minimize loses, which may lead to a short-term consumer benefit due to 
the overbuying, as theorized by Salop.1102 Also, if the overbuying fails, part of the literature and 
the US case law argue that it will benefit consumers because there is more output in the market 
and, therefore, a failed overbuying tactic that does not exclude rival undertakings may benefit in 
the short run end consumers.1103 
An example will illustrate the overbuying effects: Isolation’s Supermarket decides to acquire all 
meat produced from all farmers and slaughterhouses in Isolation Town. It does so by paying a 
purchasing price (substantially) higher than the current prevailing price in the market, with the 
intention to exclude Isolation’s Butchery from any access to beef (its input) and, therefore, force 
their exit from the Isolation’s beef-retailing market in a couple of months. As there is no 
competition in the downstream market of beef sale for end consumers, Isolation’s Supermarket 
will, after a few months and following the rival’s foreclosure, also increase its retail price to reap 
supra-competitive profits.1104 Additionally, as there are no rival buyers, Isolation’s Supermarket 
can now exploit its buyer power vis-à-vis its suppliers and exert exploitative purchasing prices to 
monopsony or supra-competitive purchasing profits.  
Consequently, overbuying is a complex exclusionary tactic that may have implications for 
upstream competition among the buyer and its rivals when competing for an input. Additionally, 
                                                          
1100 Also in this sense see: Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the 
Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 628. 
1101 See also: ibid, p. 653. 
1102 Salop (2004-2005), p. 695. 
1103 See discussing the positive impact of overbuying: Weyerhaeuser Company, v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber 
Company, Inc., in 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007). Cf with the negative opinion of Zerbe regarding overbuying effects in 
Zerbe Jr (2004-2005). 
1104 Predatory bidding cases has also been few times challenged before the US courts as noted by Kirkwood in 
Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced 
Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 655. 
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this type of conduct is likely to distort competition in the downstream market if those rival buyers 
compete also as retailers, as they are now in a disadvantaged position due to the increase in their 
purchasing costs, affecting their competitiveness vis-à-vis end consumers.  
7.4.1 How overbuying operates? Predatory overbuying and raising rival costs 
overbuying 
As discussed by Salop, overbuying can be used by a powerful buyer to gain market power in 
either/or the upstream and downstream markets and then recoup its losses by exercising 
monopsony or monopoly power by means of predatory overbuying and raising rivals’ costs 
overbuying, the two types of overbuying.1105 The aim of any of these overbuying modalities is to 
foreclose rivals so that the buyer becomes a monopsonist and faces no competition in the 
upstream market, allowing it to depreciate the purchasing price by withholding demand,1106 
which may also allow it to gain a competitive advantage in a related downstream market. 
‘Predatory overbuying’ has its effects primarily in the upstream market, as the buyer will gain 
market share and market power in the upstream market by limiting or neglecting in whole the 
access of other buyers to a necessary input. For Salop, once the buyer has excluded its 
competitors or forced them to permanently decrease their output capacity it will be able to 
withhold demand and decrease its purchasing costs by exerting monopsony power;1107 thus the 
recoupment occurs upstream. However, in my view this would not be the optimal move by a 
powerful buyer. If it is tempted to withhold demand, the reduction in price may force suppliers 
out of the market or attract entry of new buyers to the market. Instead, the buyer will probably 
exert market power by increasing prices downstream as it now faces no competition (if the 
excluded buyers also compete downstream) as there are no other retailers, being able to recoup 
by exploiting consumers through high retailing prices. Nevertheless, for Salop these retailing 
price levels may on occasion be lower than they were before the predatory scheme and, therefore 
there is no short-term harm to consumers – if a strict end consumer harm standard is adopted.1108 
This theory, however, overlooks that quantities sold in the downstream market will be reduced if 
demand is withheld to recoup losses through monopsony power, which will be welfare 
detrimental in itself and may lead to higher prices in the downstream market. 
‘Raising rivals’ costs overbuying’, on the other hand, has its primary effects in the downstream 
market as the rival buyers that compete also as retailers suffer a cost increase and are forced to 
raise their retail prices. By having to increase their price vis-à-vis end consumers, this leads them 
to a situation in which they are at a competitive disadvantage in comparison to the powerful 
                                                          
1105 Salop (2004-2005), p. 669. 
1106 Blair and Lopatka (2008). 
1107 Salop (2004-2005), p. 675. 
1108 Ibid, p. 677. 
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buyer that is able to maintain or increase to a lesser degree its retailing prices than compared to 
other rivals and, therefore, gain market share downstream.1109 Therefore, under this theory of 
harm, the exclusion takes place whenever the powerful buyer increases its output price less than 
its rivals that now see their market position harmed in what Salop calls “price-cost squeeze”.1110 
Unlike predatory overbuying, raising rival’s costs overbuying does not imply a permanent rival 
exclusion but it hinders their competitiveness. As costs raise, the competing buyers will have to 
either increase their selling prices or reduce their output, which will transfer market share to the 
powerful buyer engaging in buyer predation. Additionally, as prices of competitors rise, the large 
buyer may also increase its prices and consumers are then worse off than before the predation. 
An example of another theory of harm based on raising rivals’ costs overbuying that I have 
identified is the case of the profit distribution and benefits of producer cooperatives.1111 
Cooperatives distribute profits among their members in a different way that corporations do 
among their stakeholders, furthermore, cooperatives may benefit from special and kinder rules 
regarding taxation or labor laws that reduce their operative costs and, therefore, enjoy an 
advantage when compared with corporations.1112 Because of these advantages, cooperatives 
might pay their members a higher price for the input it acquires (for example milk) increasing the 
overall market price and increasing rivals’ costs that, even if as efficient as the cooperative, 
would not be able to fully compete as their costs have been artificially raised because of the 
cooperative’s internal profit distribution system. 
For Salop, these two theories of harm differ in the market they operate (upstream and 
downstream) and in the consumer harm effect.1113 In his view, predatory overbuying, if 
successful, will rarely harm consumers – thereby adopting a softer stance, whereas in the case of 
raising rivals’ costs overbuying consumer harm is affected because the powerful buyer may be 
tempted to increase its own retailing prices or reduce output, directly hurting consumers. In my 
view, however, such distinction and lenient treatment given to predatory overbuying would not 
hold under EU competition law standards as predation in EU competition law for several reasons. 
First, and as I will elaborate further in this chapter, exclusionary buyer power conducts are 
prohibited even absent evidence of direct consumer harm because the EU competition law has as 
an aim the protection of competition as a process and, to a certain degree, the protection of 
                                                          
1109 Hypothetically speaking, the buyer could attempt to more aggressively gain downstream market share by 
lowering its selling prices and, therefore, carrying out selling side predation, which was the theory of harm suggested 
by the US Supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser Company, v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc., in 127 S. 
Ct. 1069 (2007), and which I discuss below in detail. 
1110 Salop (2004-2005), p. 679. 
1111 Cooperatives and their relation to buyer power are discussed in depth in chapter 8, section 8.5.3. 
1112 Cf with Fici who argues that cooperatives do not get a preferential treatment but a different treatment because of 
their special nature in: Antonio Fici, ‘An Introduction to Cooperative Law’ in Dante Cracogna, Antonio Fici and 
Hagen Henry (eds), International Handbook of Cooperative Law (Springer 2013), p. 7. 
1113 Salop (2004-2005), p. 671. 
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smaller (yet not inefficient) rival buyers and their economic freedom. Second, the case law of EU 
competition law regarding predatory conduct has been interpreted as not requiring recoupment1114 
for it to be anti-competitive,1115 as discussed in Tetra Pak v Commission where the CJEU rejected 
the recoupment for the specific situation at hand (although not excluding it could be required in 
other circumstances),1116 and in France Télécom v Commission where the recoupment 
requirement seems to have been rejected in more absolute terms.1117 Third, if only attention is 
paid to the competitiveness of downstream markets, the approach might be under-inclusive 
whenever the buyers only compete for the input but do not compete as retailers, for instance 
when the buyers use the same input to produce different outputs. Lastly, Salop’s distinction, 
albeit interesting from a theoretical perspective, will in practice be blurred as both effects 
combine in a larger upstream and downstream impact. 
7.4.1.1 Naked overbuying and hoarding 
Furthermore, there are two other mechanisms that can be employed by a powerful buyer to 
exclude its competitors – ‘naked overbuying’ and ‘hoarding’ – as forms of carrying out either 
predatory or increasing rival’s costs overbuying. Both naked overbuying and hoarding are 
practices that by their very nature and object are aimed at reducing, restricting or impeding 
competition and, therefore, should be considered anti-competitive. 
Through naked overbuying a buyer attempts to exclude its competitors by acquiring an input it 
does not require, but which it is used by its competitors, in order to produce its output. An 
example of this was the case of American Tobacco v United States, in which producers of 
cigarettes entered into an agreement to overbid and acquire the less expensive tobacco types even 
                                                          
1114 For a detailed discussion of recoupment in EU competition law: Cyril Ritter, ‘Does the Law of Predatory pricing 
and Cross-Subsidisation Need a Radical Rethink?’ 27 World Competition (2004) 613; Michal S. Gal, ‘Below-Cost 
Price Alignment: Meeting or Beating Competition? The France Télécom Case’ 28 European Competition Law 
Review (2007) 382; Rousseva, [2010], p. 160-171; Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition law (Oxford 
University Press 2012), p. 745-746; Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 786. Suggesting that recoupment 
is not an adequate test for predation see: Nazzini, [2011], p. 203-205. Suggesting that scholars have argued for 
incorporation of recoupment in EU competition law see: Stavros S Makris, ‘Applying Normative Theories in EU 
Competition Law: Exploring Article 102 TFEU’ 3 UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence (2014) 30, p. 55 
1115 See also stressing that there is no recoupment requirement in EU competition law: Whish and Bailey, 
Competition law [2012], p. 745. See also stressing the divergent policy regarding recoupment from a comparative 
perspective: Elhauge and Geradin, [2011], p. 1137 
1116 “Furthermore, it would not be appropriate, in the circumstances of the present case, to require in addition proof 
that Tetra Pak had a realistic chance of recouping its losses. It must be possible to penalize predatory pricing 
whenever there is a risk that competitors will be eliminated.” Judgment of 14 November 1996 in Tetra Pak v 
Commission, C-333/94 P, EU:C:1996:436, para. 44 (emphasis added). See interpreting this as implying no actual 
need for recoupment and therefore a difference with US antitrust law: Graham, [2010], p. 143. 
1117 “[…] it does not follow from the case law of the Court that proof of the possibility of recoupment of losses 
suffered by the application, by an undertaking in a dominant position, of prices lower than a certain level of costs 
constitutes a necessary precondition to establishing that such a pricing policy is abusive” in Judgment of 2 April 
2009 in France Télécom v Commission, C-202/07 P, EU:C:2009:214, para. 110 (emphasis added). 
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if they did not incorporate such product into their own brands.1118 The US Supreme Court found 
that such behavior was a per se violation of antitrust law, in particular Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act as a boycotting agreement.1119 Hoarding, on the other hand, consists in the overbuying of an 
input that is used by the undertaking but that will not be used in the short term and, instead will 
be stored to deny other buyers access to the input and increase their costs, somewhat analogous to 
the conduct forbidden by the CJEU in Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents 
v Commission, where the supplier of a good refused to deal its product to prevent competition in 
the downstream market.1120 
7.4.2 Objective reasons to overbuy 
However, not all instances of overbuying will be anti-competitive and warrant intervention by 
competition authorities because what may appear as an exclusionary overbuying conduct can 
instead be an efficiency enhancing purchasing patter that increases demand for an input. As 
discussed by the US Supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber 
Co., Inc, there are several legitimate reasons why an undertaking may want to increase its 
purchases of an input that should not be unduly hindered by excessive regulation intervention. 
For example, a buyer may decide to acquire more goods than before because it takes a gamble 
based on the current and expected price of an input, or because it has expanded or intends to 
expand its output to increase its efficiency,1121 or simply because it has failed to properly 
calculate the amount of input it requires. 
Alternatively, input price increases – an element to look for in cases of overbuying – may have 
occurred because of external circumstances, for example, in the case of commodities like oil and 
gas that vary prices constantly and where the discovery of new techniques or reserves can have a 
sudden impact on input prices.1122 
7.4.3 Is overbuying common in practice? 
According to my research, anti-competitive overbuying is rare, an opinion also shared by 
Lopatka, who claims that the fact “[t]hat predatory buying can be a rational anticompetitive 
strategy in theory does not mean that it is prevalent”.1123 At EU level there have been no 
competition law cases of overbuying before the Commission or the Courts and in the US only a 
                                                          
1118 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). Discussing the case see: Natalie Rosenfelt, ‘The 
Verdict on Monopsony’ 20 Loyola Consumer Law Review (2008) 402, p. 406. 
1119 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), p. 810. 
1120 Judgment of 6 March 1974 in joined cases C-6/73 and C-7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial 
Solvents v Commission, EU:C:1974:18, para. 25. 
1121 John E. Lopatka, ‘Predatory Buying’ in Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Antitrust Economics, vol 2 (Oxford University Press 2015), p. 81. 
1122 See also discussing reasons to overbuy an input: Blair and Lopatka (2008), p. 452-453. 
1123 Lopatka [2015], p. 87. 
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handful of cases discuss it.1124 The sole case of dealing with overbuying/overbidding before the 
Courts has been a state aid case, DTS Distribuidora de Televisión Digital v Commission,1125 
where the General Court dismissed an applicant’s claim that argued that the Spanish National 
Broadcaster (RTVE) infringed Article 106(2) by consistently overbidding in the market for the 
acquisition of exclusive TV program content.1126 The General Court dismissed such allegations 
based on lack of evidence and legal national provision but it did not dismiss the fact that 
overbuying – even if done by the state – may run contrary to the competition provisions of the 
TFEU lato sensu.  
This lack of cases in EU competition law (and also in US antitrust) provides a good indication 
that overbuying is rarely a successful exclusionary tactic because there might be little chance of 
recovery, there may be other substitutes for the purchased goods, or because it requires pockets 
that are ‘too deep’ to function.1127 Also, economic crisis and shifts in macroeconomic trends will 
make undertakings wary of overbuying an input because if their purchasing patterns or the values 
of the input or output change drastically, these buyers would be left with an excessive amount of 
input that is not possible to be sold at a price to sufficiently cover its costs.1128  
Despite the lack of cases, in the US, however, overbuying was discussed at length by the US 
Supreme Court in the seminal case of Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber 
Co., Inc, which I discuss below, due to its importance for buyer power regulation.1129 
7.4.4 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc. 
In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc (Weyerhaeuser), the US 
Supreme Court dealt in detail with the regulation of overbuying. This judgment is important for 
buyer power regulation because it sets an international precedent that the European Courts at EU 
or MS level may resort to when dealing with similar cases in the future. However, in my view, 
                                                          
1124 Weyerhaeuser Company, v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc., in 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007); 
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), p. 810; In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 907 F.2d 510 
(5th Cir. 1990); Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1983); Cargill, Inc. v. 
Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986), which was analyzed as a predatory pricing but not predatory buying 
case. 
1125 Judgment of 11 July 2014, DTS Distribuidora de Televisión Digital v Commission, T-533/10, EU:T:2014:629, 
and under appeal pending decision as C-449/14 P - DTS Distribuidora de Televisión Digital v Commission. 
1126 Judgment of 11 July 2014, DTS Distribuidora de Televisión Digital v Commission, T-533/10, EU:T:2014:629, 
para. 131. 
1127 Weyerhaeuser Company, v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc., in 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007), IV B, 
10. See also suggesting that predatory buying tends to fail: Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: 
Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-
2005), p. 628; Salop (2004-2005), p. 678-697; Blair and Lopatka (2008), p. 468. Cf with Zerbe who argues that there 
is little data that supports such claim in Zerbe Jr (2004-2005), p. 717. 
1128 Think for example of an undertaking that overbuys oil as price drops and expect it to rise again in the short term 
but the price remains constant. I would like to thank Marco Corradi for bringing up to my attention the argument of 
macroeconomic crisis and the lower chance for overbuying to be successful. 
1129 Weyerhaeuser Company, v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc., in 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007). 
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and as I discuss in the next section, the case outcome would have been different if dealt with by 
the Courts. In particular, under EU competition law, the case law does not seem to require 
recoupment to find the anti-competitiveness of a predatory practice, it applies competition law to 
conducts that harm the upstream market without requiring direct end consumer harm, and the 
CJEU, in my view, would not require double predation as the US Supreme Court did. This is, 
exclusionary overbuying affects competition as such without requiring predatory selling.1130 This 
shows an important example of the ‘Atlantic Divide’ between EU and US antitrust regulation in 
buyer power.1131 
The US Supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser, pursuant to a Writ of Certiorari, concluded that 
overbuying is analytically similar to predatory pricing and, therefore, the applicable legal test is 
the one for predatory selling cases under §2 of the Sherman Act, the Brooke Group test,1132 
reversing a decision by the Ninth Circuit, which refused to apply such a test. Before analyzing the 
US Supreme Court Decision, I shall briefly describe the case’s facts and the Judgment from the 
Ninth Circuit. 
Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. (Ross-Simmons), and Weyerhaeuser Co. are two 
undertakings engaged in the operation of lumber sawmills in the Pacific Northwest of the US. 
These undertakings acquired timber and alder logs locally (the upstream and local geographic 
market) as input to then process the wood and produce lumber that was resold as hardwood 
finished lumber nationally (the output market). The purchasing had three methods:  
i) open bidding market; 
ii) contracts with timberland owners;  
iii) harvesting by the involved undertaking themselves.  
 
Only the bidding market was subject to complaint by Ross-Simmons.1133 
Around the time of the complaint, Weyerhaeuser Co., which entered the sawmill business in 
1980, had a market share of about 65% of the alder logs available in the region and had increased 
                                                          
1130 Judgment of 14 November 1996 in Tetra Pak v Commission, C-333/94 P, EU:C:1996:436, para. 44. Henriksson 
‘Predatory Foreclosure and EC Competition Law’ (2008), p. 710; Thomas Eilmansberger, ‘Article 82’ in Günther 
Hirsch, Frank Montag and Franz Jürgen Säcker (eds), Competition law: European community practice and 
procedure: article-by-article commentary (Sweet & Maxwell 2008), paras. 2-15-524 to 2-15-525. 
1131 For a discussion of the ‘Atlantic Divide’ and a comparative analysis of the man differences between US antitrust 
law and EU competition law see: Gifford and Kudrle, [2015]. 
1132 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). See also reaching a similar 
conclusion: Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 166. For a discussion of the Brooke Group Test see: Phillip Areeda and 
Donald F. Turner, ‘Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act’ 88 Harvard Law 
Review (1975) 697; Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, ‘Williamson on Predatory Pricing’ 87 The Yale Law 
Journal (1978) 1337; Kenneth G Elzinga and David E. Mills, ‘Trumping the Areeda-Turner Test: The Recoupment 
Standard in Brooke Group’ 62 Antitrust Law Journal (1993-1994) 559; Jonathan B. Baker, ‘Predatory Pricing after 
Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective’ 62 Antitrust Law Journal (1993-1994) 585; Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and 
Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and 
Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005); Blair and Lopatka (2008). 
1133 Weyerhaeuser Company, v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc., in 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007) I, 2. 
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the production of hardwood finished lumber due to intensive investment. Furthermore, 
Weyerhaeuser Co. was (and still is) a large retailer and one the largest owners of private 
timberland in the world.1134 On the other hand, Ross-Simmons, a smaller undertaking, had been 
operating in the region since 1962, and was found to have not engaged in efficiency enhancing 
investment and saw its market position eroded by its more efficient competitor. 
From 1998 to 2001, the prices for alder saw-logs (the input) increased while the prices of 
hardwood finished lumber (the output) declined. This price variation led Ross-Simmons to shut 
down its mill in May 2001 and it went out of business. Following the closure of its operations, 
Ross-Simmons “blamed Weyerhaeuser for driving it out of business by bidding up input costs, 
and it filed an antitrust suit against Weyerhaeuser Co., for monopolization and attempted 
monopolization under §2 of the Sherman Act.”1135 Ross-Simmons argued that Weyerhaeuser Co. 
had used its buyer power and deep pockets to engage in predatory overbuying to increase the 
input price (of logs) to exclude its competitors; i.e.: it increased its rivals’ costs by setting a 
higher purchasing price. As evidence the plaintiff put forth the existence of large market shares 
by Weyerhaeuser Co., the increase of log prices during the 1998-2001 period, and the declining 
profits of Weyerhaeuser Co. 
Before the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit Weyerhaeuser Co., claimed that Ross-Simmons 
had not fulfilled the extremes required by the Brooke Group test, which comprise:  
[f]irst, a plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury resulting from a rival’s low prices must 
prove that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs […] 
Second, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the competitor had […] a dangerous probabilit[y] of 
recouping its investment in below-cost prices.1136  
The Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit declined to apply this test and reaffirmed the District 
Court of the District of Oregon’s decision instructing the jury to determine whether there was an 
anti-competitive conduct based on whether Weyerhaeuser Co., “purchased more logs than it 
needed, or paid a higher price for logs than necessary, in order to prevent [Ross-Simmons] from 
obtaining the logs they needed at a fair price”.1137 Thus, the proposed test for predatory buying 
relies on two aspects:  
i) purchasing more logs or paying more than necessary; and  
ii) foreclosure that prevents competitors from acquiring an input at a ‘fair price’.  
 
The Jury found that these two elements (purchasing and pricing effect) were present in the case.  
                                                          
1134 http://www.weyerhaeuser.com/company/history/, last visited February 27, 2016. 
1135 Weyerhaeuser Company, v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc., in 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007), I, 2-3. 
1136 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), 222-224. 
1137 Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Ore. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F. 3d 1030, 10 (9th Cir. 2005) at 978a 
(emphasis added). These standards have been criticized as not being adequate benchmark for overbuying cases other 
than naked overbuying and hoarding. See: Salop (2004-2005), p. 714; Blair and Lopatka (2008), p. 456. 
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The Court of Appeals held that the Brooke Group test did not apply to purchasing side cases 
because benefits to consumers and competition stimulation does not derive in predatory buying 
cases as in predatory pricing cases.1138 Such a view was grounded on previous case law and the 
work of Kirkwood, who argued in 2004 that “Brooke Group should not apply to buyer-induced 
price discrimination” and proposed instead a full-fledged rule of reason approach based on 
consumer welfare.1139  
For the Court of Appeals, predatory bidding will not benefit consumers based on two grounds 
that are similar to my proposal of the hourglass shape. Firstly, as input prices increase rival 
buyers are excluded from the market, and once there is no input nor output competition the 
undertaking would:  
[l]ikely pay less for its materials while charging consumers a higher price. The firm would have 
little incentive to pass on the benefit of lower input prices to consumers when it possessed greater 
market power and needed to recoup the higher costs it had paid for its materials. Thus, the overall 
effect of a predatory bidding scheme would result in harm to consumers.1140  
Secondly, regarding entry of new rivals, the Court of Appeals also remarked that in cases of 
predatory buying this was unlikely because there were entry barriers in the industry due to the 
limited annual supply of logs. The Court of Appeal based its reasoning on Reid Bros. Logging 
Co. v Ketchikan Pulp Co., another overbuying case of wood pulp, where buyers rigged bids to 
pay higher prices for an input and foreclose another buyer and conduct which was held contrary 
to §1 of the Sherman Act and which was not overruled by the Supreme Court in Brook Group.1141 
A relevant difference among these cases that was not discussed in detail by the Court of Appeal is 
that in Reid Bros. Logging Co. v Ketchikan Pulp Co., the prohibited conduct was not carried out 
by a dominant firm, but instead by coordinated undertakings. Under the §1 of the Sherman Act, a 
buyers’ cartel fixing prices or input would qualify as a per se infringement of antitrust law, 
similar to how a conduct is treated as an object restriction of competition under Article 101 
TFEU.  
Pursuant to a Writ of Certiorari, the US Supreme Court reviewed the Judgment by the Court of 
Appeals of the Ninth Circuit and held the latter had erred in law by not applying the Brooke 
Group test to overbuying cases by doing a reverse or mirror application of it.1142 This implies 
that, according to US Supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser, overbuying would only be illegal if the 
                                                          
1138 Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Ore. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F. 3d 1030, 10 (9th Cir. 2005), para. 14. 
1139 Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced 
Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 625-626. 
1140 Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Ore. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F. 3d 1030, 10 (9th Cir. 2005), para. 16 
(emphasis added). 
1141 Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1983), at 1297-98. Rosenfelt (2008), p. 
406. 
1142 See also criticizing the outcome of the decision of the Court of Appeals in Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians 
of Ore. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F. 3d 1030, 10 (9th Cir. 2005); Salop (2004-2005), p. 709-714. Qualifying it as a 
“mechanical description” of Brooke Group see: Hylton, p. 3. See also: Lopatka [2015], p. 81. 
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purchasing undertaking has been able to recoup its losses after predating in the input and the 
downstream markets and whenever the plaintiff manages to prove consumer harm.1143 By taking 
this approach, the US Supreme Court adopted a lenient and narrow stand to exclusionary buyer 
power by emphasizing the impact of buyer power in a related downstream market regardless of 
the effects in the upstream market, which implies that through such policy there is a tendency to 
favor the case of false negatives (erroneous acquittals) rather than false positives (erroneous 
condemnations), and granting more room to buyers with regard to their purchasing patterns.1144 
The US Supreme Court held that overbuying constitutes an exclusionary practice through which a 
powerful buyer “aims to exercise the monopsony power gained from bidding up input prices” to 
then exert monopsony power through withholding demand once the other competitors have left 
the market.1145 It also held that predatory buying and selling are “analytically similar” because of 
the connection between monopsony and monopoly.1146 Consequently, both predatory buying and 
selling require undertakings to incur short-term losses due to the chance to recoup them later on 
and reap supracompetitive profits.1147  
However, the US Supreme Court reasoned that predatory buying schemes are rarely applied 
because the chances of recoupment are slim1148 and, thus, rational buyers will rarely overpay for 
an input,1149 conclusions that are consistent with the findings of this thesis. Furthermore, it argued 
that there are many legitimate reasons why overbuying may occur. For instance, because of a 
managerial error to expand production, to acquire goods before the possibility of an increase in 
the purchasing price of the good it requires, or prevent future shortages, particularly if the good is 
seasonal.  
Additionally, for the Supreme Court, unsuccessful overbuying may be pro-competitive as it may 
spur innovation for instance, by motivating new suppliers to enter the market (since prices of 
input are now higher), and benefiting consumers if there is no recoupment.1150 Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court observed that overbuying is less harmful to consumers, using a pure end 
consumer harm approach, because “a predatory bidding scheme could succeed with little or no 
effect on consumer prices because a predatory bidder does not necessarily rely on raising prices 
                                                          
1143 Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced 
Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 664. Salop (2004-2005), p. 713. 
1144 See also stressing the broader scope granted by Weyerhaeuser to decision making by buyers: Thomas Donovan 
and others, ‘USA: Monopolisation - Predatory Bidding’ 28 European Competition Law Review (2007) N86, p. N87.  
1145 Weyerhaeuser Company, v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc., in 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007), III, 8. 
1146 Also remarking this analytical approach see: Rousseva, [2010], p. 147-148. 
1147 Weyerhaeuser Company, v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc., in 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007), IV A, 
8-9. 
1148 Also suggesting that recoupment chances in this case were reduced see: Salop (2004-2005), p. 713. 
1149 Weyerhaeuser Company, v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc., in 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007), IV B, 
10. 




in the output market to recoup its losses.”1151 Recoupment, if possible, would only be obtained in 
the upstream market through further application of exploitative buyer (monopsony) power vis-à-
vis suppliers. 
Pursuant to these arguments, the US Supreme Court vacated the Judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remanded the case to be retrialed in the light of the Brooke Group test.1152 The 
application of this test demands the plaintiff must prove that Weyerhaeuser Co. was selling logs 
below costs in the output market with the capacity to recoup losses by later exercising 
monopsony power.1153 Hence, the US Supreme Court established a double predation test 
requirement – input and output predation – that may lead to under enforcement of predatory 
buying cases, as I discuss below. 
7.4.5 Weyerhaeuser à la Européene: revisiting the case from an Ordoliberal 
perspective and EU competition law 
In this section, I criticize several aspects of the US Supreme Court Decision and aim to provide a 
“Europeanized” version of the Judgment inspired by an ordoliberal buyer power perspective. In 
my view, if Weyerhaeuser would have been decided by the CJEU, the outcome would have been 
different because of the different philosophical and legal foundations of EU competition law, as 
well as the broader approach to buyer power cases when compared to US antitrust. In a nutshell, 
Weyerhaeuser appears under-inclusive and to be offering a too lenient treatment to instances of 
abusive overbuying by dominant undertakings inspired by the Chicago School, as noted by 
Rousseva,1154 making the claim almost impossible to meet the requirements of the test.1155 
Instead, the approach would look more like the Decision from the 7th Appeal Circuit and the 
suggestions by Kirkwood prohibiting overbuying because of its competitive impact in the 
upstream market and protection of the competitive structure and adoption a welfare standard that 
is broader than a pure end consumer harm standard. 
In Weyerhaeuser, the US Supreme Court adopted a narrow view to the concept of buyer power, 
overbuying, and buying power competitive harm by requiring the application of the Brooke 
Group test and only considering monopsony power as a relevant type of buyer power. This 
approach is incorrect for several reasons.  
                                                          
1151 Weyerhaeuser Company, v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc., in 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007), IV B, 
11. 
1152 This is the same solution that was suggested by Salop in Salop (2004-2005). 
1153 Donovan and others (2007), p. N86; Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 166; Rousseva, [2010], p. 147-18; Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust (West ed, 2011), p. 170. See also the opinion of Blair and Lopatka who in their analysis of this 
case argue that “[u]nder the first prong of our modified rule, the plaintiff would be required to prove that the alleged 
predator sold its output at a price below marginal costs (or a surrogate) or destroyed input”, therefore also incurring 
in downstream losses in Blair and Lopatka (2008), p. 466. 
1154 Rousseva, [2010], p. 148. 
1155 Also remarking about the demanding nature of the test: American Antitrust Institute [2008], p. 127-128. 
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Firstly, and as also remarked by Kirkwood, even before Weyerhaeuser was decided,1156 
overbuying is to be carried out by buyers exercising bargaining power and not monopsony power. 
In fact, overbuying is the reverse of monopsony power; firms do not withhold demand but 
increase demand. Hence, in an overbuying situation input prices and input quantity increases and 
not decrease, as it occurs in monopsony cases. Monopsony may only by exerted after and if 
overbuying becomes a successful conduct as now there are no rival buyers allowing the predatory 
undertaking to recoup the loss of profit through demand withholding and setting exploitative 
purchasing prices. 
Secondly, and related to assumptions of output, the US Supreme Court takes for granted that 
overbuying will not be a problem because the buyer may have excess capacity and, therefore, by 
acquiring more input it will produce more output which will reduce prices downstream. While I 
agree that larger output is beneficial for consumers, this analysis cannot be devoid of a case-
specific study as overbidding may not necessarily result in additional output in all cases; it 
requires available excess capacity from suppliers and that a supplier is also willing to sell more 
units. Furthermore, an increase in costs is likely to shift the price curve downstream upwards as 
well, which will lead to higher prices for end consumers than before the overbuying is initiated. 
Therefore, taking as a given that buying more input translates into more output requires a case-
specific assessment based on spare capacity, costs structures and the existence of demand for 
more output by consumers. 
Thirdly, in Weyerhaeuser the US Supreme Court assumes that predatory buying takes place only 
in cases where the parties compete both in the upstream and downstream markets, as confirmed 
by Lopatka.1157 However, if firms only compete for the acquisition of input (timber) but not in the 
downstream market (because undertaking ‘A’ sells furniture, whereas undertaking ‘B’ sells 
paper) then downstream predation, nor recoupment, is an adequate assessment tool because a 
comparison is not possible among non-rival retailers.1158 In a pure buying predation case the 
powerful buyer wants to exclude rivals from the upstream market, not to leverage market power 
downstream, but to gain further buyer power. Eventually, as rival buyers are squeezed out of the 
market the powerful buyer is able to exert monopsony power vis-à-vis suppliers due to the lack of 
rival buyers for the input and additionally, but not necessarily, may also acquire the assets of 
these excluded rivals at a below competitive price and enter these other downstream markets in 
                                                          
1156 Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced 
Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 627. 
1157 “In the simplest setting for predatory buying, the predator is a dominant firm in the input market; its input 
competitors do not compete with it in the output market; and it has no monopoly power in the output market. These 
are the conditions the US Supreme Court assumed prevailed in Weyerhaeuser”, Lopatka [2015], p. 78. 
1158 Also remarking that a downstream comparison is an unworkable test, even for the selling of the same output see: 
Michael E. Haglund, ‘Weyerhaeuser's aftermath: Increased Vulnerability of Resource Based Input Markets to 
Monopsony’ 53 The Antitrust Bulletin (2008) 411, p. 446-451. 
231 
 
which it did not originally competed, in a practice akin to the ‘squeeze to buy’ theory of harm, 
discussed in section 7.8. 
Fourthly, the application of the Brooke Group test could be criticized.1159 In Weyerhaeuser, the 
US Supreme Court requires the plaintiff to prove overbuying harm by complying with the 
downstream predation requirement of the Brooke Group test.1160 This is, the buying undertaking 
is – in addition to overbuying an input – additionally selling its output below costs in the 
downstream market. Also, said undertaking also needs to recoup its losses by exercising its buyer 
market power in the form of monopsony power (upstream) or monopoly power (downstream).1161 
As put by Blair and Lopatka, “[t]he Court requires an examination of the price and cost of the 
defendant’s output, whereas the predation relates to the defendant’s purchase of an input.”1162 It 
would be difficult for such a stringent requirement to be met by a plaintiff, leaving cases of 
overbuying largely unsanctioned, as also remarked by Carstensen.1163 Likewise, the US Supreme 
Court failed to properly understand buyer power dynamics, as also remarked by Haglund.1164 
On the one hand, the plaintiff must prove that the buyer – with no objective justification – has 
acquired either substantially more input (or its entirety) that it needed and has paid a higher price 
than the “competitive price”, while incurring in a loss. On the other hand, the second limb of the 
test demands yet another anti-competitive conduct in the downstream market: to sell output at a 
price below either average variable costs or prices below average total costs but above average 
variable costs,1165 (i.e.: traditional selling side predation). The reason behind this strict 
requirement seems to be the fact that the US Supreme Court felt that overbuying as an anti-
competitive conduct is unlikely to happen, whereas buying additional input – for legitimate 
business reasons or simply because of a mistake – happens often and should not be discouraged.  
Hence, a successful application of the Brooke Group test would be an indicator that the buying 
undertaking possesses market power in the upstream and downstream markets and, therefore, fits 
the hourglass model, and has also carried out predation as a seller. Therefore, the Brooke Group 
test seems tailored to capture the most severe instances of buyer power abuse but grant large 
leeway to overbuying by dominant buyers that face a competitive market. Therefore, this theory 
assumes and is only applicable if and when the downstream markets are competitive. This lenient 
                                                          
1159 See also criticizing the application of the test but concluding that “the Court’s decision, with certain 
qualifications, is sound though imperfect”, Blair and Lopatka (2008), p. 416. 
1160 See also discussing that not only has to be an overpay in the input market but “the price paid was so high that the 
outlay for logs forced the defendant’s resale price to be below its costs”, Hovenkamp, [2011], p. 170. 
1161 Ibid, p. 170. 
1162 Blair and Lopatka (2008), p. 469. 
1163 Carstensen ‘Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among 
Suppliers’ (2008), p. 317. 
1164 Haglund (2008), p. 411. 
1165 Judgment of 3 July 1991 in AKZO v Commission, C-62/86, EU:C:1991:286, paras. 71-72 Judgment of 2 April 
2009 in France Télécom v Commission, C-202/07 P, EU:C:2009:214, paras. 195-218. See discussing costs levels 
used in EU competition law: Graham, [2010], p. 140-145; Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2012], p. 742-748. 
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approach would be compatible with a strict end short consumer welfare or harm standard to buyer 
power, but not with a broader approach that also factors the competitive structure of the markets 
upstream and downstream, possible dynamic effects concerning suppliers, or the economic 
freedom of other rival buyers.  
In my view, however, despite the fact that there are many reasons why a buyer may legitimately 
acquire more input, having such a strict predatory buying test that also demands downstream 
predation will result in under-inclusion and predatory buying cases not being captured by 
antitrust and competition law, a problem also identified by van Doorn, and Blair and Lopatka.1166 
This is the main problem concerning the applicability of a dual predation test. 
Also, another argument against the application of the Brooke Group test is that buyer that has 
increased its rivals’ costs by overbuying does not need to predate in the downstream market to 
increase its market share. By simply maintaining previous prices or increasing them less than 
those of its rivals, it will be able to capture the excess demand and reap supra-competitive profit 
downstream. Nevertheless, with this I do not discard the fact that downstream predation may not 
take place, what it means is that it is not, and should not be, a necessary requirement for 
overbuying to be an anti-competitive concern. A problem with this criticism is that by overbuying 
the costs of the buyer are increased upstream, which will impact its own costs downstream. 
Therefore, if the buyer sells at the same price as before or a price below its new marginal 
downstream costs, it is incurring in downstream predation because it would be pricing below 
either average variable costs or prices below average total costs but above average variable costs. 
Hence, unless the buyer increases its retailing prices to reflect the current purchasing upstream 
costs, there will be some form of selling side predation. 
An additional reason why the application of the Brooke Group test does not suit overbuying 
situations is that there is actually no need for recoupment in the downstream market if the 
exclusion succeeds. The recoupment can take place in the upstream market alone as the buyer has 
managed to displace rival buyers and is now able to decrease the purchasing prices it pays to 
generate a supracompetitive profit without requiring any increase in downstream prices. The 
recoupment downstream would, in any case, be an additional albeit unnecessary source of profit. 
A caveat to this argument should be made, however, as the argument would not hold in case the 
buyer decides to exert monopsony power upstream and faces downstream competition. If that is 
the case, the demand withhold would affect its profitability as a seller downstream and see how 
rival retailers are able to substitute the amount of goods withheld by the monopsony practice. In 
the case of bargaining power, as there is no demand withhold, if markets are not competitive the 
buyer would not be incentivized to decrease its retailing prices. But if the downstream market is 
                                                          
1166 van Doorn, p. 156; Blair and Lopatka (2008), p. 448. 
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competitive then passing on the lower prices to end consumers would allow it to increase its 
market share and, therefore, increase profits. 
Lastly, Weyerhaeuser follows the Brooke Group Test by assuming that consumer harm – sensu 
stricto – is the requirement to trigger competition intervention in buyer power cases. In so doing, 
the US Supreme Court disregarded granting any protection to competition as such in the 
upstream market, as well as the economic freedom and competitiveness of weaker (but not 
necessarily inefficient buyers), and it concentrated its analysis purely on end consumer harm. 
Blair and Lopatka also seem to criticize this narrow approach to overbuying, when holding that  
the fact that an increase in monopsony power may have little impact on consumers does not 
mitigate the antitrust concern, because the negative impact on sellers by itself warrants equal 
antitrust concern, a point oddly unacknowledged by the Supreme Court in its Weyerhauser [sic] 
decision.1167 
This narrow posture concerning competition intervention in buyer power cases by unilateral 
conduct, in my view, would be inconsistent with the general treatment granted to buyer power 
cases in EU competition law and the case law arguing that a violation of EU competition law 
does not require a “direct link between that practice (the wrongdoing) and consumer prices”.1168 
Consequently, how would the Courts have decided Weyerhaeuser? 
Under EU competition law, the case would have been focused by means of Article 102 as a price 
predation case and, to an extent, using the few and all selling side predation cases as a guiding 
tool or precedent.1169  
In my opinion, the main difference would have been the requirement made by the US Supreme 
Court of direct end consumer harm in order to intervene in the market. The case law and the EU 
competition policy foundations as a whole, and for buyer power specifically, have an approach 
that does not require the evidence of direct end consumer harm to trigger the application of 
Article 102 TFEU, as confirmed by the case law in in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others1170 and 
also in TeliaSonera Sverige.1171 This is the case for buyer power because, as held by the CJEU in 
British Airways v Commission, Article 102 TFEU concerning exclusion is not only designed to 
                                                          
1167 Blair and Lopatka (2008), p. 468. 
1168 Judgment of 4 June 2009 in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, C-8/08, EU:C:2009:343, para. 39. See the opinion 
of Petit who found “unsurprisingly” that the CJEU found that unfair competition applies even absent a direct link 
between the conduct and end consumer harm in Nicolas Petit, The IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy and its Definition 
of "Reasonable" Rates: A Transatlatic Antitrust Divide? (2016) 1, p. 14. See also remarking that evidence of end 
consumer harm is not required to protect competition as a process in Judgment of 6 October 2009 in 
GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others, Joined cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P 
and C-519/06 P, EU:C:2009:610, para. 78 
1169 Judgment of 3 July 1991 in AKZO v Commission, C-62/86, EU:C:1991:286; Judgment of 2 April 2009 in France 
Télécom v Commission, C-202/07 P, EU:C:2009:214; Judgment of 14 November 1996 in Tetra Pak v Commission, 
C-333/94 P, EU:C:1996:436. 
1170 Judgment of 4 June 2009 in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, C-8/08, EU:C:2009:343, para. 36 to 37. 
1171 Judgment of 17 February 2011 in TeliaSonera Sverige, C-52/09, EU:C:2011:83, para. 22. 
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protect the short-term wellbeing of the end consumer but also to protect the competitive structure 
and competition as such, as I discuss in detail below, and also regarding countervailing buyer 
power, as I discuss in chapter 10.1172 This implies that an additional downstream predation 
(which could exist) is not required to prove the existence of an abuse if upstream predation by 
itself is proven. The downstream predation, if anything, would be an additional factor confirming 
the existence of the predation and the perniciousness of the conduct as an exclusionary device, 
but not a pre-requisite. 
Hence, it is likely that the Courts would have been satisfied if the plaintiff were able to show a 
substantial harm to competition in the upstream market that was capable of affecting the 
competitive structure, in this case by excluding a rival from the market without any economic 
justification. Hence, the test is somewhat similar to the one upheld by the 9th Appeal Circuit, but, 
in my view, the test would not need to determine if the overbuying prevented Ross-Simmons 
from obtaining the logs they needed at a fair price.1173 I think fairness would not have been the 
standard applied by the courts to determine if there was predation. Instead, the Courts would have 
resorted to some form of cost analysis to determine the predation in the upstream market. 
The problem with the existing tests and cost benchmarks employed up to now is that the use of 
either average variable costs or prices below average total costs but above average variable 
costs1174 looks at the predation from a selling side perspective and are not an adequate benchmark 
for buyer side cases, as also happens with the applicability of the as efficient competitor test and 
which I discuss below in section 7.9. They are not good indicators because these costs 
benchmarks do not measure the efficiency of the undertaking as a buyer but as a seller. 
Determining what the adequate benchmark to be used would be from an economics perspective 
entails a complex economic assessment, and the Courts have clarified that the Commission has a 
broad margin of discretion when deciding which benchmark to use.1175 
Lastly, another relevant difference is that, as I mentioned above, under EU competition law the 
Courts have not required express evidence of the possibility of recoupment.1176 Therefore, unlike 
in the US, the existence of recoupment would be a relevant factor regarding the predatory pricing 
to determine whether it is abusive and/or exclusionary, but it is does not constitute a pre-requisite 
as in US antitrust law. 
                                                          
1172 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 106 
1173 Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Ore. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F. 3d 1030, 10 (9th Cir. 2005), at 978a. 
These standards have been criticized as not being adequate benchmark for overbuying cases other than naked 
overbuying and hoarding. See: Salop (2004-2005), p. 714; Blair and Lopatka (2008), p. 456. 
1174 Judgment of 3 July 1991 in AKZO v Commission, C-62/86, EU:C:1991:286, paras. 71-72; Judgment of 2 April 
2009 in France Télécom v Commission, C-202/07 P, EU:C:2009:214, para. 195-218. 
1175 Judgment of 30 January 2007, France Télécom v Commission, T-340/03, ECR, EU:T:2007:22, para. 129. 
1176 See section 7.4.1 for the case law and relevant literature dealing with this topic. 
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Therefore, my impression is that if Weyerhaeuser had been litigated before the Courts, the 
overbuying behavior would likely have been to be found in breach of Article 102 TFEU, 
although not anchored on a weak reasoning based on buying more than needed or raising costs 
beyond a ‘fair price’, but on the economic analysis of the foreclosure harm to the state of 
competition in the upstream market by means of an economic analysis of the purchasing conduct, 
that would not necessarily require demonstrating end consumer harm nor an additional 
downstream predation. 
7.5 Concentrations leading to input (vertical) foreclosure 
7.5.1 Horizontal mergers 
As in the case of past and current unilateral input foreclosure, horizontal and vertical mergers that 
may foreclose rival undertakings may be considered anti-competitive. The general standard 
employed concerning input foreclosure is that the concentration would be considered 
incompatible with the SIEC test even if rivals are not forced to exit the market, as it is only 
required to demonstrate “that the rivals are disadvantaged and consequently led to compete less 
effectively.”1177 However, there is little specific guidance for foreclosure – and in general buyer 
mergers – as a consequence of the small amount of buyer-side mergers,1178 which implies that the 
Commission and the Court are likely to evaluate input foreclosure risks in a way that is analogous 
to that which is carried out for seller side cases.1179  
As discussed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, concentrations that create or strengthen buyer 
power in upstream markets “may significantly impede competition, in particular by creating or 
strengthening a dominant position”, especially if the “merged entity were likely to use its buyer 
power vis-à-vis its suppliers to foreclose rivals”.1180 This could be the case, for example, if 
suppliers were to become, or are, dependent on the merged entity and, therefore, would be willing 
to enter into exclusive supply agreements or offer better purchasing conditions than those offered 
to rival buyers. Therefore, input foreclosure in mergers is closely connected with buyer 
dependence. 
                                                          
1177 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 29. 
1178 Scheelings and Wright (2006), p. 233. 
1179 See the Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6 for the general assessment for coordinate and non-
coordinated foreclosing effects of seller-side mergers. 
1180 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 61. 
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This theory of harm of input foreclosure in mergers was used as one of the grounds leading to the 
declaration of incompatibility with the internal market of the Kesko/Tuko concentration.1181 The 
assessment of the proposed merger between two food retailing chains found that the operation 
would have created a dominant buying and selling – hourglass shaped – undertaking that would 
have been in a position to both exploit their suppliers – as discussed in chapter 9, section 9.4.3.2. 
– as well as also potentially excluding rival buyers, in particular new entrants from other Member 
States, hence impacting market integration.1182 According to the Commission, input foreclosure 
risks arose due to two circumstances. First, dependent suppliers would be less willing to find and 
switch to alternative sources of demand (buyers) to prevent retaliation from the dominant buyer 
(as occurs in cases of unfair purchasing practices that I discuss in chapter 9), and because the new 
undertaking is preferred by consumers, for example, because of its widespread distribution. 
Second, and derived from the exclusionary pressure vis-à-vis rival buyers, the existence of such a 
large retailer and powerful buyer would have decentivized new entries into the retailing business 
due to the lack of access to some of the suppliers.1183 
A similar theory of harm linking dependence of suppliers to input foreclosure was used by the 
Commission when reviewing the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas concentration among two airplane 
manufacturers and buyers of spare parts that was declared compatible with the internal market 
pursuant to commitments.1184 The Commission held that the proposed concentration “would lead 
to a large increase in Boeing’s buying power vis-à-vis its suppliers,” some of which received up 
to 50% of their total turnover in sales to Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. If those suppliers were 
to lose such a powerful buyer this would be “very critical for them”, meaning that suppliers were 
dependent on the buyer.1185 As a result of the merger, the buyer power of Boeing would be 
strengthened and, therefore, this “would increase suppliers’ overall reliance on Boeing and might 
put them in a position where they could not resist prioritizing Boeing over Airbus.”1186 
                                                          
1181 Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53. See 
discussing the case from a purely exploitative perspective see: Scheelings and Wright (2006), p. 234. See also: Faull 
and Nikpay, [1999], para. 4.154. 
1182 Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53, taken from 
the unabridged version, para. 11, upheld by the General Court in Judgment of 15 December 1999, Kesko v 
Commission, T-22/97, ECR, EU:T:1999:327. 
1183 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 31. 
1184 Commission Decision of 30 July 1997 declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the 
functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.877 - Boeing/McDonnell Douglas) [1997] OJ L 336/16. 
1185 Commission Decision of 30 July 1997 declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the 
functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.877 - Boeing/McDonnell Douglas) [1997] OJ L 336/16, para. 
105. 
1186 Commission Decision of 30 July 1997 declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the 




Consequently, Boeing would be in a position to either secure exclusive supply agreements or 
induce purchasing price discrimination to the detriment of competing buyers.  
Based on the risk of input foreclosure as a side effect of supplier’s dependency, the Commission 
concluded that, “it seems likely that the increase in Boeing’s buying power could significantly 
weaken the competitive position of Airbus and, in turn, strengthen the position of Boeing.”1187 To 
offset the input foreclosure risks, Boeing accepted commitments that required it to not exert 
undue influence on its suppliers by either promising to increase demand or threatening to 
decrease demand in any way that could lead suppliers to reject requirements from other 
competitors, while still entitled to select its suppliers and enforce contracts regarding price, 
delivery, quality and proprietary information.1188 
7.5.2 Vertical Mergers 
Vertical mergers between a buyer and one (or several) of its suppliers may also raise concerns 
regarding buyer induced input foreclosure. Post-merger the new entity may be in a position to 
hamper or eliminate altogether actual or potential rivals’ access to a necessary input as it has 
vertically integrated, thereby putting those rival buyers and business partners of the supplier at a 
disadvantage, restricting their ability to compete with the newly merged entity, as discussed at 
length in the Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (“Non-horizontal Mergers 
Guidelines”).1189  
However, vertical mergers – like agreements among non-competing undertakings – do not 
generally have significant buyer power induced foreclosing effects and tend to be pro-competitive 
because they provide room for efficiencies arising from the complementarities of the operations 
and may reduce transaction and administrative costs.1190 Hence, it is unlikely that vertical 
mergers would create substantial risks of input foreclosure that may cause the concentration to 
significantly impede effect competition. Nevertheless, if the vertical merger leads to a creation of 
substantial buying power and has the capacity to hinder significantly competition in the 
downstream market due to foreclosure of rival undertakings, then it would be not compatible with 
                                                          
1187 Commission Decision of 30 July 1997 declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the 
functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.877 - Boeing/McDonnell Douglas) [1997] OJ L 336/16, para. 
108. 
1188 Commission Decision of 30 July 1997 declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the 
functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.877 - Boeing/McDonnell Douglas) [1997] OJ L 336/16, para. 
119. 
1189 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, paras. 31-57. See discussing the economics of input 
foreclosure in vertical mergers and the Commission’s practice: Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 8-009 to 8-019. 
1190 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 




the internal market. Practice and literature, however, confirm that anti-competitive foreclosure in 
vertical mergers is a rare phenomenon, as I discuss in detail below.1191 
Merger-induced vertical input foreclosure takes place whenever a large buyer merges either with 
several suppliers or with one large supplier to secure the most efficient input source(s). By 
integrating one of the buyers into the upstream market, an alternative demand source for other 
suppliers disappears and the former buyer becomes a rival supplier, which alters the purchasing 
patterns in the market.1192 Through the integration, the merged entity may limit input access by 
refusing to supply competitors, and ultimately may increase its rivals’ costs in the upstream 
market, which will confer an advantage in the downstream market on the downstream department 
of the merged undertaking.1193 In the purchasing market, the undertaking’s upstream department 
will employ its ability to sell the necessary input to weaken competing buying firms by either 
charging them higher input prices (purchasing price discrimination, as discussed in section 7.6) or 
simply refusing to supply the good.1194 To do so, the merged undertaking must have market 
power in the upstream market (i.e. the place where rival firms buy), as remarked by Non-
horizontal Mergers Guidelines and the literature, which links this theory of harm with market 
power leverage, and which I discuss in section 7.7.1195 This explains why, for the Commission, 
the focus of the assessment should be placed on the downstream (output) market and less so on 
the upstream market, as the merged entity will seek to leverage its buyer market power 
downstream.1196 
In the assessment of possible vertical foreclosure effects pursuant a concentration the 
Commission pays attention to three key aspects connected to the theories of harm discussed 
above:  
i) the ability to foreclose access to an input upstream;  
ii) the existence of an incentive to foreclose;  
iii) significant impact in the competition downstream market. 
  
In the following I discuss these three conditions. 
                                                          
1191 Also of this opinion and claiming they are “very rare”, see: Schwalbe and Zimmer, [2009], p. 369. 
1192 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 37. 
1193 See also making a similar remark regarding vertical mergers in general: Schwalbe and Zimmer, [2009], p. 362. 
1194 Refusal to supply is a typical example of exclusionary conducts by a dominant seller and, thus, outside of the 
scope of discussion of this dissertation. For some literature in the topic see: Werden ‘The Law and Economics of the 
Essential Facility Doctrine’ (1987-1988); Areeda (1989); Lidgard (1997); Stothers (2001); Korah (2002); Nagy 
(2007). 
1195 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 35; Schwalbe and Zimmer, [2009], p. 363-364; 
Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 8-011. I discuss exclusionary buyer power market leverage in section 7.7 of this 
same chapter. 
1196 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 32. 
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Pursuant to the merger, the new entity may have acquired the ability to foreclose rivals to input 
access as it may now decide to not supply its competitors, engage in purchasing price 
discrimination, or degrade the quality of the input sold to rivals. The foreclosing ability can be 
done unilaterally or by means of agreements. By itself, the merging undertaking is only able to 
foreclose rivals if by reducing access to competitors it is able to negatively affect “the overall 
availability of inputs for the downstream market in the terms of price or quality”;1197 for example, 
if the remaining suppliers are less efficient or offer goods not preferred by end consumers in the 
case of ‘must stock’ products. If in addition to the merger the new entity secures exclusive supply 
obligations with other suppliers then the foreclosing effect is larger. However, if there are any 
alternative sources of supply, foreclosure is unlikely. 
Additionally, the merging undertaking must also be incentivized to foreclose competition in the 
upstream market. This decision will be made based on whether or not the foreclosure is profitable 
for both the upstream and downstream divisions of the merged entity.1198 Foreclosing rival buyers 
– by not selling any output, for example – will reduce profit as a supplier but will also increase 
profits as a retailer. Therefore, there is a trade-off to be considered between profitability as a 
supplier or as a retailer and if the foreclosure would lead to a loss of profits then the merging 
entity is expected to not engage in it. This was the approach taken by the Commission in 
Philips/Intermagnetics, where anti-competitive foreclosure effects were rejected as it was more 
profitable for the merged entity to keep on supplying competing downstream undertakings and 
because buyers would have been able to find alternative sources of supply.1199 
Furthermore, a vertical concentration would be incompatible with the internal market if the 
foreclosure leads to “increased prices in the downstream market thereby significantly impeding 
effective competition”.1200 As discussed above, buyers of the merged entity may suffer from a 
post-merger price increase, which may decrease their competitiveness as retailers in the 
downstream market. However, not all post-merger price increase would mean that the 
concentration is incompatible, as the effects must be substantial in the sense that not only a small 
rival should see its costs increased, but rather the input foreclosure must affect a significant 
proportion of rival undertakings and also have a significant price increase.1201 Furthermore, 
adverse effects on downstream competition may occur if the input foreclosure is capable of 
                                                          
1197 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 36. 
1198 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 40. 
1199 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4300 — Philips/Intermagnetics) [2007] OJ C 123/1, 
paras. 56-62. 
1200 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 47. 
1201 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 48. 
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affecting potential entrants in the market because it sells output in discriminatory conditions 
(partial foreclosure) or refrains from doing so (total foreclosure). Also, if there are no other 
sources of supply – because other competitors are also integrated or the input is necessary – then 
foreclosure of incoming undertakings will be significant. Interestingly, despite the fact that the 
focus of the commission is on the foreclosure effects on downstream competition and prices, the 
analysis by the Commission is centered on granting protection to both end consumers and rival 
buyers to safeguard the ability of rival firms to compete and the competitive process, which 
attests to a standard going beyond pure end consumer harm towards a broader harm to trigger the 
applicability of competition law to buyer power cases. 
Lastly, buyer power is also taken into account regarding the input foreclosure effects of a vertical 
merger in its passive form as countervailing buyer power may limit the foreclosing effects of the 
concentration. If the merging firm faces a strong buyer upon which it may be dependent, then the 
risks of foreclosure will diminish as not supplying goods or doing so in less favorable conditions 
will reduce its profit as a supplier and will strengthen the position of rival suppliers that now have 
a strong customer.1202 
Summing up, in common with most buyer power exclusionary cases, the main concern regarding 
input foreclosure in horizontal and vertical concentrations is centered on the adverse competitive 
effects on downstream competition and how input foreclosure affects the competitiveness of rival 
undertakings in the retail market by hindering access to supply sources or decentivizing entry of 
new players. Horizontal input foreclosure is largely caused by the existence of supplier 
dependence that leads to a fear of retaliation from the buyer as their turnover is critically 
dependent on keeping such a large business partner,1203 and which is in line with the dualistic 
approach to buyer power effects proposed in this thesis and analogous to the input foreclosure 
treatment discussed under Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU. On the other hand, vertical foreclosure arises 
due to the unwillingness of the merged entity to supply rival buyers or apply discriminatory 
purchasing prices, possibly affecting the ability of rivals to compete in the downstream market. 
However, the likelihood of anti-competitive vertical mergers is small as the conduct will most 
often not be profit maximizing and, therefore, seen as mostly pro-competitive, as occurs with 
vertical supply agreements among non-competing undertakings. 
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7.6 Purchasing price discrimination 
Another way of foreclosing rivals through exclusionary buyer power is resorting to purchasing 
price discrimination. Price discrimination occurs when buyers (or sellers) pay different prices for 
the same products under the same conditions and in a manner that does not reflect supply or 
buying costs in any persistent way.1204 By and large, price discrimination is pro-competitive as it 
allows a more efficient distribution of goods and the ability to exert neutralizing seller power. 
Therefore, most instances of price discrimination are legitimate and efficiency enhancing, as 
remarked by Bishop and Walker;1205 this would be the case for instance if price discrimination is 
based on economies of scale or quantity based discrimination.1206 However, price discrimination 
in legal terms may also imply that there is a differentiated and discriminatory treatment among 
different undertakings that may trigger the application of competition law. Unjustified and 
discriminatory purchasing price discrimination with an exploitative1207 or exclusionary effect is 
prohibited under Article 102(2)(c) TFEU for buyers and sellers alike absent an objective 
justification,1208 and whenever it distorts competition either among competing buyers or vis-á-vis 
suppliers.1209 Also purchasing price discrimination is forbidden among coordinated undertakings 
by means of Article 101(1)(d) TFEU. In both cases, as noted by Akman, the prohibition of price 
discrimination is interpreted as targeted against rival undertakings and not end consumers.1210 
Hence, there is a tension between the economic efficiency generated by price discrimination and 
the prohibition of legal discrimination (sensu stricto) between parties, which is one of the most 
                                                          
1204 Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 6-028; Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials 
[2014], p. 396; Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 802. 
1205 Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 6-028. See the analysis regarding price discrimination’s effect on welfare in 
ibid para. 6-031 to 6-036. Also stressing the positive effects of price discrimination in a buyer power context see: 
Scheelings and Wright (2006), p. 211. 
1206 Judgment of 9 September 2010, Tomra Systems and Others v Commission, T-155/06, ECR, EU:T:2010:370; 
Judgment of 19 April 2012 in Tomra and Others v Commission, C-549/10 P, EU:C:2012:221, para. 212. 
1207 I deal with exploitative purchasing price discrimination in chapter 8, section 8.4. 
1208 Such a efficiency argument could be assessed as part of an objective justification analysis under Article 102 
TFEU or an objective justification pursuant to Article 106(2) TFEU as discussed in Judgment of 29 March 2001 in 
Portugal v Commission, C-163/99, EU:C:2001:189, paras. 67-78. See also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in 
C-53/03 - Syfait and Others (GlaxoSmithKline), EU:C:2004:673 E.C.R. [2005] I-04609, para. 72. For a thorough 
discussion of objective justifications defenses in exclusionary abuses see: Albertina Albors-Llorens, ‘The Role of 
Objective Justification and Efficiencies in the Application of Article 82 EC ’ 44 Common Market Law Review 
(2007) 1727; Penelope Papandropoulos, ‘How Should Price Discrimination be Dealt with by Competition 
Authorities?’ 3 Concurrences (2007) 34; Østerud, p. 245-299; Rousseva, [2010], p. 259-296. 
1209 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 144. Under US 
antitrust law purchasing price discrimination is prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act and not the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. The Robinson-Patman Act is a legislative piece more akin to those European national legislations 
prohibiting unfair purchasing practices and which are discussed in detail in chapter 9 of this dissertation. In 
economics, price discrimination is understood as the situation in which the same exact good is sold at different prices 
that do not correspond to any cost differences. For some competition economics dealing with price discrimination 
see: Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 215-223; Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 6.29-6.36. 
1210 Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law And Economic Approaches [2012], p. 232. 
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discussed aspects of the EU case law1211 as the Courts have taken a stand that is seen as 
“extremely hostile”1212 or old fashioned.1213  
Purchasing price discrimination can be done through many different practices, such as rebates, 
predatory pricing schemes and forms of exclusive dealing,1214 and I cover all aspects in detail in 
this chapter and in chapter 8. In this section, however, I adopt a narrow approach and discuss the 
situation in which the buyer incentivizes its suppliers so they charge a higher selling price to rival 
buyers to raise their costs and put them at a competitive disadvantage in a related downstream 
market. Hence, in this chapter I will not discuss traditional selling side price discrimination or the 
effects of rebates,1215 but rather will center on buyer induced price discrimination with 
exclusionary effects on competing buyers.  
Buyer induced price discrimination occurs when a powerful buyer forces suppliers to sell goods 
to other buyers at a higher price than those that are offered to it; this implies than the buyer 
obtains a lower purchasing prices than those offered to its competitors.1216 In such a way, the 
buyer obtains a competitive advantage over smaller rivals that may force their market exit, 
resulting in the foreclosure effect.1217 Hence, exercise of buyer (bargaining) power to obtain 
better terms and conditions based on buyer power will unavoidably result in price discrimination, 
as the outcome of the negotiation depends on the bargaining power of each party.1218 Therefore, 
the issue would be determining when the discrimination has exclusionary (and exploitative)1219 
effects and when such effects are unjustified. 
                                                          
1211 See, inter alia: Judgment by the General Court in Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission 
of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:343; and Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v 
Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166; Judgment of 9 September 2009, Clearstream v Commission, T-301/04, 
ECR, EU:T:2009:317; Judgment of 24 October 2002 in Aéroports de Paris v Commission, C-82/01 P, 
EU:C:2002:617; T-504/93 - Tiercé Ladbroke v Commission, EU:T:1997:84 E.C.R. [1997 II-00923]; Judgment of 14 
February 1978 in United Brands v Commission, C-27/76, EU:C:1978:22. 
1212 Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 6-040. 
1213 See discussing the economic treatment given to price discrimination (rebates) in Intel v Commission and 
addressing part of this discussion: Wils (2014). See in general: Denis Waelbroeck, ‘Michelin II: A Per Se Rule 
Against Rebates by Dominant Companies?’ 1 Journal of Competition Law and Economics (2005) 149; Christian 
Ahlborn and David Bailey, ‘Discounts, Rebates and Selective Pricing by Dominant Firms: A Trans-Atlantic 
Comparison’ 2 European Competition Journal (2006) 101; Damien Geradin and Nicolas Petit, ‘Price Discrimination 
under EC Competition Law: Another Antitrust Doctrine in Search of Limiting Principles?’ 2 Journal of Competition 
Law and Economics (2006) 479; Nicholas Economides, ‘Loyalty/Requirement Rebates and the Antitrust 
Modernization Commission: What is the Appropriate Liability Standard’ 54 Antitrust Bulletin (2009) 259; Zenger 
and Walker, [2013]. 
1214 Geradin and Petit (2006), p. 479; Graham, [2010], p. 155. 
1215 For a discussion concerning the effects of rebates limiting exercise of buyer power and some literature dealing 
with it see chapter 11. 
1216 Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 167. 
1217 Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced 
Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005); Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Healthcare Prices, p. 7. 
1218 See also: Scheelings and Wright (2006), p. 210. 
1219 I discuss exploitative purchasing price discrimination in chapter 8.4 of this dissertation. 
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7.6.1 How does buyer purchasing price discrimination operate and what are 
its effects? 
Unlike in the case of selling side price discrimination – which occurs through rebates or discounts 
– although a buyer may not directly set exclusionary purchasing price discrimination, it “induces 
a supplier to engage in price discrimination by causing it to grant the buyer a lower price than it 
charges competing buyers”.1220 A way of differentiating buyer induced price discrimination with 
selling side discrimination is that the buyer is the one that has the largest amount of bargaining 
power and the one ‘forcing’ or ‘motivating’ the seller to grant it the price concession. However, 
the distinction is blurred and probably impractical for most cases, as it is also in the interest of the 
seller to price discriminate to the benefit of a large buyer to secure more sales than otherwise; 
hence, the buyer induced discrimination is the flip side of the coin of selling side discrimination. 
For instance, Isolation’s Supermarket will ‘convince’ the slaughterhouses of Isolation to grant it a 
preferential price for processed beef, thanks to its buyer power1221 and, therefore, charge a non-
preferential (and higher) price to its competitors, which may not be economically justified (i.e.: 
the suppliers’ cost curve is flat, the buyer does not buy in large amounts allowing for supplier’s 
economies of scale, or there are no additional distribution costs). Thus, by forcing such a 
purchasing price discrimination, Isolation’s Supermarket is increasing their rivals’ costs and 
possibly forcing exit from the market of some of them. Accordingly, buyer power is usually 
employed to gain a competitive benefit in the adjacent downstream market, reinforcing the 
dualistic effect of buyer power. 
Furthermore, in some cases buyer market power is leveraged to induce price discrimination of the 
same entity as a retailer (selling side price discrimination). This was the theory of harm employed 
in Irish Sugar v Commission, where it was found that Irish Sugar, a dominant undertaking as a 
buyer of raw sugar and retailer of processed sugar, granted its customers of processed sugar 
rebates that were seen to have a discriminatory effect, by charging buyers of sugar that competed 
with its own processed sugar brand discriminatory prices for industrial sugar.1222 Thus, pricing 
discrimination by a dominant buyer in a related market was used to exclude retailing 
competitors.1223 
The effects of buyer induced price discrimination, however, are not particularly straightforward 
under an efficiency analysis to conclude it is a conduct in breach of Article 101(1)(d) or 102(c) 
TFEU. Justified purchasing price discrimination (for example, based on quantities purchased) 
                                                          
1220 Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced 
Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 629 (emphasis in original). 
1221 Also suggesting that the ability to impose price discrimination is a characteristic of having market power: Jones 
and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials [2014], p. 396. 
1222 Judgment of 7 October 1999, Irish Sugar v Commission, T-228/97, ECR, EU:T:1999:246, paras. 150-172. 
1223 Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials [2011], p. 397-398. 
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will tend to be efficiency enhancing in allocative terms and passed on to consumers, whereas 
unjustified purchasing price discrimination will tend to be inefficient (from a broader welfare 
perspective) and disrupt the competitive structure, as the efficiency gains of the buyer and 
perhaps its consumers do not out outweigh the losses of other buyers, suppliers and consumers. 
Thus, the analysis of purchasing price discrimination is highly counterfactual.1224 
More often than not, however, the purchasing price discrimination is justified in terms of 
economic efficiency, even if the difference in price can have an impact on rivals’ costs that may 
also have a foreclosure effect. In such circumstances, for example, whenever the price reduction 
is based on the amount of quantities purchased (secondary line discrimination),1225 the price 
discrimination does not have an anti-competitive effect, even if induced by the buyer and, 
therefore, not of an abusive nature. 
However, and as I discuss below, there are other types of rebates – those with a loyalty enhancing 
effect and the residual type of rebates that are conditional and presumed to have anti-competitive 
effects.  
Furthermore, even if purchasing price discrimination is a buying conduct it may have foreclosing 
effects in the upstream and downstream markets, as also recently confirmed by the EFTA Court 
in Sorpa bs. v The Icelandic Competition Authority, as the “disadvantage must occur on a market 
either downstream or upstream of the dominated market.”1226 In the downstream market, the 
powerful buyer receives a discount that lowers its costs and grants it a competitive advantage in 
the downstream market by reducing its retail prices and, therefore, attracting end consumers to 
the detriment of rival buyers that compete in the downstream market. If this is the case, prima 
facie, such behavior would be efficiency enhancing as the undertaking employs its bargaining 
power to obtain better purchasing conditions that are then passed on to consumers, who now 
acquire more goods at a lower price, having a positive impact on allocative efficiency, although 
only if there is competitive pressure in the downstream market. Absent intense competition in the 
retailing market, the buyer is not forced to pass on the benefits to end consumers and, as rivals 
increase their output prices, the powerful buyer can also increase prices and still capture 
demand.1227  
                                                          
1224 O'Donoghue and Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC [2006], p. 561-562. 
1225 Geradin and Petit (2006), p. 483. 
1226 Judgment of 22 September 2016 in Sorpa bs. v The Icelandic Competition Authority (Samkeppniseftirlitið) E-
29/15 [2016], para. 108. 
1227 The economic analysis of purchasing price discrimination follows closely the discussion on the effects of 
bargaining power in general addressed in chapter 3. See also how Kirkwood distinguishes 5 different situations in 
which welfare of competing buyers and consumers can be affected under such circumstances in: Kirkwood ‘Buyer 
Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination 
and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 647-652. 
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Concerning the upstream market, the effects are more ambiguous. Induced purchasing price 
discrimination may lead to a waterbed effect in the upstream market if suppliers decide to 
increase their selling prices to other buyers to recoup the lost supracompetitive profits to the 
powerful buyer.1228 Consequently, if the rivals increase their costs and retail prices, the powerful 
buyer may also increase its retail prices to reap additional profit.1229 However, the reverse effect 
can also take place if the discount obtained by the large buyer from a seller with oligopoly power 
(i.e.: charging prices above the competitive level) also generates a spillover or anti-waterbed 
effect as the discount is also obtained, in the same or a smaller scale, by other smaller buyers.1230 
The spillover effect would occur whenever the other buyers are aware of the discount obtained by 
the powerful buyer and demand discounts from their supplier which would theoretically lead to 
lower purchasing prices, and also lower downstream prices if the downstream market is 
competitive. Therefore, the exercise of buyer power and price discrimination benefits both the 
large buyer and other rivals, even if unwanted, because it lowers prices overall. If there is such a 
spillover effect on smaller buyers then the buyer power application will benefit competing 
undertakings and consumers alike. This spillover defense and effect that could be claimed by the 
powerful buyer to justify its buying discrimination conduct is efficiency enhancing and, 
therefore, not to be prohibited under EU competition law, also bearing similarities to the legal 
treatment granted to countervailing buyer power as a seller-side market power neutralizing force 
by the Courts, as I discuss in chapter 10. Under the ‘comparison test,’ to determine the 
sufficiency of countervailing buyer power to neutralize seller market power, the Courts demand 
that in addition the neutralizing effects spillover and benefit other smaller buyers than the one 
exercising the countervailing buyer power. 
Contrastingly, if purchasing price discrimination is employed against suppliers with no oligopoly 
power (i.e.: pricing on the competitive level) then there are no supracompetitive profits to extract 
and, if any, the imposition of purchasing price may have exploitative or exclusionary effects, as 
discussed in chapters 8 and 9 with regard to unfairly low purchasing prices and unfair 
purchasing practices, respectively.  
If there is no spillover effect due to the purchasing price discrimination, the effects on consumers 
and market conditions depend on the case circumstances. If the powerful buyer faces downstream 
competition – or if it wants to gain market share - it will have to pass on its benefits, in the form 
of lower retail prices, to its final consumers, who will therefore be benefited, at least in the short 
term. This is the argument raised by large food retail chains that claim that obtaining preferential 
                                                          
1228 The waterbed effect was discussed in chapter 3.6.1. 
1229 Krattenmaker and Salop (1986).  
1230 See also: Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for 
Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 645-651. For the discussion of the 
anti-waterbed effects see chapter, 3, section 3.6.2. 
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purchasing conditions allows them to obtain lower purchasing prices that are passed on to end 
consumers and, therefore, being efficiency enhancing. 
Therefore, this analysis has shown that discriminatory purchasing prices by a powerful buyer (or 
a group of coordinated buyers) may have some anti-competitive foreclosure risks that may be 
captured under either Article 101(1)(d) or Article 102(c) TFEU. However, an economic analysis 
of these types of practices reveals that purchasing price discrimination is the natural consequence 
of bargaining power exercise (the powerful buyer receives a discount due to is bargaining 
abilities) and, it is usually economically justified and efficient.  
In the section below I briefly discuss the legal standards used under Article 102(c) TFEU to 
determine when price discrimination is abuse for unilateral conducts. 
7.6.2 What is the legal standard used for purchasing price discrimination? 
In EU competition law, there are no specific examples of cases dealing with exclusionary price 
discrimination sensu stricto. Therefore, the analysis of these types of possibly anti-competitive 
practices must be carried out following the general approach taken with respect to exclusionary 
price discrimination selling side cases. Due to the complexity of the topic and the fact that it is 
not linked to buyer power exertion itself, I limit my discussion in this section to highlighting the 
general treatment of exclusionary price discrimination by dominant undertakings in EU 
competition law in general. 
As mentioned above, purchasing price discrimination may fall under the scope of application of 
Article 102(c) TFEU. The first element to show is that there is a “dissimilar condition” with 
regard to the purchasing prices paid by the buyer, which, according to Geradin and Petit’s 
interpretation of the case law, implies “dissimilar prices”.1231 For purchasing prices to be a 
dissimilar condition, the facts of the case and, therefore, the buyer’s characteristics must be based 
on “equivalent transactions”, as required expressly by Article 102 TFEU.  
This first analysis is where the buyer power of an undertaking plays an important role in 
justifying the difference in prices paid. The fact that a large buyer is able to acquire a large 
amount of goods may also allow the supplier to exploit economies of scale, reduce transaction 
and transportation costs and secure an important sale to a customer, constituting an example of 
secondary line discrimination. Therefore, the purchases made by a buyer with market power are 
likely to be different from those made by a single buyer and the counterfactual evidence of the 
case at hand is very relevant when determining if two purchases are equivalent. Hence, the ability 
of a buyer to obtain a discount and which it is likely to pass on in the form of lower prices to end 
consumers if there is downstream competition would be efficiency enhancing and should with 
                                                          
1231 Geradin D and Petit N, ‘Price Discrimination under EC Competition Law: Another Antitrust Doctrine in Search 
of Limiting Principles?’ (2006) 2 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 479, p. 486. 
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“[g]reat caution […] be the norm when considering the condemnation of price discrimination in 
such circumstances”, as remarked by Papandropoulos.1232 Because of this, plaintiffs would have 
to prove that the pricing practice is not due to quantities purchased, because such type of 
discounts or rebates are economically justified and legal. 
A second requirement imposed by the wording of Article 102 TFEU is that rival buyers of the 
dominant undertaking must be put at a competitive disadvantage, this being the situation leading 
to the foreclosure of those buyers.1233 In this case, this would be the situation of rival buyers that 
see their purchasing costs increased and, therefore, are in a worse situation than before. 
In the case of rebates, the recent case law clarifies what the legal treatment to these types of price 
discrimination that may have a foreclosing effect is, also recognized in the soft law and the 
literature.1234 In Intel v Commission, the General Court classified rebates according to three large 
types depending on their effects, particularly regarding exclusion.1235 This classification of rebate 
types was later on confirmed by the CJEU in Post Danmark, with the important remark that any 
type of rebates can be economically justified.1236 Very recently, however Advocate General Wahl 
strongly criticized the classification of rebates done by the General Court in Intel v Commission 
in his opinion on the same case, which is now pending for clarification by the CJEU.1237 
First, there are quantity rebates, which would be forced on a supplier by its buyer. These types of 
rebates are generally considered to not create an anti-competitive foreclosure effect because they 
are linked to the amount of goods purchased in which the buyer acting as a retailer, if there is 
downstream competition, is entitled to pass on that reduction to the customer in the form of a 
more favorable tariff.1238 Hence, the larger discounts obtained by a buyer due to its purchasing 
size would not in principle be abusive, even if they would increase the rivals’ costs or cause the 
buyer to have lower costs. This is economically sound, as I discussed earlier. 
Second, there are conditional rebates, in which the price discrimination obtained by the buyer 
depends on the fulfillment of an additional requirement, for example buying most of the goods 
from the same seller or reaching a threshold in order to obtain the rebate. These types of 
exclusivity and loyalty enhancing rebates are deemed in principle anti-competitive because they 
                                                          
1232 Papandropoulos (2007), p. 38. 
1233 See also stressing that the foreclosed firms must be rivals of the undertaking investigated: Geradin and Petit 
(2006), p. 487. 
1234 See also Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, 
para. 37. Wils (2014), p. 406. 
1235 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v Commission, T-286/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:547, paras. 74-78. 
1236 Judgment of 6 October 2015 in Post Danmark, C-23/14, EU:C:2015:651, para. 31. 
1237 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl of 20 October 2016 in Intel Corporation v Commission, C-413/14 P, 
EU:C:2016:788, paras. 39-174. 
1238 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v Commission, T-286/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:547, para. 75; Judgment of 30 
September 2003, Michelin v Commission, T-203/01, ECR, EU:T:2003:250, para. 58. 
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are not economically justified, have a foreclosure effect on rivals due to the suction effect1239 of 
beneficiaries wanting to reach the conditional margins, and restrict the economic freedom of 
undertakings in choosing their sources.1240 
Thirdly, the case law recognizes a third and residual type of rebates “where the grant of a 
financial incentive is not directly linked to a condition of exclusive or quasi-exclusive supply 
from the undertaking in a dominant position, but where the mechanism for granting the rebate 
may also have a fidelity-building effect”, which do not have an explicit exclusivity component, 
but may be anti-competitive depending on the circumstances, for instance the attainment of 
individual sales or purchases objectives.1241 
The EU case law adopts a formalistic approach to the last two types of conducts, by assuming 
these are likely to have a potential foreclosure anti-competitive effect. Nevertheless, a dominant 
undertaking is capable of demonstrating that its rebate scheme is not anti-competitive if it is able 
to “justify the use of an exclusivity rebate system, in particular by showing that its conduct is 
objectively necessary or that the potential foreclosure effect that it brings about may be 
counterbalanced, outweighed even, by advantages in terms of efficiency that also benefit 
consumers”.1242 
From a buyer power perspective, the two types of rebates that the Courts have identified as 
having a potential foreclosure effect on rivals are unlikely to be the type of purchasing price 
discrimination ‘imposed’ by a buyer on a seller. This is the case because the buyer, if it has 
substantial market power to be dominant, would not make its price discounts conditional on 
certain targets; instead it would request or impose a uniform rebate on all its purchasing without 
any kind of additional requirements from its side. Therefore, in my view, one is unlikely to see 
any of these types of buyer induced purchasing discrimination, which explains the absence of any 
of these kinds of cases under EU competition law, although this does remain a theoretical 
possibility, and which is likely to be evaluated under the same standards as for selling side cases. 
What does exist is the payment of supra-competitive bonuses from the buyer to the supplier, as I 
                                                          
1239 Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 6.038. See also: Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the 
Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 40. 
1240 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v Commission, T-286/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:547, para. 77; Judgment of 6 
October 2015 in Post Danmark, C-23/14, EU:C:2015:651, para. 33. 
1241 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v Commission, T-286/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:547, para. 78; Judgment of 30 
September 2003, Michelin v Commission, T-203/01, ECR, EU:T:2003:250, para. 73; Judgment of 15 March 2007 in 
British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, paras. 65 and 67. 
1242 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v Commission, T-286/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:547, para. 94. See also reiterating 
this possibility of objective justification and cited by the General Court: Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-
La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, para. 90; Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v 
Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 85 to 86; Judgment of 27 March 2012 in Post Danmark, C-209/10, 
EU:C:2012:172, para. 40 to 41.  
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discuss in the section below, but that is not a discount obtained by the buyer but rather a form of 
overbuying for an input, as I discuss regarding British Airways v Commission in section 7.7. 
 This way of approaching rebates and the fact that the case law has tailored the application of 
exclusive and residual types of rebates explain why authors like Gifford and Kudrle in the US 
argue that Article 102(c) TFEU  
applies only to large sellers that can meet the criteria for ‘dominance’ […] Thus, while Congress 
ostensibly designed Article 82(c) and the Robinson-Patman Act to prevent buyers from being 
competitively disadvantaged, the two provisions actually direct their focus in opposite directions. 
Article 82(c) focuses on the pricing behavior of powerful sellers while the core concern of the 
Robinson-Patman Act is upon the purchasing behavior of powerful buyers.1243  
Although it is true that Article 102(c) TFEU is unlikely to capture buyer induced price 
discrimination, this does not mean that it could not potentially apply to it. Hence, I think the 
remarks by Gifford and Kudrle might be too absolute and were probably made to emphasis the 
differences between EU competition law and the Robinson-Patman Act as an instrument to 
prevent buyer induced exclusion, which I discuss below. 
Also, and more recently, the CJEU has confirmed that in order for purchasing price 
discrimination to constitute an abuse of dominance, it is abusive only to the extent that it has a 
distorting effect on competition as “charging a single price to customers for whom supply costs 
differ, cannot of itself suggest that there exists an exclusionary abuse”.1244 
Lastly, and of importance for buyer power cases, the CJEU1245 has confirmed that the effects of 
exclusionary price discrimination are prohibited, regardless of whether the price discrimination 
takes place in the upstream market but the foreclosure effects are present in the downstream 
market, as was confirmed by the General Court in Irish Sugar v Commission.1246 In a buyer case, 
this would imply, therefore, that the purchasing price discrimination by the buyer could be 
carried out to eliminate competition from a rival buyer that also acts as a rival retailer, which is 
consistent with the treatment given to buyer market power leverage, as I discuss below in section 
7.7. 
7.6.3 The Robinson-Patman Act: exclusionary purchasing price 
discrimination in US Antitrust law 
Under US antitrust, competing buyers excluded by buyer induced discrimination may have 
standing to file a claim based on the Robinson-Patman Act and its prohibition of secondary line 
                                                          
1243 Daniel J. Gifford and Robert T. Kudrle, ‘The Law and Economics of Price Discrimination in Modern Economies: 
Time for Reconciliation?’ 43 UC Davis L Rev (2010) 1235. 
1244 Judgment of 27 March 2012 in C-209/10 - Post Danmark, EU:C:2012:172, para 30. 
1245 Judgment of 6 March 1974 in joined cases C-6/73 and C-7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial 
Solvents v Commission, EU:C:1974:18, para. 25. 
1246 Judgment of 7 October 1999, Irish Sugar v Commission, T-228/97, ECR, EU:T:1999:246, para. 165. 
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discrimination (that one that puts other buyers at a competitive disadvantage pursuant a demand 
by other buyer to a supplier).1247 Unlike EU competition law regulation for single behavior, the 
Act applies to any supplier or intermediary buyer regardless of the involved undertaking’s market 
power and the market impact of the conduct,1248 taking a very stern stance towards price 
discrimination by buyers, even stricter than EU competition law, as I discuss below, and 
disregarding any type of economic justification for the buyer induced purchasing price 
discrimination.  
The explicit goal of the Robinson-Patman Act, a substantial amendment of the Clayton Act,1249 is 
to limit the capacity of powerful buyers to exert buyer market power that allows them to obtain 
preferential purchasing conditions from sellers.1250 Therefore, this Act aims at limiting the use of 
buyer power and preventing price discrimination on suppliers. To do so, the Act prohibits price 
discrimination in two ways. First, discrimination by sellers that would sell the same good to two 
different buyers at different prices (primary line discrimination), for example, by granting rebates 
or preferential dealing conditions.1251 Second, buyer induced exclusionary price discrimination as 
discussed above (secondary line discrimination). In this case both the buyer and the supplier are 
held in breach of Section §2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, which makes it look more akin to 
regulation through Article 101 TFEU than Article 102 TFEU, even if it is the buyer that is the 
one ‘imposing’ the discrimination. However, Section §2(f) will only trigger if there is active 
participation by the retailer after being induced or forced by buyer, and it will not be applicable 
if the seller claims that it is meeting rival’s competition or the discrimination is justified, as 
interpreted by the US Supreme Court in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v FTC.1252 
The Act, unlike the rest of the US antitrust law, protects the interest of competitors1253 without 
express regard to efficiency concerns,1254 as confirmed by the US Supreme Court in Jefferson 
Cty. Pharm. Ass'n v. Abbott Labs, in which the US Supreme Court held that the Act’s aim is to 
protect small businesses over large organizations.1255 Because of this aim the Act “has the 
                                                          
1247 Primary line discrimination, i.e.: targeted vis-à-vis suppliers is discussed in chapter 8 in section 8.4. See also 
using the term for buyer induced exclusion: Blair and Harrison, [2010]. 
1248 Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘The Robinson-Patman Act and Competition: Unfinished Business’ 68 Antitrust Law 
Journal (2000-2001) 125, p. 128. 
1249 Marius Schwartz, ‘The Perverse Effects of the Robinson-Patman Act’ 31 Antitrust Bulletin (1986) 733, p. 733. 
1250 See also Mezines stressing already in 1969 that the Robinson-Patman Act is an instrument to limit buyer power 
as: “[o]ne of the primary purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act is to control large-scale buying power so that small 
consumers will not be unduly prejudiced by their lack of purchasing power” in Basil J Mezines, ‘Group Buying--
When is it Permitted under the Robinson-Patman Act’ 44 New York University Law Review (1969) 729, p. 729. 
1251 Hovenkamp ‘The Robinson-Patman Act and Competition: Unfinished Business’ (2000-2001), p. 128. 
1252 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v Federal Trade Commission, 440 U.S. 69 (1979). 
1253 Also stressing that the Act is meant to protect competitors and not economic efficiency: Geradin and Petit 
(2006), p. 487-488. 
1254 Terry Calvani and Gilde Breidenbach, ‘An Introduction to the Robinson-Patman Act and its Enforcement by the 
Government’ 59 Antitrust Law Journal (1990) 765, p. 766. 
1255 Jefferson Cty. Pharm. Ass'n v. Abbott Labs., 460 U.S. 150 (1983). 
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distinction of being almost universally unpopular among antitrust scholars” as remarked by 
Ross1256 and is said to capture price differences but not price discrimination.1257 Hansen, for 
instance, argues that the Robinson-Patman Act is not really an antitrust piece of legislation and 
that it only is “an antitrust statute in name only”.1258 Gifford, on the other hand goes further and 
claims it is an “anachronism [… whose] purpose is inconsistent with the current consensus that 
the antitrust laws are designed to foster efficiency and thus to add to the total well-being of 
society.”1259 Indeed, a reading of the Act reveals that more than being a piece of competition law, 
it is a piece of unfair competition law,1260 a topic I discussed when dealing with unfair purchasing 
practices in chapter 9. This is because the Act adopts an un-economical and strict approach to 
buyer power purchasing discrimination as it forbids it regardless of the existence of market power 
by either the buyer inducing the exclusionary treatment of the seller grating the rebate. However, 
not all sectors of Antitrust recommend repealing the act, as is the case of the American Antitrust 
Institute, albeit it recommends making amendments to it.1261 
The wording and the strict approach followed by the Robinson-Patman Act is the result of 
historical circumstances. It was created due to the pressure and lobby of small buyers against the 
emergence of chain/department stores in the first decade of the twentieth century.1262 Traditional 
businessmen saw how buyers with substantial bargaining power were able to obtain better prices 
from their suppliers (buyer induced price discrimination) and grant them a competitive advantage 
in the downstream market, as they were able to pass on the benefits to end consumers by setting 
lower retailing prices. The proponents of the Robinson-Patman Act saw those better terms and 
conditions as ‘unfair,’ despite the fact that, on occasion, they were obtained by legitimate 
reasons such as cost differences, economies of scale, and superior efficiency. 
                                                          
1256 Thomas W. Ross, ‘Winners and Losers under the Robinson-Patman Act’ 27 Journal of Law & Economics (1984) 
243, p. 243. Also calling the Act’s effect as “perverse” see: Schwartz (1986). Calling the Act as “irritating to almost 
anyone who is serious about antitrust” see: Hovenkamp ‘The Robinson-Patman Act and Competition: Unfinished 
Business’ (2000-2001), p. 125. See criticism the effects of the Robinson-Patman Act and suggesting that prohibiting 
purchasing price discrimination increases overall prices: Daniel P. O'Brien and Greg Shaffer, ‘The Welfare Effects of 
Forbidding Discriminatory Discounts: A Secondary Line Analysis of Robinson-Patman’ 10 Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization (1994) 296. 
1257 Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 23. 
1258 Hugh C. Hansen, ‘Robin-Patman Law: A Review and Analysis’ 51 Fordham L Rev (1983) 1113, p. 1124. 
1259 Daniel J. Gifford, ‘Farewell to the Robinson - Patman Act - The Antitrust Modernization Commission's Report 
and Recommendation’ 53 The Antitrust Bulletin (2008) 481, p. 515-516. 
1260 See the opinions of O’Brien and Shaffer stressing the fact that the Robinson-Patman Act aims at precluding 
unfair exclusionary buyer power tactics when remarking that: “in an effort to protect small business from alleged 
unfair purchasing practices of larger rivals, and thereby to ensure ‘equal competitive opportunity’, Congress enacted 
the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936” in O'Brien and Shaffer (1994), p. 296; and also Abood who stressed the lobby 
campaign of independent merchants and suppliers against what they saw as unfair purchasing practices in Richard R 
Abood, ‘Differential Pricing of Pharmaceuticals and Retail Competition under the Robinson-Patman Act’ 11 
American Journal of Law & Medicine (1985), p. 296. 
1261 American Antitrust Institute [2008], p. 98. 
1262 Calvani and Breidenbach (1990). 
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Despite its stern approach to buyer-induced price discrimination, application of the Robinson-
Patman Act has increasingly diminished, particularly since the 1970s and the ‘US Antitrust 
revolution’, as remarked by Gifford and Kudrle and confirmed in a recent study by Luch et 
alia.1263 This dis-application of the Act is pursuant to the US Courts interpretation of it and the 
low priority these types of cases receive from Antitrust agencies. Furthermore, the case law and 
the Act’s interpretation have also narrowed its applicability. Firstly, the Act only applies to sales 
and purchases of commodities and does not cover sales of services nor leases. Secondly, goods 
must be of “like grade and quantity” which implies that they must be close substitutes. Because 
the Act applies only to the sales of “like grade and quantity” from the same supplier it only 
captures conduct affecting intra-brand competition and not competition among different 
producers of different goods.1264 Thirdly, the buyer that is harmed by the foreclosure must prove 
damage to its business, which, as remarked by Blair & Harrison, is quite difficult in cases of 
exclusionary buyer power.1265 Lastly, the Act only applies in cases of interstate sale, limiting its 
geographical space of application.  
7.6.3.1  Exclusionary buyer induced discrimination 
The Robinson-Patman Act precludes buyer induced price discrimination by making it unlawful 
for “any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or 
receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section”.1266 The type of exclusionary 
purchasing that is pursued under the Robinson-Patman Act includes conducts in line with those 
discussed in the section 7.7 below. For example, buyers must refrain from inducing suppliers to 
grant discounts that are not justified in terms of costs or meeting competitor’s prices or granting 
promotional services or allowances that are not available to the same extent, or only available to a 
lesser extent, to competing buyers. 
As mentioned, purchasing price discrimination will be prohibited regardless of the buyer’s 
market power and even absent consumer harm and without requiring harm to market-wide 
competition.1267 This was clarified by the US Supreme Court in Morton Salt when holding: 
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly clear that Congress 
considered it to be an evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive advantage over a small 
buyer solely because of the large buyer's quantity purchasing ability.1268 
                                                          
1263 Gifford (2008); Gifford and Kudrle (2010), p. 1235; Ryan Luchs and others, ‘The End of the Robinson-Patman 
Act? Evidence from Legal Case Data’ 56 Management Science (2010) 2123. 
1264 Hovenkamp ‘The Robinson-Patman Act and Competition: Unfinished Business’ (2000-2001), p. 126. 
1265 Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 167. 
1266 15 U.S. Code § 13(f) - Discrimination in price, services, or facilities (emphasis added). 
1267 Hovenkamp ‘The Robinson-Patman Act and Competition: Unfinished Business’ (2000-2001), p. 125; Kirkwood 
‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price 
Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 634. 
1268 Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948), 43 (emphasis added). 
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Therefore, under the Robinson-Patman Act, obtaining a price reduction due to bargaining power 
ability of the buyer that may put other rival buyers at a disadvantage because they do not receive 
the same price reduction would be an infringement of antitrust laws, even if the buyer does not 
have substantial upstream nor downstream market power. However, despite the triggering of the 
prohibition absent substantial buyer (bargaining power), and as remarked by Kirkwood, buyer 
induced exclusionary price discrimination would be unlikely to arise if the buying undertaking 
lacks some substantial bargaining power vis-à-vis the specific supplier; i.e. the buyer would not 
be able to obtain a discount and prevent the supplier from giving discounts to rival buyers.1269 
Hence, when applying the rule the lack of substantial market power requirement will be balanced 
by the economics exerting purchasing price discrimination that requires substantial buyer power 
to operate. 
As a conclusion, the Robinson-Patman Act treats exclusionary buyer power discrimination under 
US antitrust law in a more restrictive manner than EU competition law, which, in my view, may 
be unjustified as it will render as an Antitrust violation instances where bargaining power is 
exerted without a real foreclosing effect to competitive buyers.1270 As a commonality, both 
regimes sanction buyer induced purchasing price discrimination because of its exclusionary 
effects. A large buyer forces suppliers to sell goods (or services in the case of the EU) at higher 
prices to competing undertakings of the buyer, which raises their costs and makes them less 
competitive in a connected downstream market or, if do not compete downstream, to have less or 
worse access to a required input and, therefore, exit either the upstream and downstream market 
in the long run. However, in the case of EU competition law this would only be unlawful if there 
is an ‘agreement’ among some of the buyers forcing such discrimination or if the buying 
undertaking is dominant. If the exclusion is pursuant to the buying pressure of a dominant 
undertaking that imposes the discrimination under EU competition law, only the dominant 
undertaking would be in breach, not the supplier. In contrast, according to the Robinson-Patman 
Act, no substantial market power is required to trigger the application of the law and, in the case 
of buyer induced purchasing discrimination with foreclosing effects, both the buyer and the 
supplier would be held liable under Section 2(f), if the supplier has actively participated in the 
foreclosive conduct. 
The lack of substantial market power requirement and its application even absent consumer and 
competition harm makes the Robinson-Patman Act prone to over-enforcement, particularly for 
                                                          
1269 “The firm must have significant market power as a buyer in the form of bargaining power that it can exert against 
the seller of the input”, Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards 
for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 636. 
1270 Also supporting this claim, see the opinion of Hovenkamp who argues that: “[i]n sum, to impose Robinson-
Patman Act liability when significant buyer power is lacking is to go beyond the concerns of the Congress that 




situations in which there is no need for competition intervention because the purchasing price 
discrimination is justified and the natural consequence of bargaining power exertion. Therefore, 
in my view, an excessively punishing competition policy against buying discrimination absent 
coordination among undertakings or unilateral conduct by a buyer with substantial buyer market 
power, is economically unjustified if the intention of the act is to protect the competitive process 
and/or consumer welfare and it is also disproportionate even if there is room for a limited 
protection of rival buyers to preserve the competitive conditions, as happens under EU 
competition law. For these reasons the provisions on exclusionary buyer induced price 
discrimination of the Robinson-Patman Act more resemble provisions of unfair competition than 
competition law and explain why there has been not only a decline in the application of the law 
but also why the Antitrust agencies have not prioritized its enforcement, as well as why the US 
Courts have narrowed the Acts interpretation. 
7.7 Leveraging market power from input to output markets with a 
foreclosing effect 
Exclusionary practices such as the one discussed above can be exerted along with, or in 
connection to, the leverage of market power by an undertaking from one market to another, in 
this case upstream buying market power towards downstream retailing market power. Leverage, 
however, is not exclusive to buyer power cases and in general refers to the circumstance in which 
an undertaking will employ its market power in one market to gain market power in another. 
Therefore, leverage in itself is not an autonomous conduct but the consequence or effect of 
another conduct, for example obtaining exclusivity agreements with the best suppliers of an input 
to strengthen the ability of the buyer to compete as a retailer. Also, leveraging has taken many 
forms in competition law cases, for example, using the market power of an undertaking in 
electricity generation to exclude a rival selling light bulbs,1271 or concerning complementary 
goods to a main product,1272 or using local geographic market power to maintain or strengthen its 
position in an adjacent market, as discussed by Inderst,1273 and as happens in the case of tying and 
bundling.1274  
                                                          
1271 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). See commenting this case from a state action doctrine 
perspective: Schwarz JD, ‘The Use of the Antitrust State Action Doctrine in the Deregulated Electricity Utility 
Industry’ (1999) 48 American University Law Review 1449, p. 1460-1462. 
1272 Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc., et al. 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
1273 Roman Inderst, ‘Leveraging Buyer Power’ 25 International Journal of Industrial Organization (2007) 908. 
1274 Also remarking the connection of leveraging of market power and tying and bundling in connection with 
exclusionary rebates see: Nicolas Petit, ‘Intel, Leveraging Rebates and the Goals of Article 102 TFEU’ 11 European 
Competition Journal (2015) 26, p. 38-39. See linking buyer power leverage with tying and bundling: Blair and 
Harrison, [2010], p. 37. For literature discussing tying and bundling practices and its legal treatment see, inter alia: 
Daniel J. Seidmann, ‘Bundling as a Facilitating Device: A Reinterpretation of Leverage Theory’ 58 Economica 
(1991) 491; Jean Tirole, ‘The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer’ 1 Competition Policy International (2005) 1; F. 
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Additionally, market power leverage is a rather common abusive conduct, which has been dealt 
with on several occasions in EU competition law and typically as exerted by dominant 
undertakings. In Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v Commission the 
CJEU set the foundations for exclusionary (unilateral) market power leverage. The Court held 
that  
[a]n abuse of a dominant position on the market in raw materials may thus have effects restricting 
competition in the market on which the derivatives of the raw material are sold and these effects 
must be taken into account in considering the effects of an infringement, even if the market for the 
derivative does not constitute a self-contained market.1275  
This is true, particularly if “it is further apparent that the undertaking in question held a dominant 
position on both markets concerned,” as held in Irish Sugar v Commission, where Irish Sugar had 
an hourglass shape by virtue of being dominant both in the market of purchasing raw sugar and 
the retail market of processed sugar in Ireland.1276 Similarly, under US antitrust law market 
leverage may be captured by Section 2 of the Sherman Act, as recognized by the US Supreme 
Court in Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc.1277 and reaffirmed by the 
Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit in Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited v. British Airways 
Plc.1278 
In buyer power leveraging cases, an undertaking will employ its buyer power in the upstream 
market to affect a downstream market where it acts as a retailer that has a connection with the 
input market in which it carried out the foreclosive conduct through the granting of a 
supracompetitive bonus.1279 By exercising buyer power vis-à-vis its suppliers and creating a 
loyalty enhancing effect with respect to them, the powerful buyer may disadvantage rival buyers 
that also compete in a related downstream. This could be done, for example by securing all input 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Enrique Gonzalez Diaz and Anton Leis Garcia, ‘Tying and Bundling under EU Competition Law: Future Prospects’ 
3 Competition Law International (2007) 13; Einer Elhauge, ‘Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theory’ 123 Harvard Law Review (2009) 397; Christian Ahlborn and David S. Evans, ‘The 
Microsoft Judgment and its Implications for Competition Policy Towards Dominant Firms in Europe’ 75 Antitrust 
Law Journal (2009) 887; Erik Hovenkamp and Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm’ 52 
Arizona Law Review (2010) 925; Nicolas Petit and Norman Neyrinck, ‘Back to Microsoft I and II: Tying and the 
Art of Secret Magic’ 2 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (2011) 117. 
1275 Judgment of 6 March 1974 in joined cases C-6/73 and C-7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial 
Solvents v Commission, EU:C:1974:18, para. 22. See also in the same sense when dealing with leveraging of market 
power and granting discriminatory rebates: Judgment of 7 October 1999, Irish Sugar v Commission, T-228/97, ECR, 
EU:T:1999:246, para. 166; Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-
219/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:343, para. 127. 
1276 Judgment of 7 October 1999, Irish Sugar v Commission, T-228/97, ECR, EU:T:1999:246, para. 166 (emphasis 
added). 
1277 Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc., et al. 504 U.S. 451 (1992), at 483. 
1278 Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited v. British Airways Plc, 99-9402 (2nd Cir., 2001). 
1279 See also remarking that buyer power is used in the upstream market to affect conditions in a related downstream 
market: Carstensen ‘Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of Discrimination 
Among Suppliers’ (2008), p. 309. See also stressing that leveraging market power can affect either the upstream or 
the downstream activities of a competitor: Judgment of 22 September 2016 in Sorpa bs. v The Icelandic Competition 
Authority (Samkeppniseftirlitið) E-29/15 [2016], paras. 99-118. 
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or the most efficient input sources through bonuses which will allow the buyer to gain and exert 
market power in a now less competitive downstream market allowing the powerful buyer to reap 
supra-competitive benefits as a retailer.1280 Therefore, leverage of buyer power either increase 
rivals’ costs in a form that is analogue to margin-squeezing practices,1281 because buyer power 
leverage combines several types of effects and conducts and is exerted by applying them jointly. 
On most occasions, the leverage of buyer market power is possible because suppliers are 
dependent on the powerful buyer and, therefore, suppliers fear retaliation of the buyer and 
succumb to its demands; therefore, the exclusion is also based on the potential risks of buyer 
power exploitation. For example, Isolation’s Supermarket employs its buyer power in the beef 
purchasing market by granting slaughterhouses a bonus fee or fidelity benefit for entering into an 
exclusive supply agreement with Isolation’s Supermarket. This, on the other hand, forecloses 
other buyers that now have no access to the beef sold by the slaughterhouses and permits 
Isolation’s Supermarket to use its buyer power to gain downstream market power. Other times, 
however, the leverage can be exerted because the buyer uses its ‘deep pockets’ to secure 
exclusivity agreements upstream and leverage its ability to acquire an input or service to buyer to 
distort competition in a related downstream market where it offers its services as retailer. 
Importantly, under EU competition law, exclusionary buyer market power leverage is captured 
by Article 102(b) or (c) TFEU even if the powerful buyer is not directly competing with its 
foreclosed rivals in a similar market but only if the input acquired is necessary for the affected 
foreclosed undertakings to carry out its own economic activity, as held in Aéroports de Paris,1282 
and confirmed in British Airways v Commission for buyer power cases.1283 This implies that 
exclusionary buyer power leveraging conducts are precluded even absent strict downstream 
competition harm, if the conduct has a substantial effect in the upstream market; in other words, 
EU competition law intervenes even if end consumer prices are not affected to protect the 
competitive process. However, it ought to be remarked that with this protection of competition as 
a process is also for the benefit of end consumers of the other market in which the rival carries 
out its economic activity. By intervening in a market, even if in its subsequent direct downstream 
                                                          
1280 Salop (2004-2005); Scheelings and Wright (2006). 
1281 See, for instance, the leverage of market power in an upstream and downstream market to foreclose competitors 
in a related market in Judgment of 10 April 2008, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, T-271/03, ECR, EU:T:2008:101, 
upheld by the CJEU in appeal in Judgment of 14 October 2010 in Deutsche Telekom v Commission, C-280/08 P, 
EU:C:2010:603; Judgment of 17 February 2011 in TeliaSonera Sverige, C-52/09, EU:C:2011:83; Judgment of 29 
March 2012, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, T-336/07, ECR, EU:T:2012:172, appealed and 
upheld by the CJEU in Judgment of 10 July 2014 in Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, C-295/12 
P, EU:C:2014:2062; Commission Decision of 18 July 1988 relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC 
Treaty (Case No IV/30.178 Napier Brown - British Sugar) [1988] OJ L 284/41.  
1282 Judgment of 12 December 2000, Aéroports de Paris v Commission, T-128/98, ECR, EU:T:2000:290; upheld in 
full in Judgment of 24 October 2002 in Aéroports de Paris v Commission, C-82/01 P, EU:C:2002:617. 
1283 Judgment by the General Court Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 




market there is no harm end consumer harm, Courts protect the wellbeing of end consumers in 
the other indirectly affected downstream market where the rival carries its own downstream 
activity. Therefore, as a whole, such perspective protects competition as such and end consumers, 
being in line with my discussion on ordoliberalism in chapter 4. Also, leveraging would be 
precluded by competition law if buyer market power is used to reserve for the buyer, without an 
objective justification, an auxiliary or derivative activity on a related upstream (input market) to 
affect and restrict competition in a downstream market where it may or may not be an dominant 
undertaking, as confirmed by the CJEU in Tetra Pak v Commission.1284 
Also, buyer power leverage may constitute a breach of US antitrust law, as confirmed by the US 
Supreme Court in United States v Griffith,1285 in which it was found that that leveraging market 
power as the owner of the only movie theater in small towns to decrease the purchasing price it 
paid for the movies and to prevent competitors from obtaining enough first- or second-run films 
to operate successfully was a violation of the antitrust laws. Because, in accordance to the US 
Supreme court, “it would be a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act to use monopoly power in one 
market to gain a competitive advantage in another, even without an attempt to monopolize the 
second market”.1286 However, the standards have changed pursuant to the US Supreme Court 
case Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan where it was held that §2 of the Sherman Act “makes the 
conduct of a single firm unlawful when it actually monopolizes or threatens to do so”.1287 This 
approach is narrower than the previous requirement of gaining a competitive advantage and is in 
line with the Weyerhaeuser doctrine that requires an element of double predation in the related 
downstream market, as discussed above, and adopts a consumer harm approach to buyer power 
exclusion. 
In the following sections, I discuss the legal treatment given by EU competition law to a buyer 
leveraging its market power downstream as discussed at length in British Airways v Commission. 
7.7.1 Input leveraging through supra-competitive bonuses and British 
Airways v Commission 
Buyer market power can be leveraged though the granting of fidelity enhancing bonuses to 
suppliers to obtain a competitive advantage in the downstream market by foreclosing rivals’ 
                                                          
1284 Judgment of 14 November 1996 in Tetra Pak v Commission, C-333/94 P, EU:C:1996:436, paras. 21-33.  
1285 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948). See also interpreting this case as involving buyer power leverage: 
Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 37. 
1286 Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited v. British Airways Plc, 99-9402 (2nd Cir., 2001), quoting its own precedent in 
Berkey Photo, Inc v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, (2nd Cir. 1979), at 275. 
1287 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993), at 459. 
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access to a necessary input or distribution channel, as was the case of British Airways v 
Commission.1288  
By granting exclusionary and retroactive bonuses, a powerful buyer does not employ its buyer 
power exploitatively. Quite the contrary, it grants supracompetitive benefits to its suppliers to 
secure their fidelity when selling their output, which compensates the suppliers for their inability 
to sell to other buyers and, therefore, the buyer now has no, or fewer, suppliers, which raises its 
purchasing costs. Such supracompetitive benefits may have the effect of creating a quasi de facto 
exclusive supply obligation that makes it more difficult for other competitors to reach end 
consumers, for instance by not being able to sell airplane tickets because there are no available 
travel agents to connect the buyer/supplier with the passengers. 
This modality of market leveraging was the one employed in British Airways v Commission.1289 
In this case the leveraging of buyer market power involved a complex set of conducts that 
included the payment of supracompetitive bonuses to travel agents in order to obtain an 
exclusivity or quasi exclusivity effect. The General Court and the CJEU confirmed that the type 
of supracompetitive bonuses used by British Airways as a buyer were abusive because they were 
conditional and loyalty enhancing rebates that were not economically justified.1290 The leverage, 
therefore, occurred because it was its ability of the buyer to exclude or make difficult the access 
to an upstream services that constituted a necessary distribution mechanism, the travel agents, to 
reach downstream consumers for the sale of air passenger transport and which, therefore, 
impacted on the rivals’ ability to compete downstream. From the suppliers’ perspective, the use 
of buyer power in the form of supracompetitive bonuses with an exclusionary effect made either 
entry very difficult to the market of rivals, or “more difficult or impossible for its co-contractors 
to choose between various sources of supply or commercial partners”, as confirmed by the 
CJEU.1291 And, therefore, the granting of exclusionary rebates increased other rivals’ costs in the 
upstream market to be less of a competitive threat in the downstream market, levering market 
power as a purchaser to benefit its competitiveness as a seller. 
To clarify, the leverage of buyer market power was an instrument and not the conduct itself that 
created the foreclosure, these were the loyalty enhancing rebate schemes. Due to the scope of my 
                                                          
1288 Judgment by the General Court in Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 
December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:343; Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-
95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166. 
1289 This series of Decisions and Judgments comprehends 3 different legal instruments to be discussed, namely: 
Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 - 
Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1; Judgment by the General Court Judgment of 17 December 2003, British 
Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:343; and Judgment of 15 March 2007 in 
British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166. 
1290 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 270-299; Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, 
EU:C:2007:166, para. 57-80. 
1291 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 68. 
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thesis, I will center on how buyer power was leveraged, and not deal in extenso with the 
treatment of rebates under EU competition law, nor the formalistic approach taken to some types 
of rebates. Due to the complexity of the case and the fact that I discuss several aspects of it in 
different parts of this dissertation, I will present a brief summary of the case and then discuss how 
and what the legal treatment given to buyer power leverage by the Courts was. 
7.7.1.1 British Airways v Commission: long story short 
Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited (Virgin) lodged a complaint against certain commercial 
conducts carried out by BA before the Commission as they were said to be contrary to Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU. At the time of the complaint, BA was a privately owned company 
incorporated under English law. It was formerly a public undertaking and was privatized in 1987 
as part of the liberalization process in the air transport sector.1292 BA is active in the air transport 
market and, at the time of the Decision, was the largest airline in the United Kingdom with a 
market share of between 46% in 1992 and 39.7% in 1998, the years in which the discount rebates 
object of analysis were in force.1293 In contrast, the main competitors of BA, namely five airline 
undertakings, had much smaller market share, as was noted both by the Commission1294 and the 
General Court.1295  
Virgin complained that BA engaged in commercial practices that constituted an abuse of 
dominance by offering rebates, upgrades or other incentives to travel agencies by BA when 
purchasing their services.1296 For Virgin, the strategy of BA was to offer supracompetitive 
commissions to travel agents to incentivize selling (almost exclusively) BA tickets to end 
consumers. At the time of the decision, travel agents constituted a necessary distribution tool for 
airline tickets and, therefore, a necessary vehicle to end consumers as travel agents represented an 
average of 80 to 85% of the sales of air tickets in the UK. Only the remaining 15 to 20% were 
sold directly by the airline’s offices or other alternative mechanisms.1297 
Said financial incentives were granted through three types of supracompetitive bonuses: 
marketing agreements, global agreements and a performance reward scheme, rewarding the sale 
of BA tickets to end consumers. The three agreements had a common feature: all of them had a 
                                                          
1292 For more on the presence of a ‘public’ element on buyer power cases see chapter 12, section 12.2. 
1293 Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 
- Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1, para. 36.  
1294 Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 
- Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1, para. 41. 
1295 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 211-212. 
1296 Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 
- Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1, para. 3-4. 
1297 By the time the Decision was issued the sales of air transport tickets by alternative means (i.e.: websites) was still 
rather small. Both the Commission and the EU judiciary made reference to this issue when analyzing alternative 
sources of supply. 
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noticeable effect at the margin because of its retroactivity. In this sense, the Commission held that 
“[i]n each case meeting the targets for sales growth leads to an increase in the commission paid 
on all tickets sold by the agent, not just on the tickets sold after the target is reached”.1298 The 
effect was said to be fidelity inducing because when a travel agent is close to reaching the 
threshold, it will do all it can to keep selling BA tickets, as this will have very large effect on the 
commission it receives. For a competitor, on the other hand, the rebates make it very costly to 
compete with BA as it will have to “pay a much higher rate of commission […] to overcome this 
[the loyalty/fidelity building] effect”.1299 This characteristic rendered the rebates considered both 
by the Commission and the Courts judiciary exclusionary and the vehicle to leverage the market 
power downstream. Because the rebates were found to be conditional, having a loyalty-enhancing 
effect was not economically justified, British Airways supracompetitive schemes were found to 
be anti-competitive under EU competition law.1300 
7.7.1.2 How did BA leverage its market power? 
In the assessment of the case, the Commission, and consequently the Courts, focused the analysis 
of the rebates on the position of British Airways as buyer of a service, and not as a supplier of 
goods in the downstream market.1301 As it was pleaded by the Commission “BA is a purchaser in 
a dominant position on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services, especially 
because of the percentage which sales of BA tickets represent in the total of air ticket sales”.1302 
This condition of a buyer of a service was found to be “irrelevant having regard to the definition 
of the market in question. Article [102 TFEU] applies both to undertakings whose possible 
dominant position is established, as in this case, in relation to their suppliers and to those which 
are capable of being in the same position in relation to their customers.”1303 Hence, the General 
                                                          
1298 Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 
- Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1, para. 29. This finding by the Commission was upheld both by the GC 
and the CJEU in the respective procedures. 
1299 Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 
- Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1, para. 29. See discussing how the fact that BA’s market share declined 
was a signal that the input leverage was not effective: Bishop and Walker, [2010], paras. 6-042 - 6-043. 
1300 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 270-299 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, 
EU:C:2007:166, para. 57-80. 
1301 A remark concerning this point ought to be made. In British Airways v Commission the purchasing of a service or 
a distribution channel is not identical to the purchase of a physical input. However, in my view the acquisition of a 
service constitutes a purchasing activity, regardless if such service is acquired in order to carry out a downstream 
economic activity (the air passenger transport). Also, the case can be seen as a downstream conduct because it 
implies buying a distribution service that would act as if the undertaking was an integrated firm or that acquires just 
an agent to carry out part of its business. 
1302 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 22. 
1303 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 101. 
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Court also looked at the conduct from a buyer perspective or, at least, did not challenge the 
Commission’s way of presenting the case. 
To secure the best access to an input and make it more difficult, or very costly, for rivals to obtain 
such service, British Airways remunerated suppliers of travel agency services by means of a 
supracompetitive bonus for the sale of its tickets.1304 Therefore, British Airways used its buyer 
market power as acquiring a distribution service to gain access to a necessary input and at the 
same time prevent rival buyers from getting access to it or making it very costly, due to the nature 
of the rebates, which had a loyalty and retroactive enhancing effect, which had no economic 
justification as they were not based on quantity. As British Airways was a very important air 
transportation service provider (with a market share that at its lowest was 39.7%) suppliers were 
said to be dependent on the sales or airline tickets and the commissions paid by BA created a 
relation with similar effects as a selling exclusivity for the travel agents.1305 Such dependence 
was the key element in order for British Airways to be able to leverage its buyer market power 
and obtain an advantage in the retailing market by foreclosing access of competitors to the most 
efficient travel agents.1306 
This dependence existed according to the Commission due to “BA’s position on the markets for 
air transport take it an obligatory business partner for travel agents”. For the travel agents the 
sales of BA’s tickets was their largest source of income,1307 due to the “extremely successful”1308 
position of BA as provider of air transport services in the UK. This bargaining strength vis-à-vis 
travel agents gave British Airways substantial bargaining power that could be used to secure a 
semi-exclusivity relation with the as suppliers of travel agency services that were the vehicle to 
sell airline tickets at the time. Likewise, for airline companies, travel agents were a necessary 
distribution channel to reach each consumers, as travel agents represented an average of 80% to 
85% of the sales of air tickets in the UK at the time and only the remaining 15% to 20% were 
sold directly to end consumers.1309 Therefore, a symbiosis existed between airlines and travel 
                                                          
1304 “Payment of the performance reward or the special bonus was subject to travel agents increasing their sales of 
BA tickets from one year to the next”, Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 
December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:343, para. 10. 
1305 Also remarking that this was the exclusionary effect of the rebates and, therefore, foreclosing access to 
competing buyers see: Østerud, p. 72. 
1306 The General Court confirmed that BA was a dominant seller even if there was evidence that the market shares of 
their competitors increased during the years the bonus schemes were implemented in Judgment of 17 December 
2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:343, para. 212-217. 
1307 Also remarking the fact that British Airways was an unavoidable trading partner for the travel agents see: Petit 
‘Intel, Leveraging Rebates and the Goals of Article 102 TFEU’ (2015), 33-34. See also stressing the strong position 
of British Airways vis-à-vis its suppliers: Graham, [2010], p. 162. 
1308 Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 
- Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1, para. 91. 
1309 By the time the Decision was taken, the sales of air transport tickets by alternative means (i.e.: websites) were 
still rather small. Both the Commission and the Courts made reference to this issue when analyzing alternative 
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agents to sell tickets to end consumers and for travel agents to maximize their profits by the 
bonuses. 
To secure access to the best travel agents and incentivize them to sell the largest amount of 
British Airways tickets as possible, British Airways offered them bonuses through three financial 
incentive programs: through marketing agreements, global agreements and a performance reward 
scheme. All these incentive agreements rewarded travel agents for their sale of British Airways’ 
air transport tickets to end consumers. The three agreements had a common feature: all of them 
had a noticeable effect at the margin because of its retroactivity which created a loyalty 
enhancing effect that was deemed capable of foreclosing rival airline companies. The 
Commission held that 
[i]n each case meeting the targets for sales growth leads to an increase in the commission paid on 
all tickets sold by the agent, not just on the tickets sold after the target is reached.1310  
The effect was said to be fidelity inducing because when a travel agent is close to reaching the 
threshold imposed by British Airways to trigger the compensation, the agent will do all it can to 
keep selling British Airways tickets, as this will have a large effect on the commission it receives. 
For a competing buyer, on the other hand, the rebates make it very costly to compete with British 
Airways as it will have to “pay a much higher rate of commission […] to overcome this [the 
loyalty/fidelity building] effect”.1311  
In this way, and in quite ordoliberally-sounding terms, the bonuses schemes would foreclose 
competition and be in breach of Article 102 TFEU when it is proven that they: 
tended to remove or restrict the agents’ freedom to sell their services to the airlines of their choice 
and thereby hinder the access of BA’s competitor airlines to the United Kingdom market for air 
travel agency services.1312  
Furthermore, using an argument based on the market power of big vs small undertakings, the 
General Court held that, as British Airways competitors were small in the downstream market for 
air transport services, they “were not in a position to attain the United Kingdom a level of 
revenue capable of constitution a sufficiently broad financial base to allow them effectively to 
establish a reward scheme similar to BA’s in order to counteract the exclusionary effect of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
sources of supply. See in this thesis the discussion of necessary trading partner and gatekeeping in chapter 6.4 for a 
reverse explanation of this phenomenon. 
1310 Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 
- Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1, para. 29. This finding by the Commission was upheld both by the 
General Court and the CJEU in the respective procedures. 
1311 Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 
- Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1, para. 29. See discussing how the fact that British Airways’ market share 
declined was a signal that the input leverage was not (fully) effective: Bishop and Walker, [2010], paras. 6-042 – 6-
043. 
1312 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 270 (emphasis added). 
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scheme against them”.1313 The General Court based its decision on the fact that, according to the 
Commission’s findings, the bonus scheme had a foreclosure effect because for a competitor to 
replace 1000 GBP of the sales for BA by a travel agent they would have to offer them a 
“commission of 17.4% on those tickets to compensate the travel agent for its loss of BA 
commission revenue”, which implies an increase in British Airways’ rivals’ costs.1314  
A similar approach was taken by Advocate General Kokott when remarking that the exclusionary 
effect of the bonus schemes made it “particularly difficult for competitors of the dominant 
undertaking to outbid such whole-turnover-based rebates [… because they] in absolute terms, 
regularly weigh more strongly in the balance than anything which even more generous offers 
from competitors could normally achieve”.1315  
This finding of the exclusionary effect of the supracompetitive rebates on other buyers attempting 
to acquire travel agency services was upheld by the CJEU. The Court reasoned that leverage of 
buyer power by granting bonuses schemes to contracting parties can have an exclusionary effect 
on the competitors of the undertaking as buyers of a necessary input because, “[i]n order to attract 
the co-contractors of the undertaking in a dominant position, or to receive a sufficient volume of 
orders from them, those competitors would have to offer them significantly higher rates of 
discounts of bonus”, which is another method to raise a rival’s costs.1316 And it confirmed 
expressly the finding of the General Court regarding that the “rival airlines were not in a position 
to grant travel agents the same advantages as British Airways, since they were not capable of 
attaining in the United Kingdom a level of revenue capable of constituting a sufficiently broad 
financial base to allow them effectively to establish a reward scheme similar to BA’s.”1317 
Furthermore, the CJEU also confirmed that the General Court was correct in deciding that the 
bonuses schemes by British Airways were not objectively justified under a counterbalancing test 
due to the competitive benefits of the scheme.1318 Consequently, the General Court and later the 
CJEU upheld the finding that British Airways had abused its dominant position by granting of 
loyalty enhancing rebates that had a foreclosure effect on rival airline companies.1319 
                                                          
1313 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 278 (emphasis added). 
1314 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 30. 
1315 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 23 February 2006 in Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v 
Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2006:133, para. 52 (emphasis in original). 
1316 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 75 (emphasis 
added). 
1317 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 76. 
1318 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 84-89. 
1319 “Therefore, the Court of First Instance was right to examine, in paragraphs 270 to 278 of the judgment under 
appeal, whether the bonus schemes at issue had a fidelity-building effect capable of producing an exclusionary 
effect”, Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 77; 
264 
 
An analysis of the case law shows that the Courts confirmed the theory of harm used by the 
Commission concerning the way in which the downstream exclusion operated through the 
leverage of buyer power by the granting of loyalty enhancing bonuses. This was the case because, 
by preventing rivals from having better or cheaper access to travel agency services, it made it 
difficult for them to sale airline tickets to end consumers. The foreclosure effect was created 
because, due to the fidelity-enhancing nature of the rebates, the rivals would have had to pay a 
much higher bonus to travel agents so they would sell a ticket from the competitors rather than 
British Airways. Therefore, the use of buyer power in the upstream market to affect the 
downstream market and gain a competitive advantage by securing the best/most efficient 
distribution channels of its retail products was found to be, in addition to the rebate system, an 
abuse of a dominant position, a finding that confirms the dual market effect of buyer power cases. 
7.7.1.3 A buyer power analysis through the dualistic approach 
British Airways v Commission1320 constitutes the landmark case concerning input leveraging 
through supra-competitive bonuses by a dominant buying undertaking in EU competition law, as 
also remarked by Jones and Sufrin.1321 Furthermore, it is the sole instance where the anti-
competitive behavior took place in the upstream market as it was through the purchasing that the 
foreclosure was imposed on other rival buyers/sellers.1322  
The case is important not only because it constitutes the sole instance in EU competition law 
where an exclusionary unilateral conduct has been focused on buyer power analysis, but also 
because it clearly shows the relation between the effects of the upstream and downstream markets 
in buyer power cases. This is so because British Airways v Commission shows how a privileged 
position or dominance in a market allows the undertaking to exercise market power in another 
market if the markets are sufficiently connected, which is not a novel proposal in EU competition 
law, as was confirmed in Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, paras. 270-278. 
1320 Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 
- Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1; Judgment by the General Court Judgment of 17 December 2003, British 
Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:343; and Judgment of 15 March 2007 in 
British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166. 
1321 Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials [2011], p. 286; Jones and Sufrin, EU 
Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials [2014], p. 323-325 and 469-475. 
1322 “The Commission then maintains that BA is a purchaser in a dominant position on the United Kingdom market 
for air travel agency services, especially because of the percentage which sales of BA tickets represent in the total of 
air ticket sales carried out in the United Kingdom […]”, Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v 
Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:343, para. 22. See also making a similar statement: 
van Doorn, p. 154. The case is well known because of its treatment of rebates. The discussion in this section, 
however, will not be focused on rebates in general but rather on the buyer power related aspects of the case. 
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Commission.1323 This finding of the case law reinforces the need for a dualistic approach to 
buyer power cases. 
The case also shows how a powerful buyer, who is also a powerful seller, is more likely to exert 
anti-competitive effects with its buyer power than powerful buyers without downstream market; 
in this case by negatively affecting the ability of rivals to compete in the downstream market, 
because it has an hourglass shape. I make this interpretation based on the fact that the 
Commission and the Courts took into account the “extremely successful”1324 position of British 
Airways as provider of air transport services in the UK, which allowed the applicant to possess a 
dominant position vis-à-vis travel agents. Therefore, being a strong retailer allowed it to exert 
pressure on its suppliers, and having access to the best suppliers allowed it to have an even better 
position as a retailer, due to the undeniable close connection between these markets.1325 This 
interconnection of buyer and seller market power explains why the literature tends to discuss the 
case from a selling side perspective disregarding the buyer power aspects of it focusing on rebate 
schemes, and why, in the US, the case was brought as a pure selling side case. 
Furthermore, in the case the analysis of the buyer power effects seems to be anchored on the risks 
of a buyer having dual market power (upstream and downstream) as by having an hourglass 
shape, anti-competitive effects of the buying conduct are more likely to be present. Hence, upon 
the existence of loyalty rebates the General Court adopted an approach in which it seems to have 
assumed that, because of the characteristics of British Airways as a powerful buyer and seller as 
“for the purposes of establishing an infringement of Article 82 EC, it is not necessary to 
demonstrate that the abuse in question had a concrete effect on the markets concerned. It is 
sufficient in that respect to demonstrate that the abusive conduct of the undertaking in a dominant 
position tends to restrict competition, or, in other words, that the conduct is capable of having, or 
likely to have, such an effect”.1326 Therefore, it could be interpreted that the General Court found 
convincing the fact that an undertaking with an hourglass shape when it carries out an activity 
that is likely to create a foreclosure effect there is a high likelihood that the conduct would restrict 
competition. Therefore, the form of the undertaking along with the form of the conduct, in this 
case the loyalty enhancing rebate, created the presumption of the harm, also in line with the ideas 
of Wils.1327 This interpretation of the case is not supported by an express wording of the 
Judgments but could be an alternative and economically sound explanation in accordance to the 
                                                          
1323 Judgment of 6 March 1974 in joined cases C-6/73 and C-7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial 
Solvents v Commission, EU:C:1974:18, para. 22. 
1324 Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 
- Virgin/British Airways) [2000] OJ L 30/1, para. 91. 
1325 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 132. 
1326 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 293.  
1327 Wils (2014). 
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buyer power economics described in chapter 3, section 3.5, why dominance (in this case as a 
seller) was said to exist at even at relatively low market shares of 39%, when compared to other 
cases of breaches of Article 102 TFEU,1328 and why the anti-competitive nature of the loyalty 
enhancing bonuses was presumed. 
In connection to the dualistic effect and the need for a dualistic approach to buyer power cases, 
the General Court confirmed that in buyer power leverage there is a connection between the 
dominated market and the non-dominated market in which the anti-competitive effects also take 
place.1329 Furthermore, it is settled case law that the abuse of dominance in a market that has its 
competitive effects in another falls under the scope of application of Article 102 TFEU if those 
markets are sufficiently related.1330 In this case, the General Court and the Commission found 
that the air travel agency market and air transport market to and from the UK were closely 
connected as “there is a mutual dependence between travel agents and airlines which are not in 
themselves in a position to market their air transport services effectively”.1331 Because of the 
existence of a close connection between the two markets and the ability of buyer power to have 
dualistic effects of competition it was, therefore, correct for the Commission and Courts to 
conclude that the abusive leverage of buyer market power with anti-competitive foreclosure 
effects in a related downstream market could be prohibited by Article 102 TFEU. 
Moreover, and in line with a broader approach to buyer power, by placing the emphasis on the 
increase of rival’s costs, the General Court and the CJEU granted a limited competitive protection 
to rival buyers and their ability to compete with the dominant undertaking as buyers and retailers 
in a related market. Hence, competition law should protect the competitive structure upstream 
and downstream and competition as such, arguments much in line with an ordoliberal approach 
to buyer exclusion.1332 Therefore, the legal standard employed by the Courts was to consider 
buyer power exclusion as anti-competitive if the ability of rival undertakings to effectively 
compete (as buyers and retailers) was diminished even absent end consumer harm (as there was 
no evidence of a price increase for airline tickets), triggering competition law application upon 
substantial harm to rivals and the competitive structure. 
                                                          
1328 Cf with Venit who argues that the case lacked of a substantive economic analysis as it treated the rebates as 
restrictive by nature: Venit (2004), p. 1158-1160 and 1166-1167. 
1329 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, paras. 127-136. 
1330 “An abuse of a dominant position on the market in raw materials may thus have effects restricting competition in 
the market on which the derivatives of the raw material are sold and these effects must be taken into account in 
considering the effects of an infringement, even if the market for the derivative does not constitute a self-contained 
market. The arguments of the applicants in this respect and in consequence their request that an expert's report on 
this subject be ordered are irrelevant and must be rejected”, Judgment of 6 March 1974 in joined cases C-6/73 and C-
7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v Commission, EU:C:1974:18, para. 22. 
1331 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 95. 
1332 See also remarking and criticizing the ordoliberal influence in the decision Venit (2004), p. 1166-167. 
267 
 
Even if British Airways v Commission acknowledge that buyer power can be abusively leveraged 
to adversely affect competition, particularly if a buyer is powerful both upstream and downstream 
in line with the hourglass shape, the Court’s approach can be criticized regarding the assessment 
of the bonuses effects on the markets involved. In this case, the Courts analyzed the leverage 
effects mostly anchored on the buyer power aspects and consequences on the upstream market 
but did not analyze in depth the consequence of the practice in the downstream market where BA 
and Virgin competed as providers of air transport services. This is, the Courts could be criticized 
by being shy of doing a full dualistic assessment to the case. As other authors have pointed out, 
from the Commission’s investigation it is clear that, despite the fact that British Airways 
exercised buyer power vis-à-vis travel agents the market shares of British Airways’ competitors 
still increased.1333 This could be interpreted in two different ways. One way of interpretation, in 
line with the case’s outcome, is that competition in the downstream market was affected because 
absent the leverage conduct the competitors would have been in a position to increase further 
their market shares. An alternative approach would have been claiming that the leverage of buyer 
market power was not exclusionary because it was not aimed at foreclosing rivals – or at least it 
did not have such an effect – but instead it aimed at securing the best distribution channels for 
British Airways to reach end customers without having an adverse nor unjustified effect in 
competition. This approach could be further backed up as there appears to be no evidence in the 
case of a price increase vis-à-vis end consumers in the form of higher airline transport tickets, 
which implies that British Airways internalized the costs of the supracompetitive bonuses granted 
to airline travel agents. However, this can also be criticized by the implicit Court’s reasoning that 
even if no direct end consumer harm had occurred, there was still harm to the competitive 
structure and the ability of the rivals of the dominant undertaking to compete, thereby also 
creating downstream harm in the medium and long run. Also, it could be interpreted from the 
cases that, if were not for the supracompetitive bonus scheme, the market shares of the 
competitions in the downstream market would have increased much further than they did, due to 
the existence of the loyalty enhancing rebates. 
Lastly, an aspect that was not dealt with by the Courts or the Commission concerning the 
foreclosure effects of the rebates was the decision-making power of end consumers when 
determining which airline service provider to acquire tickets from. In principle, and despite the 
commission paid by British Airways, the passengers were able to determine which airline they 
should choose. However, it could have also been the case that travel agents were reluctant to 
provide passengers with information about different travel options or routes and downplayed 
other competitors with the interest of selling only, or mostly, British Airways tickets. From the 
                                                          
1333 Graham, [2010], p. 162; Ariel Ezrachi, EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases (Hart 
2012, 3rd edn), p. 209; Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2012], p. 734. 
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Commission’s report, however, there were no indications of these types of practices, nor that 
customers frequently requested alternative options.  
All in all, British Airways v Commission constitutes the most important case in EU competition 
law dealing with buyer power exclusion and its line of thought appears to be based on the 
concerns of buyer power leverage to affect competition in a related downstream market where the 
powerful buyer also enjoys substantive downstream market power. The General Court and 
CJEU’s stand was centered on the way employing supracompetitive benefits to a supplier of a 
buyer would create a relation of semi-exclusive supply that would have foreclosed rival’s access 
to a necessary distribution mechanism to reach end consumers, by increasing their costs. The 
perspective of the Courts in this case, appears to be that they have taken a mild approach to the 
dualistic analysis of buyer power cases, as it centered its analysis more on upstream competition 
than downstream. Also, the Courts showed a preference for the protection of competition as a 
process and guaranteeing the wellbeing of upstream market conditions by granting a limited 
protection to rival buyers of a dominant undertaking by prohibiting supra-competitive bonus 
schemes that would affect their ability to acquire an input and compete downstream. 
Consequently, the case adopted a broader approach to buyer power as it triggered the application 
of EU competition law absent evidence of direct end and short-term consumer harm if there was 
evidence of substantial upstream harm to the competitive process. 
7.7.1.4 Virgin vs British Airways: the US Antitrust law version 
Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited v British Airways Plc is a clear-cut example of the differences 
regarding the treatment given to buyer power cases (and rebates in general) between US and EU 
competition regulation.1334 Unlike the Commission, the plaintiff Virgin initiated a private 
antitrust claim against the anti-competitive behavior of BA as a retailer and offerer of air 
passenger transportation. Both in the first instance and the Court of Appeals of the Second 
Circuit, it was found that the alleged behavior of British Airways was not proven to be anti-
competitive because “Virgin failed to show how British Airways’ competition harmed 
consumers”, as “[t]he Sherman Act and other antitrust laws are designed to protect competition, 
not individual competitors”.1335 Therefore, the standard applied assumes that exclusionary buyer 
power must directly affect downstream competition and harm consumers, taking a narrower 
stance to buyer power harm. 
The way of focusing the case was also very different, instead of focusing its arguments on a 
theory of harm anchored on exclusionary leverage of buyer market power, Virgin argued that BA 
                                                          
1334 Virgin Atlantic Airways v. British Airways Plc, 69 F.Supp. 2nd 571 (1999); appealed and upheld in its entirety in 
Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited v. British Airways Plc, 99-9402 (2nd Cir., 2001). See also stressing the different 
outcome but without analyzing the different approach: Elhauge and Geradin, [2011], p. 1137; Whish and Bailey, 
Competition law [2012], p. 734. 
1335 Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited v. British Airways Plc, 99-9402 (2nd Cir., 2001). 
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was a powerful retailer of air passenger transport and that it used its downstream market power to 
engage in downstream predation practices by offering ‘loyalty programs’ for its individual and 
corporate clients that allow these to obtain a rebate according to how much they flew with this 
airline company. These practices, along with BA’s dominant presence in the routes to and from 
the UK to the US impeded, according to Virgin, new routes being opened that could compete. 
Also, before the Court of Appeals Judgment Virgin claimed that British Airways had leveraged 
its buyer power by granting incentive agreements to travel agencies. The Court of Appeals 
dismissed in limine litis such claims - and the appeal altogether – as Virgin failed to prove that 
British Airways: 
(1) possessed monopoly power in one market; (2) used that power to gain a competitive advantage 
over Virgin another distinct market; and (3) caused injury by such anticompetitive conduct [...]. In 
other words Virgin would have to demonstrate that British Airways’ use of alleged monopoly 
power via its incentive agreements “threaten[ed] the [second] market with higher prices or 
reduced output or quality associated with the kind of monopoly that is ordinarily accompanied by 
a large market share1336 
Hence, as Virgin was unable to provide evidence that buyer market power leveraging had any 
effects in the downstream conditions (increase of prices vis-à-vis end consumers), the Court of 
Appeals decided to dismiss the appeal and issued a summary judgment.  
7.7.2 Where do we stand in buyer market power leverage? 
To conclude, British Airways v Commission confirms that the exclusionary application of buyer 
power through leveraging is captured as a breach of EU competition law (particularly if exerted 
by a dominant undertaking).1337 Leverage buyer market power through the granting of retroactive 
bonuses allows a powerful buyer to foreclose rivals’ from a necessary input that will either 
impede them from acquiring it (total foreclosure) or mean that they obtain it at higher cost or 
through inferior sales channels, increasing their costs and making them less attractive as retailers. 
This grants the buyer an advantage in the upstream market as a buyer and an additional advantage 
as a retailer if parties compete in a downstream market. Not all types of rebates, however, would 
be anti-competitive, as the case law shows that only those that have a fidelity enhancing effect 
and that are not economically justified are anti-competitive.  
Buyer market power leveraging can potentially constitute an abuse of a dominant position when 
it, in combination with the practice used to cause the foreclosure effect (for example the loyalty 
rebate), adversely affects the competitive structure in the upstream and/or downstream markets, 
even absent end consumer harm. However, leveraging by itself seems to be insufficient to 
                                                          
1336 Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited v. British Airways Plc, 99-9402 (2nd Cir., 2001) quoting III Phillip E. Areeda et 
al., Antitrust Law ¶ 652). 
1337 See also stressing the anticompetitiveness by nature of retroactive rebates pursuant to the recent CJEU case law: 
Sunny S. H. Chan, ‘Post Danmark II: Per Se Unlawfulness of Retroactive Rebates Granted by Dominant 
Undertakings’ 37 European Competition Law Review (2016) 43. 
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constitute in itself an infringement of competition because it has to be accompanied by the 
conduct that causes the leveraging effect. In the case of British Airways v Commission, 
leveraging was found abusive because it was done through granting an exclusionary and abusive 
loyalty-enhancing rebate that was unjustified. Therefore, the legal standard to be applied in 
leverage cases to determine its anti-competitiveness seems to be coupled with the type of conduct 
that generated the leveraging effect. What can be said of leveraging itself is that the Courts adopt 
a broader approach in terms of finding the anti-competitiveness of leveraging in buyer power 
cases because it can be found to be abusive even absent end consumer harm. Therefore, the case 
law can be interpreted as showing how the Courts have an interest in protecting competition as a 
process, the ability of rival buyers (and retailers) to compete with the powerful firm without 
being subject to an unjustified economically disadvantage, and in a way, the economic freedom 
of these rivals. Additionally, unlike US antitrust law, leveraging of buyer market power will 
trigger the application of EU competition law, even if parties do not compete in a related 
downstream market. Also, EU competition law will preclude an undertaking from leveraging 
market power even if it has no presence in the downstream market but the input in the upstream 
market is necessary for the rival buyer to carry out its economic activity. 
7.8 Squeeze to buy 
Squeeze to buy1338 is a hybrid practice in which exploitative and exclusionary effects of buyer 
power jointly operate to the benefit of the buying(s) undertaking(s) and to the detriment of its 
suppliers, rival buyers and end consumers alike. As a hybrid practice like margin squeeze,1339 
squeeze combines exploitative and foreclosure effects that affect different parties and markets in 
different ways as suppliers are exploited by exploitative pricing and a subsequent forced take-
over. Therefore, unlike in the previous theories of harm, the exclusion effects take place on a 
vertical level to force the exit of suppliers, but not rival buyers or sellers. 
                                                          
1338 Term coined by the author. I would like to thank Sebastian Peyer for his suggestion about a theory of harm like 
this for buyer power cases. 
1339 For some literature dealing with margin and price squeeze and its hybrid nature as an anticompetitive conduct, as 
well as whether the practice is in reality or not a competition concern see, inter alia: Damien Geradin and Robert 
O'Donoghue, ‘The Concurrent Application of Competition Law and Regulation: The Case of Margin Squeeze 
Abuses in the Telecommunications Sector’ 1 Journal of Competition Law and Economics (2005) 355; Dennis W. 
Carlton, ‘Should “Price Squeeze” be a Recognized Form of Anticompetitive Conduct?’ 4 Journal of Competition 
Law and Economics (2008) 271; E. Hovenkamp and H Hovenkamp, ‘The Viability of Antitrust Price Squeeze 
Claims’ 51 Arizona Law Review (2009) 273; Alberto Heimler, ‘Is a Margin Squeeze an Antitrust or a Regulatory 
Violation?’ 6 Journal of Competition Law and Economics (2010) 879; John B Meisel, ‘The Law and Economics of 
Margin Squeezes in the US Versus the EU’ 8 European Competition Journal (2012) 383; Barak Y. Orbach and 
Raphael Avraham, ‘Squeeze Claims: Refuslas to Deal, Essential Facilities and Price Squeezes’ in Roger D. Blair and 




In a squeeze to buy scheme, therefore, a powerful buyer (or a group of coordinate buyers) would 
employ its market power by paying an exploitatively low purchasing price1340 – or just barely 
covering the costs – forcing its supplier to either leave the market or accept a take-over offer 
under less favorable conditions than absent the exploitative practice. In this scenario, the 
powerful buyer is not interested in reaping supracompetitive monopsony profits but rather in 
acquiring at a lower price the assets of a supplier to vertically integrate, in an analogue and 
reverse scenario as discussed in Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v 
Commission.1341  
An example will illustrate this theory of harm. Isolation’s Supermarket possesses an excellent 
market position in the processed beef retailing business after it has managed to exclude 
Isolation’s Butchery through overbuying. Now that it dominates the downstream market it wishes 
to expand in the supply market by acquiring its beef providers. To avoid paying the market price 
of the assets or shares of Isolation’s three slaughterhouses, Isolation’s Supermarket has decided 
to exert exploitative buyer power to force the exit of the beef suppliers. The strategy is to pay a 
beef-purchasing price below the marginal costs of the most efficient of its suppliers in a take-it-
or-leave-it offer (but not below the competitive level). By setting such low purchasing price the 
supplier “do(es) not have a sufficient profit margin on the processing to remain competitive on 
the market for the processed product”.1342 To remedy such a situation, the slaughterhouses – 
absent other demand sources - are forced to either heavily invest to reduce its production costs or 
exit the market and carry out a different economic activity that would be profitable for its 
shareholders. Some months after the exploitative prices are set by Isolation’s Supermarket, two of 
the slaughterhouses approach the board of directors with a communication stating they have 
decided to leave the business and close their operations as beef producers and are offering 
Isolation’s Supermarket a preferential deal in case they are interested in purchasing their assets. 
However, the squeeze to buy theory of harm, despite its intuitive appeal has hurdles for it to be a 
credible competition problem as hybrid theories tend to be. A powerful buyer might impose a 
purchasing price sufficiently low for a supplier to not be able to fully cover its costs, pushing it 
                                                          
1340 I discuss buyer power exploitation through low purchasing prices in chapter 8, section 8.3. 
1341 In this case, the dominant firm refused to supply an input required for the production of a good to a competing 
undertaking to gain market power in the downstream market and exclude undertakings from competing and selling 
their goods to end consumers. Judgment of 6 March 1974 in joined cases C-6/73 and C-7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico 
Italiano and Commercial Solvents v Commission, EU:C:1974:18. See discussing this case from an angle linked with 
the ordoliberal concern of protecting market structures: Gormsen ‘Article 82 EC: Where are we Coming from and 
Where are we Going to?’ (2006), p. 12-15. 
1342 Judgment of 30 November 2000, Industrie des poudres sphériques v Commission, T-5/97, ECR, EU:T:2000:278, 
para. 178. See, however, the change in criterion to trigger competition application in cases of margin squeeze when 
the General Court held that the anticompetitiveness lies between the prices an undertaking charges for its wholesale 
access and its retail prices in Judgment of 10 April 2008, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, T-271/03, ECR, 
EU:T:2008:101, paras. 166-168. See the upheld appeal in Judgment of 14 October 2010 in Deutsche Telekom v 
Commission, C-280/08 P, EU:C:2010. 
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out of the market, or accepting a low takeover bid. However, unlike in the case of exploitatively 
low purchasing prices, purchasing price is compared to the particular supplier’s cost structure and 
it does not have to be below the competitive level as an exploitative price. This is so, because this 
relative threshold is sufficient to create the squeeze to buy scenario. If the relative suppliers’ 
costs is resorted to as the applicable legal standard to trigger the application of the law, and the 
purchasing price paid is above the competitive costs, then considering this practice anti-
competitive due to foreclosure risks would in some instances excessively protect rival 
undertakings and the economic freedom of inefficient suppliers. If, on the other hand, the 
standard resorted to for the determination of whether the price has a foreclosure effect is the 
competitive level, then competition intervention would be warranted because there are two 
violations: first, the price is exploitatively low, as discussed in chapter 8, section 8.3, which 
would in itself constitute an abuse under Article 102 TFEU not requiring the takeover, and, 
second, the conduct has a foreclosure effect and it is abusive because it restricts the rival’s 
economic freedom unjustifiably and distorts the upstream market structure. 
Therefore, it is difficult to predict whether the Courts in Europe – and to a minor degree in the 
US – would find conducts such as the squeeze to buy purchasing behavior anti-competitive if the 
prices offered are not below the competitive levels (which is a difficult standard to apply), or 
more likely by taking as reference the marginal or average costs of an efficient supplier. If they 
do, the competition intervention would risk preventing efficient purchasing behavior. However, if 
they do not, then these exclusionary conducts could perhaps trigger medium to long-term 
competition concerns with regard to the upstream market structure, dynamic efficiency due to 
lack of incentives to invest, or entry into a supply market and, therefore significantly impede 
effective competition in either the upstream and downstream market.  
However, would squeeze to buy be likely to be condemned by the Courts under EU competition 
law? In my view, if the effects are widespread on the upstream market and not only a few 
marginal and inefficient suppliers are squeezed out and if the buyer is a dominant undertaking, 
then squeeze to buy practices could be under the scope of Article 102(a) TFEU, if the prices are 
exploitative and unfairly low, which is unlikely to happen, as I discuss in chapter 8.2. 
Furthermore, if that is the case then there would not be any need for a theory of harm such as 
squeeze to buy. An alternative approach, based on Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and 
Commercial Solvents v Commission,1343 would be that competition intervention would take place 
at the moment when the take-over is evaluated by competition authorities and then determine the 
terms in which was carried out and find out any possible harm. A problem with this merger-based 
approach is that the harm has already taken place and would not represent a significant 
impediment to effective competition in the future. Therefore, even if under EU competition law 
                                                          
1343 Judgment of 6 March 1974 in joined cases C-6/73 and C-7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial 
Solvents v Commission, EU:C:1974:18.  
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there is some concern regarding the protection of the undertaking’s economic freedom and a 
broader standard is employed in buyer power cases without requiring evidence of downstream 
end consumer harm, I think it is unlikely that squeeze to buy scenarios would be found anti-
competitive by the Courts as an autonomous theory of harm. 
7.9 ‘As efficient buying competitor test’ for price related abuses? 
The Commission in its Enforcement Guidelines on the Application of Article 102 TFEU has 
suggested applying the As Efficient Competitor Test (AECT) to determine whenever exclusion of 
competitors by a dominant undertaking is abusive and not the outcome of competition.1344 A 
thorough discussion of the test is outside the scope of this dissertation. However, in this section I 
discuss and criticize its application from a buyer side perspective and why reverse application of 
the AECT may not be an adequate policy in EU competition law for buyer power cases, and, in 
particular, for rebates, position in line with the buyer power case law in British Airways v 
Commission.1345 
In short, the AECT aims at determining if the conduct of an undertaking is anti-competitive and 
has a foreclosure effect by taking as a reference another firm that is as efficient as the dominant 
undertaking. The Commission would only intervene whenever the conduct under analysis has 
already been, or is capable of, hampering competition from that as ‘efficient competitor’.1346 The 
judicial reception of the AECT has been mixed. In cases of predatory pricing1347 and margin 
squeeze1348 it has been endorsed by the Courts, whereas concerning rebates it has recently been 
                                                          
1344 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 23. 
For some literature discussing the AECT see, inter alia: Vickers (2005); Giorgio Monti, ‘Article 82 EC: What Future 
for the Effects-Based Approach?’ 1 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (2010) 2; Damien Geradin, 
‘The Decision of the Commission of 13 May 2009 in the Intel case: Where is the Foreclosure and Consumer Harm?’ 
1 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (2010) 112; Giulio Federico, ‘The Antitrust Treatment of 
Loyalty Discounts in Europe: Towards a more Economic Approach’ Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice (2011) 1; Nazzini, [2011], p. 221-256; Wils (2014). 
1345 The General Court and the CJEU held in British Airways v Commission that in the case of rebates there is no 
need of applying the AECT test as some rebates may be anticompetitive due its nature and without requiring 
assessment of their effects in either consumers nor competitors. See also criticizing with strong arguments the AECT 
for rebates: Wils (2014), p. 428-432. 
1346 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 23. 
1347 Judgment of 3 July 1991 in AKZO v Commission, C-62/86, EU:C:1991:286; Judgment of 14 November 1996 in 
Tetra Pak v Commission, C-333/94 P, EU:C:1996:436. 
1348 Judgment of 14 October 2010 in Deutsche Telekom v Commission, C-280/08 P, EU:C:2010:603; Judgment of 17 
February 2011 in TeliaSonera Sverige, C-52/09, EU:C:2011:83; Judgment of 29 March 2012, Telefónica and 
Telefónica de España v Commission, T-336/07, ECR, EU:T:2012:172, appealed and upheld by the CJEU in 
Judgment of 10 July 2014 in Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, C-295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062. 
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clarified in Post Danmark II that the AECT is one of the many tools available to determine 
whether a rebate could have an exclusionary and illegal nature.1349 
The AECT is designed with selling cases in mind where firms compete in a downstream market 
offering their output to other consumers (final or intermediaries) and with an exclusive focus on 
price, but not on variety or quality. As such, the test measures the capacity of a hypothetical 
competitor to produce a similar or like output as efficiently as the dominant undertaking under 
investigation, by taking as reference if that hypothetical would have similar or lower costs and 
sale prices than the dominant undertaking, as explicitly remarked by the Commission.1350 
Therefore, the AECT does not take into account the efficiency of current rivals. The assessment 
is carried out measuring the efficiency of the foreclosed undertakings as producers of an output 
(and the Guidelines use average avoidable cost and long-run average incremental cost) but not 
when buying. Therefore, its reverse application is challenging.  
If the test is reversed, I distinguish two different alternatives on how it could be applied. First, the 
AECT could assess which firm is more efficient by focusing the costs test in the output market; 
i.e. how the firm behaves in the downstream market as a seller but not a buyer. If that is the case, 
then the AECT is just applied in a regular way to buyer cases. The problem with this 
methodology would be that to find that the undertaking has engaged into an exclusionary conduct 
it must have substantial seller market power in the downstream market in addition to having 
substantial buyer power. Hence, this test would be analogue to the double predation requirement 
as established in Weyerhaeuser and risks being under-inclusive.1351 Additionally, the test might 
be under-inclusive because a reverse application presumes that the upstream and downstream 
markets are a reverse of each other and would not determine if there is foreclosure in cases where 
the rivals only compete for the input but not the downstream market. If firms do not compete in 
the downstream market, then their cost structure and sale prices are not comparable and, 
therefore, the test cannot be easily applied. 
Additionally, the analysis could be based on who acquires cheaper the input – that is, ultimately, 
the most efficient firm. However, purchasing input at low prices does not exclude competitors 
and may have the opposite effect. If a buyer offers a higher purchasing price then the suppliers of 
                                                          
1349 Judgment of 6 October 2015 in Post Danmark, C-23/14, EU:C:2015:651, paras. 63-74. See also Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott in Judgment of 6 October 2015 in Post Danmark, C-23/14, EU:C:2015:343, para. 56-75. 
1350 “In order to determine whether even a hypothetical competitor as efficient as the dominant undertaking would be 
likely to be foreclosed by the conduct in question, the Commission will examine economic data relating to cost and 
sales prices, and in particular whether the dominant undertaking is engaging in below-cost pricing”, Communication 
from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 25 (emphasis added). 
1351 Weyerhaeuser Company, v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc., in 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007). See 
also remarking that the Weyerhaeuser requirement of the Brooke Group test “the Supreme Court immunized pricing 
behavior from antitrust scrutiny and substantially increased the potential for a dominant buyer to exercise 
monopsony power to the detriment of its smaller competitors, input sellers generally, and ultimately consumers” in 
Haglund (2008), p. 440 
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the desired input will be shift the sale to the new buyer that pays a higher amount, either because 
it values the input more or because it has less buyer power (and is thus less efficient). If a higher 
purchasing price is paid that implies that the firm has higher costs and it can be assumed that such 
higher costs would be transferred in the form of higher output prices for end consumers. Hence, a 
buyer that pays more will be able to capture all sources of supply and this is not because it is an 
efficient buyer. This would, for example, be the case for an agricultural cooperative that, due to 
its internal profit distribution mechanisms, is able to pay more to its members than a more 
efficient buyer that could pay less but if it does would not be able to acquire input. Therefore, the 
more efficient buyer is unable to compete with a less efficient dominant undertaking for the 
acquisition of input — these are some factors to take into account if a reverse application of the 
test is suggested. For these reasons, an application based on who acquires the input cheaper 
would not be an adequate application of the AECT to buyer power cases. 
Furthermore, a reverse application of the AECT places the emphasis on triggering the application 
of EU competition law in the presence of direct end consumer harm despite the fact that it is 
designed to determine when a conduct is anti-competitive because it has a foreclosing effect vis-
à-vis competing undertakings. This happens because the test looks at how efficient the firm is 
regarding its costs and the sales of output vis-à-vis end consumers who will benefit from 
acquiring the end product from the most efficient/cheapest source. If this is the case then there is 
little room for welfare considerations of other buyers,1352 particularly if they are not part of the 
same downstream market, the protection of competition as a process and the undertaking’s 
economic freedom being contrary to the broader approach taken in EU competition law 
concerning buyer power exclusion, which takes these factors into account and intervenes even 
absent consumer harm if upstream competition has been substantially affected. 
Therefore, in my view a reverse application of the AECT test for buyer power cases as it stands 
risks being under-inclusive and/or inadequate for buyer power cases, in particular concerning the 
granting of supracompetitive benefits. Consequently, and following the recent case law 
concerning its use as an assessment tool as discussed CJEU in Post Danmark II1353 and the 
                                                          
1352 See also the opinion of Monti who argues that the application of the AECT in selling side cases already shows 
little concern for weaker (but not necessarily inefficient firms) in Monti, ‘EU Competition Law from Rome to Lisbon 
- Social Market Economy’ [2013], p. 48. 
1353 “The Court has also held that, in order to establish whether such a practice is abusive, that practice must have an 
anti-competitive effect on the market, but the effect does not necessarily have to be concrete, and it is sufficient to 
demonstrate that there is an anti-competitive effect which may potentially exclude competitors who are at least as 
efficient as the dominant undertaking (…). 
It follows that only dominant undertakings whose conduct is likely to have an anti-competitive effect on the market 
fall within the scope of Article 82 EC. 
In that regard, the assessment of whether a rebate scheme is capable of restricting competition must be carried out in 
the light of all relevant circumstances, including the rules and criteria governing the grant of the rebates, the number 
of customers concerned and the characteristics of the market on which the dominant undertaking operates.”, 
Judgment of 6 October 2015 in Post Danmark, C-23/14, EU:C:2015:651, paras 66-68. See also the Opinion of 
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General Court in Intel v Commission, the use of the AECT to determine the exclusionary nature 
of a buying conduct should be approached with caution, always taking into account the 
specificities of buyer power cases and its dual impact in competition. Consequently, this is an 
area ripe for further academic research and in particular for economic methodologies oriented to 
determining when exclusion exists in buyer power cases. 
7.10 Which type of harm triggers competition law application in 
exclusionary cases? 
In this section I discuss two different approaches concerning what kind of consumer harm must 
be proven by a plaintiff or a competition authority in order to trigger the application of 
competition laws to exclusionary cases and the implications of such choice. To do so, I 
synthesize the approaches adopted by the Courts – choosing a broader approach that does not 
require evidence of direct end consumer harm – and the US courts – choosing a narrow approach 
requiring such evidence – with the exception of the Robinson-Patman Act. In this discussion I 
evaluate this approaches and contrast them with ordoliberalism. 
This discussion is of particular relevance to unilateral conduct (dominance and mergers), as well 
as agreements that restrict competition by effect, but less so for agreements where the objective is 
to foreclose rival buyers because these types of collusive behavior are captured because they 
constitute a serious breach to the rivalry process without requiring any existence of effects (either 
upstream or downstream) as their pernicious is presumed. In a nutshell, if for buyer power 
exclusion, a pure end consumer harm standard is to be applied – as occurred in Weyerhaeuser – 
and antitrust liability would only exist whenever the purchasing behavior has an effect on the 
welfare conditions of consumers in a downstream market. Therefore, absent direct end consumer 
harm, competition law would not prohibit a conduct if there is only harm in the upstream market 
among rival buyers or suppliers.1354 However, if a broader welfare standard applies that seeks 
protection of not only end consumers but also competition as an economic process and economic 
freedom of suppliers and rival buyers, or as the EFTA Court recently held from a seller side 
perspective in in Sorpa bs. v The Icelandic Competition Authority (Samkeppniseftirlitið), 
competition intervention against anti-competitive exclusion is triggered to “prohibit[s] a 
dominant undertaking from distorting competition on an upstream or downstream market, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Advocate General Kokott in Judgment of 6 October 2015 in Post Danmark, C-23/14, EU:C:2015:343, in particular 
paras 56-75. See also: Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v Commission, T-286/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:547, paras. 140-
166, in which the General Court considered that in rebate cases there is no obligation to carry out the AEC to 
determine if a conduct is exclusionary or not, specially because the Commission Guidelines are not binding for 
Courts.  
1354 This was also the argument used by British Airways before the CJEU and which was overruled in Judgment of 
15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 103. 
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other words between suppliers or customers of that undertaking”,1355 then such approach would 
intervene in an exclusionary case absent evidence of direct consumer harm with the aim of 
preventing it in the long run, analogous to what Petit calls the incipiency theory.1356 
An example simplifying but also illustrating the differences is helpful. If a narrow end consumer 
harm standard is employed by the Courts the fact that Isolation’s Supermarket decides to overbuy 
all the available meat in Isolation from all farmers to foreclose the local butcher shops in town, 
rival buyers would not warrant competition intervention unless that ‘buy-out’ has a short term 
negative effect on end consumer prices. Therefore, Isolation’s Supermarket would need to also 
raise downstream end consumer prices for its behavior to be anti-competitive, regardless of 
whether the local butchers are pushed out of the market and, therefore, all the end consumer 
demand is captured by Isolation’s Supermarket.1357 The second alternative, where competition 
law applies, not requiring direct end consumer harm, would reach a different outcome. The 
overbuying conduct would be prohibited because rival buyers have been foreclosed in an 
unjustified manner and the competitive structure in the upstream market would have been 
substantially affected. This would be sufficient because it is presumed that the harm to 
competition in the medium and long term would harm end consumers because it allowed 
Isolation’s Supermarket to become a monemporist (monopsonist and monopolist). Also, this 
broader approach would capture conducts with a foreclosure effect in which the buyers only 
compete upstream, but not downstream, thus it is a more inclusive approach than the end 
consumer harm one. 
In connection with this I would like to stress that the fact that adopting a legal standard that 
triggers the application of EU competition law even absent evidence direct consumer harm does 
not imply that there is an inconsistency to a dualistic approach to buyer power cases. If only an 
upstream market perspective is taken into account, then the effects of buyer power in the 
downstream market (whether there is direct or indirect harm to direct or indirect consumers) 
would be completely disregarded, which is contrary to the idea of protecting competition as a 
process because it is protected in the interest of the consumer in the medium and long run, as I 
explain under the welfare standard advocated by ordoliberalism in chapter 4, section 4.4.3, which 
is also contrary to the case law. In connection with this, the fact that upstream consumer harm is 
sufficient to trigger the application of EU competition law is precisely because the aim is to 
                                                          
1355 Judgment of 22 September 2016 in Sorpa bs. v The Icelandic Competition Authority (Samkeppniseftirlitið) E-
29/15 [2016], para. 109. 
1356 Petit, The IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy and its Definition of "Reasonable" Rates: A Transatlatic Antitrust 
Divide? 
1357 In this example I assume that all consumers of the foreclosed butchers are not consumers of Isolation’s 
Supermarket. If that is not the case, then there is some consumer harm to ‘other consumers’ part of a different but 
related downstream market. 
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guarantee a competitive environment and the maximization of allocative and dynamic 
efficiencies in both sides of the market to the ultimate benefit of consumers.  
Furthermore, adopting a harm standard that is broader than pure end downstream consumer harm 
does not mean that competition law would not intervene if there is existence of that harm; in fact, 
in my opinion, in cases of direct end consumer harm competition authorities must intervene. 
What it means is that not only that short term harm to end consumers triggers the application of 
the law, but also harm in the upstream market that might impact consumers in the medium and 
long term. And, in order to determine the possibility or existence of the current or future end 
consumer harm, a dualistic approach is needed by looking at the buyer power effects 
downstream. 
My research has identified that under EU competition law the second alternative applies; that of a 
broader welfare standard that applies to buyer power exclusion even absent consumer harm, as it 
was the case in British Airways v Commission where there was no evidence of an increase in the 
prices of air transportation services for end consumers. 
7.10.1 Precluding buyer exclusion absent consumer harm – the broader view 
Precluding unilateral or concerted exclusionary buyer power behavior even absent evidence of 
direct end consumer harm seeks to protect the competitive process by guaranteeing that upstream 
competition and rivalry among buyers is undistorted. Therefore, under this approach, competition 
law would be triggered if the buying conduct has a substantial restrictive effect on upstream 
competition, without requiring direct end consumer harm or that buyers compete both as 
purchasers and retailers. Such a position implies that exclusionary and unjustified buyer power 
exertion will be condemned in the upstream market with the goal of protecting competition as a 
process, protecting the competitive structure and protecting the legitimate interest of efficient 
rival buyers that see their market access and economic freedom affected by the buyer induced 
exclusion. 
This protection to competition structure and economic freedom – and indirectly to rival buyers –
is granted not to safeguard inefficient buyers but rather to preserve a healthy competitive 
environment and to allow other firms potentially as efficient – or more – as the dominant one to 
thrive. Paraphrasing Jones in his analysis of the goals of US antitrust law, protection of rivalry 
among competing buyers absent short term end consumer harm is important because it promotes 
competitive markets and in the end economic efficiency.1358 Hence, protection should be granted 
to existing and new entrant undertakings so that they have the opportunity to be as efficient, or 
more so, as the dominant undertaking.1359 If, however, the dominant undertaking is allowed to 
                                                          
1358 Jones (1989), p. 91 
1359 See also stressing that in exclusionary abuses there must be protection for weaker competitors against methods 
other than competition on the merits: Rodger and MacCullogh, [2015], p. 110. 
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foreclose these rivals then those options would not exist. A disclaimer must be made, 
nevertheless. Granting protection to the competitive process in the upstream market and to a 
certain extent also protecting the rival undertakings’ economic freedom is not equivalent to the 
protection of other inefficient firms that, as the Commission points out, might be forced out of the 
market as part of the competitive process as a mechanism towards achieving efficiency,1360 as I 
discussed in chapter 4 under ordoliberalism. 
This proposition of a broader welfare standard for buyer power exclusion that seeks to protect 
the competitive process as such, and consequently, in the medium and long run, also the 
wellbeing of consumers thanks to a healthy competitive environment has grounds in the EU case 
law and the Commission policy, as I discuss below.1361 
For instance, the Non-horizontal Mergers Guidelines when dealing with input foreclosure clarify 
that a merger would raise anti-competitive concerns even if the outcome does not force rival 
buyers to exit the market because this would cause “consumer harm” being the benchmark of 
whether the merger “would lead to higher prices for consumers.1362 The use of the terms by the 
Commission, however are misleading. When the Commission speaks of consumers it means that 
“[i]n the context of competition law, the concept of ‘consumers’ encompasses intermediate and 
ultimate consumers”.1363 In the context of buyer power exclusion, those ‘consumers’ are no other 
than rival buyers that are affected because the exclusion increases their costs and therefore 
affects their ability to compete and also affects the competitive structure and competition as such. 
Even clearer is the position of the CJEU in British Airways v Commission, where it confirmed 
that dominant buyers would be in breach of Article 102 TFEU even if their conduct does not 
generate short-term end consumer harm, if their conduct has the effect of restricting competition 
by unjustifiably increasing its rivals’ costs, pushing them outside of the market, or making them 
                                                          
1360 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 6. 
1361 This policy is not exclusive to exclusionary buyer power cases but a part of the EU exclusionary competition 
policy as a whole. As early as in Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, 
EU:C:1979:36, the CJEU, in quite ordoliberal terms, held that the relevant effect of exclusionary abuses is the impact 
on market structure that leads to a weakening of competition because it has the “effect of hindering the maintenance 
of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition”, para 91. A similar an even 
clearer approach of applying a broader welfare standard was held in Judgment of 17 February 2011 in TeliaSonera 
Sverige, C-52/09, EU:C:2011:83, when holding that: “[t]he function of those rules [Article 102 TFEU] is precisely to 
prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and 
consumers, thereby ensuring the well-being of the European Union”, para 42.  
1362 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 31. 
1363 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1, Article 2.1(b); Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal 
mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, 
para. 16 (emphasis added). 
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less attractive for end consumers.1364 The CJEU, in terms much in line with an ordoliberal policy 
for buyer power and largely following Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion,1365 held that: 
[…] Article [102 TFEU] is aimed not only at practices which may cause prejudice for consumers 
directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective 
competition structure […].1366 
This was also the position of the General Court when it held that “Article [102 TFEU] is aimed at 
penalizing even an objective detriment to the structure of competition itself […], BA's argument 
that there is no proof of damage caused to consumers by its reward schemes cannot be 
accepted”.1367 
Therefore, it confirmed that the General Court was entitled “[…] not to examine whether BA’s 
conduct had cause prejudice to consumers within the meaning of subparagraph (b) the second 
paragraph of Article [102 TFEU], but to examine […] whether the bonus scheme at issue had a 
restrictive effect on competition and to conclude that the existence of such effect had been 
demonstrated by the Commission in the contested decision.”1368 
This broader approach to buyer power exclusion was also explicitly adopted by Advocate 
General Kokkott in this case and went further explaining the reasons why buyer power exclusion 
and abuse of dominant buying undertakings should be prohibited with the aim of protecting the 
competitive process and rival buyers affected by the foreclosure effects of a conduct. In Advocate 
General Kokkott’s view the application of Article 102 TFEU is to “protect existing competition in 
a market, weakened by the presence of the dominant undertaking”.1369 For the Advocate General, 
                                                          
1364 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 103-108. See 
also reaching a similar conclusion: Victoria Daskalova, ‘Consumer Welfare in EU Competition Law: What Is It 
(Not) About?’ 11 The Competition Law Review (2015) 133, p. 157. Also stressing this point from a buyer power 
perspective when stating that “it is important to note that the British Airways case that has been concisely discussed 
above provides for an important indication that the European Commission does not take the position that consumer 
harm is a necessary requirement for a violation of Article 102 TFEU. That is, the Commission specifically held in 
British Airways that proof of consumer harm is no necessary requirement in the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU. 
The decision by the European Commission was moreover upheld by the General Court and the European Court of 
Justice” in van Doorn, p. 157. See in general terms remarking that consumer harm is not required for the finding of 
an exclusionary abuse: Østerud, p. 43. 
1365 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 23 February 2006 in Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v 
Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2006:133, para. 67-84.  
1366 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 106. See also 
Nazzini that corroborates this interpretation of the CJEU’s Judgment that consumers are protected if the market 
structure and competition as such is protected in: Nazzini, [2011], p. 14 and more specifically p. 138-139. See also: 
Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials [2011], p. 50. 
1367 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 311. 
1368 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 106-107 
(emphasis added). 
1369 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 23 February 2006 in Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v 
Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2006:133, para. 44 (emphasis in original). 
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the purpose of Article 102 TFEU must be to prevent competition as a process from being 
distorted and, therefore, competition law:  
[it]… is not designed only or primarily to protect the immediate interests of individual 
competitors or consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such 
(as an institution), which has already been weakened by the presence of the dominant undertaking 
on the market. In this way, consumers are also indirectly protected. Because where competition as 
such is damaged, disadvantages for consumers are also to be feared.1370 
Therefore, exclusionary buyer power is captured by Article 102 TFEU “as soon as it runs counter 
to the purpose of protecting competition in the internal market from distortions” and not only 
whenever it has concrete effects on market participants.1371 Therefore, what needs to be proven is 
the likelihood of the exclusionary conduct to hinder the maintenance or development of 
competition in the market, proving that bonus schemes “are capable of making it difficult or 
impossible for that undertaking’s competitor to have access to the market and its business 
partners to choose between various sources of supply”.1372 Hence, and in the current state of the 
law, “Article [102 TFEU] applies not only to conduct which can directly prejudice consumers, 
but also to conduct which can prejudice them indirectly in that it is detrimental to a state of 
effective competition”,1373 a position which happens to be quite in line with the ordoliberal policy 
regarding competition harm that triggers the intervention of the law. 
Lastly, Zerbe suggests adopting a total welfare standard where the position of other buyers and 
suppliers is expressly considered in cases of buyer power exclusion, which is another form of a 
broad harm standard and even broader than the one resorted to by EU competition law. Under 
this approach, an exclusionary buying conduct that can be detrimental for consumers may be 
deemed legal if the aggregated effect is welfare enhancing (supplier/buyer surplus outweighs 
consumer surplus),1374 thus harm to competitors could be sufficient to trigger competition 
intervention or vice versa.  
7.10.2 The US Antitrust law narrow approach: protection only present 
consumer harm 
A narrow approach to buyer power exclusion implies that there will be competition law 
intervention whenever there is consumer harm in a related downstream market. This is a less 
intervening approach favored by those advocating that competition law’s aim is seeking end 
                                                          
1370 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 23 February 2006 in Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v 
Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2006:133, para. 68 (emphasis in original). 
1371 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 23 February 2006 in Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v 
Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2006:133, para. 69 (emphasis in original). 
1372 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 23 February 2006 in Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v 
Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2006:133, para. 71 (emphasis in original). 
1373 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 23 February 2006 in Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v 
Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2006:133, para. 86 (emphasis in original). 
1374 Zerbe Jr (2004-2005). 
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consumer welfare or preventing end consumer harm and the standard adopted by the US Supreme 
Court in Weyerhaeuser and preferred by the adherents to the Chicago School as a competition 
policy. Therefore, buyer power exclusion is only illegal under the rule of reason approach if 
there is consumer harm. Furthermore, this also may imply that the conduct would be deemed 
lawful in case it benefits end consumers but forecloses or harms competitors, as the goal is the 
promotion and protection of consumer welfare end not protecting competition as such.1375 
Part of the literature in US antitrust law also supports this stricter consumer harm approach. For 
instance, Scheelings and Wright argue that “[a] basic lesson of the economics of vertical 
restraints, and exclusionary conduct in general, is that antitrust analysis need only be concerned 
with the welfare of the final consumer”1376 and therefore reject the adoption of a broader approach 
to buyer power exclusion cases. Also, Salop remarks that “[o]f course, the overriding concern of 
antitrust is the impact of the overbuying conduct on consumers, not competitors or suppliers”1377 
and, therefore, in cases of buyer power exclusion “[t]he consumer welfare reason of rule standard 
would require evidence of harm to competition (i.e., consumers), not just harm to 
competitors.”1378 
In Europe, this narrower standard seems to find support in some of the Commission’s guidance 
documents by means of promoting consumer welfare as the goal of EU competition law and also 
for buyer power exclusion, for instance by resorting to the ‘as efficient buying competitor test’ as 
a mirror of the selling side approach. Also in the same vein is the guidance given by the 
Commission regarding its assessment dealing with exclusive supply obligation imposed through 
vertical agreements, in which the position of the buyer in the downstream market seems to be 
sole source of concern, while the competitive conditions in the upstream market are downplayed. 
However, as discussed, this approach is under-inclusive for buyer power cases and the adequacy 
of the test (even for selling side cases) has been recently questioned by the CJEU in Post 
Danmark II.1379 
                                                          
1375 Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984). See discussing this case from an 
exploitative perspective chapter 8, section 8.3. 
1376 Scheelings and Wright (2006), p. 212 (emphasis in original). 
1377 Salop (2004-2005), p. 677. 
1378 Ibid, p. 704. 
1379 Judgment of 6 October 2015 in Post Danmark, C-23/14, EU:C:2015:651, paras 66-68. See also the Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott in Judgment of 6 October 2015 in Post Danmark, C-23/14, EU:C:2015:343, in particular 
paras 56-75. See also: Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v Commission, T-286/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:547, paras. 140-
166, in which the General Court considered that in rebate cases there is no obligation to carry out the AEC to 




7.10.2.1 The broader approach to buyer power exclusion in the Robinson-Patman Act: 
protecting small buyers 
However, and somewhat surprisingly, in the US antitrust law an even a broader approach to 
exclusion in buyer power cases is adopted by the Robinson-Patman Act regarding purchasing 
price discrimination.1380 As remarked by Kirkwood, buyer power exclusion is precluded with the 
aim of protecting smaller buyers, regardless of the efficiency of the conduct.1381 Indeed, the US 
Supreme Court in Morton Salt when held that: “[t]he legislative history of the Robinson-Patman 
Act makes it abundantly clear that Congress considered it to be an evil that a large buyer could 
secure a competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because of the large buyer's quantity 
purchasing ability.”1382 Thus, buyer power exclusion or exploitation is prohibited under the 
Robinson-Patman Act, even absent consumer harm, if there is harm to “a small buyer” that would 
be foreclosed or put at a disadvantage. Also, in these cases there will be no need to prove an 
impact on market-wide competition, only to the foreclosed buyer.1383 Hence, the Robinson-
Patman Act goes much further than EU competition law when dealing with buyer power 
exclusion because it triggers absent consumer harm, regardless of the impact of the exclusion and 
also regardless of whether buyer imposing the exclusion has any substantial market power. 
Therefore, the Robinson-Patman Act and its wording resemble more an “unfair competition law” 
clause than a competition law provision, as I discuss in chapter 9. 
However, this broader approach to US buyer power exclusion is not representative of current US 
law because, as discussed in section 7.6, the Robinson-Patman Act is a piece of legislation that is 
not actively enforced by the Antitrust authorities and has a very limited room, if any, when it 
comes to application in private litigation cases.1384 
7.10.3 What are the differences between the approaches? 
Choosing one of the standards regarding the type of harm to be required to trigger the application 
of competition law in buyer power exclusion has important consequences because opting for 
either one or the other, in some cases, would lead to different outcomes and would condemn 
some purchasing conducts that under a different standard would not be illegal. 
In my view, if the approach taken is based on pure downstream consumer harm then it will be 
under-inclusive because it will only capture those instances where buyers are rivals in the same 
input and output markets, unless the competition authorities take into account the end consumer 
                                                          
1380 The Robinson-Patman Act is the amendment introduced to §2 of the The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 (Pub.L. 
63–212, 38 Stat. 730, enacted October 15, 1914, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53). 
1381 Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced 
Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p. 631-635; Hovenkamp, [2011], p. 324. 
1382 Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948), 43 (emphasis added). 
1383 Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced 
Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2004-2005), p.633. 
1384 Luchs and others (2010). 
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harm in a market in which the buyer does not participate but its rival does, this is something not 
explicitly taken into account in EU competition law. If pure purchasing harm is irrelevant, then 
buyers may exclude rivals without directly and in the short term increasing their selling costs 
(they could even offer a lower end consumer price), which will lead to an increase in further 
market concentration.1385 
If a broader welfare approach is employed, then exclusion that takes places in an upstream 
market where firms compete as buyers but that does not involve competition as retailers will also 
be captured, as well as the foreclosure effects of anti-competitive conducts without any 
immediate harm to end consumers. These instances of exclusion should also be captured because 
the buyer will foreclose rivals from the upstream market to gain more buyer (monopsony) power, 
potentially creating a loss in welfare even if there is no direct comparable consumer harm (end 
consumers for the competing rivals are not the same), and affecting the upstream competitive 
structure. 
I submit that this broader standard for buyer power exclusion requiring no end consumer welfare 
harm is adequate because it aims at protecting competition as such, the competitive process and 
grants a limited and justified protection to the economic freedom of market participants so that 
they can be as efficient as or more than a buying undertaking exerting the foreclosure.1386 A 
broader approach to buyer exclusion does not necessarily imply that it will protect inefficient 
rivals through decisions lacking economic “depth” and “revea[ling] a bias towards protecting 
competitors irrespective of whether they are efficient or not”, as argued by Rousseva.1387 Instead, 
as Carstensen puts it from an Antitrust perspective, by adopting a broader and more inclusive 
welfare standard for exclusionary buyer power and therefore “retaining workably competitive 
buying markets, many of the problems involved in focused analysis of specific buyer conduct can 
be avoided”.1388 
This section has shown that this preferred broader approach to buyer power exclusion, 
particularly regarding dominance cases is the one endorsed by the Courts. This finding reinforces 
one of the proposals and findings of this dissertation: buyer power in EU competition law triggers 
the application of competition law beyond strict consumer harm. Buyer power exclusion has been 
found to trigger EU competition law application absent evidence of direct consumer harm, as 
well as in cases in which the buyers compete only for the input but not downstream, because the 
                                                          
1385 Haglund (2008), p. 440. 
1386 Also stressing that this broader approach but with an emphasis on supplier welfare, see the opinion of Haglund 
who claims that one of the purposes of US antitrust law because it aims at protecting “the competitive process, which 
includes sellers victimized by cartels or monopsony, just as it protects consumers from monopoly” in ibid, p. 441. 
1387 Rousseva, [2010], p. 187. 
1388 Carstensen ‘Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among 
Suppliers’ (2008), p. 331. 
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buyer induced foreclosure exclusion has a negative competitive impact on the competitive 
process, which has an indirect effect on end consumers. 
7.11 Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that buyer induced exclusion is the most important problem concerning 
abuse of buyer power, as also recognized by the Commission.1389 Not only does the buyer power 
induced exclusion have repercussions in the upstream purchasing market where buyers compete 
for an input regardless if they compete downstream. In most cases, however, the foreclosure is 
made with the aim of having an additional impact on the competitive conditions in the 
downstream market if the undertakings compete as retailers of the input vis-à-vis consumers, 
therefore the buyer gains an advantage as a buyer to eventually exercise monopsony power 
against suppliers and monopoly power vis-à-vis final consumers. Therefore, buyer power 
exclusion has a dualistic effect in upstream and downstream markets as supported by the case 
law, the Commission’s practice, and examples of buyers competing in related markets. 
I analyzed different theories of harm involving buyer power exclusion and have shown that all of 
them have in common that their aim is to disadvantage rival buyers by increasing their costs 
which will make it either impossible for these competing buyers to gain access to an input (total 
foreclosure) or more expensive (partial foreclosure). To do so, I discussed the theories of harm 
leading to input foreclosure through exclusive supply obligations, overbuying or mergers that 
may lead to equivalent effects. Also, I discussed instances in which purchasing price 
discrimination may amount to an infringement of competition and how US antitrust law takes a 
surprisingly stern stance regarding the protection of rival buyers in this regard through the 
Robinson-Patman Act. Furthermore, I discussed how buyer power can be used through 
leveraging practices so that a powerful buyer can affect the competitive capability in a related 
downstream market through the granting of supra competitive and fidelity enhancing bonuses. 
Finally, the last theory of harm explored is the situation of squeeze to buy as an exploitative 
practice with the aim of preparing for a take-over under a lower purchasing price absent the 
conduct. 
An important finding regarding buyer conducts with foreclosure effects is that on most occasions 
buyer power exertion is connected to a strong position in the market as a retailer, as occurred in 
British Airways v Commission. If a buyer is dominant as a retailer this will generally put its 
suppliers (particularly if they are atomized) in a dependent position. The dependence is not used 
to exploit the suppliers, as a monopsonist would do, but instead to exclude rivals through their 
suppliers by imposing input foreclosure tactics or by securing the most efficient supply sources. 
                                                          
1389 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 20. 
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Therefore, exclusionary buyer power cases tend to deal with abuses of bargaining power but not 
with demand withholding (monopsony power) as purchasing prices are usually not lowered below 
the competitive level, nor are suppliers exploited. 
Also, this chapter has shown that buyer power exclusion happens in different ways and with 
different aims, and in some instances the foreclosure is even economically efficient, for example 
concerning exclusive supply agreements. Sometimes the foreclosure aims to exclude rival buyers 
from being able to exercise monopsony power upstream as there are no other buyers and, 
additionally, if they compete downstream as retailers, to leverage their buying power to gain a 
competitive advantage in the downstream market by raising rivals’ costs and making them less 
attractive to end consumers. However, despite these commonalities there is no standard test to be 
applied in buyer exclusion and most cases will require an evaluation of the circumstances of the 
case and the effect of the behavior, either on a superficial level if the behavior due to is object or 
nature seems prima facie anti-competitive, or in a more detailed manner if its effects may reveal 
that it creates an anti-competitive foreclosure. 
Finally, I discussed two policy issues regarding buyer power exclusion. First, I evaluated whether 
the reverse application of the ‘as efficient buying competitor test’ is an adequate tool to capture 
buyer induced exclusion. I sustain that as the test stands it risks being under enforcing and not 
appropriate for buyer power cases, therefore I suggest adopting further the test for buyer power 
realities and consider this an area ripe for the development of further methodologies. Secondly, 
and regarding which welfare standard applies to buyer power exclusion, this chapter has shown 
that under EU competition law the approach goes beyond triggering the application of EU 
competition rules only whenever the exclusion also has direct end consumer harm as competition 
intervention is warranted to protect competition as such, the competitive upstream market 
structure and grant some limited protection to the economic freedom of rival buyers. This more 
interventionist (and justified) approach regarding buyer power exclusion captures cases where 
buyers compete in the input and output markets as well as those instances where buyers only 
compete in the input but not the output market. On the other hand, narrower approaches like the 
one resorted to in the US concerning unilateral foreclosure and those advocating for end 
consumer as the goal of competition law represent a more ‘hands-off’ approach and subordinate 
competition intervention in buyer power exclusion cases to an eventual downstream consumer 
harm centered around the protection of end consumers in the short term, as shown in 
Weyerhaeuser and as supported by part of the literature. In my view, however, such an approach 
is flawed because of risks of under-enforcement and because it fails to grasp the different 
dynamics of buyer power exclusion. 
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8 Exploitative Buyer Power 
8.1 Introduction 
The exploitation of buyer power implies imposing purchasing conditions to the detriment of 
suppliers and the benefit of the buyer, which are typically but not exclusively in the form of very 
low purchasing prices.1390 In this chapter I discuss the different behaviors through which a buyer 
may exploit its market power vis-à-vis suppliers to obtain a “monopsony” or excessive profit as a 
buyer, therefore transferring said profit from the supplier to the buyer. My analysis starts with a 
discussion of unilateral behavior followed by concerted exercise of buyer power because, even 
though the buyer power economics is rather similar for both unilateral and concerted behavior, 
the legal treatment is different. 
Concerning unilateral behavior, I submit that anti-competitive buyer power exploitation through 
monopsony pricing (i.e.: below the competitive level) is not a real concern because it rarely arises 
(if at all),1391 due to the fact that, from an economics perspective, it is a conduct that is unlikely to 
be held for a long period of time, in terms of both current and future behavior. The same cannot 
be said when it comes to coordinate behavior, however. The stance taken regarding coordinate 
buying behavior varies depending on whether the agreement involves a buyers’ cartel or a buying 
alliance. In the case of buyers’ cartels that fix purchasing prices or quotas, the approach given by 
EU competition law is to consider these types of agreements as anti-competitive by object, as 
they erode the natural rivalry competitive process, even if it may lead to lower purchasing prices. 
In the case of a buying alliance, used to create bargaining power in an efficiency-enhancing 
manner, the legal treatment is to consider them pro-competitive and, if anything, to assess them 
as effect-based restrictions of competition. The Commission’s practice and the analogue selling 
side case law shows that buyer cartels are treated as object restrictions of competition, whereas 
buying alliances enjoy a presumption of legality and are treated as possible effect-based 
restrictions. Therefore, there are discrepancies concerning the exploitative treatment to buyer 
power. 
To study buyer power exploitation and the different ways in which to carry it out, I have 
organized this chapter as follows. In section 8.2 I discuss how buyer power exploitation works (if 
it does) from an economic perspective and whether self-correction is an alternative for these 
types of cases. This is followed by an analysis concerning unilaterally imposing “unfairly low 
                                                          
1390 For a discussion of the concept of exploitation see: Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law 
And Economic Approaches [2012], p. 6. 
1391 Also stressing that the “case law on abuse of buying power is relatively scarce” see: Frederic Jenny, 
‘International Report’ in Pierre Kobel, Pranvera Këllezi and Bruce Kilpatrick (eds), Antitrust in the Groceries Sector 
& Liability Issues in Relation to Corporate Social Responsibility (Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2015), p. 31. 
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purchasing prices” and its treatment under Article 102 TFEU. In section 8.3, I propose that the 
traditional United Brands test must be reinterpreted for buyer power cases and offer the supplier’s 
profit curve as a better benchmark to determine when a purchasing price is unfair in the light of 
Article 102 TFEU. Section 8.4 continues the discussion concerning unilateral behavior and 
discusses price discrimination that may exploit suppliers and which may also create 
disadvantages for them with respect to other suppliers. Then, in section 8.5, I analyze the case of 
centralized purchasing and cooperatives as a form to group and maximize the efficiency of buyer 
power and its efficiency enhancing, and also for exploitative purposes. This section serves as an 
introduction to the discussions regarding agreements among buyers and the analysis regarding the 
differences between buyer cartels and buying alliances, which I carry out in section 8.6. In 
section 8.7 I discuss how undertakings – both for unilateral and coordinated behaviors – may 
present efficiency defenses to justify their purchasing conduct and, therefore, show that the 
practice was not exploitative. In section 8.8 I discuss the type of harm and market that is 
necessary to trigger EU competition law intervention in exploitative buyer power cases. Finally, 
section 8.9 concludes the chapter. 
8.2 How does low purchasing price exploitation work, if it does? 
The most intuitive form of exploitation of buyer power occurs when a buyer underpays its 
supplier below the competitive level for the input it acquires, which implies a transfer of profits 
from supplier to buyer.1392 The exploitative effect is usually connected with a previous 
exclusionary practice by undertakings that make the scenario ripe for exploitation as there is less 
competition.1393 However, pure exploitative practices can exist without the involvement of prior 
exclusion of rival buyers. Nevertheless, despite its intuitive appeal and the fact that buyer power 
has traditionally been linked to monopsony price exploitation, in my view, and as is corroborated 
by the economic theory and the (absence of) case law, it is unlikely that buyer exploitation by 
means of prices below the competitive level and the supplier’s marginal costs will take place, 
either unilaterally or collectively. Therefore, it is unsurprising that very few cases dealing with 
buyer power exploitation exist.1394 In the following, I aim to explain how purchasing price 
                                                          
1392 O'Donoghue and Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU [2013], p. 841. See also making a similar 
statement from a seller’s perspective: Robles Martín-Laborda, Exploitative Prices in European Competition Law, p. 
2. For further literature: Massimo Motta and Alexandre de Streel, ‘Excessive Pricing in Competition Law: Never say 
Never?’ in Konkurrensverket - Swedish Competition Authority (ed), The Pros and Cons of High Prices (2007) 20, 
14, p. 20; Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust 
Policy’ (2010), p. 30; F. Enrique González-Díaz and John Temple Lang, The Concept of Abuse, Vol. 5 (F. Enrique 
González-Díaz and Robbert Snelders eds, Claeys and Casteels 2013). 
1393 OECD Policy Rountables: Excessive Prices, Paris (2011), p. 26. 
1394 See also stressing the lack of cases dealing with exploitative purchasing prices: Motta and de Streel [2007], p. 16; 
Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials [2011] 538. For example, the OECD report on 
excessive prices does not even have a section on excessively low purchasing prices in its 468 pages, see: OECD 
‘Policy Rountables: Excessive Prices’ (2011).  
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exploitation works, if it does, and what the risks associated with it are, as an introduction for the 
remainder of the chapter. 
Excessively low purchasing prices is the textbook effect of monopsony; by withholding 
purchases the buyer is able to pay a price that is below the marginal cost of production and the 
competitive level. This price imposition can either be done unilaterally by a dominant undertaking 
or jointly if it is the result of competitor’s agreement among rival buyers. If a very low 
purchasing price is imposed and buyers do not have other sources of demand they will be in 
principle obliged to sell their output to the sole buyer who extracts a monopsony profit from the 
trade. This generates a transfer of wealth between the supplier to the buyer which has no direct 
effect on a pure direct end consumer surplus perspective.1395 If the supplier refuses to accept the 
monopsony price its options are limited and will tend to exit the upstream market as it is no 
longer economically viable.1396 Therefore, exploitative purchasing prices can result in 
exclusionary tactics in the long run with some similitude to cases of margin squeeze, as noted by 
Robles Martín-Laborda.1397 In addition to these statics effects, exploitative purchasing practices 
can also have a negative impact on dynamic efficiency as suppliers will exit the market or may 
refuse to carry out investments, as stressed by Faull and Nikpay.1398 These impacts on dynamic 
efficiency, such as triggering the exit of suppliers from the upstream market, decentivizing entry 
of new suppliers or buyers, affecting innovation and variety are a competition concern when the 
exploitation is carried out by a dominant purchasing undertaking, as captured under Article 102 
TFEU and as I discuss in section 8.3. 
Like monopoly pricing, when the quantities purchased by a buyer are reduced from its normal 
purchasing patter in order to obtain the price reduction, there is an efficiency loss that triggers 
competition intervention, as discussed in the concentration appraisal. In Sovion/Südfleisch.1399 In 
this Decision the Commission evaluated possible buyer power effects pursuant to a proposed 
concentration by two entities engaged in the purchasing and slaughtering of pigs and cattle for 
human consumption and proposed two theories of harm. One of them being the reduction of 
purchases typical of monopsony power and the other the risk of competitors’ foreclosure in the 
                                                          
1395 Also raising this issue for buyer power cases see: John B. Kirkwood and Robert H. Lande, ‘The Fundamental 
Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency’ 84 Notre Dame Law review (2008-2009) 191; 
Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust Policy’ 
(2010), p. 21. See suggesting that even within a consumer welfare standard there ought to be protection to smaller 
suppliers in John B. Kirkwood, ‘The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from 
Anticompetitive Conduct’ 81 Fordham Law Review (2013) 2425. 
1396 See also remarking that buyer power exploitation may lead to supplier squeeze, particularly if these are SMEs in 
Alexander Italianer, ‘The Object of Effects’ (CRA Annual Brussels Conference – Economic Developments in 
Competition Policy), p. 6. 
1397 See also: Robles Martín-Laborda, ‘La Cadena Alimentaria: Cuando el Poder de Mercado lo Tiene el 
Comprador’. 
1398 Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 6.328. 
1399 Commission Decision of 21/12/2005 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market (Case 
No COMP/M.3968 - Sovion/Südfleisch) according to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 [2005]. 
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input market (topic discussed in chapter 7).1400 However, despite recognizing monopsony pricing 
as a theory of harm, it dismissed the allegations, as I discuss in section 8.3. 
Furthermore, exploitative purchasing prices affect most smaller suppliers, as noted by Kirkwood 
and Carstensen.1401 I distinguish between two situations here, one situation is where the suppliers 
are inefficient and their costs of production are above the competitive level. Harm to those 
suppliers is not anti-competitive because they are inefficient and the market would be better 
without them in the first place. However, there are other suppliers that might not be small yet able 
to produce with costs that are equal or slightly below the competitive level. These small, yet still 
competitive suppliers,1402 are the ones most likely to be anti-competitively affected by buyer 
power exploitation because the price reduction below the competitive level will erode any chance 
of profitability; instead, larger and more efficient suppliers with lower costs would not be that 
affected because even if their profitability would be reduced they are not producing at a ‘minus’. 
However, and in contrast to what happens concerning excessive pricing, the effects of low 
purchasing prices are not necessarily welfare detrimental if quantities purchased are not reduced, 
a proposal not shared by Akman that seems to equate buyer exploitation with monopsony 
price.1403 This is not the case because exertion of bargaining power that reduce prices towards the 
competitive level and does not adversely affect quantity are not welfare detrimental and may 
even be welfare beneficial, from both a total and a consumer welfare perspective.  
Therefore, from a welfare perspective, buyer power exploitation involves a wealth transfer from 
the supplier to the buyer that, depending on the downstream conditions, can be passed on to 
consumers in the form of lower final retailing prices.1404 This is an important difference with 
selling-side excessive pricing which is always welfare detrimental and in which there is no 
passing on of any efficiencies. If the purchasing price reduction is passed on to end consumers, 
then the buyer exploitation is very likely not to be ‘exploitative’ and it is an efficiency enhancing 
                                                          
1400 Commission Decision of 21/12/2005 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market (Case 
No COMP/M.3968 - Sovion/Südfleisch) according to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 [2005], paras. 37 and 
44. 
1401 Carstensen ‘Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among 
Suppliers’ (2008); Kirkwood ‘The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from 
Anticompetitive Conduct’ (2013). 
1402 Kirkwood ‘The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct’ 
(2013), p. 2426. 
1403 Cf with the view of Akman who claims that “there is no fundamental distinction between the economic analysis 
and mechanism of buyer power and seller power”, even though it makes a reference to O’Donoghue and Padilla who 
explain that there is a difference when it comes to the welfare effects and wealth transfer in Akman, The Concept of 
Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law And Economic Approaches [2012], p. 193 and see note 22. 
1404 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 194. See also 
supporting this interpretation O'Donoghue and Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU [2013], p. 841. 
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exercise to the benefit of end consumers, as also remarked by O’Donoghue and Padilla.1405 If, on 
the other hand, the prices paid are exploitative and set below the competitive level and the 
supplier’s marginal costs then suppliers are not duly compensated for their goods and are 
exploited by the buyers.1406  
However, the price reductions obtained by powerful buyers are not always passed onto 
consumers and would be kept by the buyers, therefore not increasing welfare from a consumer 
perspective and only increasing their own (buyer) welfare. This would happen if the unilateral 
buyer is also a power retailer, as shown by the hourglass shape facing no real downstream 
competition, or those instances in which buyers coordinate their behavior upstream and 
downstream to erode competition between them, as discussed in Raw Tobacco Italy.1407 
Therefore, and based on the economics of buyer power, in my view, an excessive fear concerning 
exploitation of buyer power by means of setting exploitative and below the competitive level 
purchasing pricing and withholding demand is unwarranted if done by a dominant undertaking. 
As I discuss in chapter 3, section 3.3.3., monopsony cases rarely happen because monopsony 
purchasing is not the most profitable buying tactic. Also, exploitative purchasing price is not 
rational because in so doing the buyer squeezes its suppliers (even if not all of them, at least 
marginal suppliers) away from business. As confirmed in the analysis by the OFT in BetterCare 
II: 
in principle, charging excessively low purchase prices could constitute an abuse of a dominant 
position, the OFT considers that it is only likely to do so in exceptional circumstances. In the 
absence of barriers to exit by suppliers from the relevant market, a purchaser which paid 
excessively low prices would be unable to obtain supply beyond the short term even if it was a 
monopsonist.1408  
Consequently, a powerful buyer (both a monopsonist and one enjoying substantial buyer power) 
will not be actively seeking to eliminate alternative sources of supply because by doing so it 
grants further seller market power to the remaining suppliers and loses buyer power. The case 
law discussed in this chapter confirms this argumentation, as there have been only two instances 
in which such possibility has been argued and in none of them the decision-making body found 
the theory of harm to be sufficiency substantiated.1409 
                                                          
1405 See also making a similar analysis: O'Donoghue and Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC [2006], p. 
639-641. 
1406 Kirkwood ‘The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct’ 
(2013), p. 2427. 
1407 Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) [2006] OJ L 353/45, para. 280 to 282. See for a somewhat similar view 
but regarding monopsony effects exclusively: Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 79. 
1408 CA98/09/2003 BetterCare Group Ltd/North & West Belfast Health & Social Services Trust [2003], para. 56.  
1409 Judgment of 28 March 1985 in CICCE v Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:150; Commission Decision of 
21/12/2005 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market (Case No COMP/M.3968 - 
Sovion/Südfleisch) according to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 [2005]. 
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The situation shifts, however, if the exploitation of buyer power occurs by means of coordination 
among undertakings. Buyer cartels fixing purchasing prices, quotas or other buying modalities do 
so with the intention of maximizing the profits of the cartel members, reducing competition 
between them in the upstream and downstream markets,1410 while not passing on the benefits of 
lower purchasing prices to end consumers. Therefore, even if setting low purchasing prices may 
perhaps decrease end consumer prices in the short term, coordination among firms that has the 
object of eliminating, impeding or restricting competition is forbidden because the normal 
competitive process of rivalry is vitiated, which it is the goal of Article 101 TFEU. Additionally, 
another reason for which competition intervention happens in cases of coordination of buyer 
power is that purchasing agreements might have exclusionary effects foreclosing access to 
suppliers for new entrants.1411 Furthermore, this stricter treatment concerning agreements among 
buyers, even if the coordination fixes lower purchasing prices, can be explained from the 
perspective of the remedies available to NCAs. In the case of an agreement among buyers, it is 
necessary to terminate, sanction and prohibit the coordination, although individual and un-
coordinated purchasing is not prohibited. Whereas in the case of a dominant undertaking what 
must be changed is the conduct: for example, it is no longer allowed to pay a purchasing price 
below the competitive level for the input it requires. 
However, not all coordination among purchasing firms is anti-competitive. As I will discuss, 
buying alliances that are formed in the upstream markets to generate buyer power by grouping 
purchasing while not exchanging sensitive information and keeping intense downstream 
competition are procompetitive as they tend to lower purchasing prices towards the competitive 
level and pass on these benefits to end consumers. This explains why there is a benevolent 
treatment in EU competition law when discussing buying alliances, and, in most cases, these 
types of behaviors may only constitute competition infringements by effect and tend to be exempt 
because of their efficiency effects under a 101(3) TFEU analysis. 
8.2.1 Self-correction in buyer power cases? 
This discussion leads to the question of whether buyer power exploitation can be self-corrected 
by the market’s own competitive forces, as it is the preponderant theory regarding selling side 
price exploitation.1412 According to this self-correcting force, exploitative conducts will be 
neutralized by the market itself as new players enter the market to reap the supracompetitive 
                                                          
1410 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 201. 
1411 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 203. 
1412 See, for example, the opinion of Robles Martín Laborda when arguing that: “[t]herefore, even if competition law 
promotes consumer welfare rather than total welfare, dominant firms should be free to charge prices at the level they 
choose, as supra-normal profits will attract new competitors”, in Robles Martín-Laborda, Exploitative Prices in 
European Competition Law, p. 12. 
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profits extracted by the monopolist by selling the same goods at a lower price. Despite its appeal, 
not all economists agree with this self-correcting theory and seems not to not hold true in all 
scenarios.1413 Therefore, based on this line of thinking, the Commission has considered cases of 
excessive pricing to be beyond its enforcement priorities regarding dominance, although may 
intervene if the proper functioning of the market cannot be otherwise adequately ensured,1414 for 
example in the presence of high and non-transitory entry barriers into the market.1415 
However, how self-correctable are exploitative buyer power cases? In buyer power cases, market 
self-regulation is apparently not as straightforward as it is in a seller-oriented scenario. In this 
case, firms obtain a lower purchasing price thanks to its buyer power. If the prices are excessively 
low, new suppliers will not be incentivized to enter the market because they will not obtain 
supracompetitive profits, nor will other buyers enter the upstream market because when they do 
the low prices will be increased and not decreased. These newcomer buyers, however, will be 
able to profit from entry due to the abnormally low prices to a greater or lesser extent depending 
on the competitive conditions in the downstream market in which they operate as a retailer but 
not as a buyer. Hence, new entrant buyers – that act in the same vein as to buyer substitution 
discussed in chapter 51416 – will be a competitive constraint for the excessively low purchasing 
prices having the ability to regulate the market.1417 Therefore, it is a combination of the 
competitive downstream and upstream market conditions that will largely dictate the possibility 
of entry of new buyers in the upstream market as a buyer.  
Consequently, albeit self-regulation concerning buyer power exploitation is possible, it might not 
always occur and, therefore, competition law intervention it is warranted and justified. Hence, if 
self-regulation is not the always possible, what is the legal treatment given by EU competition 
law to buyer power exploitation? This is the focus of the remainder of the chapter. 
8.3 Unilaterally imposing unfairly low purchasing prices 
Imposition of unfairly low purchasing prices is the most intuitive type of buyer power 
exploitation. In this section I discuss how a single undertaking may exploit their buyer power vis-
                                                          
1413 OECD ‘Policy Rountables: Excessive Prices’ (2011), p. 10. 
1414 See also the Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, 
para. 7. 
1415 OECD ‘Policy Rountables: Excessive Prices’ (2011), p. 12. See inter alia for tests when to intervene in cases of 
excessive pricing: David S. Evans and A. Jorge Padilla, ‘Excessive Prices: Using Economics to Define 
Administrable Legal Rules’ 1 Journal of Competition Law and Economics (2005) 97; O'Donoghue and Padilla, The 
Law and Economics of Article 82 EC [2006]; Motta and de Streel [2007]; Bishop and Walker, [2010] para 6.014-
6.019; Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 268-282. 
1416 See chapter 5, section 5.4.2. 
1417 See from a seller oriented perspective a similar argument by the OECD in OECD ‘Policy Rountables: Excessive 
Prices’ (2011), p. 9-10.  
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à-vis suppliers through the imposition of unfairly low purchasing prices at the competitive level. 
However, despite its intuitive appeal, my research concludes that these instances are very rare, as 
corroborated by Faull and Nikpay.1418 This confirms that cases of unilateral monopsony power 
rarely happen in practice and that buyers do not attempt to squeeze their suppliers until reaching a 
point that drives them out of the market, as argued in this thesis, and, therefore, monopsony does 
not represent a real competitive concern. 
According to Article 102(a) TFEU a dominant buying undertaking abuses its dominant position 
when it imposes unfairly lower prices, as it also does in terms of selling side exploitation. This 
prohibition takes place regardless of whether or not the buyer also abuses its position in the 
downstream market; i.e. the abuse is autonomous and can be triggered even when there is no 
abuse in the downstream market or consumer harm. Furthermore, this prohibition requires an 
element of fairness as the prices have to be both excessively low and unfair, which is a 
requirement that does not exist concerning purchasing price fixing by buyers’ cartels. 
As I discuss in this section, unfairly low purchasing prices rarely happen in practice and its 
regulation by the Courts is practically non-existent and remains in general very modest for selling 
side cases.1419 Regarding buyer power, the lack of case law and legal guidance is even scarcer, as 
there are no cases in which these issues have been dealt with in detail.1420 Only in CICCE v 
Commission1421 for dominant firms, and in Sovion/Südfleisch1422 with respect to concentrations, 
was the topic partially addressed. In the US the scenario is similar; there are few cases in which 
unfairly low prices (monopsony prices) have been subject to analysis by the US Courts, such as 
the exceptional case of Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts,1423 which I discuss below. On 
other occasions, some party claimed before the US courts the existence of exploitative buyer 
                                                          
1418 Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 4.882. 
1419 See: Judgment of 29 February 1968 in Parke, Davis & Co. v Probel and Others, C-24/67, EU:C:1968:11; 
Judgment of 18 February 1971 in Sirena v Eda, C-40/70, EU:C:1971:18; Judgment of 13 November 1975 in General 
Motors v Commission, C-26/75, EU:C:1975:150; Judgment of 14 February 1978 in United Brands v Commission, C-
27/76, EU:C:1978:22; Judgment of 13 July 1989 in Tournier, C-395/87, EU:C:1989:319; Judgment of 4 May 1988 
in Bodson v Pompes funèbres des régions libérées, C-30/87, EU:C:1988:225; Commission Decision of 23 July 2004 
in case no. COMP/A.36.568/D3 – Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg [2004], para. 226 to 228; and 
Commission Decision of 23 July 2004 in case no. COMP/A.36.570/D3 – Sundbusserne v Port of Helsingborg 
[2004], para. 207 to 208. Also stressing this point see, inter alia, Pinar Akman and Luke Garrod, ‘When are 
Excessive Prices Unfair’ 7 Journal of Competition Law & Economics (2011) 403; Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition 
Law: Text, Cases, and Materials [2011], p. 538; Ioannis Kokkoris and Marcus Glader, Excessive Pricing, Vol. 5 (F. 
Enrique González-Díaz and Robbert Snelders eds, Claeys and Casteels 2013), para 10.5. 
1420 Also having found no case in which there was a condemnation of excessively low purchasing prices see: Akman, 
The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law And Economic Approaches [2012], p. 192-193; O'Donoghue 
and Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU [2013]. 
1421 Judgment of 28 March 1985 in CICCE v Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:150. See commenting this case: 
Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 3.306; Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials [2011], p. 
538; Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 766. 
1422 Commission Decision of 21/12/2005 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market (Case 
No COMP/M.3968 - Sovion/Südfleisch) according to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 [2005]. 
1423 Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984). 
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power practices through low purchasing prices but the courts did not deal with the claims, as it 
occurred in West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc. v. UPMC; Highmark, Inc.1424 Lastly, most 
instances of unilateral excessive pricing are related to or exist because of the existence of a legal 
monopoly.1425 
The main rule concerning the regulation of excessive pricing and scenarios where it is contrary to 
Article 102(a) TFEU is based on the United Brands test. In United Brands v Commission, the 
CJEU held that a price becomes ‘unfair’ when it is set higher (or lower for buyer power cases) 
than that which would result from effective competition.1426 The Court, however, did not provide 
specific guidance as to what ‘unfair’ means. It did, however establish a reference for determining 
when a price is unfair, the CJEU clarified that the “price […] is excessive because it has no 
reasonable relation to the economic value of the product [purchased]”.1427 Thus, United Brands v 
Commission established a two-tier1428 test for determining when a price is unfair from a seller 
side perspective: 
[…] whether the difference between the costs actually incurred and the price actually charged is 
excessive, and, it [sic] the answer to this question is in the affirmative, whether a price has been 
imposed which is either unfair in itself or when compared to competing products.1429 
The first limb of the test measures the difference between the costs for producing the good and 
the selling price and whether or not the sale leads to an excessive profit.1430 The second limb of 
the tests consists in determining whether or not the price is unfair by comparing the good with 
identical products produced by another undertaking, or substitutes ones, or comparing the prices 
charged by the undertaking in the relevant market with competing products to determine if the 
price is exploitative and illegal because of the exercise of abusive market power or due to 
efficiency.1431 Importantly, the CJEU recognized that this test is not the only option for assessing 
                                                          
1424 West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, No. 09-4468 (3rd Cir. 2010). For some discussion of the case 
see: Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Healthcare Prices, p. 34; Bruce D. Sokler and Farrah Short, ‘Third Circuit Revives 
Conspiracy Claims against Hospital and Insurer’ (2010) <https://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2010/Advisories/0801-
1210-NAT-AFR/web.html> accessed 4th February 2016. 
1425 See: Judgment of 20 March 2002, UPS Europe v Commission, T-175/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:78.  
1426 Judgment of 14 February 1978 in United Brands v Commission, C-27/76, EU:C:1978:22, paras. 248-249. For a 
discussion of fairness under Article 102 TFEU, ordoliberal influence and the case law see: Akman, The Concept of 
Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law And Economic Approaches [2012], p. 146-184.  
1427 Judgment of 14 February 1978 in United Brands v Commission, C-27/76, EU:C:1978:22, para. 250. 
1428 Supporting the two tier test see, inter alia, Robles Martín-Laborda, Exploitative Prices in European Competition 
Law, p. 3-4; OECD ‘Policy Rountables: Excessive Prices’ (2011), p. 11; Akman and Garrod (2011); Gal, ‘Abuse of 
Dominance - Exploitative Abuses’ [2013], p. 401; Cf with the one tier test interpretation given in Motta and de Streel 
[2007]. 
1429 Judgment of 14 February 1978 in United Brands v Commission, C-27/76, EU:C:1978:22, para. 252. 
1430 European Commission, ‘Contribution of the European Union in OECD Policy Rountables: Excessive Prices’ in 
OECD (ed), Policy Rountables: Excessive Prices (OECD 2011) 317, p. 317; Akman and Garrod (2011), p. 404. 
1430 European Commission, ‘Contribution of the European Union in OECD Policy Rountables: Excessive Prices’ in 
OECD (ed), Policy Rountables: Excessive Prices (OECD 2011) 317, p. 317; Akman and Garrod (2011), p. 404. 
1431 European Commission, ‘Contribution of the European Union in OECD Policy Rountables: Excessive Prices’ 
[2011], p. 317; OECD ‘Policy Rountables: Excessive Prices’ (2011), p. 11. 
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whether or not prices are excessive, this leaves the Commission and NCAs with certain margins 
of discretion,1432 as occurred in Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg and Sundbusserne v 
Port of Helsingborg.1433 This is particularly important for excessive purchasing prices as 
discussed infra. 
Furthermore, excessive pricing can be forbidden even in the absence of end consumer harm. As 
clarified by the selling oriented case law, the Courts have found unlawful the imposition of 
exploitative selling prices that affect other undertakings acting in intermediate markets, without a 
requirement of evidence of end consumer harm.1434 An analogical interpretation of the case for 
buyer power cases leads to the conclusion that, for buyer oriented cases concerning exploitative 
purchasing prices, EU competition law intervention is warranted whenever buyer exploitation 
affects suppliers with the aim to protect competition as a process and the market from consumer 
harm in a broad sense, not only due to consumer welfare considerations, which may appear 
consistent with an ordoliberal approach.1435 Therefore, for buyer power exploitation, no harm is 
required to trigger the application of the prohibition of excessively low prices. 
8.3.1 The case law on unfairly low purchasing prices 
In the case law and the Commission practice there have been two instances in which the 
possibility of a breach of EU competition law by means of excessively low purchasing practices 
has been discussed to a certain extent. In this section I discuss these cases, while also briefly 
touching upon the scenario involving MS dealing with these types of practices and the US 
antitrust. 
In CICCE v Commission, the Comité des Industries Cinématographiques des Communautés 
Européennes (CICCE) and representative of film makers, claimed before the Commission that 
three public French television companies (the TV companies) were imposing unfairly low license 
                                                          
1432 Judgment of 14 February 1978 in United Brands v Commission, C-27/76, EU:C:1978:22, para. 253. In practice 
NCAs tend to apply not only a different methodology, but several to a same case. See supporting this approach: 
Motta and de Streel [2007]; OECD ‘Policy Rountables: Excessive Prices’ (2011), p. 12. 
1433 Commission Decision of 23 July 2004 in case no. COMP/A.36.568/D3 – Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of 
Helsingborg [2004], para. 226 to 228; and Commission Decision of 23 July 2004 in case no. COMP/A.36.570/D3 – 
Sundbusserne v Port of Helsingborg [2004], para. 207 to 208. For some discussion on how these cases deviate from 
the United Brands test see, inter alia: G.J. Werden, ‘Monopoly Pricing and Competition Policy: Divergent Paths to 
the Same Destination’ in Barry E. Hawk (ed), Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Competition law Institute (Juris 
Publishing, Inc 2009); OECD ‘Policy Rountables: Excessive Prices’ (2011), p. 56; Akman and Garrod (2011), p. 424 
to 426. 
1434 See also: Robles Martín-Laborda, Exploitative Prices in European Competition Law, p. 8. 
1435 See the opinion of Robles Martín Laborda in connection with explains that for the majority exploitative selling 
prices that “the prohibition would be in line with some of the proposals of the ordoliberal ideology, which strongly 
influenced the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position in Article 102 TFEU (initially Article 86 EEC).” But for 
whom this interpretation is wrong as the incorporation into the Treaties was not prompted by the German delegation 
but rather the French delegation, in ibid, p. 9-11. 
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fees for broadcast copyright content administered by the applicant as a collecting society.1436 As 
in most cases of unfair pricing, these TV companies were organized in the form of ‘service 
public’1437 and enjoyed a dominant purchasing position due to it being granted by means of a 
legislative measure.1438 
CICCE claimed before the French NCA, and later before the CJEU, that the TV companies 
abused their dominant purchasing position to impose film license fees that were deemed to be 
abnormally low,1439 basing its claim also on a non-binding opinion of the French NCA that had 
reached said conclusion.1440 For CICCE, the fees paid by the TV companies were “so low as to 
bring about an unbalanced distribution of amortization between the cinemas […] and the 
television [and also therefore] one third of television programmes were paid for with between 3% 
and 6% of the aggregate budget […]”.1441 The procedure before the French NCA was 
discontinued because it was not possible to determine by using a single average value of license 
fees if an abuse of a dominant purchasing position had taken place. The evidence should have 
been presented film by film and not by a general presumption of the average values of the license 
fees, or based on the budget earmarked for the purchasing of licenses for films. Against this 
rejection, CICCE lodged an application for the declaration of their voidness before the CJEU. 
The CJEU found that the decision to discontinue with the investigation was lawful and correct, 
demanding the “need to prove the alleged abuse by reference to actual cases involving specific 
films rather than by reference to the average licence fee paid for all the films for which the 
television companies acquired broadcasting rights”.1442 From the evidence available the CJEU 
confirmed that the license fees were not consistent but varied from film to film.1443 The CJEU, 
                                                          
1436 Judgment of 28 March 1985 in CICCE v Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:150, para. 2. See briefly discussing 
this case and stressing the difficulty of proving excessive pricing practices: Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 3.305-
3.306. 
1437 Loi n° 74-696 du 7 août 1974 relative à la radiodiffusion et à la télévision, last modified in 14 May 2014. 
1438 The companies involved were: i) Société nationale de la télévision française 1 (TF 1) a public undertaking at the 
time of decisión and privitzed 2 years after the rendering of the Judgment by the CJEU; ii) Société nationale de la 
télévision en couleur Antenne 2 (A 2) a public undertaking at the time and still part of the state-owned France 
Telévisions group; and iii) Société nationale des programmes France Régions (FR 3) also a public undertaking at the 
time and still part of the state-owned France Telévisions group. 
1439 Opinion of the Advocate General Lenz of 16 January 1985, in Judgment of 28 March 1985 in CICCE v 
Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:16 [1985], p. 1106-1107. 
1440 Opinion of the Advocate General Lenz of Opinion of the Advocate General Lenz of 16 January 1985, in 
Judgment of 28 March 1985 in CICCE v Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:16 [1985], in Judgment of 28 March 
1985 in CICCE v Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:16 [1985], p. 1108. Article 50 of Regulation reproduced 
almost identically Article [102] TFEU. 
1441 Opinion of the Advocate General Lenz of 16 January 1985, in Judgment of 28 March 1985 in CICCE v 
Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:16 [1985], p. 1108. 
1442 Judgment of 28 March 1985 in CICCE v Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:150, para. 24; see also stressing the 
fact that the CJEU rejected the allegation by lack of sufficeient evidence Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 
4.883. 
1443 Judgment of 28 March 1985 in CICCE v Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:150, para. 26. 
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although not explicitly,1444 gave acquiescence and did not reverted the Commission’s finding that 
“an undertaking in a dominant position imposes unfair purchase prices may constitute an abuse 
within the meaning of Article [102] of the Treaty”.1445 However, the CJEU dismissed the case and 
dealt neither with determining whether or not the prices were abusive, nor the suggestion of 
Advocate General Lenz that a reverse application of the United Brands v Commission test be 
performed. 
Advocate General Lenz applied the test to determine whether the purchasing prices paid were 
effectively unfairly low. He did this through two steps. In terms of the first limb, he concluded 
that films are heterogeneous goods,1446 and, therefore, went on to state that “the size of that 
budget item (the movie price) says nothing conclusive about its use: where it is used only to pay 
for a relatively small number of films a fair price is quite possible paid for each film”.1447 Thus, 
movies are different goods and it is difficult to compare them. Then the Advocate General 
applied the second limb of the test and compared the prices paid in France for the film’s licenses 
with the prices pair in other Member States, demonstrating that “all other countries recorded 
lower fees, with the sole exception of […] Germany, where the average fee […] was somewhat 
higher than France”.1448 The test, despite not being endorsed, is interesting because it proposed a 
methodology to review unfairly low purchasing prices, which I review in section 8.3.2. 
CICCE v Commission, therefore, clarifies several important aspects concerning unfairly low 
exploitative purchasing prices. Firstly, this type of unilateral conduct may account for a breach of 
Article 102(a) TFEU and the assessment must be made case by case.1449 Secondly, the CJEU did 
not deal with how to determine when a price is unfairly low, which leaves uncertainty regarding 
the legal standard to be applied for these cases but confirms the very rare occurrence of 
exploitative purchasing practices.1450  
In the case of risk of future unilateral imposition of unfairly low purchasing prices, the 
assessment of the Commission in Sovion/Südfleisch1451 sheds some light on this, albeit to a 
                                                          
1444 See also noting that the Court did not dispute the Commission’s assertion, O'Donoghue and Padilla, The Law and 
Economics of Article 102 TFEU [2013], p. 843. 
1445 Judgment of 28 March 1985 in CICCE v Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:150, para. 22 (emphasis added). 
1446 Of the same view was the Advocate General Lenz when he stated that “it is plain that films are very 
heterogeneous products and consequently very different values”. Opinion of the Advocate General Lenz, in C-
298/83 - CICCE v Commission, EU:C:1985:16 [1985], p. 1114 (emphasis in original). 
1447 Opinion of the Advocate General Lenz of 16 January 1985, in Judgment of 28 March 1985 in CICCE v 
Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:16 [1985], p. 1114. 
1448 Opinion of the Advocate General Lenz of 16 January 1985, in Judgment of 28 March 1985 in CICCE v 
Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:16 [1985], p. 1115. The comparison of prices among MS was discussed by the 
CJEU in Judgment of 21 February 1973 in Judgment of 14 February 1978 in United Brands v Commission, C-27/76, 
EU:C:1978:22, para. 258 and ratified in Judgment of 13 July 1989 in Tournier, C-395/87, EU:C:1989:319, para. 46.  
1449 Judgment of 28 March 1985 in CICCE v Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:150, paras. 22 and 26. 
1450 Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 3.306. 
1451 Commission Decision of 21/12/2005 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market (Case 
No COMP/M.3968 - Sovion/Südfleisch) according to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 [2005]. 
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limited extent. In this case, the Commission evaluated and dismissed the argument that the 
proposed concentration would have led to situations in which the new buyer would have been 
able to exercise exploitatively low prices by withholding demand. In the assessment, the 
Commission found that the proposed concentration posed no real risks of supplier exploitation 
through low purchasing prices or demand withholding because, even in areas where the 
concentration would have increased the purchasing market shares dramatically, suppliers would 
have been able to find alternative buyers (slaughterhouses) with sufficient spare capacity to 
purchase the meat. Therefore, the merging parties would have been unable to withhold demand to 
decrease the purchasing price of meat.1452 Also, the Commission found that there was no serious 
risk of exploitative low prices due to other factors such as the transparent pricing system, the 
increase in the size of pig farms (which allow them to exercise selling countervailing power), the 
capacity to easily switch to other slaughterhouses, the competitive pressure exercised by traders 
purchasing livestock and, lastly, the buyer power of food retailers which will constrain the buyer 
power of slaughterhouses.1453 Consequently, the Commission found that the proposed 
concentration posed no risks concerning exploitation of buyer (monopsony) power and, after 
evaluating other effects, declared the concentration compatible with the internal market.1454 
However, the fact that the Commission evaluated the likelihood of imposition of future 
exploitatively low prices renders it theoretically possible that a concentration may significantly 
impede effective competition in an upstream market because of exploitation of suppliers. 
On a national level, the UK NCA also dealt with complaints regarding unilateral abusive 
purchasing prices in The Association of British Travel Agents and British Airways.1455 The 
Decision found that even if British Airways had reduced booking payments to travel agents it did 
not infringe Section 18 of the UK Competition Act by setting low purchasing prices for the 
acquisition of travel agent services. The travel agents argued that the new payment fee – 
recoupment fee – was so low that it did not allow travel agents to cover their costs.1456 It was 
held, nevertheless, that even if the prices were not sufficient to cover the costs, the travel agents 
would have been able to recoup these losses by charging a mark-up or service fee added to the 
ticket price for end consumers.1457 Because the suppliers could obtain the losses through the end 
consumer, like any other retailer, there was no buyer power exploitation. Concerning the 
additional cost, the UK NCA clarified that for consumers and their wellbeing, the important 
                                                          
1452 Commission Decision of 21/12/2005 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market (Case 
No COMP/M.3968 - Sovion/Südfleisch) according to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 [2005], paras 38-46. 
1453 Commission Decision of 21/12/2005 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market (Case 
No COMP/M.3968 - Sovion/Südfleisch) according to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 [2005], paras 47-52. 
1454 Commission Decision of 21/12/2005 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market (Case 
No COMP/M.3968 – Sovion/ Südfleisch) according to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 [2005], para. 95. 
1455 CA98/19/2002 The Association of British Travel Agents and British Airways plc [2002]. 
1456 CA98/19/2002 The Association of British Travel Agents and British Airways plc [2002], para. 1. 
1457 CA98/19/2002 The Association of British Travel Agents and British Airways plc [2002], para. 2. 
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factor was the end ticket price and not the fees paid to the carrier or travel agent.1458 Therefore, 
provided that the final price for the ticket would be the same or lower than before the reduction of 
the payment for the travel agency services, the fact that the supplier charges a new fee would not 
be detrimental.1459 This, reasoning, however, seems to disregard the fact that the new fee imposed 
by the travel agents to cover their costs in the form of a service fee would increase the final end 
consumer prices unless British Airways had also reduced their prices as the result of the lower 
purchasing prices paid for the travel agency services. 
In contrast to EU competition law, where unilaterally imposing unfairly low purchasing prices is 
a conduct that can be prohibited by Article 102 TFEU or the Merger Control Regulation, in the 
US antitrust law the regulation of excessive unilateral pricing is the opposite. As a general rule, 
US antitrust law does not intervene in cases of exploitation of buyer power through excessively 
low prices as “U.S. courts tak[e] the position that merely charging profit-maximization monopoly 
prices is not an antitrust violation”,1460 as clarified by the US Supreme Court case law.1461 
Concerning exploitative purchasing prices, this has been ratified in US antitrust in Kartell v. Blue 
Shield of Massachusetts, where the Court of Appeals of the First Circuit adopted a pure end-
consumer harm perspective and held that US antitrust law only intervenes in pricing matters on 
special circumstances,1462 it concluded that low purchasing prices did not constitute a violation of 
Antitrust, even if the buyer is a monopsonist.1463  
In my view, such a different approach to buyer power exploitation through excessively low 
purchasing prices in EU and US antitrust is anchored on the goals and competition policy 
grounds of each jurisdiction. EU competition law adopts a broader approach to buyer power 
competition intervention because it seeks to safeguard competition as such and the wellbeing of 
market structure. As setting unfairly low purchasing prices may lead to suppliers exiting the 
market, this will negatively impact the freedom of choice, diversity and, more importantly, 
economic freedom of market players, ideas which are also consistent with ordoliberal theory. In 
the US, on the other hand, the approach to buyer power is a narrow one, warranting exploitation 
                                                          
1458 CA98/19/2002 The Association of British Travel Agents and British Airways plc [2002], para. 32 
1459 CA98/19/2002 The Association of British Travel Agents and British Airways plc [2002], para. 33. 
1460 Elhauge and Geradin, [2011], p. 404. 
1461 The US Supreme Court goes as far to say that “[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly prices at least for a short 
period is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and 
economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found 
unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct”, in Verizon Communications Inc., v. 
Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). See also: United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass, 
166 U.S. 290 (1987); United States v. Aluminim co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945). See also: Motta and 
de Streel [2007], p. 16; Elhauge and Geradin, [2011], p. 404; see supporting in general that exploitative prices for 
buyer and seller side cases should not be prohibited under Article 102 TFEU: Robles Martín-Laborda, Exploitative 
Prices in European Competition Law, p. 15. 
1462 Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), 929. 




only whenever there is end consumer harm and the economic foundations of the case law are 
grounded on the Chicago school and the self-regulating mechanism of the market in exploitative 
cases. This, like buyer power as a whole, is a topic ripe for future pure comparative legal research 
between the jurisdictions. 
8.3.2 United Brands test for excessive purchasing prices: a profit curve test 
The United Brands test is the legal standard employed in EU competition law for determining 
whether a price is abusive and therefore prohibited by Article 102(a) TFEU and its reverse 
application, as suggested by Advocate General Lenz in his opinion in CICCE v Commission,1464 
is the logical starting point for buyer power cases. In this section, I use the United Brands test as a 
starting point and discuss the application of a methodology to determine when a purchasing price 
is unfairly low and exploitative. 
In my view, the methodology to be employed must review the two limbs of the United Brand test 
and adjust them to buyer power economics in order to be an adequate legal standard for unilateral 
excessively low purchasing pricing. Furthermore, in my proposed methodology I do not require 
the dominant buyer to in addition decrease the price below the suggested levels to also reduce the 
quantities, as is required by O’Donoghue and Padilla’s model, but which I understand as a logical 
consequence of applying a pure monopsony power perspective to purchasing price 
exploitation.1465 If an abuse of dominance regarding purchasing price exploitation would 
necessarily involve a withholding effect, this implies that Article 102 TFEU would not capture 
the abuse of bargaining purchasing power; only monopsony power would be under its scope. 
While I fully agree with the fact that exploitative monopsony power should be captured by 
Article 102(a) TFEU, it should also be the case for exploitative and abusive bargaining power 
because, even if it is unlikely, the exercise of bargaining power may also comply with the test 
requirements and be exploitatively abusive. Therefore, the lack of a withholding requirement 
does not compromise the test but rather adequately broadens its scope to capture all forms of 
buyer power abuse. 
8.3.2.1 The test’s first limb 
The first limb of the test dealing with the difference between the production costs and the 
purchasing price offered by the buyer is the most relevant part of the analysis. In this test, it must 
be determined whether the price offered for the purchasing of goods makes the profit curve of the 
supplier negative and below the competitive level; if it does, then the price is unfairly low. 
Consequently, any price paid by the buying undertaking that it is either competitive and/or does 
not make the profit curve negative would be lawful and not abusive. Therefore, the industry’s 
                                                          
1464 Opinion of the Advocate General Lenz of 16 January 1985, in Judgment of 28 March 1985 in CICCE v 
Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:16 [1985]. 
1465 O'Donoghue and Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU [2013], p. 841. 
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competitive level acts as an indicator and precondition to determine whether there might be an 
instance of unfair pricing, followed also by a case-by-case cost assessment. Finding this 
competitive level, however, and as I discuss below in the limitations of this methodology, is a 
difficult exercise in practice. Here lies the main difference with the traditional United Brands test: 
in a perfectly competitive market, the optimal price would be the intersection between demand 
and supply so that none of the parties makes any extraordinary profits and are able to cover their 
costs.1466  
A supplying undertaking will choose as its optimal production-point, the output for which the 
difference between revenue and cost is the greatest.1467 This occurs whenever marginal revenue 
equals marginal costs, regardless of the market power of the firm; i.e.: firms determine their 
production output based on their marginal costs. The profitability of an undertaking, therefore, 
varies and has a margin from the least to the most profitable extreme. In the lower end, 
profitability is negative because the income does not cover fixed or variable costs until output 
reaches a point in which revenue increases faster than costs and the difference become positive. 
In this scenario, the excessively low prices would be imposed when the buyer forces the supplier 
to sell goods when the marginal costs of producing one additional unit are higher than its 
revenue; selling the units is unprofitable because the revenue it obtains is insufficient to cover its 
production costs. This could be done by acquiring less input than required – therefore 
withholding demand – while perhaps being able to decrease purchasing prices without restricting 
purchases, due to other type of bargaining strategies, such as offering a take or leave it contract to 
a farmer with rapidly perishable goods. Additionally, for the prices to be exploitatively and 
unfairly low, this price paid must be below the competitive price level; otherwise, the exploitative 
analysis will run the risk of over enforcement, as inefficient suppliers that have higher costs than 
the competitive level will be unduly protected.1468 For this reason, to avoid protecting inefficient 
suppliers, I suggest adopting the competitive production cost of the market as a proxy. 
In order to force an undertaking to sell its goods below its costs and also below the competitive 
level, if a monopsony approach is employed to buyer power exploitation, there must be a demand 
withholding conduct. This would imply, nevertheless, that only exploitative purchasing prices 
can exist if the supply curve of the seller is upward-sloping and which would disregard any 
possibilities of exploitatively low purchasing prices in industries with a flat or downward sloping 
supply curve, for which I think the requirement of demand withholding is excessive and under-
inclusive. Alternatively, the price could be decreased without withholding demand, but by 
                                                          
1466 Costs in economics, unlike other sciences like business administration or accounting include already a profit. See 
also: Pindyck and Rubinfeld, [2009], p. 222; OECD ‘Policy Rountables: Excessive Prices’ (2011), p. 12. 
1467 Pindyck and Rubinfeld, [2009], p. 276. 
1468 The competitive price level is a benchmark to be used in both monopsony and bargaining power cases of 
exploitative buyer power not only to prevent protection of inefficient buyers, but because the monopsony model 
itself requires purchasing prices to be lowered below it. 
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threatening not to purchase, for instance using a take-it-or-leave it offer and, therefore, not 
necessarily resorting to a monopsony practice and not requiring an inelastic supply curve.  
However, courts should not use marginal costs as the guiding parameter in all cases as there 
might be instances in which marginal costs would not truly reveal the real costs of a firm to 
produce output. Such cases would include, for example, whenever the supplier has to incur high 
fixed costs, is a new entrant, or needs to recoup costs incurred because of an important 
investment or costs incurred for R&D, or where the specific type of transaction is not known in 
advance; i.e.: whenever there is a hold-up problem.1469 In such situations, an average cost would 
more accurately represent the ‘costs’ a supplier would need to cover to continue selling a good to 
a buyer in a repeated game.1470 
Recapitulating, to satisfy the first limb of the test a purchasing price would qualify as being 
unfairly low if in the price comparison two requirements are met: first, the price should be below 
the competitive level, and, second, the price should not cover the supplier’s marginal (or average 
costs). If the price charged is on or above the competitive level but below the previous purchasing 
price, the purchasing price imposed by the buyer would be competitive and would only 
negatively impact inefficient suppliers with higher-than competitive costs. Therefore, prices 
would be unfair and exploitative whenever they are reduced below the competitive level and also 
make the suppliers’ profit negative because the purchase price is insufficient to cover the 
supplier’s costs. Furthermore, prices would not be exploitatively abusive if they allow the 
supplier to supply in the long run its goods in a quantity that is able to satisfy the effective 
demand by buyers and end consumers, without leading to an inefficient outcome by employing 
less than ideal resources.1471 Lastly, prices may be also considered unfairly low if the payment 
makes the profit curve of the seller negative, unless a recoupment fee is charged, but the final 
price remains the same or lower for end consumers, if a similar approach as the UK Courts is 
taken.1472 However, the charging of a recoupment fee would not be admissible when it implies 
that the final consumer price would be higher or when it is not possible to do such charging 
                                                          
1469 A hold up problem is when parties would be better off they decided to collaborate to determine their input/output 
but refrain from doing so to avoid granting more bargaining power to its counterpart. The hold-up problem usually 
leads to underinvestment and, therefore, loss of efficiency. For some literature discussing the hold-up problem in 
industrial organization and buyer power see: Dieter Bos and Christoph Lulfesmann, ‘The Hold-up Problem in 
Government Contracting’ 98 Scandinavian Journal of Economics (1996) 53; Faruk Gul, ‘Unobservable Investment 
and the Hold-Up Problem’ 69 Econometrica (2001) 343; Robert A Skitol, ‘Concerted Buying Power: Its Potential for 
Addressing the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting’ 72 Antitrust Law Journal (2004-2005) 727; Stephanie 
Lau, Information and Bargaining in the Hold-Up Problem (The RAND Corporation 2008) 266; J. Gregory Sidak, 
‘Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard-Setting Organizations’ 5 Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics (2009) 123; Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz, ‘Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? 
Experimental Evidence’ 73 Games and Economic Behavior (2011) 186. 
1470 Average costs will tend to be lower than marginal costs until a point in which marginal costs surpass average 
costs due to being an additional unit being much more expensive compared to previous ones. 
1471 OECD ‘Policy Rountables: Excessive Prices’ (2011), p. 25. 
1472 CA98/19/2002 The Association of British Travel Agents and British Airways plc [2002]. 
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because the supplier has no control over the downstream prices, which would be in the majority 
of cases. My proposal for a test can be understood by looking at the following graph: 
 
 









8.3.2.2 The test’s second limb 
The second limb, entailing a comparison of costs between the purchased good and other similar 
ones, appears to be less controversial and admits a reverse application of the United Brands test 
in cases where adequate substitutes exist.1473 For example, it would be possible to compare the 
purchasing price for the same or a substitutable input in other geographic markets, such as in the 
                                                          
1473 See remarking this issue from a seller side perspective: Robles Martín-Laborda, Exploitative Prices in European 
Competition Law, p. 5. 
In this case, the flattening of the supplier’s profit curve because of low purchasing 
prices up to the limit in which it breaks even (profit = 0) will not be abusive (EfS). It 
will only become abusive when the profit curve is forced to: i) reduce the quantity 
purchased so that profits are negative; or ii) not reduce quantity purchased by force 
the supplier to sell below costs, making profit negative and when such price paid is 
also below the competitive level (ExP). 
Legend: 
ExP = exploitative purchasing price; EfS = efficient supplier’s costs;  
CmC = competitive industry cost; InS = inefficient supplier’s costs 
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case of licenses for works under copyright protection, or the fees charged in a MS for the same 
work compare to those in another MS, as suggested by Advocate General Lenz in CICCE v 
Commission.1474 
8.3.2.3 Possible shortcomings of the proposed methodology 
This suggested profit-curve based test to identify when a purchasing price is exploitatively low is 
not without deficiencies, which I acknowledge need for further refinement for the competition 
authorities to consider applying it.  
The most important shortcoming is the use of the industry’s competitive cost as a proxy for 
supplier efficiency. Determining what is the competitive cost of production of a specific good is a 
very difficult exercise that may prove almost impossible in certain cases due to lack of sufficient 
data. However, not resorting to a sort of industry-wide proxy would trigger the application of 
Article 102(a) in cases in which suppliers are not competitive and inefficient and any kind of 
buyer pressure would result anti-competitive. Such a broad approach would imply granting an 
undue protection to suppliers to the detriment of competition as such because efficient purchasing 
behavior is precluded and upstream undertakings would not be required to invest to decrease their 
costs and improve their quality. Therefore, an excessive protection of the suppliers’ economic 
freedom would run contrary to the protection of competition as such from an ordoliberal 
perspective. Alternatively, other indicators – for example, the industries’ historical costs, or an 
efficient producer benchmark – could be used as an additional proxy. This, contrastingly, is not 
the case regarding selling side price exploitation because there is no need to determine costs of 
other producers, only of the dominant undertaking exerting monopoly power. Second, it is 
difficult to calculate the investigated firms’ profit and cost and, unless a profit-curve average is 
used, then the profitability of the sale must be carried out seller by seller. This difficulty leads to 
errors of either under or over enforcement that have an impact on welfare conditions, as 
discussed in length by Gal.1475 Also, the test defines when a price is excessively low but does not 
answer a related problem that I discussed in chapter 7, section 7.8 when dealing with the theory 
of harm: “squeeze to buy”. Therefore, this profit-based test does not determine if prices below 
costs but above the competitive level can be exploitative if the aim is to squeeze suppliers out of 
the market to then acquire them.  
8.4 Exploitative purchasing price discrimination 
Articles 101(1)(d) and 102(c) TFEU preclude undertakings, coordinately or unilaterally, from 
“applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
                                                          
1474 Opinion of the Advocate General Lenz of 16 January 1985, in Judgment of 28 March 1985 in CICCE v 
Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:16 [1985], p. 1115. 
1475 Gal, ‘Abuse of Dominance - Exploitative Abuses’ [2013], p. 414-421. 
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placing them at a competitive disadvantage”, which reduce the chances of equal opportunity 
when they compete among themselves.1476 This implies that, under EU competition law, 
discrimination with exclusionary (against other buyers)1477 and exploitative effects (against 
suppliers) by buyers is prohibited.1478 The general literature regarding exclusionary price 
discrimination – in particular rebates from a seller perspective – is vast and outside of the scope 
of this section, which focuses on purchasing exploitative cases exclusively,1479 and which I have 
also dealt in chapter 7, section 7.6 from a buyer power angle. 
In the US, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits buyers’ induced price discrimination by making it 
illegal for any buyer (not necessarily dominant) “knowingly to induce or receive discrimination 
in price which is prohibited”1480 This provision, however, has been toned down by the US 
Supreme Court in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. FTC as, to infringe the Robinson-
Patman Act under buyer induced discrimination it also is required that the seller is engaging in 
seller discrimination;1481 i.e.: pure buying pressure would not suffice to trigger the application of 
the provision).  
The differences concerning price discrimination between EU competition law and US antitrust 
has also spurred interesting debate concerning whether buyer induced exploitative price 
discrimination is condemned in EU competition law. As mentioned in chapter 7, section 7.6, 
Gifford and Kudrle argue that under EU competition law buyer power discrimination is not 
captured by Article 102(c) TFEU for dominant buyers unlike the Robinson-Patman Act does in 
the US.1482 While this premise perhaps might find support in the lack of exclusionary cases, it 
does not with regard to buyer induced exploitative discrimination as the EU case law does 
prohibit a dominant undertaking from doing so as I discuss below. Furthermore, concluding that 
buying side exploitative discrimination is not covered by EU competition law would lead to 
under-enforcement risks, disregard for the wellbeing of competition as such,1483 put in jeopardy 
the economic freedom of market participants and, ultimately, make the application of Article 102 
TFEU discriminatory and selective. The Commission’s practice and as endorsed by the Courts in 
British Airways v Commission illustrates that price discrimination cases can occasionally be 
                                                          
1476 Wils (2014), p. 418. 
1477 I have discussed in detail in chapter 7, section 7.6, the theories of harm and legal regulations concerning price 
discrimination by means of paying a supracompetitive bonus to a supplier of a good. 
1478 See also distinguishing purchasing price discrimination and foreclosure: Papandropoulos (2007). 
1479 The literature dealing with price discrimination, both from and economic and legal perspective is abundant. See, 
inter alia: Bellamy, Child and Roth, [2001], para. 9-083 to 9-087; Papandropoulos (2007); Gifford and Kudrle 
(2010); Bellamy and others, [2013], para. 10.091 to 10.100. 
1480 15 U.S. Code § 13(f). 
1481 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v Federal Trade Commission, 440 U.S. 69 (1979). 
1482 “Although the Robinson-Patman Act directs most of its provisions against the discriminating sellers, its premise 
is that buying power is misused at the purchaser level. By contrast, Article 82(c) applies only to large sellers that can 
meet the criteria for "dominance" as used in the EC Treaty” in Gifford and Kudrle (2010), p. 1276. 
1483 Wils (2014), p. 414. 
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focused from a buying or seller side perspective and both being under the scope of Article 102 
TFEU. 
In this current section, I discuss how buyers can use their purchasing power to discriminate 
among different suppliers and exploit them by abusing of their dependent position in order to pay 
a purchasing price that is lower than what is paid to other suppliers that are not in a weak 
bargaining position, which constitutes a reverse form of primary line discrimination,1484 in 
opposition to secondary line discrimination that implies the grant of different bonuses for the 
purchase of a good, which I discuss in chapter 7, section 7.6.1485 Exploitation occurs as a buyer of 
a service might take advantage of the dependence of its suppliers on it and offer lower prices (or 
bonuses) for this, compared to another seller that is not dependent and that would receive a better 
commission by segregating suppliers based on their supply elasticity.1486 In other words, those 
suppliers are ‘locked-in’ as buyers of a good might be vis-à-vis the buyer(s) and succumb to the 
low and exploitative offered purchasing price.1487 
In the case of unilateral behavior, the intuition is simple: the buyer would underpay a supplier 
regarding the price paid for the same goods in similar conditions to a different supplier. In so 
doing, it extracts supracompetitive profits from that specific supplier, which, at the same time, is 
left in a worse competitive situation vis-à-vis rival suppliers,1488 as confirmed in British Airways 
v Commission, which I discuss immediately below.1489 In the case of coordinated agreements, the 
situation is more complicated and, due to the specificities of the concept of agreement in EU 
competition law, buyer or seller exploitative discrimination is unlikely to arise, as stressed by 
Gifford and Kudrle,1490 and as confirmed due the lack of cases of a horizontal or vertical nature. 
However, Gifford and Kudrle’s interpretation of the case law seems to go beyond the concept of 
agreement under EU competition law,1491 and, in my view, would only be correct concerning 
                                                          
1484 Using primary line discrimination to deal with exclusionary behavior and secondary line discrimination referring 
to exploitative discrimination see: Gifford and Kudrle (2010), p. 1263-1266 and 1272. 
1485 See also using secondary line discrimination as based on the amount of units acquired: Geradin and Petit (2006), 
p. 483. I discussed exclusionary discrimination by means of granting supracompetitive bonuses in chapter 7, section 
7.6. 
1486 Hovenkamp, [2011], p. 320. 
1487 Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2012], p. 760. 
1488 See discussing persistent and sporadic price discrimination: Hovenkamp, [2011], p. 319. 
1489 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 240. 
1490 Gifford and Kudrle (2010), p. 1273. 
1491 See discussing the unilateral element in vertical agreements: Okeoghene Odudu, The Boundaries of EC 
Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81 (Oxford University Press 2006), Chapter 4; Albertina Albors-Llorens, 
‘Horizontal Agreements and Concerted Practices in EC Competition Law: Unlawful and Legitimate Contacts 
Between Competitors’ 51 The Antitrust Bulletin (2006) 837; Gjendemsjø, [2011]; Whish and Bailey, Competition 
law [2012], p. 105-110. 
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sales to end consumers, but not concerning contracts between suppliers and intermediary 
buyers.1492 
My study of this theory of harm and the case law dealing with it shows that buyer power 
exploitative discrimination is directly linked with buyer power exclusionary discrimination. In 
the case of the exploitation, the harm is on the supplier, whereas in the case of the exclusion the 
harm is to rival buyers of the undertaking(s) exercising the discrimination. Despite this 
theoretical distinction, both effects usually take place within the same conduct and are evaluated 
jointly, as occurred in British Airways v Commission where it was found that a buyer is in breach 
of Article 102(2)(c) TFEU by offering different rebate schemes that are applied to identical 
amounts of revenues generated by the suppliers, as this puts some suppliers at a competitive 
disadvantage.1493  
In British Airways v Commission, the GC confirmed that suppliers and buyers can be mutually 
interdependent as firms need the collaboration of the other to market their products effectively, as 
input and output markets are independent but related economic activities representing distinct 
markets.1494 In this case, however, the dominance in the market of air transport passenger services 
by BA put its suppliers of travel agency services in a dependent situation as travel agents 
“substantially depend on the income they receive from BA in consideration for their air travel 
agency services”,1495 particularly because BA was also an obligatory business partner.1496 
Therefore, the GC found that dependent suppliers from a powerful buyer can be subject to buyer 
power exploitation whenever they are offered discriminatory low purchasing prices by 
remunerating identical services in different ways. Additionally, as travel agencies compete 
between each other and depend on the bonuses paid by the powerful buyer, the competition 
between them is distorted due to the discrimination in purchasing prices as well as with regard to 
their relation to other airline companies. Consequently, it was held that: 
[i]n those circumstances, the Commission was right to hold that BA's performance reward 
schemes constituted an abuse of BA's dominant position on the United Kingdom market for air 
travel agency services, in that they produced discriminatory effects within the network of travel 
                                                          
1492 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 25. 
1493 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, paras. 133-141. Also remarking that the abuse was buyer power induced vis-à-vis travel agents and 
contrary to Article 102(c) TFEU, see: Rousseva, [2010], p. 180 and 202; and Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: 
Text, Cases, and Materials [2011], p. 389 and p. 538-548; Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 805. See 
discussing discrimination under Article 102 TFEU and two different ways to look at it: Temple-Lang J, ‘The 
Principle of Essential Facilities in European Community Competition Law - The Position Since Bronner’ (2000) 1 
Journal of Network Industries 375, p. 390-391. 
1494 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, paras 89-100. 
1495 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 216. 
1496 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 217. 
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agents established in the United Kingdom, thereby inflicting on some of them a competitive 
disadvantage within the meaning of subparagraph (c) of the second paragraph of Article 82 
EC.1497 
The CJEU confirmed this finding of the GC as it held that Article 102(2)(c) TFEU “prohibits any 
discrimination on the part of an undertaking in a dominant position which consists in the 
application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading partners, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage”.1498 The test, therefore, requires finding 
discrimination sensu stricto and the placing of suppliers at a disadvantage because they compete 
among each other.1499 In the analysis of BA’s conduct the CJEU confirmed that the payment for 
the travel agency services to some of them was discriminatory and exploitative because the 
rewards paid lead to situations in which different travel agents would receive, for the same 
amount of ticket sales, different remunerations based on whether they reached their sales target. 
Thus, with such finding the CJEU took a quite formalistic and strict approach to the definition of 
discriminatory conditions centered on a comparison of amounts and identity of subjects. 
Furthermore, the CJEU held that discriminatory purchasing practices are exploitative and abusive 
“as soon as the behavior of the undertaking in a dominant position tends, having regard to the 
whole of the circumstances of the case, to lead to a distortion of competition between business 
partners.”1500 To determine whether the conduct put the discriminated suppliers at a disadvantage 
in this case, the CJEU evaluated how travel agents competed with each other based on offering 
attractive seats to consumers, and their financial resources. As the rebates had a direct impact on 
the financial resources of the agents and their ability to offer the best services possible, the CJEU 
confirmed that the GC was entitled to decide on the basis of the reward structure and without any 
detailed analysis to conclude that the competitive conditions among suppliers of a dominant 
buyer were affected and some of them were put at a disadvantage. 
Hence, adopting a rather formal and strict stand towards discriminatory and disadvantaging 
trading conditions and perhaps excessively protective of suppliers, the CJEU confirmed that 
purchasing price discrimination – and bonus schemes granted by a dominant buyer – are abusive 
depending the underlying factors of the case, such as for example obtaining a benefit set on 
reaching specific sales objectives not based on quantities nor fidelity discounts in the meaning of 
                                                          
1497 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343, para. 240. 
1498 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 133. 
1499 This test is similar to the conditions required under US antitrust law for a secondary-line violation of the 
Robinson-Patman Act concerning buyer induced discrimination. However, in this case, the Robinson-Patman Act 
would not have been triggered because it does not apply to sales (or purchases) of services, only goods. See also: 
Hovenkamp, [2011], p. 324-330. 
1500 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 145. See also 
referring to this part of the Judgment Judgment of 22 September 2016 in Sorpa bs. v The Icelandic Competition 
Authority (Samkeppniseftirlitið) E-29/15 [2016], para. 109. 
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Hoffmann-La Roche.1501 For BA, the CJEU confirmed that purchasing price discrimination based 
on bonus schemes in upstream markets runs contrary to Article 102(2)(c) TFEU whenever the 
bonus: 
[…] tends to remove or restrict the buyer’s [rectius seller] to choose his sources of supply, to bar 
competitors from access to the market, to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
with other trading parties or to strengthen the dominant position by distorting competition1502  
Thus, if a dominant undertaking imposes discriminatory purchasing practices that lead to a 
distortion of competition among suppliers – ones that are benefitted to the detriment of others 
creating a disadvantage – it would be found as infringing Article 102 TFEU for abuse of its 
purchasing power.1503 In this case, the disadvantage is very clear because the travel agent gets 
remunerated by the buyer for its services and then sells to end consumers the airline tickets, in a 
two-sided market setup.1504 Those travel agents that have received fewer bonuses than others for 
the same amount of sales are at a disadvantage as they would need to increase their retailing 
prices to obtain the same level of profits when compared to those obtaining the supracompetitive 
bonus. Hence, the Judgment in British Airways, tacitly, appears to take this into account to 
determine the existence of a competitive disadvantage. 
Therefore, the rationale of the decision seems to be based on a protection of the economic 
freedom and competitive conditions among suppliers to a powerful buyer. 
Summing up, according to the little case law concerning buyer power discriminatory exploitation, 
Article 102(c) TFEU would be applied prohibiting a dominant buyer from discriminating among 
its suppliers if two conditions are met. First, there must be discrimination sensu stricto in the 
sense that some suppliers are paid less than others for the similar goods sold in similar 
circumstances due to their weak bargaining position vis-à-vis the powerful buyer. Additionally, 
this differentiated and lesser payment for the same goods must also lead these suppliers to be at a 
competitive disadvantage with regard to other suppliers, and which is likely to exist if the 
supplier sells goods in a downstream market to end consumers, such as a distributor. If, on the 
other hand the suppliers only compete vis-à-vis the intermediary buyers (like a producer of wood 
would do with respect to furniture manufacturers), then differences in prices paid by buyers to 
suppliers may be justified by the balance of bargaining power among the parties without it 
existing a competitive disadvantage and, therefore, no exploitative price discrimination. This 
competitive disadvantage, however, may exist if the price difference is not objectively justified 
(for example purchasing volumes) and when it is discriminatory in line with the first limb of the 
                                                          
1501 This is, granting rebates based on an exclusive or quasi exclusive supply agreement, Judgment of 15 March 2007 
in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 60-80. 
1502 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 67. 
1503 Østerud, 116; Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials [2011], p. 547. 




test because that supplier is less able, for example, to invest when compared to a better-paid 
supplier. No cases, however, in EU law have dealt with this for which it remains an unclear area 
of the law. Therefore, this dual requirement and legal standard seems to grant protection to some 
weaker suppliers vis-à-vis a strong buyer based on the protection of economic freedom and the 
competitive process in the upstream market, in line with, but also going beyond, ordoliberal 
competition policy. 
This approach to buyer power discriminatory exploitation, nevertheless, can be criticized because 
the legal standard applied by the CJEU relies perhaps excessively on a formalistic approach to the 
protection of economic freedom without an in-depth analysis of the justification or otherwise of 
the discrimination. The analysis and the legal standard adopted by the CJEU is centered on the 
creation of a disadvantage by applying dissimilar purchasing conditions among different 
suppliers, but not on whether there could be grounds for a differentiated treatment justifying the 
conduct. However, the Courts did take into account the fact that for the same sales different 
remuneration schemes were applied to different suppliers, which constitute discrimination sensu 
stricto. A contrario interpretation would imply that supracompetitive bonuses that are not 
conditional and economically justified would not exploit suppliers by leaving some of them at a 
competitive disadvantage. 
8.5 Centralized purchasing and cooperatives, between cartels and 
dominance 
Centralized purchasing is a common commercial practice that is carried out both by undertakings 
acting jointly or by single firms that agglutinate all the purchases from their different departments 
with the aim of creating buyer power, generating economies of scale and reducing transactional 
costs. Additionally, centralization allows obtaining other benefits, such as the creation of 
economies of scale for both the buyer and the seller as well as minimization of administrative 
costs. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that centralized purchasing – that does not involve 
demand withholding – is often associated with the pro-competitiveness of buying alliances or 
individual centralized purchasing, it is raised as a pro-competitive argument whenever an 
undertaking’s buying conduct is evaluated. Due to these positive economic effects, centralized 
purchasing is a phenomenon that has now been incorporated into public procurement markets, 
particularly with the impulse given to demand aggregation techniques and central purchasing 
bodies, a topic which I have explored extensively elsewhere.1505 
                                                          
1505 Herrera Anchustegui ‘Centralizing Public Procurement and Competitiveness in Directive 2014/24’ (2015); 
Sánchez Graells and Herrera Anchustegui, ‘Impact of Public Procurement Aggregation on Competition. Risks, 
Rationale and Justification for the Rules in Directive 2014/24’ [2016]; Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui, ‘Division into 
Lots and Demand Aggregation – Extremes Looking for the Correct Balance?’ in GS Ølykke and A Sánchez-Graells 
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Cooperatives, on the other hand, are societal forms that allow their members/users to join efforts 
to carry out an economic activity through the cooperative that grants them benefits derived from 
their own work and the cooperative’s effort as a whole. Cooperatives are active in industries 
where buyer power plays an important role, for instance in the case of agriculture, and are 
vehicles used to agglutinate both buyer power and reap centralization benefits, and also to oppose 
buyer power when the sales are made through the cooperative and not individually.  
In this section, I discuss the rationale for purchasing centralization, economies of scale and 
cooperatives as agglutinators of buyer power. These two forms of buyer market power pooling, in 
particular in the case purchasing centralization and the generation of economies of scale are not 
forms of abuse of buyer market power with an exploitative effect, but efficiency reasons that can 
justify a purchasing conduct and which serve to the understanding of the pro-competitiveness of 
buying alliances and centralization conducts. 
8.5.1 Rationale for purchasing centralization – economies of scale 
The economic rationale behind centralized purchasing is the ability to accumulate buyer market 
power by pooling several buyers’ purchases (or re-arranging demand within a single 
undertaking).1506 By agglutinating demand, the joint purchasing leads to economies of scale and a 
reduction of transaction costs.1507  
Demand is pooled by means of a purchasing agreement among buyers or when in the case of a 
single buyer all departments consolidate their purchasing in a single unit.1508 Centralizing and 
agglutinating demand grants the buyer a more favorable negotiation position vis-à-vis the 
suppliers and allow it to exert the buyer market power generated to improve the supply conditions 
offered by its seller(s).1509 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
(eds), Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules in 2014 (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2016 - in press). 
1506 James Chard, Gustaf Duhs and John Houlden, ‘Body Beautiful or Vile Bodies? Central Purchasing in the UK’ 
Public Procurement Law Review (2008) NA26. Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector 
Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), 10. See also: Alberto Vaquero García, ‘Compras Agregadas y Eficiencia 
Económica’ in Patricia Valcárcel Fernández (ed), Compra conjunta y demanda agregada en la contratación del 
sector público Un análisis jurídico y económico (Thomson-Aranzadi 2016), p. 211-215. 
1507 Also supporting this view that aggregated procurement techniques achieve “economies of scale” see Office of 
Fair Trading Assessing the Impact of Public Sector Procurement on Competition, (2004) para 1.43 to 1.51; Hamer 
(2014). See also Recital (59) of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65. 
1508 Judgment of 20 January 2011 in General Química and Others v Commission, C-90/09 P, EU:C:2011:21, para. 
37-43. See discussing the concept of single economic entity: Okeoghene Odudu and David Bailey, ‘The Single 
Economic Entity Doctrine in EU Competition Law’ 51 Common Market Law Review (2014) 1721. 
1509 Argument raised by the French Republic in Judgment of 3 April 2003, Petrolessence and SG2R v Commission, 
T-342/00, ECR, EU:T:2003:97, para. 92-93. 
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Furthermore, purchasing centralization permits the formation of economies of scale1510 for the 
purchaser (and in some circumstances also for the supplier)1511 by fostering operational efficiency 
and reducing administrative and transaction costs, as recognized by the case law and 
literature.1512  
8.5.1.1 How do the economies of scale in centralized purchasing work? What are the 
effects? 
In microeconomic terms, and because of the scale of its operational efficiency,1513 centralized 
purchasing allows buyer(s) to reduce the overall costs of their purchasing compared to the 
situation where the undertaking(s) would have carried out individual purchases. This occurs as a 
higher purchasing capacity reduces the average costs paid by a buyer and vice versa for a 
supplier,1514 as explicitly recognized by the Commission when remarking that economies of scale 
“normally accompany high volume purchases,” as held in DaimlerChrysler v Commission.1515 
 
                                                          
1510 For an economic discussion on the concept of economies of scale see, inter alia: George J. Stigler, ‘The 
Economies of Scale’ 1 Journal of Law & Economics (1958) 54; Paul R. Krugman, ‘Increasing Returns, Monopolistic 
Competition, and International Trade’ 9 Journal of International Economics (1979) 469; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 
[2009], p. 245; Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 136-137. For a discussion of economies of scale generated 
by centralization of purchases see in particular: Office of Fair Trading ‘Assessing the Impact of Public Sector 
Procurement on Competition’ (2004), para 1.43 to 1.51; Katri Karjalainen, ‘Challenges of Purchasing Centralization: 
Empirical Evidence from Public Procurement’ (Helsinki School of Economics 2009); Karolis Šerpytis, Vytautas 
Vengrauskas and Zinaida Gineitienė, ‘Evaluation of Financial effects of Public Procurement Centralisatiom’ 90 
Ekonomika (2011) 87; Sigma, Central Purchasing Bodies (Brief, 2011), p. 4; Hamer (2014), p. 201. See also recital 
(59) of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65. 
1511 This would be the case when the supplier is able to sell in bulk, increase its output and reduce its transaction 
costs. 
1512 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v Commission, T-286/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:547, para. 75. For some selected 
works on operational efficiency in the public sector, see: Peter Smith and David Mayston, ‘Measuring Efficiency in 
the Public Sector’ 15 Omega, International Journal of Management Science (1987) 181; John Ruggiero, ‘On the 
Measurement of Technical Efficiency in the Public Sector’ 90 European Journal of Operational Research (1996) 553; 
Lars Anwandter and Teofilo Jr. Ozuna, ‘Can Public Sector Reforms Improve the Efficiency of Public Water 
Utilities?’ 7 Environment and Development Economics (2002) 687; Hannu Rantanen and others, ‘Performance 
Measurement Systems in the Finnish Public Sector’ 20 International Journal of Public Sector Management (2007) 
415; António Afonso, Ludger Schuknecht and Vito Tanzic, ‘Public Sector Efficiency: Evidence for new EU Member 
States and Emerging Markets’ 42 Applied Economics (2010) 2147. 
1513 See the Commission’s opinion also highlighting the importance of large operational scales in Judgment of 14 
April 2011, Visa Europe and Visa International Service v Commission, T-461/07, ECR, EU:T:2011:181, para. 147. 
1514 Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 1.37. 




Figure 6: Buying Economies of Scale 
Two examples will help to illustrate how centralized purchasing generates economies of scale in 
practice. In the case of a purchasing alliance, several undertakings agree to delegate to a common 
entity/division the purchasing of all input required by all parties which will later on distribute the 
purchased goods among the members, as it occurred in the National Sulphuric Acid Association 
Decision.1516  
On the other hand, a single economic entity could assign all purchases it carries out through all its 
different departments to a central single purchasing office. This initiative, for instance, is being 
currently used in the field of public procurement where contracting authorities agglutinate their 
demand on a single buyer, the central purchasing body, which carries purchases for or on behalf 
of them.1517 In EU competition law, interestingly, in a few occasions centralized purchasing by a 
single undertaking has also been under scrutiny, while also serving to recognize the efficiency of 
centralized purchasing, as well as its ability to enhance anti-competitive buyer power effects.  
The case law has recognized these positive effects expressly. For instance, in Car Glass, car 
manufacturers individually centralized glass purchases for all their own affiliated trademarks to 
                                                          
1516 Commission Decision of 9 July 1980 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/27.958 
National Sulphuric Acid Association) [1980] OJ L 260/24. 
1517 Article 37 of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65. 
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achieve two economic and efficiency enhancing benefits.1518 First, purchasing centralization 
allowed buyers to, even in the presence of a suppliers’ cartel, to play-off their sellers against each 
other which help them to obtain lower prices based on the volume of sales and incentivizes cartel 
members to ‘cheat’.1519 Second, purchase centralization allowed a powerful buyer to extend its 
geographic market and reach larger deals, for instance by purchasing for all its subsidiaries.1520  
Furthermore, centralized purchasing may also generate economies of scale for suppliers under 
certain conditions. If the centralization of purchases allows a supplier to sell to the joint 
purchasing entity larger amounts of goods, in particular homogenous ones, this will enable it to 
reduce its average production costs as noted by Albano and Sparro.1521 Additionally, 
centralization of purchases produces additional benefits aimed at the reduction of transactional 
and administrative costs as a single entity is carrying out all purchasing routines. This has been 
confirmed in the case law by the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs who held that 
“institutionalised management cooperation […] allows the companies involved to achieve 
significant economies of scale […] is generally procompetitive”.1522 
Economies of scale are, however, limited.1523 This means that a point is reached in both the 
purchasing and supplying curves — the “minimum efficient scale” — and no further benefits can 
be reaped.1524 This occurs because after reaching a certain point in the production or purchasing 
curves, the average costs cannot decrease any further and increase instead. Also, the minimum 
efficient scale has been used to explain market concentration issues and why, under certain 
circumstances, “more companies in a market does not necessarily lead to a better market 
outcome”.1525 
                                                          
1518 Summary of Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.125 — Car glass) 
[2009] OJ C 173/13, taken from the unabridged version, para. 437. Confirmed by the General Court in Judgment of 
17 December 2014, Pilkington Group and Others v Commission, T-72/09, EU:T:2014:1094, para. 109. Appealed and 
dismissed in its entirety as Judgment of 7 September 2016 in Pilkington Group and Others v Commission, C-101/15, 
EU:C:2016:631. 
1519 Summary of Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.125 — Car glass) 
[2009] OJ C 173/13, taken from the unabridged version, para. 441. 
1520 Summary of Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.125 — Car glass) 
[2009] OJ C 173/13, taken from the unabridged version, para. 33. 
1521 Gian Luigi Albano and Marco Sparro, ‘Flexible Strategies for Centralized Public Procurement’ 1 Review of 
Economics and Institutions (2010), p. 4. See also: Faull and Nikpay, [1999] para. 1.37; Herrera Anchustegui 
‘Centralizing Public Procurement and Competitiveness in Directive 2014/24’ (2015). 
1522 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs of 28 January 1999 in Judgment in Albany, C-67/96, EU:C:1999:28, para. 
265.  
1523 Also arguing that economies of scale might get exhausted see the Commission’s arguments in Judgment of 9 
March 2015, Deutsche Börse v Commission, T-175/12, EU:T:2015:148, para. 311. 
1524 Schmalensee (1981); Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 1.43-1.49. 
1525 Faull and Nikpay, [1999] para. 1.40; Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 1.44. 
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Also, economies of scale and the ability to reinforce buyer market power may increase the 
pernicious effects of buyer power, or may tie a buyer to a supplier. This was the case regarding 
the purchasing patterns and rebates system discussed in Tomra and Others v Commission, where 
the Courts analyzed the effects of the purchases of bottle-recycling machines by means of 
“central purchasing organisations such as Superunie and ICA/Hakon”.1526 Tomra, as discussed in 
detail in chapter 10, alleged that their customers had countervailing buyer power, despite these 
allegations the Courts did not evaluate whether centralized purchasing had an effect on the 
countervailing ability. Instead, to dismiss an allegation of lack of exclusivity enhancing effect of 
the rebates, the GC reasoned that centralized purchasing had the effect of tying purchasers further 
to the seller as it were easier to attain the rebates offered if all members of the purchasing 
organization acquired goods through the centralized purchasing entity,1527 therefore revealing a 
negative aspect of centralized purchasing. Also, in the Court’s view, a system of centralized 
purchasing had an effect extra-partes as it also influenced the purchasing behavior of 
independent retailers and reinforced the rebates’ effect.1528 
8.5.2 Centralized purchasing and economies of scale under an efficiency 
analysis 
Based on its efficiency-enhancing ability, economies of scale generated through centralized 
purchasing are raised as pro-efficiency arguments under Article 101(3) TFEU,1529 Article 102 
TFEU,1530 or in concentration operations.1531 In the following I discuss how and what the legal 
assessment of the benefits of centralized purchasing is, with a particular emphasis on unilateral 
behavior. 
                                                          
1526 Judgment of 9 September 2010, Tomra Systems and Others v Commission, T-155/06, ECR, EU:T:2010:370; 
Judgment of 19 April 2012 in Tomra and Others v Commission, C-549/10 P, EU:C:2012:221. 
1527 Judgment of 9 September 2010, Tomra Systems and Others v Commission, T-155/06, ECR, EU:T:2010:370, 
paras. 55 to 67. 
1528 Judgment of 9 September 2010, Tomra Systems and Others v Commission, T-155/06, ECR, EU:T:2010:370, 
para. 63. 
1529 To name just but a few of the many examples dealing with economies of scale in collusion cases as an efficiency 
defense: Judgment of 11 September 2014 in CB v Commission, C-67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204, para. 84; Opinion 
Advocate General Wahl in Judgment of 11 September 2014 in CB v Commission, C-67/13 P, EU:C:2014:1958, para. 
71; Judgment of 17 September 2007, Microsoft v Commission, T-201/04, ECR, EU:T:2007:289, para. 1000; 
Judgment of 22 March 2011, Altstoff Recycling Austria v Commission, T-419/03, ECR, EU:T:2011:102, para. 23. 
See also stressing this from a centralized purchasing perspective: Wollmann [2008], para. 2-2-109. 
1530 For some of the many examples dealing with economies of scale in dominance cases: Judgment of 27 March 
2012 in Post Danmark, C-209/10, EU:C:2012:172, para. 10 and 11; Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in 
Judgment of 27 March 2012 in Post Danmark, C-209/10, EU:C:2011:342, paras. 52 and 105; Judgment of 29 March 
2012, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, T-336/07, ECR, EU:T:2012:172.  
1531 Judgment of 4 July 2006, easyJet v Commission, T-177/04, ECR, EU:T:2006:187, paras. 86 and 87; Judgment of 
6 July 2010, Ryanair v Commission, T-342/07, ECR, EU:T:2010:280, paras. 122-124; 261-272; and 427 to 431; 
Judgment of 3 April 2003, BaByliss v Commission, T-114/02, ECR, EU:T:2003:100, para. 360; Judgment of 3 April 
2003, Petrolessence and SG2R v Commission, T-342/00, ECR, EU:T:2003:97. 
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Centralization of purchases and economies of scale are one of the most frequently employed 
arguments to support the efficiency and compatibility of buying alliances or to justify the 
existence of a buyers’ cartel. In the case of coordinated behavior, for economies of scale to be 
considered as an efficiency enhancing, at least some of the benefits accrued by them ought to be 
passed to consumers, according to Article 101(3) TFEU and the Opinion of Advocate General 
Léger in Wouters and Others.1532 The case law, however, remains silent regarding whether the 
economies of scale should also benefit the supplier by generating selling side benefits thanks to 
the increase in purchasing quantities. In my view, such a requirement would be an additional 
factor to consider but not a necessary element as it is not required by Article 101(3) TFEU. 
In the case of single behavior, powerful firms have argued that their centralized purchasing 
behavior allowed them to generate efficient economies of scale either in the upstream market or a 
related downstream market and that, consequently, this should be taken into account in an object 
justification analysis or the assessment of a concentration. This has been confirmed in Intel v 
Commission and previously in Michelin v Commission,1533 where the GC recognized that quantity 
rebates may be a reflection of efficiency gains obtained through economies of scale and may be 
an efficiency defense under Article 102 TFEU,1534 this was subsequently restated in the buyer 
power related case of Tomra and Others v Commission.1535 The existence of economies of scale, 
however, does not deprive an undertaking of its liability under Article 102 TFEU if it decides to 
impose below cost pricing predatory pricing - as discussed by the General Court in France 
Télécom v Commission.1536 A contrario interpretation of this passage implies that the reverse 
would hold true in cases of exploitation of buyer power; exploitative buying in connection with 
economies of scale where a price is paid that is below the competitive level and below the 
supplier’s marginal costs would be contrary to Article 102 TFEU, as discussed in section 8.3 of 
this chapter. Hence, the benefits of centralized purchasing can also be used to extract 
supracompetitive profits.1537 However, a reverse application of such test would require using the 
supplier’s and not the buyer’s costs as a reference. 
In relation to unilateral buyer power cases, there are four cases in which centralized purchasing 
and its benefits regarding purchasing economies of scale have been scrutinized by the Courts. In 
three of them, the argument was raised under abuse of dominance cases, namely Tomra and 
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Others v Commission,1538 British Airways v Commission,1539and Imperial Chemical Industries v 
Commission.1540 One of them involved a case of a concentration assessment and risk of creating a 
collective dominant position in Airtours v Commission.1541 However, in none of these cases were 
the economies of scale generated by the large buyer part of the substantive discussion, nor did 
they have much weight in the analysis of the competitive effects of the conducts. 
In British Airways v Commission, in an attempt to justify its rebate policy, the defendant 
recognized and the CJEU used as an argument that there was no relation: 
[…] between, on the one hand, the possible economies of scale achieved by virtue of BA tickets 
sold after the attainment of the sales objectives and, on the other hand, the increases in the 
commission rates granted to United Kingdom travel agents in consideration for exceeding those 
objectives.1542 
From this wording, it may be concluded that, for the CJEU in cases regarding buyer power 
leveraging or exploitation economies of scale it would be relevant if they are connected with the 
conduct that is under scrutiny and has taken place in the related market. In this case, the 
economies of scale argument was not upheld because British Airways was not able to prove that 
obtaining economies of scale in the air transport service would lead to paying a larger 
commission rate to travel agents to sell further tickets. Therefore, there must be a relation 
between the economic benefit, the conduct and the economies of scale generated. A contrario 
argumentation of this passage could also imply that economies of scale will only be relevant 
when its achievement generate an economic effect in the related market. 
Also, in Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission and Tomra and Others v Commission, 
economies of scale were invoked as a justification regarding rebates granted by a dominant 
undertaking. In Tomra and Others v Commission the GC concluded that quantity rebates, even if 
granted by a dominant undertaking, can and should be justified if granted because of reasons of 
economic efficiency and economies of scale – i.e. if the buyer acquires large quantities of the 
good.1543 In Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, the CJEU, following the Commission’s 
assessment, found that the rebates granted by this dominant buyer and seller were not the 
reflection of “efficiency gains or economies of scale”.1544 Interestingly, in this case, Imperial 
Chemical – which claimed the existence of countervailing buyer power by its clients – did not 
                                                          
1538 Judgment of 9 September 2010, Tomra Systems and Others v Commission, T-155/06, ECR, EU:T:2010:370; 
Judgment of 19 April 2012 in Tomra and Others v Commission, C-549/10 P, EU:C:2012:221.  
1539 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166. 
1540 Judgment of 25 June 2010, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, T-66/01, ECR, EU:T:2010:255. 
1541 Judgment of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission, T-342/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:146, para. 211. 
1542 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 83 and 29. 
1543 Judgment of 9 September 2010, Tomra Systems and Others v Commission, T-155/06, ECR, EU:T:2010:370; 
Judgment of 19 April 2012 in Tomra and Others v Commission, C-549/10 P, EU:C:2012:221, para. 212.  
1544 Judgment of 25 June 2010, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, T-66/01, ECR, EU:T:2010:255, para. 
222, see also paras. 298 and 303. 
319 
 
claim that its own economies of scale could also lead to economies of scales for its clients, an 
idea I discuss further below. 
Lastly, in Airtours v Commission, a case dealing with collective dominant position and in which 
countervailing buyer power was argued as a defense, economies of scale were also discussed. 
The discussion, however, did not deal with buyer power related issues but instead the inability of 
small and not vertically integrated travel services suppliers to “make the same economies of scale 
and scope as the larger operators”.1545 
Interestingly, in none of these cases where economies of scale were invoked did the large buyers 
claim that in addition to their own economic benefits generated by centralized purchasing there 
were also economic benefits generated for their suppliers in the form of selling economies of 
scale and reduction costs, which is an efficiency effect that economic literature recognizes. It is 
very likely that in none of these cases would their behavior have generated a spillover effect to 
the economies of scale of suppliers that could be quantified. 
At a national level, I have also found instances where centralized purchasing and its derived 
economies of scale have been taken into account in connection with buyer power exploitation and 
unfair purchasing practices, the latter is discussed in chapter 9. In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt 
has recently stated in the merger Edeka- Kaiser's Tengelmann that large buyers are “able to make 
use of its economies of scale by asking to be granted special conditions, which the 
Bundeskartellamt considers as abusive conduct to the detriment of suppliers and smaller 
competitors” and contrary to the prohibition of Anzapfverbot, which I discuss in chapter 9, 
section 9.6.2.1546 This sort of exploitative use of economies of scale, however, has not been 
claimed at the EU level, nor is there a provision similar to the Anzapfverbot in EU competition 
law that seeks to protect small and medium undertakings from relative dependence to larger 
firms. 
In sum, purchasing economies of scale generated because of centralized purchasing techniques or 
large purchases are commonly used efficiency arguments used by undertakings that have been 
said to be in breach of EU competition law to different extents of success. Therefore, purchasing 
economies of scale are factored in when determining if an agreement between buyers may satisfy 
the conditions required under Article 101(3) TFEU, serve as an objective justification assessment 
under Article 102 TFEU in the case of individual behavior, or whenever a concentration is being 
evaluated and future competition is assessed. In the case of purchasing agreements and buying 
alliances, purchasing economies of scale often succeed in justifying the agreement or as a 
                                                          
1545 Judgment of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission, T-342/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:146, para. 211. 
1546 Bundeskaterllamt, Case summary from 6 July 2015: Prohibition of acquisition of Kaiser´s Tengelmann outlets by 
Edeka, B2-96/14 (English version), p. 4, appealed and revoked by the German Federal Minister for Economic 
Affairs and Energy under § 42 of the German Competition Act based, inter alia, on the protection of working 
positions that would be absorved by Edeka. 
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precondition for the disapplication of EU competition law by means of the Block Exemption 
Regulation. However, purchasing (or selling) economies of scale that may justify individual 
current or future behavior have less probability of success. 
8.5.3 Cooperatives as agglutinators of buyer and countervailing power 
Like centralized purchasing arrangements, cooperatives, as an organizative form grouping 
different buyers/sellers/workers, play an important role concerning the creation of purchasing 
alliances and buyers’ cartels, as discussed in this chapter’s section 8.6.1547 In buyer power related 
cases, cooperatives are usually not the buyer but the entity that groups smaller farmers that claim 
to be exploited by large food retailers. As remarked by Reich, small farmers tend to agglutinate in 
cooperatives “[t]o countervail the power of the marketing firms and improve their lots”.1548 This 
allows the farmers to join efforts, jointly commercialize their products and derive benefits from 
the pooling of sales and purchases.1549 
A cooperative is a societal form different from for-profit corporations and not for-profit legal 
entities, whereby it is necessary to discuss and then evaluate their impact in buyer power and the 
competitiveness of these entities.  
A cooperative has a ‘mutual purpose’, the cooperative is created to benefit its members, and the 
economic activities it carries out are precisely fitted to serve this purpose.1550 Therefore, a 
cooperative is primarily a horizontal agreement that also contains vertical agreement 
elements.1551 Furthermore, cooperatives, unlike a traditional corporation, requires their members 
to have a “double quality”: they are beneficiaries of the cooperative but also users.1552 This means 
that the members must contribute by means of direct effort in the activities, for example in a 
farmer’s cooperative, by running a farm and transferring the goods it produces to the cooperative. 
This also implies that the members of a cooperative have a “fidelity duty” to supply their goods 
or obtain their goods from the cooperative, as remarked by Faull and Nikpay.1553 The benefits for 
their members/users will be generated whenever the cooperative sells those goods to, for 
example, a large food retailer and the profits are then distributed among members.  
The cooperative, therefore, allows its members to join efforts and set prices and selling 
conditions that, if done by a group of non-cooperatively affiliated farmers, would have probably 
                                                          
1547 See also linking cooperatives with joint purchasing and buyer power creation: Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], 
para. 7.362. 
1548 Arie Reich, ‘The Agricultural Exemption in Antitrust Law: A Comparative Look at the Political Economy of 
Market Regulation’ 42 Texas International Law Journal (2007) 843, p. 846. 
1549 Fici [2013], p. 24. 
1550 Ibid, p. 23. 
1551 Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 7.363. 
1552 Fici [2013], p. 26. 
1553 Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 6.295. 
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triggered the application of EU competition law as an agreement between undertakings.1554 
However, this does not mean that cooperatives are not under the scrutiny of EU competition law, 
as cooperatives constitute associations of undertakings, because farming constitutes an economic 
activity and single farmers also constitute undertakings themselves, as the buyer power case law 
shows below in this chapter’s section 8.6,1555 even if the application of competition law to 
agriculture is limited.1556 In the US, producer cooperatives related to agriculture are partially 
exempted from the application of US antitrust law by means of Article 6 of the Clayton Act and, 
more importantly by the Capper-Vollstead Act of 1922, except whenever the cooperative engages 
in exclusionary conducts or restraints of trade vis-à-vis competitors.1557 
Furthermore, cooperatives agglutinate market power in two different ways that are relevant for 
this buyer power study. From a negative perspective, suppliers can integrate into the form of a 
cooperative to create countervailing selling power to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis 
retailers to prevent the imposition of UPPs as they negotiate as a group and are, therefore, less 
prone to be dependent on the buyer, as I discuss in chapter 9. From a positive perspective, 
suppliers’ cooperatives create buyer power by agglutinating all the purchases from their 
members/users, for example when purchasing cheese colorant for the preparation of yellow 
cheese of fertilizer to cultivate.1558 
As it is discussed in this thesis, the special nature of cooperatives, their ability to agglutinate 
buyer power as a buying alliance, its use as countervailing seller power mechanisms to oppose 
                                                          
1554 For a similar opinion from a US antitrust law perspective: Reich (2007), p. 847-848. See discussing the role of 
cooperatives in agriculture and its competition effects Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro of 16 June 1994 in 
Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:249, section 18, I – 5658. 
1555 See also applying competition law to the agreements entered into by the members of a cooperative and the 
agreements between the cooperative and other undertakings: Judgment of 14 May 1997 in VGB and Others v 
Commission, T-77/94, EU:T:1997:70; appealed and upheld in Judgment of 30 March 2000 in VBA v VGB and 
Others, C-266/97 P, EU:C:2000:171. Mario Monti, The Relationship Between CAP and Competition Policy - Does 
EU Competition Law Apply to Agriculture? (Helsinki Fair Trade edn, 2003); Ritter and Braun, [2004], p. 708; Whish 
and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 1116-117. 
1556 Agriculture has a special regime pursuant to Articles 38 to 44 of the TFEU including in Article 42 a provision 
stating that “[t]he provisions of the Chapter relating to rules on competition shall apply to production of and trade 
in agricultural products only to the extent determined by the European Parliament and the Council”. The level of 
applicability of EU competition law to agriculture is regulated by the Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products 
[2013] (OJ L 347/671), Articles 206-210. See also: Reich (2007); Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 
1018-1021. 
1557 7 U.S. Code Chapter 12 - Associations of Agricultural Products Producers, § 291-292. For a discussion of the 
Act and US antitrust law see: Christine A. Varney, ‘The Capper-Volstead Act, Agricultural Cooperatives, and 
Antitrust Immunity’ December 2010 The Antitrust Source (2010) 1; Donald M. Barnes and Christopher E. Ondeck, 
‘The Capper-Volstead Act: Opportunity Today and Tomorrow’ (1997) 
<http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/capper.html>; Hovenkamp, [2011], p. 339. 
1558 Judgment of 25 March 1981 in Coöperatieve Stremsel- en Kleurselfabriek v Commission, C-61/80, 
EU:C:1981:75; Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:413. 
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the buyer power of large retailers, and a special treatment in some legal areas (for example, tax 
law, labor law, special rules regarding corporations and to a minor extent competition law), might 
grant cooperatives an advantage when exercising their (buyer) market power when compared to 
non-cooperative undertakings and which may also carry competition risks related to buyer power 
exploitation and exclusion.1559  
For example, in New Zealand, the milk sector and its competitiveness has been impacted in a 
negative way because of the existing cooperative milk structure by Fonterra,1560 a dominant 
cooperative owned by more than 15,000 milk producers. According to a recent study Fonterra “in 
the years 2005 to 2009 enjoyed a world market share of 45% for butter, 35% for whole-milk 
powder, 27% for skimmed milk powder, 19% of all cheese sales and 50%, or more, for milk 
protein concentrate and casein.”1561 Pursuant to buying related allegations the New Zealand 
Commerce Commission elaborated a report in 2016, which confirmed that the competitiveness in 
the milk sector was affected by Fonterra’s purchasing and selling behavior, particularly regarding 
competition in the factory gate market which is very limited. Furthermore, the report concluded 
that without the current regime restraining Fonterra’s market power, then Fonterra “would be 
able to increase the price of raw milk it sells to other domestic processors, referred to in this 
report as independent processors (IPs). This would likely result in higher prices for dairy products 
in downstream domestic markets.”1562 Therefore, the preferential position of Fonterra as a 
cooperative grouping producers of milk was seen as having an impact of rival processors of milk 
– and indirect purchasers of milk. Additionally, the report also raised issues concerning the 
ability of Fonterra to exert buyer market power in an anti-competitive manner and concluded that 
Fonterra: 
also has buyer side market power in the purchase of raw milk at the farm gate. Buyer side market 
power gives Fonterra the ability to depress the price paid to farmer suppliers for raw milk below 
competitive levels. However, we do not think that Fonterra would exercise this market power 
against its farmers despite its ability to do so.1563 
In other words, the report concluded that Fonterra would not use its buyer power to exploit the 
suppliers of milk which is to be expected because these suppliers are the members of Fonterra as 
a cooperative. Therefore, by reducing the purchasing prices it pays as a buyer to exploit its 
monopsony power, it would be underpaying its own members which runs counter to the 
cooperative spirit as the payment of a purchasing price below the competitive levels would imply 
a reduction in the profitability and production levels of the farmers integrating it. 
                                                          




1562 Commerce Commission of New Zealand Review of the State of Competition in the New Zealand Dairy Industry, 
(2016), para. X6.  
1563 Ibid, para. X7. 
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As the report shows, particularly in the agricultural sector, cooperatives may trigger exploitative 
issues as both buyers and retailers that are half way between single conducts by dominant 
undertakings and purchasing alliances, and which are accentuated by the particularities of the 
cooperatives’ societal form. I, however, acknowledge that this is an area that is ripe for further 
academic research that due to its specificity, sector focus and requirement of additional legal and 
economic tools, I do not in depth in this study. 
8.6 Agreements imposing purchasing conditions 
Buyers acting in coordination may pool their forces through joint purchasing agreements to 
increase their buyer power leading to situations that can be positive or negative for welfare 
depending on the way the carry out their activity and the aim pursued by its members.1564  
I distinguish between two types of joint purchasing agreements and I attempt to differentiate 
these. On the one hand, those that operate as buyers’ cartels that aim at pooling buyer power to 
reduce competition among their members in the upstream and downstream markets, abuse their 
buyer power vis-à-vis suppliers and/or facilitate collusion in the downstream market where they 
act as retailers.1565 On the other hand, buying alliances1566 that aim at pooling buyer power to 
improve their bargaining ability vis-à-vis suppliers and obtain the benefits of a joint purchasing 
enterprise by achieving economies of scale,1567 obtaining lower purchasing prices, reducing 
transaction costs and/or buying larger quantities of input.1568 Both types share a commonality, as 
discussed by Advocate General Jacob’s in Albany: the larger the amount of participants in the 
cartel or alliance, the larger the accumulated buyer power.1569 However, there is a striking 
difference between them which is also reflected in their legal treatment. Buyers’ cartels are anti-
                                                          
1564 See also stressing the ambiguous effect on welfare regarding strategic joint purchasing behavior: Faull and 
Nikpay, [1999], para. 6.297; Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 7.362. 
1565 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 201. 
1566 The term “buying alliance” appears to be the most widely used at least in EU competition literature, see for 
example using this term: Ioannis Kokkoris, ‘Purchase Price Fixing: A Per Se Infringement?’ 28 European 
Competition Law Review (2007) 473; Ezrachi, EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases 
[2012], p. 120, 135-137; Ezrachi ‘Buying Alliances and Input Price Fixing: In Search of a European Enforcement 
Standard’ (2012). On the other hand, other authors use the term “buying groups” to refer to these buyers’ association 
mechanism, see: Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and 
Antitrust Policy’ (2010). 
1567 “An economy of scale exists whenever the cost of some input decliens as volume increases. The result of 
economies of scale is that the cost of production decreases on a per unit basis as the amount being produced 
increases”, Hovenkamp, [2011], p. 90 (emphasis in original). 
1568 Ritter and Braun, [2004], p. 233; Hans-Theo Normann, Jürgen Rösch and Luis Manuel Schultz, ‘Do Buyer 
Groups Facilitate Collusion?’ 109 J Econ Behav Organ (2015), p. 73. 
1569 “By contrast, sectoral funds have an obvious interest in maintaining a high level of affiliation. More affiliated 
persons means, for example, greater economies of scale as regards administrative costs, more buying power on the 
investment markets and a more advantageous spreading of risks” in Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs of 28 
January 1999 in Judgment in Albany, C-67/96, EU:C:1999:28, para. 452. 
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competitive devices made to eliminate competition between their members as buyers, exploit 
suppliers and may also be a recourse for reducing competition intensity in downstream markets 
and, therefore, are regarded as object restrictions of competition. Buying alliances are mostly 
efficiency enhancing and, therefore, enjoy a presumption of legality and are treated as possible 
infringements of competition by effect, depending on their impact in upstream and/or 
downstream competition.1570 
The Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements identifies several theories of harm or competitive 
concerns raised by purchasing agreements in general leading to exploitative and/or exclusionary 
effects on competition in either the upstream and/or downstream, an idea that is also supported in 
this dissertation when discussing the dualistic effect of buyer power. As a main rule, and also for 
buyer power exercise as a whole, purchasing alliances may raise anti-competitive risks of a 
general nature such as “increased prices, reduced output, product quality or variety, or 
innovation, market allocation, or anti-competitive foreclosure of other possible purchasers.”1571 
Furthermore and as a particularized theory of harm for concerted behavior, purchasing 
agreements may be used to reduce competition among purchasers to coordinate their behavior, 
particularly regarding price competition in the downstream market in part now generated by the 
commonality of costs and exchange of information.1572 This also implies that joint purchasing 
agreements may be used to exclude other buyers’ access to the most efficient suppliers1573 or to 
reduce technological innovation if the buyers select the same supplier.1574 Additionally, the 
Commission fears that when the purchasing agreement pools substantial buyer power and 
downstream market power, the buyer power benefits may not be passed to the consumer, a 
concern that is in line with the hourglass shape argument advanced in this thesis.1575 With regard 
to exploiting suppliers, the Commission acknowledges that if parties “have a significant degree of 
market power on the purchasing market [buying power] there is a risk that they may force 
suppliers to reduce the range or quality of products they produce”,1576 which is a concern 
regarding the withholding effect of monopsony power.  
                                                          
1570 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 194. 
1571 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 200. 
1572 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 201. Faull, 
Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], paras. 7.367-7.368. 
1573 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 203. 
1574 Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust 
Policy’ (2010), p. 33. 
1575 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 201. 
1576 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 202. See also 
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However, the Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements also set a “safety zone” when indicating that 
a buying agreement is unlikely to raise competition concerns if the parties belonging to the 
arrangement have a combined market share not exceeding 15% on the purchasing market or 
markets as well as a combined market share not exceeding 15% on the selling market or markets, 
because it is unlikely that buyer market power exists.1577 Therefore, the Commission recognizes 
that a buying agreement can be both anti-competitive and efficient, depending on its form, aims 
and content. What is unclear from the Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements is whether a buyers’ 
cartel may benefit from this safety zone presumption. From the wording employed,1578 however, 
it can be concluded that this presumption of substantial market power existence applies for both 
buyers’ cartels and buying alliances alliance, but the analysis of the competitiveness of the 
agreements based on its effects likely to render a different outcome. 
Furthermore, the Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements do not expressly differentiate a buying 
alliance from a buyers’ cartel, although they offer some indications concerning which 
circumstances are likely to make a purchasing agreement a buyers’ cartel and an object restriction 
of competition.1579 The main indicator of a collusive purchasing agreement is when its design 
facilitates coordination on the retailing market, which can be carried out if the outcome allows 
parties to achieve a high degree of commonality of costs.1580 This can also be facilitated if there is 
an exchange of sensitive or confidential information among the parties.1581 Also, a collusive 
outcome is likely to happen if parties have a significant proportion of their variable costs in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
raising this point Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and 
Antitrust Policy’ (2010), p. 30. 
1577 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 208. Cf with the 
more lenient approach in US antitrust law in which a buying alliance has been deemed as being in a “safety zone” if 
the group represents less than 35% of sales in the downstream market in US Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission ‘Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care’ (1996). 
1578 However, in most cases it is unlikely that market power exists if the parties to the joint purchasing arrangement 
have a combined market share not exceeding 15 % on the purchasing market or markets as well as a combined 
market share not exceeding 15 % on the selling market or markets. In any event, if the parties’ combined market 
shares do not exceed 15 % on both the purchasing and the selling market or markets, it is likely that the conditions of 
Article 101(3) TFEU are fulfilled”, being a purchasing agreement a general category that engulfs both buying 
alliances and buyers’ cartels, Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, 
para. 208. 
1579 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 205. 
1580 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 213; Faull, 
Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 7.388. 
1581 Communication from the Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 




downstream market where they compete against each other, as in the retail sector.1582 This is the 
case because their costs as buyers are similar which means that their downstream prices would 
tend to be also very similar. 
Thus, the lack of more precise indications concerning the differences between collusive and non-
collusive purchasing agreements and their legal treatment justifies discussing these aspects in 
detail, as I do in the following sections.  
8.6.1 Buyers’ cartel fixing purchasing conditions 
In accordance with Article 101.1(a) TFEU any agreement that imposes purchasing prices, 
regardless of whether they are exploitative or not, constitutes a violation of competition law.1583 
Therefore, a joint purchasing agreement that fixes prices, limits output or allocates markets for 
the parties is a buyers’ cartel and not a buying alliance,1584 and which in accordance with the 
limited Commission’s practice it accrues to an object restriction of competition, as I discuss 
below.1585 Additionally, in a buyers’ cartel their members become price makers and not price 
takers to the detriment of their suppliers, who are forced to sell their input at prices lower than 
they would have been absent the buyers’ cartel.1586 
8.6.1.1 What are and how buyers’ cartel operate and affect competition? 
Exploitative price-fixing buyers’ cartels - like sellers’ cartels – are conceived to increase their 
members’ profits. This is done by eliminating competition among the members and agglutinating 
purchasing power that can be used exploitatively vis-à-vis suppliers by reducing the purchasing 
price the cartel pays when compared to the situations in which buyers competed for an input. In 
addition to exploiting suppliers, purchasing price fixing it may also have related effects, such as 
exclude other buyers from the market, reduce output by restricting purchases and negatively 
affect variety and innovation.1587 Furthermore, a buyers’ cartel may additionally have exploitative 
effects in the downstream market as its members can use the cartel to restrict competition as 
                                                          
1582 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 214. 
1583 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 205 to 206. 
1584 See the definition of a cartel by the Commission in Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of 
fines in cartel cases [2006] OJ C 298/17, para. 1; Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 7.375. 
1585 Commission Decision of 20 October 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.238/B.2) — Raw tobacco — Spain [2007] OJ L 102/14; Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 
relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) 
[2006] OJ L 353/45, taken from the unabridged version. 
1586 Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 157. 
1587 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 210. See also: 
Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust Policy’ 
(2010), p. 21. 
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retailers and facilitate collusion in the output market.1588 Exclusionary buyers’ cartels, however, 
do not usually involve a price decrease but the opposite, they tend to involve overpaying for an 
input as it discussed in the US antitrust law case Reid Bros. Logging Co. v Ketchikan Pulp Co. 
analyzed in chapter 7, section 7.4.1589  
Traditionally, buyers’ cartels are formed by undertakings part of private or competitive markets. 
However, it is also possible for public buyers under the scrutiny of public procurement law to 
coordinate their purchasing behavior and exert their buyer market power. As noted by Sánchez 
Graells, this could occur, for example, when public purchases are made by few entities 
aggregating demand through central purchasing bodies or other institutional collaborative forms, 
like dynamic purchasing systems or framework agreements, or by agglutinating demand through 
ad hoc forms of collaboration, if harmonization or cost-saving policies are implemented by 
public policy makers.1590 Also, the more demand aggregation is fostered, the more likely public 
buyers will be incentivized to collude as private buyers would.1591 However, coordination in these 
types of markets among buyers might be harder to achieve because of ‘jurisdictional’ limitations: 
i.e.: each contracting authority is only competent to acquire goods in its own region and political 
pressure from different parties may make coordination among different entities less likely.  
In addition to fixing purchasing prices, buyers’ cartels are usually accompanied by other types of 
practices or contractual clauses as noted by Doyle and Han,1592 and as confirmed in Raw Tobacco 
Italy, such as purchasing quotas.1593 These additional clauses are aimed at preventing cartel 
members from ‘cheating’ and obtaining their purchases outside of the cartel and, thus, get a lower 
input price. Among these stability clauses the agreements typically accompany provisions such as 
exclusive dealing clauses, minimum purchase quotas, and rebate schemes. 
Alternatively, or along with these additional clauses, buyers may instead of fixing purchasing 
prices opt to divide markets horizontally creating ‘monopsony’ markets for each cartel member. 
The effect of the cartel is also exploitative because competition is eliminated in the designated 
geographic market and the legal treatment follows a similar approach as input price fixing; they 
                                                          
1588 Chris Doyle and Martijn A Han, ‘Cartelization Through Buyer Groups’ 44 Review of Industrial Organization 
(2014) 255, p. 257. 
1589 Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1983), at 1297-98. 
1590 Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules [2015], p. 75. 
1591 For a discussion on demand aggregation in the Directive 2014/24 see, inter alia: Hamer (2014); Herrera 
Anchustegui ‘Centralizing Public Procurement and Competitiveness in Directive 2014/24’ (2015); Sánchez Graells 
and Herrera Anchustegui, ‘Impact of Public Procurement Aggregation on Competition. Risks, Rationale and 
Justification for the Rules in Directive 2014/24’ [2016]; Vaquero García [2016]. 
1592 Doyle and Han (2014), p. 270-271. 
1593 Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) [2006] OJ L 353/45. 
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are forbidden by Article 101(1)(c) TFEU,1594 and found to be object restrictions of competition 
by the Commission’s practice and by analogy to selling side cases.1595 
8.6.1.2 Cartels fixing purchasing prices as object restrictions of competition 
The anti-competitive nature of buyers’ cartel fixing purchasing price as either object or effect 
restrictions of competition is an element that this far has not been clarified by the case law. 
However, and as I mentioned above, in my view, cartels fixing purchasing prices ought to be 
considered as object restrictions of competition even absent substantial buyer power.1596 This 
proposal is based on several grounds: the anti-competitive nature of the conduct, the 
Commission’s practice, the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in AOK-Bundesverband and 
Others,1597 the literature and the analog case law for selling side cases. In the following, I discuss 
why buyers’ cartels fixing purchasing prices should be treated as object restrictions. 
The most obvious and important reason to treatment buyers’ cartels fixing purchasing prices as 
object restriction is the blatant anti-competitive nature of these practices.1598 The aim of these 
agreements is to disrupt the competitive price formation, which is the core of competition as a 
process under an ordoliberal competition policy, and which adversely affects the competition 
structure upstream and downstream. As purchase price fixing alters the dynamic of price 
formation it follows that this type of coordination “can be regarded, by their very nature, as being 
harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition”,1599 and which is presumed to have 
anti-competitive effects which makes unnecessary to demonstrate any actual or likely anti-
competitive effects on the market.1600 Hence, if anything, purchasing price fixing prima facie 
constitutes a prime example of a hardcore object restriction of competition. 
Furthermore, there are other reasons to grant this by object treatment to purchasing price fixing. 
The nature of buyers’ cartel fixing purchasing practices as object restrictions of competition has 
                                                          
1594 The same approach is followed in the US as noted by Blair and Harrison in Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 162-
163. 
1595 See, inter alia: Judgment of 17 October 1972 in Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission, C-8/72, 
EU:C:1972:84, paras. 19-25; Judgment of 11 July 1989 in Belasco and Others v Commission, C-246/86, 
EU:C:1989:301, para. 10-15; Judgment of 15 July 1970 in Chemiefarma v Commission, C-41/69, EU:C:1970:71. 
1596 See also supporting this interpretation of the Commission’s practice: Ezrachi ‘Buying Alliances and Input Price 
Fixing: In Search of a European Enforcement Standard’ (2012), p. 58. 
1597 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs of 22 May 2003 in Judgment of 16 March 2004 in AOK-Bundesverband 
and Others, joined cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, EU:C:2003:304 [2003]. 
1598 See also stressing that “[h]orizontal price fixing would be regarded by most people as the most blatant and 
undesirable of restrictive trade practices”, Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2012], p. 522. 
1599 Commission staff working document - Guidance on restrictions of competition "by object" for the purpose of 
defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice, acccompanying communication from the 
Commission - Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under 
Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice), [C(2014) 4136 final], 
Brussels, 25.6.2014, SWD (2014) 198 final, p.3. 
1600 Judgment of 11 September 2014 in CB v Commission, C-67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204, para. 51. 
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been explicitly declared by the Commission in two decisions: Raw Tobacco Spain,1601 and Raw 
Tobacco Italy,1602 both related to agricultural markets.1603 
In Raw Tobacco Spain1604 the Commission found two infringements in a sellers’ vs. buyers’ 
cartels that were involved in the production and purchasing of raw tobacco, respectively.1605 
Concerning the buyers’ cartel the Commission found that an agreement among four major 
Spanish processors of raw tobacco through an interprofessional organization had the object or 
effect of fixing the (maximum) average delivery price for each variety of raw tobacco (all 
qualities) and to share out the quantities of each variety of raw tobacco that were to be bought.  
The Commission found that the tobacco buyers had agreed to fix each year the (maximum) 
average delivery price of each variety of raw tobacco from 1996 to 2001, and additionally, from 
1999 to 2001 to share out the quantities of each variety of raw tobacco to be bought and set price 
brackets per quality grade of each variety of raw tobacco and additional conditions.1606 The 
Commission held that fixing a (maximum) average delivery price of each of the raw tobacco 
varieties the processors managed to align as closely as possible the final prices paid to the 
producers and to reduce them for their own benefit to a level below that which would result from 
                                                          
1601 Commission Decision of 20 October 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.238/B.2) — Raw tobacco — Spain [2007] OJ L 102/14, taken from the unabridged version, para. 275. 
1602 Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) [2006] OJ L 353/45, Article 1, and para. 285. See also discussing this 
case from a buyer’s oriented perspective: Petit, The IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy and its Definition of 
"Reasonable" Rates: A Transatlatic Antitrust Divide?, p. 15-16. See also: Kokkoris ‘Purchase Price Fixing: A Per Se 
Infringement?’ (2007), p. 483-484; Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2012], p. 528; Ezrachi [2014], p. 149. 
1603 These two cases, Raw tobacco Spain and Raw tobacco Italy have in common with French beef – France Coop 
de Bétail (case which I discuss concerning buyer power limitation in chapter 11) that they constitute the three cases 
in EU competition law in which the Commission imposed a fine to undertakings in the agricultural sector, as pointed 
out by van Doorn, in van Doorn, p. 141, which reinforces the thesis put forth in this dissertation that food retailing 
and agricultural markets are susceptible of exercise of buyer power. This is also confirmed by the relatively 
significant amount of cases dealing with buying cartels in the production of milk, for example in Greece, Bulgaria 
and Lithuania as discussed in European Competition Network (2012), paras. 97.101, p. 53- 55. In Greece, the NCA 
found that the five largest diary companies had entered into a cartel fixing purchasing prices for raw milk, allocated 
supply sources and exchanged price information. The Greek NCA found that these breaches were object restrictions 
of competition and set a fine of more than €78 million. In Bulgaria, the NCA fined a group of dairies in 2007 after an 
investigation also determining the fixation of purchasing prices and exchange of information in a buyer cartel on the 
basis of pure national law. Also, these diaries operated in a downstream cartel by imposing a minimum price for 
white cheese, which reinforces the thesis presented in this dissertation concerning the hourglass shape and the 
capacity of powerful buyers to affect downstream markets. 
1604 Commission Decision of 20 October 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.238/B.2) — Raw tobacco — Spain [2007] OJ L 102/14, taken from the unabridged version, para. 275. 
See also considering this case as a buyers’ cartel: Kokkoris ‘Purchase Price Fixing: A Per Se Infringement?’ (2007), 
p. 483; Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 563; van Doorn, p. 141-142. 
1605 Commission Decision of 20 October 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.238/B.2) — Raw tobacco — Spain [2007] OJ L 102/14, taken from the unabridged version, para. 2. 
1606 Commission Decision of 20 October 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.238/B.2) — Raw tobacco — Spain [2007] OJ L 102/14, taken from the unabridged version, para. 276. 
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the free interplay of competition.1607 Price fixing was deemed to be an object restriction of 
competition as there was “no need to take account of the actual effects of an agreement once it 
appears that its aim is to prevent, restrict or distort competition within the common market”, even 
though preliminary evidence found that input prices stabilized and fell at least in 1998.1608 
Therefore, even if the cartel reduced the prices paid for the input (like bargaining power would), 
the cartel was prohibited. 
A similar approach finding purchase price fixing as an object restriction of competition is Raw 
Tobacco Italy.1609 In this case, the Commission declared an agreement among four major Italian 
processors of raw tobacco fixing the trading conditions for the purchase of raw tobacco in Italy as 
an object restriction of competition under Article 101(1)(a) TFEU.1610 The agreement, which 
lasted more than 6 years, included several clauses which, inter alia, set common purchase prices 
to be paid to tobacco producers, allocated quantities of supply and demand and coordinated 
purchasing behavior.1611 The tobacco processors’ agreement not only affected competition 
upstream by fixing purchasing prices but also used the cartel to coordinate surplus and pricing 
policies in the downstream market,1612 further increasing the competitive harm as if the 
buyer/seller cartel would integrate the undertakings in the form of an hourglass shaped buyer. 
Concerning purchasing price fixing the cartel members agreed on setting a maximum price limit 
to pay at delivery depending on the quality and variety of tobacco.1613 This was done by single 
transactions between tobacco producers and buyers as well as on bids for tobacco auctions, taking 
                                                          
1607 Commission Decision of 20 October 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.238/B.2) — Raw tobacco — Spain [2007] OJ L 102/14, taken from the unabridged version, para. 301. 
1608 Commission Decision of 20 October 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.238/B.2) — Raw tobacco — Spain [2007] OJ L 102/14, taken from the unabridged version, para. 314. 
Also stressing the fact that the case was an object restriction of competition Kokkoris ‘Purchase Price Fixing: A Per 
Se Infringement?’ (2007), p. 483. 
1609 Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) [2006] OJ L 353/45. 
1610 Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) [2006] OJ L 353/45, Article 1, and para. 285. See also discussing this 
case from a buyer’s oriented perspective: Petit, The IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy and its Definition of 
"Reasonable" Rates: A Transatlatic Antitrust Divide?, p. 15-16. See also: Kokkoris ‘Purchase Price Fixing: A Per Se 
Infringement?’ (2007), p. 483-484; Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 563. 
1611 Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) [2006] OJ L 353/45, taken from the unabridged version, para. 1 and 238. 
1612 Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) [2006] OJ L 353/45, taken from the unabridged version, para. 240 to 
255. 
1613 Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) [2006] OJ L 353/45, taken from the unabridged version, para. 243. 
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the form of bid-rigging.1614 However, other times it was agreed that processors would buy as a 
centralized buyer at an agreed price as confirmed by the Decision.1615 
In some important passages for the legal treatment of buyers’ cartels as object restrictions of 
competition the Commission held that purchase price fixing had a dual effect in the upstream and 
downstream market, confirming the need for a dualistic approach in buyer power cases, as price 
fixing caused a detriment to suppliers and the imposition of joint purchasing prices and quotas 
affected consumers directly in the downstream market when holding that:  
(280) […] The impact of this aspect of the infringement on competition was significant as 
purchase price is a fundamental aspect of the competitive conduct of any undertaking operating in 
a processing business and is also, by definition, capable of affecting the behaviour of the same 
companies in any other market in which they compete, including downstream markets. […] 
(281) By fixing volume quotas and allocating suppliers, the processors were prevented from 
competing for market shares and might have gradually succeeded in preventing or limiting the 
increase of purchase prices […]. In other words, allocation of suppliers is a strategy to prevent 
price increases as a supplier allocated to a specific processor would not be able to sell to other 
processors and would find itself price-constrained by its allocated processor. In addition, by fixing 
purchasing quotas, the processors limited and controlled the suppliers’ production and the 
production of their competitors. 
(282) By doing so, the processors’ purchasing cartel had the potential to affect the producers’ 
willingness to generate output and thus reduce global tobacco production to the ultimate detriment 
of consumers.1616 
 
Therefore, the Commission concluded that the agreements between tobacco processors had “by 
their very nature the object to restrict competition within the meaning of Article [101](1) as they 
shelter processors and producers of raw tobacco in Italy from full exposure to market forces”.1617 
This was irrespective of whether the agreement created or strengthened buyer power for the 
tobacco producers.1618 Also, the Commission stressed the fact that purchasing price fixing may 
also have an impact on the output decision of suppliers and therefore imply or generate some 
degree or scarcity. Interestingly, the Commission dismissed some allegations claiming that the 
cartel and price fixing was entered into to counteract other wrongdoings and market power by 
                                                          
1614 Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) [2006] OJ L 353/45, taken from the unabridged version, para. 252. For 
some discussion on bid rigging in buyer cartels, see: Blair and Harrison, [2010] 2 to 3, p. 2-3 and 86-88. 
1615 Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) [2006] OJ L 353/45, taken from the unabridged version, para. 248. 
1616 Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) [2006] OJ L 353/45, taken from the unabridged version, para. 280 to 282 
(emphasis added). 
1617 Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) [2006] OJ L 353/45, taken from the unabridged version, para. 285 
(emphasis added). 




intermediaries in the tobacco industry, which appears to confirm that in EU competition law the 
creation of illegal buyer power would not be allowed even if to oppose illegal market power.1619 
Lastly, the Commission concluded that there were neither relevant arguments nor effects that 
could exempt the agreement under Article 101(3) TFEU.1620 
An interesting case that also helps to illustrate the anti-competitive nature of buyers’ cartels by 
object is AOK-Bundesverband and Others.1621 In this case the CJEU resorted not to apply 
competition law to that an agreement among groups of sickness funds fixing maximum amounts 
corresponding to the upper limit of the price of medicinal products is outside of the scope of 
application of competition law because these bodies do not constitute undertakings,1622 largely 
based on their exclusively social function based on the principle of solidarity and which implies 
that purchasing was not an economic activity.1623 However, the Opinion of Advocate General 
Jacobs suggested considering purchase price fixing as an object restriction.1624 
                                                          
1619 “Serious infringements of Article [101](1) of the Treaty, such as those described in this Decision, cannot be 
justified by the aim to counteract third parties’ allegedly illegal conduct. It is clearly not the task of undertakings to 
take steps contrary to Article [101](1) of the Treaty to counteract behaviour which, rightly or wrongly, they regard as 
illegal and/or contrary to their own interests”, in Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 relating to a proceeding 
under Article [101](1) of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) [2006] OJ L 353/45, para. 
289. 
1620 Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) [2006] OJ L 353/45, taken from the unabridged version, para. 292. 
1621 Judgment of 16 March 2004 in AOK-Bundesverband and Others, joined cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 
and C-355/01, EU:C:2004:150. 
1622 Judgment of 16 March 2004 in AOK-Bundesverband and Others, joined cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 
and C-355/01, EU:C:2004:150, ruling of the Court page I – 2548, and para. 55. In the US Kirkwood has recently 
suggested granting the Federal Government some negotiation capacity to concentrate purchases of medicines as part 
of the Medicare program to generate public buyer power. See: Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Healthcare Prices. 
1623 The CJEU based its reasoning on the fact that the sickness funds were not in competition to each other and 
operated in the management of the social security system based on a solidarity scheme and fulfilled an exclusively 
social function, being entirely non-profitmaking and the funds had to provide the same services/prices to all their 
beneficiaries irrespective of their own contribution. See: Judgment of 16 March 2004 in AOK-Bundesverband and 
Others, joined cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, EU:C:2004:150, paras. 52-55. Concerning the 
principle of solidarity see: Judgment of 17 February 1993 in Poucet and Pistre v AGF and Cancava, joined cases C-
159/91 and C-160/91, EU:C:1993:63, para. 15 and 18; and Judgment of 22 January 2002 in Cisal, C-218/00, 
EU:C:2002:36, para. 43 to 46; Judgment of 5 March 2009 in Kattner Stahlbau, C-350/07, EU:C:2009:127. Also 
some literature dealing with this principle see, inter alia: Catherine Barnard, ‘EU Citizenship and the Principle of 
Solidarity’ in Michael Dougan and Eleanor Spaventa (eds), Social welfare and EU law (Hart Pub. 2005); Timothy 
Stoltzfus Jost, Diane Dawson and André den Exter, ‘The Role of Competition in Health Care: A Western European 
Perspective’ 31 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law (2006) 687; Malcom Ross, ‘Promoting Solidarity: From 
Public Services to a European Model of Competition?’ 44 Common Market Law Review (2007) 1057; Nina Boeger, 
‘Solidarity and EC competition law’ 32 European Law Review (2007) 319; Markus Krajewski, Ulla Neergaard and 
Johan van de Gronden, The Changing Legal Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe: Between 
Competition and Solidarity (Asser 2009); Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules 
[2011], p. 133-134. 
1624 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs of 22 May 2003 in Judgment of 16 March 2004 in AOK-Bundesverband 
and Others, joined cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, EU:C:2003:304 [2003]. See also confirming 
this interpretation: Ezrachi [2014], p. 149. 
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As the Court found these sickness funds to not be undertakings, it did not discuss whether the 
purchase price fixing constituted an infringement of competition, although it did not overrule 
such possibility. Nonetheless, the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs did refer to this issue who 
held that: 
It seems clear to me that, whether or not the funds are, as a matter of national law, the purchasers 
of medicinal products, they are engaged in a fixing of trading conditions within the meaning of 
Article [101](1)(a) when they coordinate, by setting fixed amounts, the maximum level of 
contribution which they will make towards the cost of those products. The respondents are also 
correct, in my opinion, to characterise such a practice as fixing the purchase price for medicinal 
products.1625 
 
Advocate General Jacobs concluded that “an agreement or decision on the part of buyers to fix 
the purchase price on a given market must be understood to have as its object to restrict 
competition”,1626 having the “potential to suppress the price of purchased products to below the 
competitive level, with negative consequences for the supply side of the relevant market”,1627 
which is in my view a clear reference to the exploitative effects of buyer market power. 
Nevertheless, Advocate General Jacobs concluded that even if the fixing of maximum purchasing 
prices is captured by Article 101(1)(a) TFEU as an object restriction if competition law were to 
be applied, it was not to be applied in this case based on the State action doctrine or the 
application of Article 106(2) TFEU exemption. Neither of these solutions was ultimately adopted 
by the CJEU in an exceptional case of not following the Opinion of the Advocate General, but 
reaching a similar conclusion. 
A different reading of the case shows two problems that are outside the scope of this thesis and 
related to exploitative abuses of buyer market power. Firstly as highlighted by Sánchez Graells, 
the current definition of economic activity and, consequently, the concept of undertaking is very 
narrow and overlooks all procuring entities that do not carry out a subsequent downstream 
economic activity1628 or carry out their purchases in a solidarity system fulfilling an exclusively 
                                                          
1625 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs of 22 May 2003 in Judgment of 16 March 2004 in AOK-Bundesverband 
and Others, joined cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, EU:C:2003:304 [2003], para. 68 (emphasis 
added). 
1626 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs of 22 May 2003 in Judgment of 16 March 2004 in AOK-Bundesverband 
and Others, joined cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, EU:C:2003:304 [2003], para. 70 (emphasis 
added). 
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs of 22 May 2003 in Judgment of 16 March 2004 in AOK-Bundesverband and 
Others, joined cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, EU:C:2003:304 [2003], para. 70. See also 
supporting this interpretation: Ezrachi, EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases [2012] 134, 
p. 134; and Ezrachi ‘Buying Alliances and Input Price Fixing: In Search of a European Enforcement Standard’ 
(2012), p. 56. 
1628 Judgment of 4 March 2003, Fenin v Commission, T-319/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:50, para. 36; Judgment of 11 July 
in FENIN v Commission, C-205/03 P, EU:C:2006:453, para. 26; Judgment of 12 December 2006, SELEX Sistemi 
Integrati v Commission, T-155/04, ECR, EU:T:2006:387, para. 65; Judgment of 26 March 2009 in Selex Sistemi 
Integrati v Commission, C-113/07 P, EU:C:2009:191, para. 102 and 114. 
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social function, these are excluded from the application of competition law.1629 This means that 
buyer cartels by contracting authorities are permitted even if their market effects are as pernicious 
as cartels by undertakings. Secondly, despite recognizing the competition problems that the 
exercise of buyer power by the state in procurement markets, the current legal regime limits itself 
to exclude the application of competition law and does not offer alternatives to control or palliate 
this problem.1630 These are issues that I acknowledge as ripe for further research.  
Furthermore, the legal treatment of buyers’ cartels fixing prices as object restriction of 
competition finds good support on an uncontroversial and straightforward analogic interpretation 
of seller side cases, as also supported by Advocate General Jacobs who held that “[i]n my view, 
therefore, they [buyers’ cartels] should be subject to the same strict control applied by 
Community competition law to supply cartels.”1631 Indeed, the case law has found that price 
fixing is an object restriction of competition as confirmed in Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren 
v Commission,1632 Belasco and Others v Commission,1633 or Chemiefarma v Commission,1634 as 
some examples. An analogic mirror application of the object nature to naked purchase price 
fixing is justified because like in seller cases purchase price fixing disrupts the core mechanism 
of price formation. 
Also, in the literature there is consensus concerning the character of object restrictions of these 
types of concerted buyer conducts, as remarked by Whish and Bailey,1635 but not a per se 
infringement as suggested by Kokkoris.1636 The distinction is important and, therefore, the use of 
per se is misleading in EU competition law, because even if an agreement is qualified as an 
object restriction of competition it may theoretically satisfy the requirements of Article 101(3) 
TFEU.1637 Also, as Ezrachi puts it, considering purchasing price fixing as an object restriction of 
competition “does not determine the outcome of the analysis, but rather its starting point.”1638 
                                                          
1629 Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules [2011], p. 115-187. 
1630 For a discussion on the law and economics of buyer power in public procurement markets through aggregated 
purchasing see: Sánchez Graells and Herrera Anchustegui, ‘Impact of Public Procurement Aggregation on 
Competition. Risks, Rationale and Justification for the Rules in Directive 2014/24’ [2016]. 
1631 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs of 22 May 2003 in Judgment of 16 March 2004 in AOK-Bundesverband 
and Others, joined cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, EU:C:2003:304 [2003], para. 70. 
1632 Judgment of 17 October 1972 in Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission, C-8/72, EU:C:1972:84, 
paras. 19-25. 
1633 Judgment of 11 July 1989 in Belasco and Others v Commission, C-246/86, EU:C:1989:301, para. 10-15. 
1634 Judgment of 15 July 1970 in Chemiefarma v Commission, C-41/69, EU:C:1970:71. 
1635 Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2012], p. 604. 
1636 Kokkoris refers to this as object restriction but also as a “per se infringement”, in my opinion erroneously in 
Kokkoris ‘Purchase Price Fixing: A Per Se Infringement?’ (2007). An alternative view could be that the use of per se 
in his article resembles the idea of “object” restriction, but this is still inaccurate.  
1637 Judgment of 15 July 1994 in Matra Hachette v Commission, T-17/93, EU:T:1994:89 [1994], para. 85. 
1638 Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 113; Ezrachi ‘Buying Alliances and Input Price Fixing: In Search of a European 
Enforcement Standard’ (2012), p. 58. 
335 
 
Furthermore, most buyers’ cartels fixing purchasing prices are not only object restrictions of 
competition but also constitute hardcore horizontal agreements and, therefore, are outside of the 
scope of application of the research and development block exemption regulation,1639 and the 
specialization block exemption regulation.1640 Furthermore, in accordance with the case law1641 
object restrictions of competition do not benefit from the De Minimis exemption.1642  
Lastly, in the US an even stricter general approach to buyers’ cartels as per se violation of 
Antitrust law,1643 as confirmed in in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar 
Co1644 and National Macaroni Manufacturers,1645 and receive an analog treatment to sellers’ 
cartels.1646 The per se standard used for buyers’ cartels fixing purchasing prices was confirmed by 
the Supreme Court in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co1647 where it 
held that:  
It is clear that the agreement is the sort of combination condemned by the Act, even though the 
price-fixing was by purchasers, and the persons specially injured under the treble damage claim 
are sellers, not customers or consumers.1648 
Nevertheless, US case law shows that courts are reluctant to find all agreements fixing 
purchasing prices as per se illegal and have allowed in occasions agreements to be evaluated 
under the rule of reason approach, as was the case in US v. Brown University.1649 In thiscase 
involving fees for the admission of students into prestigious colleges it was held that “the district 
                                                          
1639 Article 5 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 
101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of research and development 
agreements [2010] OJ L 335/36. 
1640 Article 4 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1218/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 
101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of specialisation agreements 
2010] OJ L 335/43. 
1641 Judgment of 13 December 2012 in Expedia, C-226/11, EU:C:2012:795, para. 35 to 37.  
1642 Communication from the Commission — Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably 
restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis 
Notice), [2014] OJ C 291/1, paras. 2 and 13. 
1643 15 U.S. Code § 1 - Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty, formerly § of the Sherman Act. See also: 
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); 
Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Romer, 148 F.3d 359 (4th 
Cir. 1998); Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1983). See: Rosenfelt (2008), p. 
405; Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust 
Policy’ (2010); Hovenkamp, [2011], p. 98; Kirkwood ‘Collusion to Control a Powerful Customer: Amazon, E-
Books, And Antitrust Policy’ (2014). See also Vogel v. American Society of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, (7th Cir. 
1984), 601 where the Seventh Circuit held that “buyer cartels, the object of which is to force the prices that suppliers 
charge the members of the cartel below the competitive level, are illegal per se.”. 
1644 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). See also commenting the 
case from a welfare perspective Jones (1989). 
1645 I discuss the case when dealing with imposition of purchasing quotas below: National Macaroni Manufacturers 
Association v. Federal Trade Commission, 345 F2.d 421 (7th Cir. 1965). 
1646 Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 157. 
1647 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). See also commenting the 
case from a buyer and welfare perspective: Jones (1989); American Antitrust Institute [2008], p. 121. 
1648 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948), 236. 
1649 United States v. Brown University, 5 F. 3d 658 (3rd Cir.1993). 
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court was obliged to more fully investigate the procompetitive and noneconomic justifications 
proffered by MIT than it did when it performed the truncated rule of reason analysis. 
Accordingly, we will remand this case to the district court with instructions to evaluate Overlap 
using the full-scale rule of reason analysis outlined above”.1650  
Also, the same treatment under a rule of reason approach was taken in Balmoral Cinema v Allied 
Artist Pictures where an agreement among owners of movie theaters not to compete when 
bidding for which movies to acquire was declared lawful by the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals,1651 in a decision that in my view is grounded on poor economics. The reasoning behind 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision was that the purchasing cartel could have had the 
result of reducing the prices paid by the movie-owners and which could translate into lower ticket 
prices for movie tickets, adopting a mistaken consumer welfare standard that equates low 
purchasing prices upstream with low retailing prices without taking into account the withholding 
effect of such agreement.1652 This decision would not hold under the EU buyer power treatment 
to buyers’ cartel that hinders price competition for an input; instead, such agreements would be 
considered as object restrictions of violation despite the dubious possibility of obtaining lower 
retailing prices for end consumers. Also, under current US antitrust law the standard used by the 
Court of Appeals would not be upheld, as courts would not accept lower purchasing prices as an 
argument to accept the validity of an agreement among buyers. 
Finally, and connected to the per se treatment of buyer cartels, a similar approach was the one 
adopted in Germany until the 7th Amendment of the German Competition Act, which now 
considers purchase price fixing as an object restriction.1653 
8.6.1.3 Is there a difference between monopsony power cartels and bargaining power 
cartels? 
Buyer cartels are considered object restrictions of competition, even if the immediate effect they 
might have is to reduce the purchasing prices paid by buyers and which may also lead to lower 
input prices to end consumers, particularly in the cartel does not decrease demand to reduce the 
prices it pays for an input. Also, this qualification as object remains even if the cartel does not 
have direct effects on the downstream competition which would be, in any case, an aggravating 
factor. This begs the question of why a cartel that decreases prices is prohibited by competition 
law and whether there is a difference between monopsony and bargaining power cartels? 
                                                          
1650 United States v. Brown University, 5 F. 3d 658 (3rd Cir.1993), 678. 
1651 Balmoral Cinema Inc., v Allied Artist Pictures Corp., 855 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989). 
1652 Balmoral Cinema Inc., v Allied Artist Pictures Corp., 855 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989). See also criticizing the 
decision, Roger D. Blair and Jeffrey L. Harrison, ‘Antitrust Policy and Monopsony’ 76 Cornell Law Review (1991) 
297, p. 300. 
1653 Bundeskartellamt ‘Buyer Power in Competition Law - Status and Perspectives’ (2008), p. 8-9. 
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In the case of a buyers’ cartel that exerts monopsony power the answer is straight forward 
because due to the demand withholding the amounts of goods purchased decline creating a 
scarcity effect that leads to the use of fewer resources than needed and which affects negatively 
consumers and suppliers alike due to the welfare loss and the existence of less input, which may 
also lead to higher purchasing prices or fewer consumers capable of acquiring the good. Thus, 
any monopsonist buyers’ cartel should be a restriction of competition both by object and effect, 
unless the four cumulative conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU are fulfilled, which is unlikely (and 
arguably impossible), as pointed out by the Commission,1654 and the literature.1655 
However, if the buyers’ cartel does not resort to demand withholding tactics but to decrease the 
intensity of competition among its members and therefore obtain lower purchasing prices without 
restricting demand should the treatment be different? The Commission’s practice is clear in 
affirming that fixing purchasing conditions constitute an object restriction of competition without 
requiring a decrease in units acquired. Therefore, cartels that do not resort to demand withholding 
are also captured by Article 101 TFEU. However, these types of agreements among buyers may 
exceptionally have positive effects that under an analysis of Article 101(3) TFEU may 
successfully comply with the four cumulative conditions. 
Nevertheless, this does not imply that coordinated bargaining power that fixes purchasing prices 
should be treated as an effect restriction of competition. Input price fixing is de lege lata and 
ought to be de lege ferenda an object restriction of competition both for monopsony power and 
bargaining power because the creation of cartels by themselves is contrary to the protection of 
competition as a process1656 and freedom to compete as understood in ordoliberal terms, because 
cartels precisely bypass the competitive process.1657 Furthermore, buyer cartels in general have 
pernicious effects also for allocative and dynamic efficiency because as buyers do not compete 
among themselves they would not be incentivized to invest.1658 Additionally, this qualification of 
object restrictions of competition in my view should be kept regardless of the buyers’ cartel 
                                                          
1654 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 
101/97, para. 46; and Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 246. 
1655 Also reaching a similar conclusion, see: Garth Lindrup (ed) Butterworth's Competition Law Handbook, vol II 
(12th edn, Lexis Nexis 2006), p. 555, when stating: “a joint purchasing agreement under which the participants agree 
not to purchase above certain maximum prices is liable to distort the structure of demand in the market, to be 
prohibited by Article 81(1) and to be ineligible for exemption under Article 81(3)”; Carstensen ‘Buyer Power, 
Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among Suppliers’ (2008), p. 323. See 
also Kokkoris ‘Purchase Price Fixing: A Per Se Infringement?’ (2007), p. 478. 
1656 Judgment of 6 October 2009 in GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others, Joined cases C-
501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, EU:C:2009:610, para. 63. 
1657 See also case law from the US in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that buyer cartels fixing 
prices, even if passing benefits to end consumers in the form of lower retail prices, were contrary to the Sherman Act 
in Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2000). 
1658 van Doorn. 
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effects in downstream competition; i.e.: if the cartel in addition to altering upstream conditions 
also distorts downstream competition. 
My proposal for a uniform treatment to sellers’ cartels is based on the following. Firstly, from the 
reading both literal and teleological of Article 101(1)(a) TFEU it is clear that the clause does not 
distinguish between upstream or downstream price fixing. Secondly, EU competition law practice 
supports this interpretation and has recognized that purchase price fixing by itself constitutes an 
object restriction of competition without distinguishing among types of buyers’ cartels. Thirdly, 
that a conduct is an object restriction it does not imply that it might not fulfill the requirements of 
Article 101(3) TFEU which would be the instrument to assess the difference concerning the 
effects and the type of cartel. Fourthly, considering that buyer cartels and its qualification as 
object restriction depend on downstream competition harm goes contrary to the broader and 
general legal standard used by the Courts in buyer power cases as restrictions of competition in 
the upstream market may also by themselves alone have the object of distorting competition. 
Lastly, this approach of creating no distinctions between buyer cartels is also accepted in some 
MS, particularly in Germany where the German Competition Act finds purchasing price fixing as 
an object restriction irrespectively of its type but allows for the exemption of the agreement under 
efficiency considerations.1659 
This solution of finding all buyer cartels as object restriction is not shared by all the literature. 
Ezrachi suggests distinguishing between two main situations to determine when a buyers’ cartel 
is an object restriction, depending on its effects on downstream competition. Firstly, he argues 
that purchasing price fixing should be an object restriction for all cases in which there is collusion 
both upstream and downstream and that the trigger of such treatment is the retail price fixing.1660 
The second scenario distinguishes between agreements that create buyer power and agreements 
that execute buyer power (and not distinguishing between monopsony or bargaining power like I 
do). Under this perspective when undertakings enter into an agreement creating buyer power for 
fixing purchasing prices but not as part of wider and transparent activities it should constitute an 
object restriction.1661 On the other hand, if the input price fixing is a by-product of other open and 
transparent legitimate activities, then buyer power is not created by executed and, therefore, 
should be assessed under an effect restriction approach.1662 
Such approach, as acknowledged by Ezrachi, is not problem-free and I argue that it is more 
problematic that what he foresees in his article. Such approach implies an assessment of activity 
                                                          
1659 Act Against Restraints of Competition in the version published on 15 July 2005 (Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law 
Gazette) I, page 2114; 2009 I, p. 3850), as last amended by Article 3 of the Act of 26 July 2011 (Federal Law 
Gazette I, page 1554). See also supporting this approach: Bundeskartellamt ‘Buyer Power in Competition Law - 
Status and Perspectives’ (2008), p. 10. 
1660 Ezrachi ‘Buying Alliances and Input Price Fixing: In Search of a European Enforcement Standard’ (2012), p. 63. 
1661 Ibid, p. 64. 
1662 Ibid, p. 64. 
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by activity of the buying cartel and subordinating the gravity of the infringement and its legal 
treatment on the existence of downstream consumer market. Furthermore, the approach is 
problematic because it assumes some element of intent in the behavior for determining when 
purchasing price fixing is likely to be anti-competitive. Additionally, Ezrachi’s distinction 
appears to run in contrario to Commission’s practice dealing with purchase price fixing and the 
analog selling side case law that interprets these practices as an object restriction under the scope 
of Article 101(1) TFEU, regardless of downstream consumer harm. Also, in my view, this 
approach confuses the origin of buyer power with the pooling of buyer power; individual buyer 
power exists before the cartel, what the cartel does is to pool it and allow the buyers to exert it 
with a substantial effect. Hence, implying that cartels fixing purchasing prices as a stand-alone 
activity create buyer power is erroneous. 
Another distinction concerning buyers’ cartel has been suggested by Kokkoris. In his view, EU 
competition law should consider purchasing price fixing as a per se infringement of competition 
irrespectively if the behavior involves a withholding effect or not.1663 This position appears too 
radical and not consistent with EU competition law as there are no behaviors that are per se 
prohibited. However, if Kokkoris’ use of the term per se accounts for object restrictions then his 
interpretation of the Commission’s practice and the case law and proposals are not much different 
from my perspective discussed above. 
8.6.2 Imposing maximum purchasing quotas as object restrictions 
A different way to distort competition among buyers and exploit buyer power is by imposing 
purchasing quotas through a buyers’ cartel.1664 By restricting the amount of goods a buyer is free 
to purchase, if the supply curve is upward sloping the prices paid for the input are artificially 
lowered. This is the consequence of the withholding effect of monopsony power.1665 
Furthermore, by artificially narrowing the quantities purchased this negatively impact the 
availability of the goods in the downstream market, affecting consumers in the form of fewer 
goods and higher prices than under competitive trading conditions. Therefore, the effect is 
equivalent as imposing a ceiling of maximum purchasing prices which explains why these types 
of agreements should also be treated as restriction of competition by object as they distort the 
competitive price formation, based on quite similar arguments as the ones I used above for 
purchasing price fixing. 
The Commission’s practice also helps illustrating that this by object treatment is the correct and 
desired approach to buyers setting purchasing quotas by finding such practices in breach of 
                                                          
1663 Kokkoris ‘Purchase Price Fixing: A Per Se Infringement?’ (2007), p. 477. Kokkoris also argues that selling price 
fixing is “per se anticompetitive”, ibid, p. 478. 
1664 Ritter and Braun, [2004], p. 169. 
1665 See also raising this point: Blair and Harrison, [2010], p. 70-71. 
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Article 101(1), (b) and (c) TFEU. Also, the few Decisions by the Commission confirm that 
setting purchasing quotas is usually an additional measure taken by a buyers’ cartel to prevent 
cheating, as occurred both in Aluminium imports from Eastern Europe,1666 and Raw Tobacco 
Spain.1667 
In Aluminium imports from Eastern Europe, the Commission decided that the fixing of 
purchasing quotas eliminated the freedom to individually negotiate purchasing quantities and this 
was found to be restrictive of competition, which in my view accounts for an object 
restriction.1668 In a similar approach as the one held in Raw Tobacco Spain, a case previously 
discussed, the agreement between tobacco processors in addition to the setting of a maximum 
purchasing quantity included a second restrictive practice consisting in sharing the quantities of 
raw tobacco that each processor was able to buy in the cultivation contracts signed with each 
producer group the agreement aimed at “‘limit or control production’ and ‘share markets or 
sources of supply’” constituting an object restriction of competition under Article 101 (b) and (c) 
TFEU.1669 
An analogous stern approach to fixing purchasing quotas is followed in US antitrust law, as 
confirmed in the case of National Macaroni Manufacturers Association v. Federal Trade 
Commission.1670 In this case, the parties to a purchaser agreement controlled the production of a 
downstream good – pasta (macaroni) – by agreeing on the amount of durum wheat to be used in 
its recipe as an answer to a critically bad crop season. To avoid the increase in total purchasing 
costs, the macaroni recipe was modified to contain only 50% durum wheat instead of the 
traditional 100%. This manipulation of production and limiting of purchasing was qualified by 
the Seventh Circuit as a per se violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.1671 
8.6.3  Buying alliances 
Buying alliances, unlike buyers’ cartels, tend to improve the competitive conditions and be 
efficiency enhancing as they might lead to lower prices for end consumers, larger output, increase 
                                                          
1666 Commission Decision of 19 December 1984 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/26.870 - Aluminium imports from eastern Europe) [1985] OJ L 92/1, 11.2. See discussing this case also from a 
buyer power perspective: Kokkoris ‘Purchase Price Fixing: A Per Se Infringement?’ (2007), p. 481. 
1667 Commission Decision of 20 October 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.281/B.2 — Raw tobacco Italy) [2006] OJ L 353/45, taken from the unabridged version, para. 246. 
1668 Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty IV/26.870 - Aluminium 
imports from Eastern Europe, 11.2. See discussing this case also from a buyer power perspective: Kokkoris 
‘Purchase Price Fixing: A Per Se Infringement?’ (2007), p. 481. 
1669 Commission Decision of 20 October 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.238/B.2) — Raw tobacco — Spain [2007] OJ L 102/14, taken from the unabridged version, para. 303 to 
304 and 314. 
1670 National Macaroni Manufacturers Association v. Federal Trade Commission, 345 F2.d 421 (7th Cir. 1965). See 
also briefly discussing the case: Kokkoris ‘Purchase Price Fixing: A Per Se Infringement?’ (2007), p. 485. 




in quality and innovation and overall better market conditions.1672 A buying alliance will also 
benefit its members by allowing them to reduce the purchasing price1673 they pay for goods based 
on volume,1674 and decrease administrative, transportation, storage and operation costs, through 
the creation of economies of scale thanks to the pooling of buyer market power.1675 Also, unlike 
buyers’ cartels that fix prices, buying alliances tend to act as price takers instead of price makers, 
which implies that they in principle do not distort the competitive price formation; rather they 
improve the terms and conditions in which goods are bought in the upstream market and exert 
competitive pressure on suppliers1676 to pass on their supracompetitive profits, acting as 
countervailing buyer power as remarked by the CJEU in Gøttrup-Klim and Others 
Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab,1677 following the Opinion of Advocate 
General Tesauro.1678 However, a buying alliance should not degenerate in a scheme for 
coordinating conducts downstream that will lead to erosion of rivalry among the alliance’s 
players as remarked by the Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements, becoming an anti-competitive 
agreement.1679 
Furthermore, buying alliances are complex agreements that may incorporate vertical and/or 
horizontal coordination as remarked by the Commission.1680 The horizontal level is the relation 
among buyers themselves and the focus of this section. On the other hand, the vertical level deals 
with the relation between the buyers and their supplier(s), which is carried out in accordance with 
the rules of the Block Exemption Regulation on Vertical Restraints and the Guidelines on 
Vertical Restraints.  
                                                          
1672 For an analysis of the price and non-price effects of bargaining power see in this dissertation chapter 3, sections 
3.5 and 3.6. Also stressing the pro-competitiveness of buyer alliances that foster bargaining power: Communication 
from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 194; European Commission Green 
Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-Food supply Chain in Europe, 
Brussels (2013). See also: Wollmann [2008], para. 2-2-104-105. 
1673 Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust 
Policy’ (2010), p. 28-30. 
1674 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 4. 
1675 European Commission ‘Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-
Food supply Chain in Europe’ (2013), p. 3. For a discussion of economies of scale generated by buyer power related 
practices see in the chapter section 8.5. 
1676 European Competition Network (2012), para. 98. See also discussing the legitimacy of sellers cartels to oppose a 
strong buyer Kirkwood ‘Collusion to Control a Powerful Customer: Amazon, E-Books, And Antitrust Policy’ 
(2014). 
1677 Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:413, para. 32; Bellamy and others, [2013], para. 2.141. 
1678 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro of 16 June 1994 in Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and 
Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:249 [1994], section 18, I – 
5658. 
1679 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 201. 
1680 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 195. 
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Because of these implications in horizontal and vertical levels buying alliances are also seen as 
partial and de facto concentrations among undertakings,1681 or may constitute a previous step 
towards a future merger because, as suggested by Carstensen, it “acts to gain the efficiencies of a 
joint enterprise” (in a scenario akin to a partial upstream merger).1682 By improving the 
purchasing conditions and setting a transparent and unified purchasing mechanism undertakings 
effectively integrate purchasers in a similar, but not identical and more limited way, to a single 
entity operating in the upstream market and which may result in a consolidation in the market 
that sets a pre-merger scenario.1683 This, however, does not mean that all alliances will end up in 
market concentration upstream. 
Additionally, most buying alliances act as a centralized purchasing device, such as the buying 
groups described by Lianos and Lombardi,1684 as an agreement among different cooperatives, or a 
cooperative itself, for example as in the concentration case of Friesland Foods/Campina,1685 and 
which I discussed in section 8.5. Furthermore, the purchasing patterns of the buying alliances 
vary from case to case but, in general, in a buying alliance scheme there is central agent that 
carries out the negotiations for the alliance members and acquires the input in a centralized 
manner. This central agent then resells or distributes the purchases among the members of the 
alliance as it occurred in National Sulphuric Acid Association, a case I discuss below and which 
was exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU.1686 
Also, buying alliances tend to be formed by small and medium undertakings to generate buyer 
market power by pooling demand,1687 and oppose a large supplier as predicted by Galbraith’s 
countervailing power theory,1688 which is confirmed by a Commission report.1689 It is notorious 
the example of buying alliances in the agricultural sector in which farmers join forces to acquires 
inputs such as seeds, petroleum, fertilizers, farming equipment, etc.1690 Also, buying alliances in 
                                                          
1681 Summary of Commission Decision of 17 December 2008 declaring a concentration compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.5046 — Friesland Foods/Campina) [2009] OJ C 
75/21, taken from the unabridged version. 
1682 Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust 
Policy’ (2010), p. 13. 
1683 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 16. 
1684 Lianos and Lombardi, p. 19. 
1685 Summary of Commission Decision of 17 December 2008 declaring a concentration compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.5046 — Friesland Foods/Campina) [2009] OJ C 
75/21. See discussing also this case: Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 80-81. 
1686 Commission Decision of 9 July 1980 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/27.958 
National Sulphuric Acid Association) [1980] OJ L 260/24. 
1687 Doyle and Han (2014), p. 256; Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 640. 
1688 American Capitalism in Galbraith, [2010]. 
1689 European Commission, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food Sector 
(2014), p. 53. 
1690 See also stressing the existence of buying alliances in agricultural markets to neutralize opposing market power: 
Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro of 16 June 1994 in Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and 
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the food retailing market are increasingly common but not a new phenomenon as the first buying 
alliances already existed back in the 1930s.1691 
However, there are also cases in which the buying alliances are formed also by medium and 
larger firms, an increasingly common practice, particularly in the retail sector as discussed by 
Director General Italianer.1692 According to the Commission, buyers join forces to “increase their 
bargaining power to obtain better deals in the procurement market” and that should not be seen as 
a negative form of collaboration.1693 For example, in the case of Germany larger buyers acting as 
food retailers “tend to pool their demand in purchasing cooperations” including the market 
leaders: Edeka, Rewe,1694 Bünting and Bartels Langness.1695 
Lastly, there are cases of asymmetrical alliances, with one large buyer and many smaller buyers. 
In these cases it is usually the largest partner who “negotiates on behalf of all the companies 
participation in the purchasing operation.”1696 However, the parties that tend to benefit the most 
in these asymmetrical alliances are the smaller buyers because they would obtain benefits thanks 
to the aggregated buyer power and which go beyond what they could have obtained alone.1697 
Nevertheless, in practice, there might be instances in which the large buyer may not always pass 
in full the benefits of the purchasing alliances. 
8.6.3.1 Buying alliances as efficient purchasing agreements and only likely to constitute 
effect based restrictions of competition 
Buying alliances are in principle compatible with EU competition law and only liable of 
breaching Article 101 TFEU under an effect based assessment, as also remarked by Korah and 
O’Sullivan,1698 albeit this legal standard is not explicitly confirmed by the Courts due to the 
absence of relevant case law in this sense. This more lenient approach is consistent with the 
procompetitive nature of buying alliances that exert bargaining power to neutralize seller market 
power and the fact that, unlike a buyers’ cartel, the aim of the alliance is not to reduce 
competition among their members or fix upstream purchasing conditions, but rather to increase 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:249 [1994], section 18, I – 
5658. 
1691 European Commission, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food Sector 
(2014), p. 52. 
1692 Italianer, The Devil is in the Retail, p. 4. 
1693 Ibid, p. 4. 
1694 For example, Edeka in Germany represents between 25-30% of the market shares in food retailing and Rewe on 
its part represents 15-20% of the market. The other large retail supermarket chain, but not part of a buying alliance, 
the Schwarz Gruppe (LIDL and Kaufland) represent 20-25% taken together: Bundeskartellamt ‘Sektoruntersuchung: 
Lebensmitteleinzelhandel’ (2014), Table 1, p. 78. 
1695 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 4. 
1696 Ibid, p. 5. 
1697 Ibid, p. 11. 
1698 Korah and O'Sullivan, [2002], p. 47. 
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efficient competition among buyers and sellers, without compromising competition between its 
members. 
Consequently, buying alliances may benefit from a safe harbor and are presumed competitive if 
the parties belonging to it have a combined market share in both the upstream and downstream 
markets where they operate below 15%.1699 Falling outside this safe harbor does not imply that 
the buying alliance becomes a cartel, but that a more detailed assessment is to be carried out.1700 
Additionally, the Commission has clarified that even if a buying alliance in some way affects the 
way purchasing prices are set (in this case it lowers them for the members) buying alliances could 
benefit from the De Minimis Notice,1701 and which implies that these types of purchasing 
coordination do not qualify as an object restriction of competition for the Commission. 
Concerning the legal basis for considering buying alliances as eventual anti-competitive 
agreements because of their effects the limited Commission’s practice gives some indications. As 
I mentioned above, buying alliances tend to be formed by small undertakings which makes them 
unlikely to raise significant anti-competitive effects in the market as it was confirmed in EEIG 
Orphe.1702 In this case the horizontal purchasing agreement was found to not have a significant 
effect on competition because it only allowed seven small and medium size pharmaceuticals to 
join efforts by creating a purchasing alliance and a common trademark that would permit them to 
be able to compete against larger firms. 
Also, the procompetitive effects of the purchasing alliance were taken into account by the 
Commission in the assessment of a proposed concentration in Friesland Foods/Campina.1703 In 
this case and unlike in EEIG Orphe, the buying alliance grouped a very substantial amount of 
buyers, but even then, the Commission assessed how the purchasing was carried out to determine 
                                                          
1699 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 208. 
1700 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 209; Faull, 
Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 7.379. 
1701 “In the context of joint purchasing agreements (that is to say, a number of competitors openly coming together to 
make joint purchases on the market), where the parties agree on the purchasing price that their ‘joint purchasing 
arrangement’ may pay to its suppliers for the products subject to the supply contract”, Commission staff working 
document - Guidance on restrictions of competition "by object" for the purpose of defining which agreements may 
benefit from the De Minimis Notice, acccompanying communication from the Commission - Notice on agreements 
of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice), [C(2014) 4136 final], Brussels, 25.6.2014, SWD (2014) 
198 final, p. 7. 
1702 EEIG Orphe, Report on Competition Policy 1990 (Vol XX) 80, point 102. See discussing this case: Nick 
Gardner, A Guide to United European Union Competition Policy (3rd edn edn, Palgrave MacMillan 2000), p. 128; 
Richard S. Markovits, Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law, Vol. II 
Economics-Based Legal Analyses on Mergers, Vertical Practices and Joint Ventures (Springer ed, Springer 2014), p. 
609-610; Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 7.398. 
1703 Summary of Commission Decision of 17 December 2008 declaring a concentration compatible with the common 




the effects, instead of assuming that the collaborative purchasing had an anti-competitive nature. 
In the assessment of Friesland Foods/Campina the Commission found that a concentration 
among milk purchaser cooperatives leading up to a purchasing position with 70-80% market 
share would act as a buying alliance and, regardless of its size, still generate pro-competitive 
effects.1704 This large buying position could have negatively impacted the raw milk purchasing 
market. However, the fact that the buyers were organized as a purchasing alliance not exerting 
monopsony power along with the fact that the parties were grouped in the form of a cooperative, 
agreed to form a Dutch milk fund, and its statutes allowed farmers to leave the merged entity was 
sufficient to accept the creation of a purchasing alliance through the merger.1705 
Lastly, another legal ground to consider buying alliances as eventual effect based restrictions of 
competition is the treatment under a rule of reason approach under US antitrust law,1706 and the 
recognition by the US Courts of their efficiency-enhancing nature. This was the case in 
Northwest Wholesale Stationers v Pacific Stationary and Printing when the US Supreme Court 
clarified that a buyers’ cooperative allows its members “to achieve economies of scale in 
purchasing and warehousing that would otherwise be unavailable”,1707 recognizing the efficient 
character of most buyer alliances as these types of agreements “are not a form of concerted 
activity characteristically likely to result in predominantly anti-competitive effects”.1708 
8.6.3.2 Competitive risks generated by buying alliances 
Despite the fact that buying alliances are usually seen as pro-competitive agreements this does 
not mean that these forms of buying coordination may not raise upstream and downstream 
competition concerns. Therefore, buying alliances are and should be under competition law 
scrutiny as potential restrictions of competition by their effects under Article 101(1) TFEU. 
Furthermore, a buying alliance might devoid into a buyer’s cartel, which is a matter of debate 
concerning licensing of essential patents under standard setting organizations.1709 Also buying 
alliances can have anti-competitive effects vis-à-vis suppliers (exploitative) but also among their 
members themselves and rival buyers (exclusionary). Therefore, it is important to determine 
                                                          
1704 Summary of Commission Decision of 17 December 2008 declaring a concentration compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.5046 — Friesland Foods/Campina) [2009] OJ C 
75/21, taken from the unabridged version, para. 99; Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 80-81. 
1705 Summary of Commission Decision of 17 December 2008 declaring a concentration compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.5046 — Friesland Foods/Campina) [2009] OJ C 
75/21, taken from the unabridged version, paras. 1841 and 1894-1898. 
1706 See also remarking the rule of reason approach used in this case: Jones (1989), p. 80-81. 
1707 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985). 
1708 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985), at 295. 
1709 See discussing whether such organizations facilitate collusion among buyers: Petit, The IEEE-SA Revised Patent 
Policy and its Definition of "Reasonable" Rates: A Transatlatic Antitrust Divide?; Sidak (2009); J. Gregory Sidak, 
Letter from J. Gregory Sidak to the Hon. Renata B. Hesse Regarding the Business Review Letter for the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Concerning Proposed Bylaw Amendments Affecting FRAND Licensing 
of Standard-Essential Patents (January 28, 2015), https://www.criterioneconomics.com/proposed-ieee-bylaw-
amendments-affecting-frand-licensing-of-seps.html, last visited on March 18, 2016.  
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which type of anti-competitive risks can be generated by these types of horizontal cooperation 
agreements among buyers as I discuss in this section. 
The most important risk is that a buying alliance may become a device to coordinate their 
members’ conduct in the upstream purchasing market beyond the limits imposed by collaborative 
legal purchasing or, more importantly, to reduce competition in the related downstream 
market.1710 This would occur, for example, if the buying alliance coordinates behavior in the 
downstream market and eliminates competition among its members.  
Additionally and linked to the former, the assessment of the effects of the alliance must pay 
attention to both its operations in the upstream and the downstream market. As noted by Doyle 
and Han, buying alliances may look as competitive devices if the assessment is made regarding 
the setting of input prices, but they might not for example if they involve practices such as 
slotting allowances fees.1711 Therefore, the analysis of buying alliances should include a careful 
examination of the practices in both upstream and downstream markets in line with the dualistic 
approach adopted regarding the analysis of buyer power in this thesis. 
Also, buying alliances entail risks concerning exchanges of information, and whether its members 
benefit in different ways from the alliance and if this can be used to the detriment of smaller 
buyers in the retailing market benefit, particularly if the alliance is asymmetrical (i.e. some or one 
very large member and many small ones). As discussed in a report from the Bundeskartellamt in 
food retailing, in cases of assymetrical buying alliances it is usually the largest partner the main 
negotiator and this grants it with the ability to obtain sensitive information concerning its 
competitors downstream.1712 The transfer of confidential information among members facilitates 
collusion in the upstream and downstream markets, becoming a device more akin to a cartel than 
a buying alliance,1713 as also remarked in the economic literature.1714 If information is exchanged 
among members, in addition to the general risks of coordination, the larger buyer may also use 
the knowledge it has regarding the purchasing patterns of smaller buyers to then exclude them 
from the downstream market and leverage their market power to affect downstream market 
conditions. Also, exclusion among members can take place because the large buyer often decides 
what input is acquired reducing the independence of decision making by smaller buyers parts of 
the alliance. Therefore, an asymmetric alliance can have intra-members exclusionary effects. 
                                                          
1710 See also discussing the degeneration of buying alliances into anticompetitive devices: Lianos and Lombardi, p. 
20. 
1711 Doyle and Han (2014), p. 271. 
1712 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 5. 
1713 Also suggesting that this type of alliance must be “carefully examined” by the competition authorities see: ibid, 
p. 18; Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 213. 
1714 Normann, Rösch and Schultz (2015), p. 82. 
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8.6.4 Distinguishing a buying alliance from a buyers’ cartel and its 
consequences 
The Commission defines buying alliances as “an association of undertakings formed by a group 
of retailers for the joint purchasing of products” on its Guidelines for Horizontal Agreements.1715 
On the other hand, I defined buyers’ cartel in section 8.6.1 as a purchasing agreement that fixes 
prices, limits output or allocates markets for the parties with the aim of restricting competition 
between them in the upstream market and also likely to be in the related downstream market(s), 
in line with the Commission’s definition of a cartel.1716 From these definitions based on the 
Commission’s soft law, the difference appears on whether the purchasing agreement may lead to 
a collusive outcome by facilitating the coordination of the parties’ behavior on the downstream 
market.1717 Nevertheless, this distinction is of little help because it does not really contribute with 
a clear-cut answer: it bases the difference on a case-by-case-assessment and leaves the 
classification, somewhat, to the intention of the parties.1718 Also, buying alliances may degenerate 
into buyers’ cartels even if not originally created with such purpose. However, such degeneration 
should not be taken for granted as discussed by Normann et alia, who find that buying alliances 
do not necessarily facilitate collusion in any of the involved markets.1719 Therefore, the question 
is what differentiates a buying alliance from a buyers’ cartel and what elements should be taken 
into account when making the distinction? 
The simplest and perhaps more important distinction, which surprisingly can be overlooked, is 
the content of the agreement by the buying parties. If the parties had agreed to fix prices, set 
purchasing quotas, distribute territories among its members or agree not to compete as buyers 
and/or retailers, then the agreement qualifies as a cartel. If, on the other hand, the members agree 
to pool their buyer power through a central agent that carries out the purchases on their behalf 
without this implying a diminishment in their rivalry in the upstream and/or downstream markets, 
then the agreement qualifies as the alliance. In this assessment, therefore, the authorities have to 
take into account the expression of the will of the parties and determine what is the content of the 
agreement. 
                                                          
1715 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 196. 
1716 See also the Commission’s definition of a cartel as “agreements and/or concerted practices between two or more 
competitors aimed at coordinating their competitive behaviour on the market and/or influencing the relevant 
parameters of competition through practices such as the fixing of purchase or selling prices or other trading 
conditions, the allocation of production or sales quotas, the sharing of markets including bid-rigging, restrictions of 
imports or exports and/or anti-competitive actions against other competitors” in Commission Notice on Immunity 
from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases [2006] OJ C 298/17, para. 1. 
1717 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 213. 
1718 This is also noted by Ezrachi who argues that the Guidelines provide with a “hazy benchmark” in Ezrachi 
‘Buying Alliances and Input Price Fixing: In Search of a European Enforcement Standard’ (2012), p. 48. 
1719 Normann, Rösch and Schultz (2015), p. 82. 
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In my view, a buying alliance has as its most distinguishing feature the fact that is a purchasing 
agreement that does not have as its object or effect fixing purchasing prices or imposing other 
purchasing conditions, neither to limit competition among its members, particularly as retailers. 
A buying alliance, therefore and additionally, creates competitively enhancing bargaining power 
and not monopsony power. Hence a first indication of the difference anchored on the upstream 
behavior would be determining the purchasing patterns of the buying agreement. If there is an 
indication of demand withholding then the agreement exerts monopsony power to exploit 
suppliers as it reduces the purchasing price below the competitive level. This is difficult to 
determine in practice; however, examples of historical purchasing patterns of the involved 
undertakings before entering into the purchasing agreement could be used as indicators. 
Another indicator is the way the prices are negotiated between the suppliers and the buyers. 
Unlike a buyers’ cartel, buying alliances operate not by fixing purchasing prices or setting 
purchasing quotas. Hence, indicia of take-it-or-leave-it offers or unwillingness to negotiate prices 
by the cartel members can be also taken into account to differentiate between the purchasing 
conducts. 
Also, a distinctive feature is the way buying alliances operate internally when carrying out 
purchases, in accordance with what the content of the agreement is. Buying alliances tend to 
operate by means of a central agent that has to coordinate the purchases for all members and 
execute them in a transparent and independent manner to avoid becoming a cartel device.1720 This 
agent carries out the purchases on behalf of the alliance members in an independent manner and 
possessing a character of a permanent body and with strategies oriented to a long-term 
collaboration.1721 Therefore, the buying alliance and its system should minimize the risk of 
exchange of sensitive information when the administering organ of the alliance is the one 
receiving but not passing on the information,1722 which is an important anti-competitive concern 
regarding buying alliances as I discussed in section 8.6.3.1. A buying cartel, on the other hand, is 
not transparent and members do not require having an independent purchaser and are likely to 
share information regarding their purchasing patterns to coordinate conducts in the downstream 
market, if they ‘compete’ as retailers. Also, unlike some buyers’ cartels, buying alliances 
                                                          
1720 Commission Decision of 9 July 1980 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/27.958 
National Sulphuric Acid Association) [1980] OJ L 260/24. Also raising the transparency element as a difference 
between cartels and alliances see: Ezrachi ‘Buying Alliances and Input Price Fixing: In Search of a European 
Enforcement Standard’ (2012), p. 60. 
1721 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 4; 
Suchan Chae and Paul Heidhues, ‘Buyers' Alliances for Bargaining Power’ 13 Journal of Economics & Management 
Strategy (2004) 731, p. 731. 
1722 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 




integrate their purchasing operation and restrict the ability of their members to unilaterally carry 
out their purchasing activity,1723 as also confirmed by a study by the German NCA.1724  
This central and transparent purchasing modality was relevant for the Commission to determine 
the pro-competitive nature of a purchasing agreement and qualify it as a buying alliance in 
National Sulphuric Acid Association.1725 In this case involving the joint purchasing of sulphur 
and involving the limitation of freedom of their members, the Commission studied the purchasing 
rules agreed by the members to show how the pool was a buying alliance and not a cartel.1726 The 
price paid by the members (and not the price paid by the pool to their suppliers) for their sulphur 
within the pool was agreed by a committee; the quantities and type of sulphur to be purchased 
were affixed 6 months in advanced; the sulphur acquired by the pool was resold to the members 
on a non-profit basis; each member of the pool had to acquire a minimum of 25% of its sulphur 
input through the pool and if not, then would be considered as no longer member of it. In other 
words, the pool did not impose purchasing prices but instead acted like a centralized purchasing 
agent for all its members.1727 
8.6.4.1 Conclusions regarding the distinction 
Recapitulating, the key normative element that distinguishes a buying alliance from a buyers’ 
cartel is that the former should be treated as agreements that tend to be pro-competitive and 
ought to be considered only as possible effect restrictions of competition law under Article 101(1) 
TFEU, and not object restrictions like the latter.1728 Thus, the analysis of buying alliances is 
more lenient and has to assess the market effects of the conduct both in quantity, price and 
quality dimensions as suggested by the Bundeskartellamt.1729 A somewhat similar approach is 
also taken in US antitrust law as the Supreme Court has considered that buying alliances are not 
                                                          
1723 Carstensen ‘Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust 
Policy’ (2010), p. 14-17. 
1724 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 4. 
1725 Commission Decision of 9 July 1980 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/27.958 
National Sulphuric Acid Association) [1980] OJ L 260/24. 
1726 Also claiming that the buying pool was “transparent” see: Ezrachi ‘Buying Alliances and Input Price Fixing: In 
Search of a European Enforcement Standard’ (2012). Also stressing that the lowering of the purchasing obligation 
was an element for the pool to be deemed lawful: Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 6.340. See also: Ezrachi [2014], p. 
151-152. 
1727 Commission Decision of 9 July 1980 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/27.958 
National Sulphuric Acid Association) [1980] OJ L 260/24, para. 26. 
1728 This also appears to be the position of the Commission when arguing that “[j]oint purchasing arrangements 
which do not have as their object the restriction of competition must be analysed in their legal and economic context 
with regard to their actual and likely effects on competition”, in Communication from the Commission — Guidelines 
on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation 
agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 207. 
1729 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 19. 
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to be assessed under a per se rule like most buyer cartels, but under the rule of reason standard 
instead.1730 
Furthermore, even if a buying alliance is found to be anti-competitive due to its effects according 
to the assessment carried out in Article 101(1) TFEU, they are much more likely to fulfil the 
cumulative conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU as the limited case law and Commission’s practice 
demonstrates,1731 unlike in the case of a buyers’ cartel. This is even more the case if the buying 
alliance has an upstream market share of less than 15%.1732 This likelihood of fulfilling the 
efficiency requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU is so because, like bargaining power in general, 
if there is competition downstream, lower wholesale prices are passed on to consumers.1733 Also, 
a buying alliance is unlikely to raise serious competitive effects if the parties to it have little 
market power because coordination is rather unlikely or ineffective.1734 Therefore, buying 
alliances that agglutinate or pool buyer power but lack downstream market power as retailers are 
unlikely to raise competition concerns – particularly concerning end consumers. If, on the other 
hand, the buying alliance has also downstream market power (like an hourglass-shaped 
undertaking) then it is likely that the cost commonality will also serve to eliminate downstream 
competitiveness. Lastly, unlike buyers’ cartels, buying alliances may benefit from the application 
of the De Minimis doctrine if the agreement does not have a significant impact in competition.1735 
8.6.5 Buying agreements and restrictions to competition among its own 
members 
Another aspect that has received attention in the Commission’s practice and the case law is how 
becoming a member of a buying alliance limits the individual capacity of its members to 
purchase independently or outside of the alliance, and whether this amounts to a restriction of 
competition. These elements regarding how restrictive a buying alliance can be concerning the 
                                                          
1730 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific 
Stationery Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985). 
1731 Commission Decision of 9 July 1980 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/27.958 
National Sulphuric Acid Association) [1980] OJ L 260/24; Judgment of 25 March 1981 in Coöperatieve Stremsel- en 
Kleurselfabriek v Commission, C-61/80, EU:C:1981:75. 
1732 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 208. Also 
confirming this interpretation: Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food 
Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 19. 
1733 Doyle and Han (2014), p. 256. 
1734 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 221 example 1; 
Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], paras. 7-385-7.390. 
1735 Commission staff working document - Guidance on restrictions of competition "by object" for the purpose of 
defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice, acccompanying communication from the 
Commission - Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under 
Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice), [C(2014) 4136 final], 
Brussels, 25.6.2014, SWD (2014) 198 final, p. 7. 
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economic freedom of its members have been taken into account to determine if these cooperation 
agreements can be restrictive of competition, or if restrictive, whether they can satisfy the 
requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU. Therefore, this assessment and my analysis of the cases do 
not deal with the effects of the alliance with regard to external parties, but with the intra- 
competition limitations imposed to the members of the alliance. Also, these cases do not 
constitute buying alliance cases as they are traditionally interpreted by the literature,1736 in the 
sense that they do not deal with buyer power exploitation. However, in my view, provisions that 
restrict or prohibit purchasing outside of the alliance - also known as network effects -1737 
increase further the alliance’s buyer power and may allow it to exploit suppliers or even develop 
into a buyers’ cartel, for which they are also relevant considering buyer power exploitation. 
In National Sulphuric Acid Association the Commission found that the intra- effects1738 and 
activities by a transparent buying alliance that centralized the purchasing and the conditions for at 
least 25% of the sulphur requirements by its members were under the scope of Article 101(1) 
TFEU. However, it declared it inapplicable because of the pro-competitive efficiencies derived 
from the buying alliance pursuant to an assessment under Article 101(3) TFEU.1739 The members 
of the buying pool jointly acquired sulphur for internal consumption or to be sold in the 
downstream market as sulphuric acid.1740 As discussed above, the buying system was carried out 
through a central agent that determined the prices paid by the member internally, the quantities 
and type of sulphur to be purchased. Furthermore, the rules required that each member had to 
acquire a minimum of 25% of its sulphur input through the pool and if not, then it would be 
considered as no longer member of it. In the assessment of this constraint, the Commission found 
that the rules of the pool had the effect of restricting competition “between the members of the 
Pool”1741 but not between the pool and the suppliers. The restriction was internal because by 
becoming a member, the buyers were not able to negotiate better terms with suppliers on an 
                                                          
1736 See referring to some of these cases as examples of joint purchasing agreements and not exclusive purchasing 
obligations: Kokkoris ‘Purchase Price Fixing: A Per Se Infringement?’ (2007); Ezrachi ‘Buying Alliances and Input 
Price Fixing: In Search of a European Enforcement Standard’ (2012); Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 
641-642. 
1737 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 19-
20. 
1738 Part of the literature seems to omit this fact when analyzing the case. Such is the example of Kokkoris who 
briefly discusses it and concludes that “the Commission did not find that joint purchasing was itself a direct 
infringement of Art 81(1)” but appears to overlook the fact that the case was about intra effects and not extra effects 
of the pool in Kokkoris ‘Purchase Price Fixing: A Per Se Infringement?’ (2007), p. 486. 
1739 Commission Decision of 9 July 1980 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/27.958 
National Sulphuric Acid Association) [1980] OJ L 260/24, Article 1. See also discussing this case from a buyer 
power perspective: Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], paras. 7.399-7.406. 
1740 Commission Decision of 9 July 1980 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/27.958 
National Sulphuric Acid Association) [1980] OJ L 260/24, para. 4 to 5. 
1741 Commission Decision of 9 July 1980 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/27.958 
National Sulphuric Acid Association) [1980] OJ L 260/24, para. 31 (emphasis added). 
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individual basis if within the 25% quota.1742 However, after having determined that this could 
constitute an effect restriction of competition among the members of the pool and a restriction to 
each member’s economic freedom,1743 the Commission evaluated the intra-effects of the buying 
alliance made the provision as a whole to be pro-competitive after an assessment of the 
cumulative conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU, reinforcing the efficiency enhancing effects of 
buying alliances.1744 
Later in Coöperatieve Stremsel- en Kleurselfabriek v Commission the CJEU confirmed a 
Commission’s Decision declaring Article 101(3) TFEU inapplicable to a cooperative agreement 
producing rennet of animal origin and coloring agents for cheese, rendering the buying alliance 
unlawful because it was too restrictive of their member’s freedom.1745 This was the case because 
the statutes restricted excessively the members’ economic freedom of choosing where and from 
whom to acquire the input, as also noted by Faull and Nikpay.1746 According to the buying 
alliance rules, the cooperative members were obliged to purchase all quantities of rennet and 
coloring exclusively from the cooperative otherwise a fine were to be imposed and/or 
expelled.1747 The Commission Decision held that the intra purchasing obligation of members to 
acquire from the cooperative had the effect of restricting competition among themselves, 
reinforced by the fine and expulsion threat. When analyzing if the agreement could benefit from 
Article 101(3) TFEU the Commission found that the third and fourth cumulative conditions were 
not fulfilled because the obligation was not proportionate and it eliminated competition among 
the members in the Netherlands.1748 The CJEU confirmed that the provision constituted an 
exclusive purchasing obligation1749 for the members of the cooperative that had “clearly as their 
object to prevent members from obtaining supplies from other suppliers”,1750 and therefore was in 
breach of Article [101](1) TFEU and confirmed that the Commission was right when declaring 
                                                          
1742 Commission Decision of 9 July 1980 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/27.958 
National Sulphuric Acid Association) [1980] OJ L 260/24, para. 33 to 34. 
1743 Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 7.404; Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 6. 333 and 6.340. 
1744 Commission Decision of 9 July 1980 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/27.958 
National Sulphuric Acid Association) [1980] OJ L 260/24, para. 39 to 50. 
1745 See also indicating that in this case the buyer’s agreement was not compatible with EU competition law: Korah 
and O'Sullivan, [2002], p. 47. See discussing this case but not dealing with the CJEU Judgment: Faull, Nikpay and 
Taylor, [2014], para. 7.400. 
1746 Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 6.339. 
1747 Judgment of 25 March 1981 in Coöperatieve Stremsel- en Kleurselfabriek v Commission, C-61/80, 
EU:C:1981:75, para. 3. 
1748 Judgment of 25 March 1981 in Coöperatieve Stremsel- en Kleurselfabriek v Commission, C-61/80, 
EU:C:1981:75, 853 to 854. 
1749 Also raising the fact that the joint purchasing agreement was anticompetitive because of the exclusive purchasing 
obligation see: Ritter and Braun, [2004], p. 243. 
1750 Judgment of 25 March 1981 in Coöperatieve Stremsel- en Kleurselfabriek v Commission, C-61/80, 
EU:C:1981:75, para. 12. 
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Article 101(3) TFEU not applicable because the limits of the obligation were not indispensable 
for the attainment of the benefits.1751 
In Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab1752 the 
CJEU dealt again with the restriction of the member’s economic freedom within a buying 
alliance on a different legal basis. In this case, the alliance’s rules prohibited multi-cooperative 
participation (i.e.: members could not belong to more than one alliance) and found that the 
restriction of competition was allowed because it was an ancillary restraint that allowed for the 
buying alliance to achieve its competitive objective.1753 The case was prompted because after a 
change in the alliance’s statutes 37 cooperative associations that were excluded from the Danish 
cooperative association distributing farm supplies (DLG). The amendments stipulated that none 
of its members could compete in the sale or buy of fertilizers or plant protection products and 
prohibited their members from participating in other forms of organized cooperation.1754 The 
cooperatives claimed that such provision accounted for the infringements or Article 101 and 102 
TFEU and brought and action before the national courts. 
The CJEU highlighted the pro-competitive nature of cooperative purchasing agreement as “a 
voluntary association of persons established in order to pursue common commercial 
objectives”,1755 able to oppose selling market power and improve the competitive conditions.1756 
Then, it proceeded to assess the need for such strict rules and their adequacy in the light of the 
alliance’s objective.1757 The CJEU stressed that restricting dual membership was allowed as an 
ancillary restraint of intra-competition because belonging to two cooperatives makes “each 
association less capable of pursuing its objectives for the benefit of the rest of its members, 
especially where the members concerned, as in the case in point, are themselves cooperative 
associations with a large number of individual members”.1758 Following this assessment the 
                                                          
1751 Judgment of 25 March 1981 in Coöperatieve Stremsel- en Kleurselfabriek v Commission, C-61/80, 
EU:C:1981:75, para. 18. 
1752 Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:413. 
1753 Also remarking that this case deals with purchasing alliances but not discussing in detail the alternative solution 
found by the CJEU of ancillary restraints see: van Doorn, p. 143. See also: Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 2.99; 
Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 136. See also a somewhat similar interpretation by Kokkoris who sees 
the case as a discussion of the clause of the agreement but not purchasing price fixing in: Kokkoris ‘Purchase Price 
Fixing: A Per Se Infringement?’ (2007), p. 486 to 487. 
1754 Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:413, para. 7. 
1755 Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:413, para. 30. 
1756 Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:413, para. 32; Bellamy and others, [2013], para. 2.141. 
1757 Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:413, para. 31. 
1758 Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:413, para. 33. 
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CJEU concluded that a statute banning a member from having a dual cooperative membership 
“does not, therefore, necessarily constitute a restriction of competition within the meaning of 
Article [101](1) of the Treaty and may even have beneficial effects on competition”;1759 while 
recognizing that such a provision may also have adverse effects in competition if barring 
members from acquiring goods from other suppliers.1760 Hence, the compatibility of the 
agreement depended on a proportionality assessment1761 limiting the measure to what is 
necessary to ensure that the cooperative functions properly.1762 
In this sense, the Judgment can be read as an extension of the ancillary restraint doctrine,1763 as 
banning dual membership and the ability to compete with the cooperative while being a member 
is a necessary restriction of competition that is justified by the aim it seeks to achieve and is 
proportional to that end. Therefore, the assessment made was based on determining not if the 
buying alliance itself was an efficient agreement but rather if the restriction was necessary for the 
implementation of the buying alliance.1764 Hence, even if the provision in the statutes restricted 
competition it was not captured by Article 101(1) TFEU as the provision was to ensure the 
functioning of the cooperative which had a legitimate commercial purpose, as remarked by the 
literature.1765 
                                                          
1759 Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:413, para. 34. 
1760 Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:413, para. 35. 
1761 Judgment of 11 July 1985 in Remia v Commission, C-42/84, EU:C:1985:327. Also suggesting the adoption of a 
proportionality assessment in the case: Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2012], p. 129.  
1762 Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:413, para. 35. This case law was subsequently ratified by the CJEU also 
dealing with ancillary restraints in cooperatives in Judgment of 12 December 1995 in Dijkstra and Others v 
Friesland (Frico Domo) Coöperatie and Others, C-319/93, EU:C:1995:433; and Judgment of 12 December 1995 in 
Oude Luttikhuis and Others v Verenigde Coöperatieve Melkindustrie Coberco, C-399/93, EU:C:1995:434, para. 14 
to 18. 
1763 “[…] the concept of an 'ancillary restriction' covers any restriction which is directly related and necessary to the 
implementation of a main operation” in Judgment of 18 September 2001, M6 and Others v Commission, T-112/99, 
ECR, EU:T:2001:215, para. 104; Judgment of 30 June 1966 in Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm, C-
56/65, EU:C:1966:38; Judgment of 11 July 1985 in Remia v Commission, C-42/84, EU:C:1985:327. See also: 
Commission Notice on restrictions directly related and necessary to concentrations [2005] OJ C 56/24. For some 
literature on the topic see, inter alia: Robert H. Bork, ‘Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act’ 15 Section of 
Antitrust Law (1959) 211; Jeffrey L. Harrison, ‘Price Fixing, the Professions, and Ancillary Restraints: Coping With 
Maricopa County’ 4 University of Illinois Law Review (1982) 925; F. Enrique González Díaz, ‘The Notion of 
Ancillary Restraints Under EC Competition Law’ 19 Fordham International Law Journal (1995) 951; Gregory J. 
Werden, ‘The Ancillary Restraints Doctrine’ (54th Antitrust Law Spring Meeting); Whish and Bailey, Competition 
law [2015], p. 136-142.  
1764 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 
101/97, para. 30-31; Ezrachi, EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases [2012], p. 100. 
1765 Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials [2011], p. 228-230; Whish and Bailey, 
Competition law [2012], p. 129; Ezrachi ‘Buying Alliances and Input Price Fixing: In Search of a European 
Enforcement Standard’ (2012), p. 59. 
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In my opinion Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab must be given a restrictive interpretation as it should not be resorted to as a 
device that lawfully allows the restriction of competition among members of a buying alliance as 
a general rule. As remarked by Advocate General Tesauro, the case and its circumstances were 
very “specific to the agricultural sector” and, therefore, the interpretation should also be limited 
as well.1766 In other words, buying alliances should not be used as instruments to limit the ability 
of their members to compete in and outside of the cooperative/buying alliance, and only in 
exceptional cases under a proportionality assessment an ancillary restraint could be accepted 
under Article 101(1) TFEU. Otherwise, the buying alliance risks eliminating competition among 
its members and excessively restricting its members’ economic freedom. 
In sum, these cases show that buying alliances even if they might be pro-competitive in most 
occasions with regard to the relation of their members with their suppliers and end consumers are 
also devices that may restrict the buying ability of their own members. Most of the times these 
restrictions of competition would be unproblematic and required to attain the alliance’s goal and 
others it might be too restrictive rendering the agreement incompatible with Article 101 TFEU, 
adding an additional component to the competitive analysis of purchasing agreements. 
8.7 Defenses and efficiency justifications regarding buyer power 
exploitation 
In this section, I discuss the possible defenses undertakings that are investigated due to a risk of 
buyer power exploitation may resort to in case the behavior is efficient. The section builds upon 
the general treatment of these types of defenses for exploitative buyer power cases in all 
competition law areas from a buyer power perspective and, in particular, the differences 
concerning competition effects of bargaining and monopsony power exertion. In the case of 
monopsony power exploitative exertion it would be unlikely that any purchasing conduct would 
be efficient because monopsony always produces a deadweight welfare loss due to the demand 
withholding. In the case of bargaining power exertion, the chances of a conduct being considered 
justified due to being efficient are higher due to its efficiency-enhancing nature. 
8.7.1 Single conduct efficiency analysis: objective justification under Article 
102 TFEU and concentration efficiency 
In the case of unilateral behavior, the doctrine of objective justification according to which “[…] 
although the fact that an undertaking is in a dominant position [this] cannot deprive it of its right 
to protect its own commercial interests if they are attacked, and that such an undertaking must be 
                                                          
1766 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro of 16 June 1994 in Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and 
Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:249 [1994], section 18, I – 
5658. See also: C-26/76 - Metro v Commission, EU:C:1977:167 [1977] 01875. 
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conceded the right to take such reasonable steps as it deems appropriate to protect those 
interests”.1767 This defense allows for a conduct that seems to exploit suppliers, for instance by 
paying an ‘unfairly low purchasing price’, to be proven not abusive and, therefore, not be caught 
by Article 102 TFEU. Concerning buyer power exploitation, an argument that may be put forth 
by a dominant undertaking is that the price paid is not unfairly low because, even if the 
purchasing price does not cover the supplier’s costs, the price paid is above the competitive level, 
even if it is a lower purchasing price than the one prevailing in the market. This could happen in 
an industry where there has not been very aggressive purchasing behavior and suppliers have 
traditionally extracted supra-competitive prices, for example, in a market that was protected by a 
statutory selling price regulation (like a public utility such as electricity generation) where buyers 
were not allowed to exercise their buyer power. However, if the price regulation is eliminated, a 
dominant buyer in the region, for instance the largest electricity buyer, may ‘impose’ prices that 
the formerly competition-protected suppliers consider unfair because they are lower than the 
previous price, which was considered to be ‘competitive’ but which, in reality, was not so 
because it was a higher price than would have been the case if competition among suppliers had 
been intensified. 
Also, regarding concentrations that may lead to future exploitative practices and, therefore, a 
significant impediment to effective competition, the involved undertakings may claim that the 
merger generates efficiencies that justify the operation and it compatible, as recognized by 
Recital 29 and Article 2.1. (b) of the Merger Control Regulation,1768 and the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines.1769 These efficiencies may counteract the possible anti-competitive exploitative 
effects in an operation among buyers and could be represented by any type of a substantiated 
                                                          
1767 Judgment of 16 September 2008 in Sot. Lélos kai Sia v. GlaxoSmithKline, joined cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, 
EU:C:2008:504 E.C.R. [2008] I-07139, para. 50. See also: Communication from the Commission — Guidance on 
the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 28-31. For some literature on the topic see, inter alia: Paul-John 
Loewenthal, ‘The Defence of “Objective Justification” in the Application of Article 82 EC’ 28 World Competition 
(2005); Albors-Llorens ‘The Role of Objective Justification and Efficiencies in the Application of Article 82 EC ’ 
(2007); Østerud; Rousseva, [2010]; Tjarda Van der Vijver, ‘Objective Justification and Article 102 TFEU’ 35 World 
Competition (2012) 55; Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 221-222. 
1768 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1. 
1769 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, paras. 76-88. See also some literature dealing with 
efficiencies in merger regulation: Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, ‘Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal 
Merger Analysis’ 68 Antitrust Law Journal (2001) 685; William J. Kolasky and Andrew R. Dick, ‘The Merger 
Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers’ 71 Antitrust Law Journal 
(2003) 207; David Spector, ‘Horizontal Mergers, Entry, and Efficiency Defences’ 21 International Journal of 
Industrial Organization (2003) 1591; Johan N. M. Lagerlöf and Paul Heidhues, ‘On the Desirability of an Efficiency 
Defense in Merger Control’ 23 International Journal of Industrial Organization (2005) 803; Schwalbe and Zimmer, 
[2009], p. 318-356; Manfred Neumann, ‘Efficiency Defense in EU and US Horizontal Merger Control if Costs are 
Endogenous’ 17 German Economic Review (2015) 48. 
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efficiency claim.1770 Somewhat similar to the conditions required by Article 101(3) TFEU, the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the Commission’s practice require these efficiencies to comply 
with three cumulative requirements. First, the concentration should benefit consumers who shall 
not be in a worse situation than before the merger, which in this case following a dualistic 
approach to buyer power would be the situation of the end consumers in the downstream markets 
(and the traditional consumer). This would mean that the parties should demonstrate that their 
ability to exert bargaining power over suppliers allows them to pass on the lower prices to end 
consumers, or that the creation of buyer power incentivizes suppliers to invest in new products or 
technology to regain bargaining power vis-à-vis their buyer and avoid the buyer power 
exertion.1771 Furthermore, these benefits to consumers must also be substantial and timely, which 
implies that the later they happen, the less substantial they would be. Secondly, the concentration 
must also generate buying-specific efficiencies, for example purchasing economies of scale, that 
would not have been achieved to a similar extent by less anti-competitive alternative, for example 
by constituting a purchasing alliance instead of concentrating several buying undertakings into 
one.1772 Thirdly and lastly, the efficiencies must be verifiable in the sense that it is possible to 
foresee they will materialize and offset the possible anti-competitive and exploitative effects of 
the merger based on an economic counterfactual assessment.1773 
8.7.2 Assessing purchasing agreements under Article 101(3) TFEU 
Additionally, the parties to a joint purchasing agreement may claim that even if the agreement is 
deemed as restriction competition by object or effect it would satisfy the requirements of Article 
101(3) TFEU because of the efficiencies it may generate. As mentioned before, a purchasing 
alliance will tend to be pro-competitive and, therefore is in principle not to be captured by Article 
101(1) TFEU and, if it is, it is likely to satisfy the requirements of Article 101(3) and render 
Article 101(1) TFEU inapplicable. In the case of buyers’ cartels, on the other hand, especially if 
they are an object restriction of competition because the cartel fixes purchasing prices or quotas, 
it would be unlikely that they would benefit from an efficiency exemption. Nevertheless, in both 
cases, factors specific to the case can be assessed on a case-by-case basis in the light of the four 
cumulative conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU. 
Joint purchasing agreements can be efficiency enhancing if they foster the creation of buyer 
(bargaining) power and are used to maximize the benefits of a joint enterprise by leading to 
                                                          
1770 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, paras. 76-77. 
1771 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, paras. 80-81. 
1772 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 85. 
1773 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, paras. 86-88. 
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reductions in the purchasing price, reductions of transaction, storage and transportation costs and 
facilitate purchasing economies of scale.1774 This could be the case even if the joint purchasing 
agreement also involves an exclusive selling obligation that improves overall production and 
distribution of goods conditions, as was discussed in the case of distribution of films because the 
joint purchasing allowed more films to be broadcasted than compared to its absence.1775 Also, 
buyer (bargaining) power might have non-price related positive effects by creating incentives to 
suppliers to innovate promoting technical progress, produce an antiwaterbed effect for buyers not 
part of the alliance and promote variety, as discussed in chapter 3, section 3.6. 
Furthermore, the undertakings must prove that the agreement was indispensable in order to 
generate the efficiencies. Therefore, this condition will not be fulfilled when it is possible proving 
that the purchasing agreement includes provisions that go beyond what is necessary to generate 
the efficiencies because of the pooling of buyer power and creation of purchasing economies of 
scale. The assessment to determine if buying alliance was the indispensable measure to create the 
sufficient purchasing volume has to be done on a case by case basis, as recognized by the 
Guidelines for Horizontal Agreements.1776 In Métropole Télévision v Commission, the General 
Court found that the exemption given by the Commission to a joint purchasing of TV 
broadcasting rights was based on a misinterpretation of Article 101(3) TFEU due to the lack of 
sufficient analysis of economic data and because of only basing its decision on the fulfillment of 
a particular public mission.1777 
As a third assessment element, a joint purchasing agreement can be efficiency enhancing 
whenever it fosters the creation of bargaining power that also benefits end consumers as the 
lower purchasing prices grant a fair share of the resulting benefits to end consumers. As 
discussed in chapter 3, section 3.5, this is more likely to be the case when the parties to the 
buying agreement do not possess substantial market power in the downstream market. If they, in 
addition to substantial buyer power, possess retail power, the efficiencies might not be passed on 
in accordance with the hourglass shape proposal.1778 On the other hand, if the joint purchasing 
agreement exercises monopsony power the purchasing conduct will always imply a welfare loss 
                                                          
1774 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 217; Ritter and 
Braun, [2004] 235, p. 235. Purchasing economies of scale are finite as discussed recently in Albert Sánchez Graells, 
Some Bold Thoughts about the (Distant?) Future of Public Procurement in the EU (2015). 
1775 Commission Decision of 15 September 1989 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/31.734 - Film purchases by German television stations) [1989] OJ L 284/36, para. 49 to 56 
1776 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 218. 
1777 Judgment of 11 July 1996, Métropole Télévision v Commission, joined cases T-528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93 and 
T-546/93, ECR, EU:T:1996:99, paras. 118 to 123. See also: Ritter and Braun, [2004], p. 236. 
1778 Also supporting this see: Ezrachi ‘Buying Alliances and Input Price Fixing: In Search of a European 
Enforcement Standard’ (2012), p. 68. 
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that may or not additionally increase downstream prices to end consumers.1779 This is because of 
the withholding effect that will lead to the use of an inefficient amount of resources and has an 
upward pressure on price. 
Lastly, if the purchasing agreement eliminates substantial competition both intra and extra partes 
to the agreement, it will not benefit from the exemption. As recognized by the Guidelines for 
Horizontal Agreements, and in line with the dualistic approach to buyer power that I advocate,1780 
this competitive analysis must include competition among the members and those non-members 
of the agreement in both the upstream and downstream markets, particularly because purchasing 
agreements have both exploitative effects (for suppliers and/or end consumers) as well as 
exclusionary (for other buyers in the upstream market). 
8.8 Which types of harm and standard are used for exploitative 
cases? 
The analysis of the law, the Commission’s practice and the case law regarding exploitation of 
buyer power does not provide any explicit answers regarding which type of harm and which type 
of welfare standard are employed by the EU institutions to trigger the application of competition 
law to buyer power exploitation. From my research, however, it appears to be the case that EU 
competition law does not adopt a pure short-term consumer welfare standard, nor does it require 
end consumer harm to trigger the application of the law. Rather, it tends to factor other issues 
that are not directly related to the immediate well-being of the consumer, for example by 
triggering the application of EU competition law whenever there is a substantial distortion of the 
competitive market structure upstream due to exploitation of suppliers, or when their economic 
freedom is compromised, even granting some limited protection to the position of small 
suppliers, for instance by allowing elimination of competition in cases of cooperative buying. In 
more practical terms, for instance, if a pure consumer harm standard would be chosen then 
hardcore buyers’ cartel that fix upstream prices or quotas but have no impact on end consumer 
prices would be legal.1781 However, they are considered object restrictions of competition in EU 
competition law, and as per se prohibitions in US antitrust law as discussed in Mandeville Island 
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.1782  
                                                          
1779 See also raising this issue but instead of referring to monopsony power to buyer power in general (and not 
precisely enough): ibid, p. 68. 
1780 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 219. 
1781 See making a similar point from the US antitrust law perspective: Dennis W. Carlton, ‘Does Antitrust Need to Be 
Modernized?’ 21 The Journal of Economic Perspectives (2007) 155, p. 158. 
1782 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). See also commenting the 
case from a welfare perspective: Jones (1989); Blair and Lopatka (2008), p. 417-419. 
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An example will illustrate the point. Take for instance an asymmetrical buying agreement entered 
into between Isolation’s Supermarket and the other two local butchers in Isolation town agreeing 
to not compete for beef and, therefore, decrease the price currently paid for it to farmers without 
raising end consumer prices (and without diminishing the quantity purchased). In this case, as 
prices and quantities in the downstream market remain the same consumers are – strictly 
speaking - not worse off in the immediate term. The harm and the distortion to competition have 
only taken place in the upstream market because there is a transfer of profit between suppliers 
and buyers, because now suppliers are worse off than if the buyers would be competing against 
each other for the input. However, as a broader harm and welfare standard is adopted, the 
agreement would trigger competition intervention even absent consumer harm because it impacts 
upstream competitive conditions and the agreement disrupts the rivalry process. The same applies 
when the exploitation is carried out by a single undertaking if it imposes unfairly low purchasing 
prices that push input prices below the competitive level. Exploitative harm in the upstream 
market is sufficient to trigger the application of Article 102 TFEU or declare a merger 
incompatible with the internal market. However, if prices are pushed below the competitive level 
it is likely that the input decreases due to demand withholding or the lack of interest to supply by 
sellers and, therefore, there are fewer amounts of goods available pushing upwards the prices in 
the downstream markets due to scarcity. If, on the other hand, a strict short term consumer harm 
and/or welfare standard is resorted to, then Isolation’s Supermarket coordinated behavior or 
single conduct imposing an unfairly low purchasing price that does not have an adverse effect on 
direct end consumer prices would not merit competition intervention. 
In EU competition law, by and large Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU as well as the Merger 
Control Regulation and its interpretation by the Courts adopt a broader perspective than a pure 
short term consumer welfare and harm when dealing with exploitation of buyer power, which 
implies that competition law is triggered absent end consumer harm and also to promote the 
protection of competitive conditions in the upstream market.  
The case law and the Commission’s practice clarifies that in the case of buyers’ cartels and their 
treatment of object restriction of competition regardless of their impact and even in the absence 
of substantial buyer power, as consumer harm has not been part of the analysis for the conduct to 
be in breach of Article 101(1) TFEU.1783 Therefore, the NCAs are not required to prove the 
existence of end consumer harm, but either that the agreement has the object of distorting 
competition or such effect and the existence of a type of harm – either to buyers or to suppliers.  
This lack of a direct end consumer harm to trigger the application of EU competition law is not 
exclusive to buyer power cases and rather the general rule concerning anti-competitive 
                                                          
1783 See also stressing this point the opinion of Albæk who argues that a buyer’s cartel if the downstream market is 
competitive can result in lower final prices to end consumers and still be contrary to competition law in Albæk 
[2013], p. 86-87. 
361 
 
agreements. As confirmed by the CJEU in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others to trigger the 
application of Article 101(1) TFEU, “in order to find that a concerted practice has an 
anti-competitive object, there does not need to be a direct link between that practice and 
consumer prices”,1784 because “Article [101 TFEU], like the other competition rules of the 
Treaty, is designed to protect not only the immediate interests of individual competitors or 
consumers but also to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such”.1785 This 
same broad standing regarding the type of harm required and the protective nature of competition 
law with regard to ‘competition as such’ was later on reaffirmed by the CJEU in 
GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others in almost identical terms1786 and 
confirming that is not necessary to proof that an “agreement entails disadvantages for final 
consumers as a prerequisite for a finding of anti-competitive object.”1787  
Therefore, it is settled case law that an agreement that is anti-competitive by object, such as in the 
case of a buyers’ cartel that fixes prices or purchasing quotas, competition law intervenes without 
requiring evidence of end consumer harm to protect the interests of individual competitors and as 
well consumers and the competitive market structure as such. This is so even if one of the explicit 
conditions required by Article 101(3) TFEU to be satisfied is that end consumers obtain a fair 
share of the benefits generated by the agreement, which de facto demands some improvement to 
consumer welfare.1788 This requirement, however, does not change the lack of evidence of end 
consumer harm for a breach of Article 101(1) TFEU to exist, what it does is helping to 
demonstrate that some conducts that restrict competition are more efficient than the harm the 
caused, including an analysis of end consumer conditions. 
Concerning Article 102 TFEU, an ordoliberally inspired provision, as remarked by Akman,1789 it 
is well known that it does not include an exception clause because 
                                                          
1784 Judgment of 4 June 2009 in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, C-8/08, EU:C:2009:343, para. 39 (emphasis 
added). 
1785 Judgment of 4 June 2009 in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, C-8/08, EU:C:2009:343, para. 38 (emphasis 
added). 
1786 “First of all, there is nothing in that provision to indicate that only those agreements which deprive consumers of 
certain advantages may have an anti-competitive object. Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the Court has held 
that, like other competition rules laid down in the Treaty, Article 81 EC aims to protect not only the interests of 
competitors or of consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such. 
Consequently, for a finding that an agreement has an anti-competitive object, it is not necessary that final consumers 
be deprived of the advantages of effective competition in terms of supply or price. It follows that, by requiring proof 
that the agreement entails disadvantages for final consumers as a prerequisite for a finding of anti-competitive object 
and by not finding that that agreement had such an object, the Court of First Instance committed an error of law”, 
Judgment of 6 October 2009 in GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others, Joined cases C-
501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, EU:C:2009:610, paras. 63-64. 
1787 Judgment of 6 October 2009 in GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others, Joined cases C-
501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, EU:C:2009:610, para. 64. 
1788 Also raising this issue and linking it with ordoliberalism see: Gormsen, [2010], p. 50-51. See also: Lianos [2013], 
p. 26-27. 
1789 Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law And Economic Approaches [2012], p. 151. 
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there is no exception to the principle in Community competition law prohibiting abuse of a 
dominant position. Unlike Article [101] of the Treaty, Article [102] of the Treaty does not allow 
undertakings in a dominant position to seek to obtain exemption for their abusive practices […]. 
Furthermore, according to the case-law, dominant undertakings have a special responsibility not 
to allow their conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market […]. 
Consequently, there can be no exceptions to the prohibition of abuse by dominant 
undertakings.1790  
Unlike the case of Article 101(3) TFEU an abuse of dominance is not ‘justified’; it either does or 
does not exist from an objective perspective. As confirmed by the CJEU, this lack of a ‘102(3) 
TFEU’ provision does not, however, imply that efficiencies and trade-offs generated by the 
behavior cannot be taken into account to determine whether or not the undertaking has abused its 
dominant position, as confirmed by the CJEU in the buyer power case British Airways v 
Commission,1791 and, more recently, in Post Danmark II, when the CJEU argued that “it is 
nevertheless open to a dominant undertaking to provide justification for behavior liable to be 
caught by the prohibition set out in Article [102 TFEU]”.1792 The CJEU confirmed that the 
General Court was right to examine whether the granting of reverse rebates had an objective 
economic justification. Such an assessment in accordance to the CJEU must:  
be made on the basis of the whole of the circumstances of the case […]. It has to be determined 
whether the exclusionary effect arising from such a system, which is disadvantageous for 
competition, may be counterbalanced, or outweighed, by advantages in terms of efficiency which 
also benefit the consumer. If the exclusionary effect of that system bears no relation to advantages 
for the market and consumers, or if it goes beyond what is necessary in order to attain those 
advantages, that system must be regarded as an abuse.1793  
Thus, the CJEU takes into account for the existence of an abuse of a dominant position that a 
conduct might not be abusive if the granting of rebates is outbalanced by efficiency and 
competitive advantages that may also benefit the consumer and improve market conditions.1794 
This could mean, therefore, that consumer harm has a role to play in dominance cases. 
However, regarding exploitative purchasing prices, the text of the provision in Article 102(a) 
TFEU introduces an element of fairness not to be found expressly regarding discriminatory trade 
conditions in Article 102(c) TFEU.1795 This brings forth the question of whether the fairness 
element also demands a benefit for suppliers.  
In this sense, if end consumer harm is employed when determining whether a purchasing price is 
unfairly low, the behavior will only be anti-competitive when the reduction in the purchasing 
                                                          
1790 Judgment of 30 September 2003, Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission, joined cases T-191/98, T-
212/98 to T-214/98, EU:T:2003:245 E.C.R. [2003] II-03275, para. 1109. 
1791 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 85. 
1792 Judgment of 6 October 2015 in Post Danmark, C-23/14, EU:C:2015:651, para. 47. 
1793 Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, para. 86. 
1794 See also: Gormsen, [2010] 52 to 53, p. 52-53. 
1795 Interestingly, in the US, purchasing price discrimination as regulated under the Robinson-Patman Act has an 
explicit reference to a “taste for fairness” although this provision has been applied less and less since the 1970s. 
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price has a negative impact on the end consumer because of a reduction in quantities purchased: 
the withholding problem. This appears to be the position of O’Donoghue and Padilla, who argue 
that prices will only be unfairly low if there is a reduction of quantities purchased.1796 If, on the 
other hand, competition law has concern for some degree of fairness, protection of economic 
freedom, the wellbeing of small suppliers and considers that, even absent consumer harm, the 
transfer of wealth that occurs between buyers and suppliers if unfair will trigger competition 
intervention, in an ‘alla Kirkwood’1797 consumer welfare standard, or what from an ordoliberal 
perspective I call an aggregate consumer welfare standard, following a broader perspective to 
competition harm.1798  
If this concern for suppliers and fairness is factored in, this would mean that competition law 
would intervene and protect the competitive conditions whenever there are anti-competitive 
effects in the downstream market but also when there are anti-competitive effects purely in the 
upstream market between suppliers and buyers. However, this should not be interpreted as 
implying that EU competition law, because of this element of ‘fairness’, should protect inefficient 
suppliers from buyer power exertion. This aspect is important because the case law concerning 
exploitative pricing conducts, neither in the selling nor the buying side, introduce moral or ethical 
elements nor other requirements concerning fairness with the exception of a ‘gap’ between 
production costs and prices charged. Therefore, and in line with these factors, to avoid protection 
of inefficient firms and over-application of rules concerning single undertaking behavior, 
competition authorities should resort to parameters such as employing the competitive price level 
as a legal standard, as I submitted in section 8.3, and carefully determine when some degree of 
suppliers’ protection does not amount to protection of inefficient firms. In this sense, some 
degree of protection to suppliers and, indirectly, to competing rival buyers can be interpreted as a 
way to safeguard suppliers from buyer power exploitative conducts, the protection of competitive 
conditions in all markets and, to a certain degree, the protection of the economic freedom of the 
agents too. Unlike Ezrachi, in my view this is not the result of “a shift in focus from the 
downstream market to the upstream one, and a closer look at the effects on suppliers and other 
competitors”, which is a valid interpretation, but rather a continuation of the welfaristic tradition 
                                                          
1796 O'Donoghue and Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU [2013], p. 843. 
1797 “The most basic purpose of antitrust law is to protect consumers from such behavior. A closely related goal is to 
protect small suppliers like farmers and ranchers from price fixing by large buyers. When buyers with market power 
agree to depress the prices they pay small, competitive suppliers, they exploit them in the same way that colluding 
sellers exploit consumers. They take the suppliers’ wealth without providing them with countervailing benefits”, 
Kirkwood ‘The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct’ 
(2013), p. 2426. Cf with a previous paper of the same author in Kirkwood and Lande (2008-2009). 
1798 See chapter 4, section 4.4.3 for the discussion of the ordoliberal welfare standard in buyer power cases. Also 
recognizing the influence of ordoliberalism in the welfare standard incorporated in Article 102 and its case law see: 
Gormsen, [2010], p. 39-48; Cole (2015). 
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by the Courts of protecting competition as such in the market as a whole, akin to the idea of 
“vollständiger Wettbewerb”, a concept some link with ordoliberalism.1799  
Therefore, and integrating the findings for both concerted and unilateral behavior, in my view, 
this extended focus on buyer power exploitation and intervention absent end consumer harm 
occurs for three fundamental reasons. Firstly, in EU competition law there is a goal of protecting 
the competitive structure and competition as such,1800 which also implies that EU competition 
law is also “designed to protect […] the immediate interests of individual competitors or 
consumers”.1801 In accordance with the goals of competition law of protecting competition as a 
process, a broader standard for the required harm in buyer power exploitation must be resorted to. 
This implies that, to a certain degree and to avoid the (upstream) competitive structure being 
substantially disrupted, there must be a limited protection to interests and wellbeing of suppliers 
with regard to the anti-competitive and exploitative purchasing prices of buyers. This explains 
why buyers’ agreements and unilaterally imposing low purchasing prices are sanctioned even if 
they may lower prices for end consumers in the short term. In other words, the interest of 
suppliers are protected to avoid that the upstream market conditions and the competitiveness of 
input markets are adversely affected in terms of market concentration, suppliers being squeezed 
out of the market, reducing variety, decreasing innovation and, therefore, impacting static and 
dynamic welfare in the medium and long run. This approach of safeguarding the competitive 
process that requires some protection of the suppliers’ interest and, therefore, the intervention of 
EU competition without requiring evidence of direct end consumer harm, is in line with my 
ordoliberal policy for buyer power cases. Secondly, if a pure end consumer harm standard is 
applied, cases of abusive bargaining power will be outside of the scope of application of 
competition law because the prices may remain the same as before and quantity will not diminish 
regardless of the ‘unfair’ wealth transfer among suppliers and buyers or that buyers do not 
compete between each other any longer. Thirdly and following this previous argument, the 
wording used in Article 102 TFEU, i.e. ‘unfair’, implies that there is an element of commercial 
fairness – or non-economic goals1802 – involved not only for end consumers but also pertaining to 
the economic freedom of market participants. The use of the word “unfair” gives room for an 
                                                          
1799 See the discussion of ordoliberal ideas in chapter 4 of this thesis. Supporting such approach to competition in 
both the upstream and downstream market as an ordoliberal concern, but confusing this with ‘competition as if’ see:  
Gormsen, [2010], p. 46-47. See also arguing that, in general, Article 102 TFEU has goals others than pure consumer 
welfare and efficiency: Wils (2014). 
1800 Judgment of 4 June 2009 in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, C-8/08, EU:C:2009:343, para. 37; Judgment of 6 
October 2009 in GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others, Joined cases C-501/06 P, C-
513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, EU:C:2009:610, para. 63. 
1801 Judgment of 4 June 2009 in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, C-8/08, EU:C:2009:343, para. 38. 
1802 See the work of Townley when dealing with non-efficiency arguments in EU competition law, particualrly 
regarding Article 101 TFEU in Townley, [2009]. See the interpretion of ordoliberal ideas in conjunction with 
fairness, and idea I do not share, Gormsen ‘The Conflict Between Economic Freedom and Consumer Welfare in the 
Modernisation of Article 82 EC’ (2007), p. 334, and Gormsen, [2010], p. 42. 
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interpretation allowing competition intervention even absent inefficiency in order to deter 
morally offensive conduct,1803 and even this “taste for fairness”1804 can be quantified and 
monetized in terms of welfare.1805 Thus, disregarding the problem arising from the ‘unfair’ – 
rectius disproportionate – profit transfer problem creates a wealth distribution problem that is 
inconsistent with the postulates of a social market economy advocated by Article 3 TEU.1806  
Thus, my interpretation of the law, the Commission’s practice and the case law in the exploitation 
of purchasing prices for both Article 101 and 102 TFEU and the control of concentrations 
confirms that EU competition law does not follow a pure end consumer harm nor end consumer 
welfare standard for exploitative buyer power cases. Instead, it follows a balance that takes into 
account the well-being of consumers, in conjunction with other goals such as protecting 
competition as such in the upstream and downstream markets, safeguarding the economic 
freedom of the market participants and the wellbeing of small/medium (albeit not inefficient) 
suppliers, wherein economic static efficiency may be trumped for some proportionate degree of 
contractual fairness and the wellbeing of competitive conditions for suppliers and rivals, that 
would lead to a medium to long term efficiency to the benefit of consumers. By protecting these 
other goals, “consumers are also indirectly protected. Because where competition as such is 
damaged, disadvantages for consumers are also to be feared”, as stated by Advocate General 
Kokott in a rather ordoliberal vein in British Airways v Commission.1807 Consequently, my 
finding is that, regarding exploiting buyer power, EU competition law adopts a broader harm 
standard concerning buyer power exploitation that is also in line with an ordoliberal approach to 
buyer power by balancing consumer surplus with the goal of protecting competition as a process 
and economic freedom of all market participants.  
8.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed the ways in which buyers can exploit their buyer power vis-à-vis 
suppliers in the upstream market through the imposition of purchasing conditions, unilaterally or 
through concerted behavior. The chapter has put forward that buyer power exploitation is less 
likely to be self-correctable by market forces, as is the case with supplier side exploitation, 
                                                          
1803 Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 439. 
1804 This expression is coined by Kirkwood in Kirkwood ‘The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small 
Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct’ (2013). 
1805 Herbert J. Hovenkamp, ‘Antitrust Policy After Chicago’ 84 Michigan Law Review (1985) 213; Kirkwood ‘The 
Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct’ (2013). 
1806 For my interpretation of the social market economy in the TEU see: Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui, ‘The Social 
Market Economy and the European Union’ in Nina Vladimirovna Anischuk and Mykhailo Katsyn (eds), Історико-
правовий вимір інтеграційного процесу у новий та новітній час (Historical and Legal Views on the Integration 
Process During the Modern and Contemprorary Era) (2016) 74. 
1807 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 23 February 2006 in Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v 
Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2006:133, para. 68. Also stressting that this statement “replicates ordoliberal 
thinking” see: Gormsen, [2010], p. 89. 
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because of the different dynamics of buyer power. Therefore, EU competition law intervention is 
warranted and its role should be determining which type of practices buyers can exploit their 
suppliers and assessing whether these conducts indeed amount to exploitation and competition 
infringement and distinguishing them from purchasing conducts that – like in the case of 
bargaining power – are efficiency enhancing and part of the countervailing power of buyer power 
vis-à-vis seller market power. 
In the case of dominant buyers, buyer power can be exploited through setting ‘unfairly low 
purchasing prices’ – which I define as prices below the competitive level that, additionally, do 
not cover the suppliers’ marginal costs – like a monopsonist would do in a standard 
microeconomic model. However, as I discussed in the economics chapter of this thesis and as 
confirmed by the absence of cases in EU competition law, exerting buyer power in an 
exploitative manner through unilaterally imposing exploitatively low purchasing prices rarely 
occurs. In cases where it does, the pertinent question is: What test is to be applied to determine 
whether a price is unfairly low? I submit, in line with Advocate General Lenz in CICCE v 
Commission,1808 a buyer power version of the United Brands v Commission test to determine 
when a price is “unfairly low”. In this proposal, I use as indicators of exploitative purchasing 
prices the supplier’s marginal cost as a first element and then the competitive price as a second 
benchmark. If the prices paid by the dominant undertaking are insufficient to cover production 
costs, suppliers will be forced outside of the market and, if they are and also if the price paid is 
lower than the competitive level, then the conduct is abusive. This double cost standard allows 
for the protection of efficient suppliers and avoids excessive regulation that may hinder efficient 
buying conducts because it does not protect suppliers that are not competitive enough. The 
proposed test, however, is highly counterfactual and only a guiding tool that requires further 
development by the literature and the Courts. 
Also, my discussion concerning unilateral behavior has extended to purchasing price 
discrimination that exploits suppliers and creates a situation in which some of them are in a 
disadvantage position vis-à-vis other suppliers that have not been exploited. The Commission’s 
practice and case law shows that EU competition law grants protection to those discriminated 
buyers and takes a strict and formal approach to purchasing discrimination anchored on perhaps 
an excessive protection of the supplying undertakings’ economic freedom that may thwart 
efficient purchasing behaviors, which is akin to the general treatment of price discrimination in 
selling side cases of unilateral behavior. 
With regard to concerted conducts, the chapter discussed the rationale of pooling buyer power to 
create economies of scale and how this can be done through different types of coordination, 
                                                          
1808 Opinion of the Advocate General Lenz of 16 January 1985, in Judgment of 28 March 1985 in CICCE v 
Commission, C-298/83, EU:C:1985:16 [1985]. 
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including the case of cooperatives and purchasing alliances. Furthermore, I distinguished two 
main forms of exerting buyer power coordination with quite different outcomes and legal 
treatment. EU competition law distinguishes between buyers’ cartels and buying alliances. 
Buyers’ cartels are agreements among purchasers of goods to alter the competitive process of 
price formation and directed at imposing purchasing prices or maximum purchasing quotas. 
These concerted practices are held by the Courts as object restrictions of competition – regardless 
of whether they exert bargaining or monopsony power – because of their detrimental effect on the 
competitive process even absent consumer harm. Furthermore, due to their perniciousness, 
competition authorities should prosecute buyers’ cartels as a priority enforcement in buyer power, 
an opinion also shared in the US by the American Antitrust Institute.1809 In the case of buying 
alliances, however, the treatment given is, and should be, different. Buying alliances tend to be a 
legitimate form of buyer (bargaining) power exertion that do not anti-competitively distort the 
price formation of purchases operations among undertakings. Consequently, if buying alliances 
are used to generate neutralizing bargaining power and create economies of scale, their impact 
in welfare will be positive, as long as those benefits obtained through the increase buyer power 
are also passed on to end consumers in the form of lower purchasing prices. This is not to say, 
however, that all buying alliances are pro-competitive and should be exempted from the 
application of competition law absent any kind of effect based evaluation. The proposal, instead, 
is to approach buying alliances under an effect based approach within Article 101 TFEU. 
However, and as discussed in the chapter, determining what constitutes a buying alliance and a 
buyers’ cartel is a difficult exercise because what at first sight might look like a transparent 
alliance where purchasing prices are not fixed and competition among buyers in the upstream and 
downstream markets exists, might degenerate into a buyers’ cartel that sets purchasing prices, 
seems to be a growing trend in Europe as remarked by the Bundeskartellamt.1810 
Furthermore, undertakings that have been accused of exploiting anti-competitively their buyer 
power can resort to efficiency defenses for unilateral and concerted behaviors and show that their 
conduct was either not abusive or that it was efficient. This is the case regarding the doctrine of 
objective justification with regard Article 102 TFEU and the efficiency analysis concerning 
concentrations pursuant to Article 2.1. (b) of the Merger Control Regulation.1811 Concerning 
coordinate behavior, the same applies; both regarding buyer cartels and buying alliances, the 
parties to such agreements may claim that the conduct is not unlawful as it satisfies the 
requirements for the application of Article 101(3) TFEU. With respect to buyer cartels the 
conditions required and the Commission’s practice and case law shows that it will be rare, not to 
say impossible, for these types of agreements to satisfy the four cumulative conditions regardless 
                                                          
1809 American Antitrust Institute [2008], p. 97. 
1810 Bundeskartellamt ‘Sektoruntersuchung: Lebensmitteleinzelhandel’ (2014). 
1811 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1 
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of whether the cartel reduces purchasing prices or not. In the case of buying alliances it is more 
likely that these forms of buyer coordination may be exempted from the prohibition of Article 
101(1) TFEU because, by their very nature, they tend to have pro-competitive effects that 
outweigh any anti-competitive effects and which tend to be of an ancillary nature for the 
achievement of the buying alliance. 
Finally, this chapter also discussed what the welfare and harm standard that applies to buyer 
power exploitative cases is. The answer is that a strict end consumer harm standard is under-
inclusive and it also is not the adopted approach under EU competition law regarding buyer 
power exploitation. In fact, that the Courts (and the Commission) apply competition law even 
absent evidence of direct end consumer harm towards the protection of upstream market 
conditions, some degree of economic freedom of the suppliers, and to protect competition as a 
process, a posture that is also in line with the ordoliberal standard proposed concerning buyer 
power cases in general and the dualistic approach to buyer power cases advocated in this thesis.  
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9 Exploitative Buyer Power: Unfair Purchasing 
Practices* 
9.1 Introduction 
A powerful buyer, alone or in agreement with other buyers, may exploit its buyer power vis-à-vis 
its supplier(s) by imposing ‘unfair’ trading conditions, in particular Unfair Purchasing Practices 
(UPPs). UPPs, like slotting allowances, requirements to contribute to advertisements, etc., 
involve a transfer of risk or profit from the seller to the buyer that is not duly compensated or 
objectively justified and may prohibited under Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU, the Merger Control 
Regulation, or under the scope of stricter national rules for unilateral behavior in accordance with 
Article 3(2) of Regulation 1/2003,1812 and which escape the Unfair Commercial Practice 
Directive’s scope.1813 However, more often than not, UPPs are outside the scope of application 
of EU competition law and regulated in the different MS under unfair competition laws or relative 
dominance provisions which aim at addressing issues of market imbalances but not explicitly 
designed to deal with issues of market efficiency or wide market power abuse, such as EU 
competition law does. An example of these alternative approaches to deal with UPPs outside of 
EU competition law at the Community level is the creation of a voluntary and food-retailing 
specific proposal to regulate UPPs within the framework of the Supply Chain Initiative, as 
discussed in section 9.7 of this chapter. This legislative overlapping creates a complex patchwork 
                                                          
* This chapter builds upon a previous version that has been published as Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui, ‘Buyer Power 
Exploitation: Unfair Purchasing Practices’ in Fernando Cachafeiro, Rafael García Pérez and Marcos A. López 
Suárez (eds), Derecho de la Competencia y Gran Distribución Comercial (Thomson-Reuters Aranzadi 2016 - in 
press).  
1812 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1. 
1813 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, 
Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) 
No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) [2005] OJ L 
149/22. For some literature dealing with the Directive’s application and derived case law see: Malek Radeideh, The 
Principle of Fair Trading in EC Law: Information and Consumer Choice in the Internal Market ([s.n.] 2004); 
Christian Handig, ‘The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive – A Milestone in the European Unfair Competition 
Law?’ European Business Law Review (2005) 1117; Geraint G. Howells, Hans- W. Micklitz and Thomas 
Wilhelmsson, European Fair Trading Law: The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (Ashgate Pub. Co. 2006); 
Rossella Incardona and Cristina Poncibò, ‘The Average Consumer, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, and 
the Cognitive Revolution’ 30 J Consum Policy (2007) 21; Deborah L. Parry, The Yearbook of Consumer Law 2009 
(Ashgate 2008); Chris Willett, ‘Fairness and Consumer Decision Making under the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive’ 33 J Consum Policy (2010) 247; Georgios Anagnostaras, ‘The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive in 
Context: From Legal Disparity to Legal Complexity?’ 47 Common Market Law Review (2010) 147; Peter Shears, 
‘Overviewing the EU Unfair Commercial Practices Directive: Concentric Circles’ European Business Law Review 
(2012) 497; Jules Stuyck, ‘The Court of Justice and the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’ 52 Common Market 
Law Review (2015) 721. 
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of rules addressing UPPs that may apply jointly or separately, particularly at national level,1814 
and a gray area of the application (or not) of EU competition law to buyer power issues.1815  
UPPs have grasped most of the literature’s attention concerning abuse of buyer power, 
particularly when dealing with food retailing, and have been portrayed by the literature, 
politicians and lobby groups, along with monopsony power, as the negative side of buyer 
power.1816 The link of UPPs with buyer power seems to have led some to the erroneous belief, 
particularly among lawyers, that buyer (bargaining) power is a generally negative expression of 
market power, and policy makers and politicians to demand more competition law control over 
UPPs, as done by the European Parliament,1817 in part motivated by the dichotomy between 
strong vs. weak undertakings,1818 or large companies vs. small producer agricultural 
cooperatives.1819  
In this chapter, I submit that arguably the most “feared” aspect of buyer power is on most 
occasions neither a sensu stricto competition concern nor an EU competition law problem 
because UPPs tend to lack a substantial market-wide impact on competition, nor they are an 
expression of a market power problem.1820 Instead, the impact of UPPs tends to be a bilateral 
issue involving contractual imbalances among parties to a commercial relationship and problems 
of profit distribution.1821  
                                                          
1814 Also remarking the myriad of legal solutions given to UPPs within and outside competition law see: Also 
remarking the myriad of legal solutions given to UPPs within and outside competition law see: Jenny [2015], p. 4. 
1815 A similar expression was used by a report from by European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework 
Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 36, and another 
report by the Finnish NCA dealing with abuses in the food retailing industry and which has been summarized in 
European Competition Network (2012), para. 254. See for a discussion of the relation between competition law and 
unfair competition law: Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 3.307-3.311; Franz Jürgen Säcker, ‘Basic Principles’ in 
Günther Hirsch, Frank Montag and Franz Jürgen Säcker (eds), Competition law: European community practice and 
procedure : article-by-article commentary (Sweet & Maxwell 2008), para. 1-1-034 to 1-1-06; Eilmansberger [2008], 
para. 2-15-226 to 2-15-246. 
1816 Tribunal Vasco de Defensa de la Competencia (April 2009), p. 5. 
1817 European Parliament Imbalances in the Food Supply Chain, Brussels (19 January 2012). Also remarking the 
political impact of UPPs see: Jenny [2015]. 
1818 This issue of bargaining power imbalance between large buyers and small suppliers was addressed back in 1936 
in the US through the Robinson-Patman Act that prohibits any type of buyer induced purchasing price discrimination 
in order to protect small suppliers from hard bargaining. 
1819 For a general discussion on the types of cooperatives see: Fici [2013], p. 24-25. Also in the US, the issue of 
cooperatives and the abuse of powerful buyers vis-à-vis small farmers has been noted since 1952 when it was held 
that “[i]ndividual farmers, lacking adequate storage facilities and dependent upon a rapid turnover of harvested crops 
to meet operating expenses, occupy an extremely disadvantageous bargaining position in disposing of overabundant 
production to much larger, highly concentrated purchasers”, in ‘Cooperatives and the Antitrust Laws’ 27 Indiana 
Law Journal (1952) 430, p. 430. See also: Reich (2007), p. 486. 
1820 Cf with Lianos and Lombardi who argue that situations of superior bargaining power are a competition issue if 
observed with detachment from neoclassical theories and a holistic approach to markets is taken, Lianos and 
Lombardi, p. 7-8. 
1821 For a discussion on welfare distribution issues in US antitrust law see: Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Distributive 
Justice and Consumer Welfare in Antitrust (2011) 1. 
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However, these issues of profit distribution, contractual fairness and the impact of UPPs on 
suppliers in the medium and long term may have an adverse effect in competition and become a 
competition law problem. The UPP effects on these variables may lead to the creation of barriers 
to entry and exit in the upstream market, market concentration and, predominantly affecting 
dynamic efficiency in terms of innovation, variety and investments by the suppliers. Furthermore, 
the imposition of UPPs may also affect the competition among rival suppliers in a horizontal 
level pursuant to purchasing price discrimination, as those that are exploited through them are at 
a disadvantage when compared to others that are not. Also, UPPs can eventually have adverse 
effects on end consumers, for example in terms of less variety of goods, different or specialized 
retailers that are substituted by large and standardized ones or lesser quality on the products they 
acquire. These are economic law problems that can be exceptionally addressed under EU 
competition law in case the UPPs are exerted by a dominant undertaking, a buyer’s cartel or a 
vertical agreement, or arising pursuant a concentration, but much more likely to be issues 
captured by non-core EU competition law in most cases.1822 
In fact, this chapter shows how solutions to UPPs have arisen in most MS under national laws to 
address these problems, for instance by resorting to their regulation under unfair competition 
laws, sectoral laws, or national competition laws setting stricter rules for unilateral behavior that 
either diminish the thresholds to determine purchasing dominance, or creating figures of ‘relative 
dominant positions’,1823 or abuse of dependence to regulate the conduct of individual buyers with 
substantial market power.1824 The question is whether these type of solutions are an adequate 
remedy to UPPs or whether they could lead to overregulation, prohibition of efficiency enhancing 
purchasing conducts, and the application of remedies not tailored to address issues of contractual 
imbalance.1825 However, the trend that uses national competition law to regulate UPPs remains a 
minority one and it has been developed almost exclusively to tackle problems in food retailing, a 
socially and politically sensitive topic because of the protection of both end consumers and the 
agricultural producers.1826 
                                                          
1822 See also for a similar approach: European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-
Business Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 114. 
1823 Ibid, p. 116. 
1824 Also stressing this fact see: ibid, p. 36. 
1825 Also remarking the fact that rules that aim to promote competition and ensure fairness at the same time “are often 
contradictory” see: Jenny [2015], p. 6. Cf with Lianos and Lombardi. 
1826 A similar concern was expressed by the Basque NCA when dealing with the food retailing in Spain and the 
impact on the welfare of suppliers and end consumers when holding that: “the Spanish procurement market is studied 
and it is concluded that members of the distribution oligopoly are exercising their buyer power  in the supply 
market in detriment to free competition and consumers.” In Tribunal Vasco de la Competencia (April 2009), p. 137. 
See also suggesting that most buyer power cases deal with food retailing but without distinguishing between an inter 
partes or an erga omnes approach: Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 3.110. See also recently analyzing the effects of 
bargaining power in food retailer and its effects vis-à-vis suppliers: Lianos and Lombardi. 
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Consequently, in this chapter, I discuss what the nature of UPPs is and how can they be used to 
exploit buyer power vis-à-vis suppliers. I argue that despite the exploitative character of UPPs 
most of the time these types of practices will fall outside of EU competition law because they do 
not represent, by and large, a market power problem with substantive impact on allocative nor 
dynamic efficiency, as they have little impact on the competitive structure and, instead, have 
effects mostly concerning fairness and contractual balance. This, nevertheless, does not mean 
that UPPs might not also be a competition problem; what it means is that EU competition law is 
triggered whenever the effects of UPPs substantially and adversely impact the upstream 
competitive structure, competition as a process and allocative and dynamic efficiency in the 
medium and long term. Therefore, if it is proven that UPPs have this anti-competitive effect in 
the market, then EU competition law would be triggered to tackle this buyer power abuse, as I 
discuss in section 9.4. At the same time, this also means that, to solve problems that tend to 
remain within the sphere of profit distribution (without affecting market efficiency) and 
contractual fairness, other regulatory mechanisms – particularly at the national level – are better 
suited to address these exploitative buying conducts.  
Accordingly, I inquire what type of regulation is better suited to regulate these practices, when 
the EU competition law applies to UPPs, and analyze what the current practice in the national 
law of some MS is. The outcome of this analysis shows that MS do not follow a common path to 
address UPPs issues and that there is a growing trend towards (over)regulation of food retailing. 
The results of the increasing regulation, however, do not correlate with an increase in cases being 
denounced before NCAs or the Commission at the EU level, which shows that, perhaps, UPPs 
are not as pernicious as they are portrayed, or that suppliers fear retaliation by their powerful 
buyers in case they file complaints against the imposition of UPPs. 
To answer these questions, the chapter is organized as follows: In section 9.2 I discuss the 
concept of UPPs and describe some of the most common practices found in different markets. 
Section 9.3 discusses what the market impact of UPPs is, followed in section 9.4 with an analysis 
of whether and when UPPs are under the scope of application of EU competition law. My 
analysis demonstrates that, by and large, UPPs are outside of the scope of application of EU 
competition law and because of this they tend to be a contractual fairness and profit distribution 
problem that usually have no adverse effects on the market’s competitiveness. In section 9.5, I 
discuss the need to address UPPs by means of other types of economic regulation due to the 
reduced scope of EU competition law’ applicability. In section 9.6, I review the alternative 
solutions to UPPs adopted in most MS and other non-EU/EEA jurisdictions and classify them 
into four different regulatory types. In section 9.7 I discuss the EU Supply Chain Initiative as a 
method of self-enforcing good business practices within the EU whenever the impact has a cross-




9.2 Unfair purchasing practices: definition and modalities 
UPPs are a sub-type of unfair trading practices that are imposed by a buyer to a seller. Generally 
speaking, unfair trading practices constitute behaviors that are contrary to the idea of ‘fairness’ in 
a commercial transaction.1827 The Commission has defined unfair practices as behaviors that 
“grossly deviate from good commercial conduct and are contrary to good faith and dealing”.1828 
A trading condition will be unfair whenever one of the parties employs its superior bargaining 
power to demand from its counterpart a transfer of wealth without providing offsetting benefits or 
proper retribution, as remarked by Kirkwood,1829 or because the benefits are not objectively 
justified; commonalities shared by all unfair practices.1830 Furthermore, unfair trading conditions 
and UPPs surge pursuant to the imbalance of bargaining power among parties to a transaction as 
recognized by the Supply Chain Initiative,1831 or “inequality of bargaining power,” as labeled by 
Akman,1832 therefore connected with dependence, and which take place within the “business-to-
business” relation.1833 
Pursuant to the general definition of unfair practices, I conceptualize UPPs as those ‘unfair’ and 
exploitative requirements imposed by a buyer on its suppliers due to the existence of a bargaining 
                                                          
1827 Fairness, distributive and philosophical discussions aside, is understood in the competition (lato sensu) context as 
“any act of competition contrary to honest trade practices in industrial or commercial manners” according to Article 
10bis (2) of the Paris Convention, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, as 
revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at 
London on June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and as amended on 
September 28, 1979. See also: European Commission Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council on Unfair Business-to-Business Trading Practices in the Food Supply Chain, Brussels (2016), p. 2; 
paragraph 2 of the UK Groceries Supply Code of Practice and the principle of “fair dealing”, and also using the term 
“unfair” when referring to payment delays conducts by large buyers vis-à-vis suppliers see: Groceries Code 
Adjudicator, Investigation into Tesco Plc, 26 January 2016, public version available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/494840/GCA_Tesco_plc_final_report
_26012016_-_version_for_download.pdf, last visited 27 January 2016. 
1828 European Commission Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-
Food supply Chain in Europe, Brussels (2013), p. 3. 
1829 Kirkwood ‘The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct’ 
(2013), p. 2448. Also remarking the unfair transfer of benefits see: Competition Commission - UK The Supply of 
Groceries in the UK Market Investigation, London (2008), para. 95. 
1830 Bundeskartellamt Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector, (2014), p. 18. 
1831 European Commission ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Unfair 
Business-to-Business Trading Practices in the Food Supply Chain’ (2016), p. 4; a recent study by the European 
Competition Network shows how from all cases of anticompetitive practices in the food retailing sector at least 20% 
of them were accrued due to dominance and in particular the imposition of unjustified contractual obligations, 
European Competition Network (2012), para. 10. In the UK 35% of suppliers claim to have been subject to payment 
delays practices by suppliers, Groceries Code Adjudicator, Investigation into Tesco Plc, 26 January 2016, public 
version available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/494840/GCA_Tesco_plc_final_report
_26012016_-_version_for_download.pdf, para. 7.5, last visited 27 January 2016. 
1832 Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economic Approaches [2012]. 
1833 European Commission ‘Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-
Food supply Chain in Europe’ (2013), p. 3. 
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power imbalance that deviates from “good commercial conduct and [which] are contrary to good 
faith and fair dealing.”1834 This would be the case of the buyer demanding some specific benefit 
without an objective justification and/or without a proper retribution.1835 Therefore, it comes as 
no surprise that some of these unfair purchasing conditions are perceived by politicians and 
society as unethical buying behaviors that should be addressed beyond pure welfare 
considerations. Furthermore, I submit that UPPs are vertical types of purchasing practices and 
the effects between buyers and suppliers are the expressions of bargaining power exercise but 
rarely of monopsony power as UPPs do not involve underbuying a good (withholding effect) but 
instead shift commercial risks or transfer costs.1836 Thus, UPPs are not a form of pure exercise of 
monopsony power but instead an exercise of unequal bargaining power between parties to a 
commercial transaction.  
UPPs arise in general because there exists a large disproportion of bargaining power and 
information among the parties in which the buyer has a privileged position that allows it to abuse 
of its supplier, particularly if it depends on the buyer,1837 as explicitly recognized in Regulation 
261/2012,1838 and topic that has been partially discussed in chapter 6, section 6.4.3 when dealing 
with buyer power assessment. From this follows that dependence can both be an indication of 
substantial market power and can be also a situation in which suppliers are prone to be exploited 
by a powerful buyer by means of imposing UPPs.  
Nevertheless, these ‘unfair’ practices may be examples of “hard bargaining” that would not lead 
to any anti-competitive effect but towards more efficiency that benefits consumers in the form of 
lower prices and higher quantities of goods.1839 In other words, the difficulty of suppliers to earn 
                                                          
1834 Ibid, p. 3. 
1835 Decision B2-58/09 Edeka Konditionenforderungen - Verstoß gegen das "Anzapfverbot", 3 July 2014 by the 
Bundeskartellamt. Summary available at: http://www.olg-
duesseldorf.nrw.de/behoerde/presse/Presse_aktuell/20151118_PM_Edeka/index.php; Bundeskartellamt (2014), 17. 
See also: Case summary from 6 July 2015: Prohibition of acquisition of Kaiser´s Tengelmann outlets by Edeka, B2-
96/14 (English version), appealed and revoked by the German Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy 
under § 42 of the German Competition Act based, inter alia, on the protection of working positions that would be 
absorbed by Edeka. 
1836 European Commission ‘Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-
Food supply Chain in Europe’ (2013), p. 21. See also supporting this: Kirkwood ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary 
Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ 
(2004-2005), p. 625 and 637. 
1837 Carstensen ‘Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among 
Suppliers’ (2008), p. 271. 
1838 “However, in many cases the concentration of supply is low, which results in an imbalance in bargaining power 
in the supply chain between farmers and dairies. This imbalance can lead to unfair commercial practices”, 
Regulation (EU) No 261/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards contractual relations in the milk and milk products sector [2012] OJ L 
94/38, Recital (5); European Commission Tackling Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business food supply 
chain, Strasbourg (2014), p. 2; European Commission ‘Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-
Business Food and Non-Food supply Chain in Europe’ (2013), p. 3. and 5. 
1839 Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 2. 
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profit may not be because of the exploitative or unfair exercise of buyer power but instead 
because of a healthy exercise of competitive pressure by a buyer, as noted by van Doorn,1840 or 
because the suppliers are not particularly efficient. This same view was expressed recently by the 
Düsseldorf Court of Appeals when revoking a decision by the German NCA concerning abuse of 
dominance when holding that practices that look like UPPs are nothing but hard bargaining 
between contractual parties where demands are exchanged and profit is distributed in a process 
of offers and counteroffers.1841 Furthermore, a price or practice might appear to be unfair for a 
particular supplier because it is not an efficient undertaking and, therefore, the low prices paid or 
the strict requirements imposed by the buyer would be met and would not be neither exploitative 
nor unfair if exercised vis-à-vis an efficient supplier. This could be the case in agricultural 
markets where producers, such as in some areas of Spain, are still small farmers that run a 
business that due to its size is not able to optimize production and/or generate economies of scale, 
and has higher production costs than, for instance, a much larger farm.1842 Thus, there is a thin 
line between when a practice is unfair and imposed by a strong buyer and when it is accepted 
through bilateral negotiations by both parties because both undertakings are efficient. 
Therefore, and connected to the difficulty of defining from an economic perspective when a 
contractual of purchasing requirement is ‘unfair’, other approaches could be resorted to. For 
instance, a more ‘economic approach’ would be to determine if a practice is not unfair but rather 
if the UPP is inefficient and undesirable from a welfare maximization perspective by inquiring 
whether parties that enter into UPPs are not maximizing the contract welfare and, therefore, 
making the contractual relation less efficient. If the UPP causes the contract to be less efficient, 
for example, because it implies a reduction on purchases or because parties would have entered a 
different type of contract, then the UPP is inefficient, whether or not it is ‘unfair’. If this approach 
is adopted then competition authorities dealing with UPPs would have to first determine whether 
the UPP has made the contract less efficient and then evaluate if there is additionally a fairness 
problem represented by an imbalance of profit distribution originating from the parties’ 
bargaining position. Therefore, under this approach, UPPs would only be sanctionable whenever, 
                                                          
1840 van Doorn, p. 171-177. 
1841 Düsseldorf Appellate Court in Decision of 18 November 2015 EDEKA/Plus-Übernahme revoking a Decision 
B2-58/09 Edeka Konditionenforderungen - Verstoß gegen das "Anzapfverbot", 3 July 2014 by the Bundeskartellamt. 
Summary available at: http://www.olg-
duesseldorf.nrw.de/behoerde/presse/Presse_aktuell/20151118_PM_Edeka/index.php. See my the discussion of this 
case in “Sobre el abuso de dependencia económica en la cadena alimentaria: el asunto EDEKA” in the blog 
“Competencia y Regulación” of Prof. Robles Martín-Laborda, available at: 
http://derechocompetencia.blogspot.com.es/2015/12/sobre-el-abuso-de-dependencia-economica.html. 
1842 This, for example, appears to be the case in the Spanish region of Galicia where suppliers group themselves in 
very small cooperatives and the size of each farm/producer is so small that does not allow them group seller power – 
or buyer power to acquire their required input –, generate economies of scale, and drive their operational costs 
upwards. This is particularly striking in the case of milk production where farmers feed cows not with natural grass, 
but with bought cereals which increase their costs. I would like to thank Fernando Cachafeiro from bringing up this 
situation to my knowledge. 
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in addition to being unfair, they also represent a source of concern regarding value creation and 
economic efficiency. This approach, however, has not yet been endorsed by the Courts or the 
Commission’s practice, as I discuss further in this chapter. 
9.2.1 UPPs as exploitative and vertical related practices 
UPPs are primarily exploitative buyer practices of a vertical nature, accordingly, they are also 
known as buyer-led vertical restraints.1843 The rules dealing with UPPs aim at “eliminating 
competition restraints that occur within or because of the relationship between undertakings 
active in two different stages of the market,” as remarked by Këllezi.1844 Therefore, UPPs 
primarily have an impact in the buyer-supplier relation as the buyer obtains an ‘unfair’ profit. 
However, UPPs may also impact the competitive relation among suppliers – those not subject to 
the conduct and those affected by it – as well as competitive conditions downstream and vis-à-vis 
the end consumer, as confirmed by the UK Competition Commission, for instance by affecting 
variety, market concentration or entry of new players.1845 Hence, UPPs have an impact on three 
levels vis-à-vis three different target groups: suppliers that are exploited; competing buyers that 
might be foreclosed, and consumers that may also be exploited by the UPPs, directly or 
indirectly,1846 in line with the dualistic effect of buyer power exertion.  
In this chapter, my focus lies on the exploitative nature of UPPs vis-à-vis suppliers and I do not 
discuss the horizontal effects of UPPs concerning competition among suppliers,1847 the impact of 
private labels, or the UPPs consequences vis-à-vis consumer, as these scenarios fall outside of my 
thesis’ scope, but I do recognize that these are areas ripe for further investigation as a side-effect 
of buyer power related practices. 
UPPs surge on verticals relations between suppliers and buyers because if the bargaining power 
differences are so large that the supplier is in a dependent position, the buyer will be able to 
unilaterally impose terms on its weaker suppliers to transfer economic profit whenever they are 
negotiating their commercial transaction. Therefore, the UPPs are generally set through 
contractual clauses – or pre-contractual negotiations1848 – that have the aim of exploiting 
                                                          
1843 American Antitrust Institute [2008], p. 112. 
1844 Këllezi [2008], p. 83. 
1845 UK Competition Commission (2000), p. 103. See also stressing the multidimensionality of UPPs’ effects: Jenny 
[2015], p. 9.  
1846 Also highlight the levels of impact of UPPs see Tribunal Vasco de la Competencia (April 2009), p. 5. 
1847 My discussion regarding buyer power exploitation and the disadvantage to suppliers with respect to others is 
found in chapter 8, section 8.4. 
1848 European Commission ‘Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-
Food supply Chain in Europe’ (2013), p. 6. 
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suppliers by transferring risks, reducing information exchange, imposing payments for additional 
services,1849 unilateral modifications of contract conditions among others.1850  
However, not all instances of UPPs are caused by an express interest in exploiting suppliers. 
Practice shows that conducts that have analog consequences to UPPs are sometimes carried out 
not in explicit exercise of exploitative buyer power but owing to poor administration and 
communication standards on behalf of large buyers, as was found to be the case in the recent 
Tesco investigation in the UK.1851 This, nonetheless, does not imply that the exploitative effect 
should be outside of a regulatory scope or that it does not requires a remedy. 
In addition to their vertical nature, although UPPs are not an exclusive food retailing 
phenomenon, although this is the market most seriously affected by such practices because of the 
peculiar and dichotomist structure of big buyers represented by supermarket chains and small 
sellers represented by farmers and food producers, and the existence of buyer dependence. 
9.2.1.1 UPPs and dependence 
As discussed above, UPPs arise because of the difference in bargaining power among the parties 
to a bilateral relation. If such difference in buyer (bargaining) power among suppliers and buyers 
is sufficiently large it may lead to a relation of dependence where suppliers may become easy 
prey allowing suppliers to extract additional profits without proper compensation.1852 
Dependence arises because the buyer represents a substantial portion of the business of the 
retailer or because there is no possibility to switch to alternative buyers,1853 as in some industries 
the buyer represents an important and sometimes necessary distribution network for the 
                                                          
1849 Like in the case of shelf space, which was subject to a study by the Norwegian NCA in 2005 and in which it 
concluded that if competition downstream was fierce then those fees would be passed on to consumers as lower 
prices. Also, if these types of fees were to be banned they would be replaced by other unfair condition practices, such 
as volume rebates or bonuses on sales in European Competition Network (2012), para. 255. 
1850 For example, the UK Competition Commission found in 2008 at least 52 unfair trading practices which could be 
employed by buyers and suppliers alike in the food retailing market: Competition Commission - UK (2008). See also 
for additional modalities of unfair trading practices: European Commission ‘Tackling Unfair Trading Practices in 
the Business-to-Business food supply chain’ (2014); European Commission ‘Green Paper on Unfair Trading 
Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-Food supply Chain in Europe’ (2013), also see the list of unfair 
trade conditions related to access to retailers (buyer power induced) and contractually related as suggested by the 
European Parliament in European Parliament Resolution on the Imbalances in the Food Supply Chain [2012], 
P7_TA(2012)0012, para. 10. See also listing a comprehensive list UPPs in Tribunal Vasco de la Competencia (April 
2009), p. 167-70. 
1851 Groceries Code Adjudicator, Investigation into Tesco Plc, 26 January 2016, public version available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/494840/GCA_Tesco_plc_final_report
_26012016_-_version_for_download.pdf, p. 5, last visited 27 January 2016. 
1852 Also raising the issue of supplier dependence see Groceries Code Adjudicator, Investigation into Tesco Plc, 26 
January 2016, public version available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/494840/GCA_Tesco_plc_final_report
_26012016_-_version_for_download.pdf, para. 37, last visited 27 January 2016. 
1853 European Commission ‘Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-
Food supply Chain in Europe’ (2013), p. 7. Robles Martín-Laborda, ‘La Cadena Alimentaria: Cuando el Poder de 
Mercado lo Tiene el Comprador’, accessed 12.10.2015. 
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supplier’s goods to reach end consumers in a way that allows production to reach a scale in which 
it is efficient, an idea also supported by Berasategi1854and Carstensen.1855 If a dependent supplier 
refuses to accept the UPPs, there is a possibility that the buyer will not conclude the contract, 
which restricts access to the supplier to the downstream market and may drive it out of business if 
there are no alternative distribution channels,1856 especially because these modalities of contracts 
tend to be offered in a ‘take it or leave it’ situation.1857 Hence, UPPs will be more likely to be 
exerted if suppliers depend on a particular buyer and this explains the existence of provisions 
dealing with the abuse of economic dependence under national competition laws that tackle 
UPPs, as I discuss below. 
In EU competition law, the issue of dependence and UPPs has played a role when evaluating 
three concentration operations in food retailing, and, at the national level, it constitutes one of the 
main pillars for the application of competition-like rules dealing with contractual balancing and 
relative dominance provisions. As I discuss below, however, dependence is in principle a concept 
with an inter-partes reach as a supplier might depend on one buyer but not another, in opposition 
to dominance. Nonetheless, dependence can be generalized if the buyer is a dominant 
undertaking because the vast majority of its suppliers will depend on it and, therefore, its effects 
stop being a merely inter-partes situation to become an effect erga omnes.  
9.2.2 Modalities of unfair purchasing practices 
As mentioned above, UPPs can take many different forms and any listing of them will be 
indicative as these practices vary from commercial transaction to commercial transaction and are 
tailored for the each specific relation.1858 In most cases, UPPs are imposed in the contractual 
negotiation phase, although they can also be imposed in a retroactive manner in the post-
contractual phase and may take the form of pricing and non-pricing related demands.1859 
                                                          
1854 Berasategi argues that large food retailers act as a bottleneck or quasi essential facilities and, therefore, proposes 
employing a system based on FRAND similar to essential patents for food retailing in Berasategi, p. 118-153. 
1855 Carstensen ‘Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among 
Suppliers’ (2008). 
1856 European Commission ‘Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-
Food supply Chain in Europe’ (2013), p. 6. 
1857 Kirkwood ‘Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement’ (2012), p. 1485; Carstensen ‘Buyer Power and the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor Progress on an Important Issue’ (2012), p. 775. 
1858 For examples of business to business unfair trading conditions see, inter alia: Supply Chain Initiative Vertical 
Relationships in the Food Supply Chain: Principles of Good Practice, (2011); European Commission ‘Green Paper 
on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-Food supply Chain in Europe’ (2013), p. 7-8 
and 17-22. See also the 52 different practices found by the Competition Commission - UK (2008), p. 30; the 
Portuguese report by the Autoridade da Concorrência, Final Report on Commercial Relations Between the Large 
Retail Groups and their Suppliers (2010); or the Spanish NCA report listing 18 practices in the food retailing sector 
in Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, Informe sobre las Relaciones entre Fabricantes y Distribuidores en el 
Sector Alimentario (2011). 
1859 European Commission ‘Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-
Food supply Chain in Europe’ (2013), p. 6. 
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Among the price/payment types, there are: imposition of unfairly low purchasing prices; delayed 
payments;1860 listing charges; slotting allowances; atypical payments; additional payment 
requirements (e.g. listing charges, slotting allowances, retro-active discounts, or joint marketing 
contributions); or data input errors leading to overcharges, for example.1861 
The non-price related UPPs group many different conducts that either restrict the ability of the 
supplier to find alternative buyers, shift risks, or grant the buyer some unwarranted competitive 
advantage. Among these there are: refusals to buy or threats to delist products;1862 imposition of 
buying or not buying goods or services from a third party designated by the buyer (for instance 
transportation services); conditional purchasing behavior (e.g. exclusive supply obligations or 
reciprocal buying); most-favored customer clauses; deliberate risk shifting (such as enforced sale-
or-return or delayed payments);1863 duty to transfer sensitive information on prices; preferential 
treatment given to private label goods; requirements to produce own branded goods and private 
label goods; marketing contributions; category captaincy; or setting of minimum quality 
standards as a requirement for purchasing all the production. 
9.3 Market Impact of UPPs 
As mentioned in this chapter’s introduction, UPPs are portrayed as exploitative buyer power 
conducts that transfer profit from suppliers to buyers without proper compensation. However, a 
different approach would be to see UPPs as nothing but hard bargaining between buyers and 
suppliers to neutralize seller market power and, therefore, approach the contractual conditions to 
an efficient distribution of wealth among the parties and towards the competitive price level. 
Hence, there is not a clear picture regarding the competitive impact of UPPs from a competition 
law perspective. In other words, it is clear that UPPs can lead to issues of contractual unbalance 
and disequilibria that need some form of redress from an ‘unfair competition law’ or contract law 
perspective. However, do UPPs raise any market impact that goes beyond purely bilateral profit 
distribution problems? In this section, I discuss their impact on competition and in particular the 
viability of suppliers; impact on innovation and variety; and impact on end consumers in the form 
of higher prices. The impact of UPPs on these variables paves the way to the discussion regarding 
                                                          
1860 Judgment of 11 July in FENIN v Commission, C-205/03 P, EU:C:2006:453; Judgment of 4 March 2003, Fenin v 
Commission, T-319/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:50; Groceries Code Adjudicator, Investigation into Tesco Plc, 26 January 
2016, public version available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/494840/GCA_Tesco_plc_final_report
_26012016_-_version_for_download.pdf, last visited 27 January 2016. 
1861 Groceries Code Adjudicator, Investigation into Tesco Plc, 26 January 2016, public version available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/494840/GCA_Tesco_plc_final_report
_26012016_-_version_for_download.pdf, last visited 27 January 2016. 
1862 Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 5.890-5.891. 
1863 European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 32. 
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whether and to what extent UPPs are a competition problem. However, a thorough econometric 
analysis of UPPs’ impact in all these areas is outside the thesis’ scope and is an area ripe for 
future multidisciplinary research owing to the lack of sufficient and conclusive data.1864 
However, this does not mean there is no data available in this field. In the last decade, there have 
been reports entrusted by the EU institutions and NCAs to discuss the impact of UPPs, with a 
special emphasis on food retailing. In particular, the 2014 report entitled: The Economic Impact 
of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food Sector1865 (the 2014 Innovation 
Report) has been instrumental in clarifying whether modern retailing undertakings and their 
purchasing behavior may have negative effects on the EU food market. Another recent study by 
the Commission1866 also discussed the potential impact of UPPs, further backed up by Jenny’s 
findings concerning the effect of UPPs in food retailing and the fact that they are not a 
competition problem even though market concentration has been high or is increasing.1867 This 
section builds on those reports and buyer power economics to discuss UPPs effects in the market. 
9.3.1 Suppliers’ viability 
UPPs may have an impact on the viability of suppliers in the medium and long run; if a buyer 
squeezes its suppliers by demanding extraordinary conditions that are not properly compensated 
there will be a point in which, if the buyer over-squeezes, the supplier will exit the market in a 
situation similar to a BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement).1868 This would 
happen when its exit option is more advantageous than remaining in the supply market, for 
instance by stopping food production and selling the farmland. This argument of UPPs forcing 
suppliers out of the market was the basis for a complaint made by the Spanish Federation of Food 
and Drinks against a supermarket buying alliance: small producers will be subject of abuse and 
may have to exit the suppliers’ market.1869 In this exploitation scenario UPPs effects are the 
transfering of profits from a supplier to the buyer that, in principle, do not affect market 
conditions or allocative efficiency, and nor is it a competition law concern; it only has an effect 
on the profitability of the transaction for each party. This exploitative and ‘squeezing’ argument 
is remarkably similar to the monopsony effects I discussed in chapter 3, section 3.5.1, and which 
                                                          
1864 Econometrics is the application of statistical analysis to economic data to provide some empirical answers to 
research questions. 
1865 European Commission, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food Sector 
(2014). 
1866 European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 116-117. 
1867 Jenny [2015], p. 16-17. 
1868 “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement”, idea firstly developed by Fisher and Ury in Roger Fisher, William 
Ury and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving in (Penguin Books 2011). Also using 
the BATNA argument see: European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business 
Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 25 




I consider unlikely to occur in practice. In fact, this concern regarding the exploitative nature of 
UPPs as a monopsony-like behavior is tempered because of its self-destructive nature.  
A powerful buyer will be incentivized to impose UPPs to reap extraordinary buying (monopsony) 
profits but will not exercise them indefinitely or it will be cut off from suppliers and have no 
access to an input, as these suppliers would be unable to cover their costs and, consequently, 
would exit the market. If aggressive purchasing happens then perhaps a few, inefficient suppliers 
will be forced to exit the market (the marginal suppliers) but not all will. This is because even 
after ‘paying the UPP’ they will still be able to sufficiently cover their costs and, as some 
suppliers may have left the market, they will strive to capture that market share that is free to be 
absorbed, which in turn will grant them more bargaining power to oppose the powerful buyer. 
However, if the exploitative impact has a wide effect on a substantial group of suppliers that are 
forced to exit the market, the UPPs would not only trigger issues of wealth distribution, but also 
of market structure, and competition as a process. Additionally, if an important group of suppliers 
are forced to exit the market this would increase market concentration and may also have an 
adverse effect on product variety, which would lead to less inter-brand competition and increase 
in prices for end consumers, as suggested by the Report on Unfair Practices.1870 Also, this could 
lead to lower intra-community trade as undertakings will be less incentivized to carry out their 
activities in other MS. This negative effect on market concentration may be reflected in modern 
food retailing where there is a “clear trend towards greater retailer’s concentration” – i.e. the 
buyers – and among suppliers also, where the 2014 Innovation Report found that “[a]t national 
level, supplier concentration increased for 20 of the 23 product categories and 13 of 14 of the 
sample Member States”.1871 Likewise, UPPs have the effect of fostering concentration on the 
suppliers’ market as producers engage in buying alliances or merge to create neutralizing seller 
market power and oppose the strong buyer.1872 Hence, UPPs may have a detrimental 
concentration effect on both sides of the retailing market. 
Furthermore, if there is an exploitative widespread effect on suppliers’, dynamic efficiency in the 
medium and short term may be affected and, therefore, competition law intervention warranted, 
as the aggressive conduct of the buyer will determine the interest of suppliers to exit or enter the 
market and invest. Therefore, UPPs can have a detrimental effect on competition as such because 
the distributive unfairness would have a long-term consequence on incentives to remain in the 
markets.  
                                                          
1870 European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 116-117. 
1871 European Commission, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food Sector 
(2014), p. 32 (emphasis in original). 
1872 Ibid, 32. See also: Jenny [2015], p. 5. 
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However, the data seems to suggest and support that UPPs do not appear to have a major role 
regarding supplier’s viability, at least concerning modern food retailing. The 2014 Innovation 
Report shows how in the period 2004-2012, the number of brand suppliers available in 
supermarkets increased – even during the post financial crisis scenario – across all EU MS 
ranging from 1.7% in Italy to 6.4% in Spain.1873 A critical observation regarding this 
interpretation can be made, however: the study speaks about the amount of brand suppliers 
(which may be interpreted as the amount of trademarks available) but not necessarily the 
trademark holders; i.e. it is possible that despite there now being more different trademarks 
available for the same type of good (assuming that the trademarks identify perfect substitutes), 
the trademarks may be owned by the same or even fewer undertakings than in the pre-2004 
scenario. Also, the report does not discuss what the proportion of the growth of private labels is 
(i.e. goods sold and manufactured for, or on behalf of, the supermarket chain).1874 
9.3.2 Variety and Innovation 
Concerning variety, the 2014 Innovation Report indicates that, despite a concentration trend 
among supermarket retailers, the imposition of UPPs has not decreased the variety of goods 
available for end consumers. The report shows that “[c]hoice in alternative products, measured at 
a local level, has increased on average by 5.1% annually from 2004 to 20012”.1875 The growth 
happened across all MS of the EU with a minimum average of 3.2% in Italy and a maximum of 
8.3% in Poland, and across all categories of goods and even sizes available of goods.1876 It also 
showed how the introduction of private labels has a positive impact on consumer’s choice and 
variety, particularly if the private label is a ‘premium type’.1877 
Concerning innovation, there are two arguments that contradict each other concerning the effect 
of UPPs and bargaining power as a whole, which I discuss in general terms in chapter 3, section 
3.6. On the one hand, and as remarked by the Report on Unfair Practices, “UTPs lead to the 
transfer of risk and the appropriation of most of the surplus from the transaction by the stronger 
                                                          
1873 European Commission, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food Sector 
(2014). 
1874 For some literature discussing private labels see: Gorrie (2006), p. 217; Ezrachi and Bernitz [2009]; Ezrachi 
(2010); Doyle and Murgatroyd (2011), p. 631; Ezrachi and De Jong (2012), p. 257; Möschel (2014), p. 29. See also 
in Germany a decision by the Bundeskartellamt where there was concern regarding loss of competition in the private 
label sector pursuant to a proposed concentration in Case summary from 6 July 2015: Prohibition of acquisition of 
Kaiser´s Tengelmann outlets by Edeka, B2-96/14 (English version), p. 1. Appealed and revoked by the German 
Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy under § 42 of the German Competition Act based, inter alia, on 
the protection of working positions that would be absorbed by Edeka. 
1875 European Commission, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food Sector 
(2014), p. 26. 
1876 Ibid, p. 26. 
1877 Ibid, p. 34 and 53-54. 
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party, this might affect the resources available to weaker parties for R&D and innovation”.1878 
Therefore, there might be risks of a hold-up problem. On the other hand, the counter argument is 
based on the fact that a supplier that is imposed UPPs will be instead incentivized to innovate to 
gain bargaining power vis-à-vis its supplier and, therefore, break the relation of economic 
dependence. In the case of food retailing, the 2014 Innovation Report shows a trend towards 
innovation for both suppliers and buyers dealing with food distribution, even amidst the financial 
crisis of the late 2000s.1879 This could very well indicate that even in the presence of some UPPs 
both suppliers and producers keep their incentives to innovate higher to either maintain or gain 
bargaining power. If this is the case, UPPs are not likely to have a detrimental effect on market 
innovation. 
9.3.3 End-consumer conditions 
What about the effect of UPPs on end consumers? This is perhaps the most complex question to 
answer concerning their impact but of fundamental importance. End consumers are actively 
seeking to pay lower end prices, which motivates undertakings to employ their bargaining power 
to their full capacity. Therefore, it is in their best interest that bargaining over profits is efficient 
and made as competitively as possible to leave nothing on the table (i.e. extraordinary profits for 
either suppliers or retailers). Thus, hard bargaining in the upstream market that does not involve 
monopsony practices (withholding) tends to benefit end consumers in the form of lower prices 
and/or higher output, as lower purchasing prices and/or better conditions are passed on to end 
consumers.1880 
This seems to be case. According to the Commission’s data, there is no evidence that exercise of 
UPPs has an adverse effect on end prices paid by consumers, at least in the short-medium 
term.1881 Also, the report by the European Competition Network found that imposition of unfair 
trading practices from a buyer to a supplier “do not involve anti-competitive practices implying 
harm for consumers and, consequently, do not fall under the scope of EU nor most of national 
competition rules of Member States.”1882 In my opinion, this could be the indication of two 
variables that may or may not be linked. On the one hand, it shows the limited competition 
                                                          
1878 European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 116. Also remarking the negative effect on innovation of UPPs see: Jenny 
[2015], p. 31. 
1879 European Commission, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food Sector 
(2014), p. 28-30. 
1880 Jenny [2015], p. 31. 
1881 European Commission ‘Tackling Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business food supply chain’ 
(2014), p. 12. For a monitoring tool of food prices through Europe the European Food Prices Monitoring Tool is a 
helpful indication, also includes Norway and Iceland as EEA Members: 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do. 
1882 For a somewhat similar argument and going as far as saying that because there is no consumer harm there is no 
EU competition law intervention, a position I disagree with, see: European Competition Network (2012), para. 254. 
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effects of UPPs – if not imposed by a dominant undertaking – on prices and, therefore, 
strengthens the argument that these behaviors could be subject to other types of regulatory 
treatment than competition law. Secondly, in markets such as retailing, if they are highly 
competitive downstream, the exercise of buyer (bargaining power) is mostly efficiency enhancing 
as the benefits are passed on to end consumers in the form of lower prices, more variety and 
better products and services. 
Also, it is possible that UPPs will impact consumers “in the medium and long term from lower 
product quality, a decline in innovation activity, less product diversity and the risk of price 
increases caused by lower competition intensity”,1883 as stressed by the Bundeskartellamt. In my 
view, this argument may hold if the UPP is exercised by a buyer that has substantial buyer power 
and the effect of the practices spills over the market and not when the UPP has a reduced scope 
and only affects a small group of suppliers. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the end consumers’ behavior and interest seem to reinforce 
the large retailer’s bargaining against suppliers, which may explain why large buyers impose 
conditions that may appear unfair to their suppliers but that lead to lower prices in the 
downstream market. 
9.4 Are unfair purchasing practices an EU competition problem? 
The most important competition policy question regarding UPPs is whether these practices are a 
competition problem and, if so, under which circumstances should competition intervention be 
warranted to address their anti-competitive effects? This section, therefore, aims to answer the 
research question of when are UPPs under the scope of application of EU competition law and 
why?1884 
There are three avenues to answer this question. Firstly, a de lege ferenda, an approach that 
absolutely dismisses the application of EU competition law to UPPs. This extreme position is 
contrary to the state of the law, would be prone to excessive under enforcement and would also 
be contrary to the protection of certain competition goals. In my research, however, I have not 
found any advocates of such an extreme approach. 
A second alternative is the position I propose in this dissertation that supports a nuanced and 
limited application of EU competition law to UPPs whenever they have adverse effects on the 
competitive structure and competition as such, based on their market impact. This is anchored 
                                                          
1883 Decision B2-58/09 Edeka Konditionenforderungen - Verstoß gegen das "Anzapfverbot", 3 July 2014 by the 
Bundeskartellamt. Summary available at: http://www.olg-
duesseldorf.nrw.de/behoerde/presse/Presse_aktuell/20151118_PM_Edeka/index.php. 
1884 A similar question was made by the former Director-General of the Directorate General Competition Alexander 
Italianer in Italianer, The Devil is in the Retail, p. 3. 
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both in the goals of EU competition law as recognized by the Courts concerning buyer power, 
and the interpretation of the applicability of EU competition law as it stands to UPPs, hence it is a 
de lege lata perspective, partially influenced by my ordoliberal approach to buyer power. As 
discussed in this contribution, EU competition law has a limited scope of application when 
dealing with UPPs because they do not tend to represent market-wide problems. Also, there are 
better suited pieces of legislation at the EU or national level to address UPPs and their economic 
impact. 
As a general rule, the more the UPPs will impact market conditions and competition as such, the 
more there is a solid ground to require EU and/or national competition law intervention, as would 
be the case if the buyer that imposes them is a dominant undertaking or a buyers’ cartel. 
However, when UPPs are imposed by non-dominant undertakings or uncoordinated buyers it 
becomes unclear whether UPPs will have a negative impact on welfare or efficiency. 
Furthermore, competition law should apply to UPPs whenever these become a market power 
problem that affects prices, innovation, variety and consumer welfare, but not when UPPs affect 
bilateral relations of a contractual fairness nature.1885 This perspective finds support also in the 
recent studies carried out by the Commission, as well as economic literature and competition 
policy.1886 
However, this reduced scope for competition law to issues related to UPPs is not shared by all the 
literature and has been challenged by Lianos and Lombardi, advocates of a third way proposing 
the full application of competition law to UPPs. These authors argue that competition law still 
has a role to play regarding superior bargaining issues, even if the problems tackled are outside 
the accepted economic efficiency aspects protected and addressed by competition laws. In their 
view, competition law should intervene against imposition of UPPs if a “holistic competition law 
model” is adopted that detaches from neoclassical economic theory and resorts to:  
the global value chain approach, developed by political economists and economic sociologists, [as 
it] provides the appropriate theoretical framework in order to better understand the interaction 
between suppliers and retailers in the food sector and enable us, on this basis, to design 
competition law interventions.1887  
Furthermore, they argue that this is possible, as legislators and NCAs do not seem too negative 
when it comes to applying competition law to these problems.  
This innovative approach by Lianos and Lombardi that grants a broader scope to competition law 
tackling UPPs, in my view goes too far from the moderate solution I support for several reasons. 
First, Lianos and Lombardi argue that there is a need to substitute the current approach anchored 
                                                          
1885 Lianos and Lombardi, p. 5. 
1886 European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Retail Supply Chain (2014); European Commission, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and 
Innovation in the EU Food Sector (2014); Italianer. 
1887 Lianos and Lombardi, p. 8. 
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on neoclassical price theory models to the application of EU competition law for a “holistic 
approach”. This would presuppose that the competition law construct, both in the EU and the US 
antitrust law, would require a complete turnabout and that use of industrial organization and 
neoclassical microeconomics is the wrong approach. It goes without saying that this would meet 
resistance from most of academics, practitioners, judges and NCAs, as there is a general 
consensus that neoclassical theory provides the most reliable and trustworthy explanations to 
economic phenomena affecting the market because, precisely, the market as we understand it is 
theorized from a neoclassical perspective. Also from a methodological perspective, the use of 
sociology and political economy as suggested by Lianos and Lombardi would be inconsistent 
with an understanding of market dynamics, as these disciplines do not center their attention on 
the study of (private) markets, price creation or industrial organization theory. These disciplines 
see markets from a wide and top-down approach that is unable to warrant sufficient legal 
certainty regarding specific conducts and can only provide indications regarding economic policy 
theories from a macroeconomic perspective, which does not necessarily fit the nuances of 
competition law and competition economics. 
Furthermore, Lianos and Lombardi argue that a “holistic approach” to competition law should 
capture UPPs even if they are not competition law problems sensu stricto. The difficulty I find 
with this approach is that competition law provisions and remedies are neither appropriate nor 
tailored to redress issues related to bilateral contractual relations, distribution of profits and 
contractual fairness. Their provisions and its application are, and should be, applied to maximize 
economic efficiency, the wellbeing of the markets and competition as such. By contrast, other 
solutions, such as unfair competition or contract law are much better suited to regulate these 
conducts, as this is the majoritarian view of the legislation and the doctrine, as I discuss in this 
chapter. Furthermore, and from an ordoliberal perspective, such a holistic interpretation of 
competition law, even if designed to protect the market structure, forgets that competition first 
and foremost should foster economic efficiency so that other regulatory regimes distribute the 
wealth in a more effective and overreaching manner. Additionally, the proposal of these authors 
anchored on their idea of global value chains appears to be more a case of a different method to 
look at UPPs rather than a different regulatory approach. In fact, it is not clear in their paper how 
this method should be applied under the current legal regime, nor are there any authoritative legal 
sources supporting it. 
Lastly, their argument that NCAs and legislators are less negative to the application of 
competition law to UPPs contradicts the findings of this research, as most reports by NCAs argue 
the contrary. Competition law has very limited room for resolving UPP derived issues. Also, the 
argument that legislators are less negative to the application of competition laws to UPPs can be 
motivated by the strong political and social impact of UPPs in society and the lobby, particularly 
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by agricultural sectors, and not necessarily because legislators think it is an economically optimal 
solution.1888 
Going back to my proposal of a moderate approach to UPPs under competition law, this 
suggestion is justifiable as adequate because competition law is designed to address issues 
relative to the abuse of market power and market efficiency but not of bilateral bargaining power 
unbalance.1889 Therefore, EU competition law is not only insufficient to regulate UPPs because it 
does not apply in most cases,1890 but, and more importantly, because EU competition law is not 
an adequate remedy for most instances of UPPs with no widespread market effects, as these tend 
to be mostly issues of profit distributions and contractual balance, while not necessarily of wealth 
maximization. In a nutshell, whenever the UPPs’ effect is only inter partes, these instances are 
usually regulated by means of ‘unfair competition laws’ or ‘concurrence déloyale’ provisions. 
Consequently, if UPPs are an issue of ‘fairness’ or bona fide in commercial practices but not a 
market power problem sensu stricto, then this is an unfair competition issue and not a 
competition issue,1891 and, as remarked by Bishop and Walker, a problem not usually dealt with 
by micro-economics.1892 If the problem is a contractual imbalance, the solutions to be found are 
closer to traditional ‘contract law-like’ provisions, and, therefore, another set of economic rules 
should apply, including consumer protection laws if the UPPs affect end consumers vis-à-vis 
retailers. In particular, part of the literature has proposed using other sub-types of economic law, 
like unfair competition laws, as better regulatory instruments,1893 or the application of national 
broad competition law provisions, like the case of relative dominance or abuse of dependence.1894  
On the other hand, UPPs will be a competition problem when they develop into a market power 
problem by affecting overall market conditions, hindering competition, economic efficiency and 
welfare.1895 This would be the case when they are imposed by a dominant buying undertaking on 
all or most of its suppliers, by a large buying alliance or cartel, or are expected to arise pursuant a 
concentration that may significantly impede competition, because in these circumstances UPPs 
would have adverse effects on price, innovation, variety and the competitive process. If this is the 
                                                          
1888 Ibid, p. 5-6. 
1889 Also suggesting a similar argument see: European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering 
Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 40. 
1890 Ibid, p. 17. 
1891 Frauke Henning-Bodewig, Unfair Competition Law: European Union and Member States (Kluwer Law 
International 2006), p. 1. See also suggesting that fairness should not be the ultimate aim of EU competition law 
because the difficulty in defining what is fair, Nazzini, [2011], p. 21- 24. 
1892 Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 6-044. 
1893 See: Pera and Bonfitto (2011), p. 414; Pera; Antonio Buttà and Andrea Pezzoli, ‘Buyer Power and Competition 
Policy: From Brick-and-Mortar Retailers to Digital Platforms’ 41 Economia E Politica Industriale (2014) 159; 
European Competition Network (2012), para. 26; O'Donoghue and Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 
TFEU [2013], p. 846-847. 
1894 See the discussion on national implementation of rules on abuse of dependence and unfair trading practices in 
section 6 of this chapter. 
1895 Also supporting this view see: van Doorn, p. 174. 
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case then EU competition law applies and should apply to address these efficiency issues, as was 
held by the CJEU in Schutzverband gegen Unwesen i.d. Wirtschaft v Rocher when holding that 
instances of unfair competition may degenerate in restrictions of competition.1896 On the other 
hand, UPPs will not trigger competition law when there is no substantial restriction to 
competition or whenever they do not adversely affect the competitive process as such. 
However, the differences between these legal spheres in practice are quite blurred and requires on 
a case by case assessment to properly determine what set of rules govern the wrongdoing, 
depending on the practice effects. In my view, the key lies in the fact that competition law 
addresses market problems affecting the overall market, whereas unfair competition rules seem to 
tackle issues concerning bilateral relations,1897 or, as put by Henning-Bodewig, “the competitive 
relation between the parties”.1898 Therefore, these relations and connections between competition 
and contractual (related) law as different avenues for addressing UPPs demonstrate the 
complexity in dealing with these types of possibly exploitative buying conducts. 
9.4.1 Why are UPPs often outside EU competition law? 
As discussed above, most cases of UPPs occur outside the scope of application of EU 
competition law because of their limited market-wide impact, if not imposed by a dominant 
undertaking, a buyers’ cartel, or pursuant a buyers’ concentration. In this section, I discuss the 
economic and policy reasons supporting my proposal that most cases of UPPs should be 
addressed by means of regulations other than EU competition law, given that it is not only 
insufficient due to its limited room for applicability, but also because it is, in my view, not the 
most adequate tool to tackle UPPs. However, I also discuss when and how EU competition law 
may apply to cases of UPPs. 
9.4.1.1 Limited market impact 
Most UPPs are not captured by competition laws because these practices do not reflect market 
power market failures but rather problems regarding contractual imbalances and wealth 
distribution among parties to a contract. Therefore, UPPs do not tend to have a substantial 
negative impact on competition and welfare, particularly concerning innovation and variety, as 
discussed in the previous section.1899 Hence, UPPs by and large represent a contractual 
                                                          
1896 “As for the protection of fair trading, and hence of competition, it is important to note that correct price 
comparisons, prohibited by a rule of law of the kind at issue, cannot in any way distort the conditions of competition. 
On the other hand, a rule which has the effect of prohibiting such comparisons may restrict competition” in Judgment 
of 18 May 1993 in Schutzverband gegen Unwesen i.d. Wirtschaft v Rocher, C-126/91, EU:C:1993:191, para. 22. 
1897 Italianer, The Devil is in the Retail, p. 6. Cf with the narrower approach by Henning-Bodewig in Henning-
Bodewig, [2006], p. 1 and 7-8.  
1898 Henning-Bodewig, [2006], p. 1. 
1899 European Commission, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food Sector 
(2014). Also stressing that a national level is rare for UPPs to have a “detrimental impact on economic welfare” see: 
Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 6.338. 
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disequilibrium inter-partes1900 rather than having an erga omnes effect in market conditions, as 
most instances of anti-competitive conducts do, which explains why inter partes legislation like 
contract law, unfair competition laws or relative dominance clauses are better suited to deal with 
these problems. 
A similar approach has been adopted by the Commission and some NCAs. For instance, the 
Commission expressed that EU competition law does not deal with most instances of unfair 
trading practices “unless those entail malfunctioning of the market due to existence of market 
power”.1901 Likewise, the Portuguese NCA stressed in a report that: “[t]he concerns identified by 
the PCA on the basis of this market study do not come strictly within the scope of prohibited 
practices as per competition law, a finding that is in line with similar studies undertaken in other 
countries of the European Union.”1902 
9.4.1.2  Goals protected 
Directly linked to the argument above, EU competition law’s scope is too narrow to solve or 
intervene in most instances of UPPs because EU competition law aims at protecting the 
competitive process, and promoting economic efficiency and maximization of welfare.1903 In 
other words, EU competition law sensu stricto does not deal with broader issues such as 
contractual fairness and protection of the weaker party to a contractual relation, even though 
these concerns may also be addressed through national competition laws if an MS so desires, as 
confirmed in Article 3(3) of Regulation 2003/1 when stating that EU competition provisions do 
not “preclude the application of provisions of national law that predominantly pursue an objective 
different from that pursued by Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty.”1904 Furthermore, at the EU 
level there are indications that rules protecting consumers/clients absent market power abuse are 
outside of competition law, sensu stricto. For example, regulations that address purely inter 
partes relations are the Directive on Consumer’s rights,1905 the Directive on unfair terms,1906 and 
                                                          
1900 Also suggesting that unfair trading practices have a connection with contractual equilibrium see: European 
Commission ‘Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-Food supply 
Chain in Europe’ (2013), p. 6. 
1901 Ibid, p. 12. 
1902 Concorrência (2010), p. 6. 
1903 van Doorn, p. 174. For a discussion of the relation between competition law and unfair competition law from a 
procedural perspective see: Thomas M. J. Möllers and Andreas Heinemann, ‘Outlook: The Link Between Unfair 
Competition Law and Antitrust Law’ in Thomas M. J. Möllers and Andreas Heinemann (eds), The Enforcement of 
Competition Law in Europe (Cambridge University Press 2008). 
1904 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1. 
1905 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, 
amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
[2011] OJ L 304/64.  
1906 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L 95/29. 
Amended by Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer 
390 
 
the special sector regulation in the case of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation 
regarding licensing terms.1907 
Also, from an economic-oriented perspective, the regulation of UPPs is complex due to the 
overall effects in the market and the nature of economic transactions. For neo-classical 
economics contracts would only be voluntarily entered into – assuming the rationality of parties 
and their profit maximizing interest – when both parties will be better off than their BATNA.1908 
If there is a better alternative than the one proposed, the supplier would resort to a different buyer 
and will not accept the agreement containing UPPs, or invest its resources elsewhere. In the 
words of Friedman, a transaction will be “economically ethical” if it “is provided that the 
transaction is bi-laterally voluntary and informed”.1909 While a transfer of wealth without 
compensation may take place between the powerful buyer and its weaker supplier, competition 
law does not intervene to protect the profitability of one of the parties, particularly if one of them 
is inefficient. If it did, then competition law would, indeed, be an instrument for the protection of 
rivals devoid of its objective of making the market as efficient as it could be to the interest of 
consumers.1910  
9.4.1.3 Fairness and intent 
Another aspect why EU competition law does not deal explicitly with unfair purchasing practices 
can be explained by the element of intent, the requirement of fairness,1911 and the doctrines of 
‘duress’ and ‘undue influence’ in common law systems as raised by Akman.1912 In the case of 
unilateral abusive conducts under competition law scrutiny, the illegality of them does not 
involve any element of intent; the breach is objective, and even in cases of agreements only the 
coordination has to be proven, but not the willfulness of affecting competition. Once it has 
happened, competition law is triggered even if the party did not aim to restrict competition. In 
cases of imposing unfair trading practices by a purchaser, there is a willful/intent element that 
may be relevant to determine the ‘fairness’ of the conduct. The powerful buyer is aware of its 
stronger bargaining power and that it is likely that its supplier is a dependent party and, thus 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council [2011] OJ L 304/64. 
1907 Commission Regulation (EU) No 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of technology transfer agreements [2014] OJ L 93/17. 
1908 Also discussing the BATNA in UPPs see: Lianos and Lombardi. 
1909 Milton Friedman and Rose D. Friedman, Capitalism and freedom (University of Chicago Press 1962), p. 55. 
1910 European Competition Network (2012); Italianer. 
1911 Henning-Bodewig, [2006], p. xv-xvi. 
1912 Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economic Approaches [2012], p. 169-174. 
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willfully imposes a certain practice or demands some kind of benefit without appropriate 
compensation.1913 
Also, laws dealing with unfair trading practices and contractual fairness aim at remedying 
contractual imbalances and banning certain practices to avoid a party from exploiting its superior 
bargaining power, rather than regulating the behavior in the market.1914 Therefore, these rules are 
not aimed at addressing issues of inefficiency but at restoring fairness to the commercial 
transaction.1915 
9.4.1.4 Not an area of enforcement priority 
Furthermore, UPPs are not an enforcement priority, even if they might be under the scrutiny of 
EU competition law, as, for the Commission, vertical and exploitative issues are not of major 
importance when compared to conducts affecting competition among rivals. Therefore, these 
kinds of practices are of lower enforcement (or no) priority because they can:  
only arise if there is insufficient competition at one or more levels of trade, that is, if there is some 
degree of market power at the level of the supplier or the buyer or at both levels. Vertical 
restraints are generally less harmful than horizontal restraints and may provide substantial scope 
for efficiencies.1916  
Thus, UPPs are much less likely to be an area of competition priority, unless there is a change in 
the current competition policy, which is highly unlikely and not desirable.1917 
9.4.1.5 Lack of cross-border impact 
Lastly, the majority of unfair purchasing obligations will lack a cross-border or community 
dimension that affects the internal market because the purchasing markets are narrow in 
geographic scope, even more so if we are talking about UPPs exercised against farmers or local 
food producers. Therefore, the lack of an effect on trade between MS1918 precludes the 
application of EU competition law and leaves the matter to the national laws pursuant to the 
                                                          
1913 See also remarking this element of willfulness and knowledge of the illegitimate pressure under the economic 
duress and undue influence doctrines ibid, p. 170-174. 
1914 College of Europe and Centre for European Policy Studies, The Impact of National Rules on Unilateral Conduct 
that Diverge from Article 102 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (2012), p. 22. 
1915 Këllezi [2008], p. 84. 
1916 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 6. 
1917 “Not every case of unfairness is a matter for competition law. We won't prioritize cases that are not really about 
competition”, Margrethe Vestager, Setting Priorities in Antitrust (European Commission 1 February 2016). 
1918 Commission Notice — Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 
[2004] OJ C 101/81. For a thorough discussion of the cross-border element in EU competition law see, inter alia: 
Mihail Danov, Florian N. T. Becker and Paul Beaumont, Cross-Border EU Competition Law Actions, Vol. 4 (Hart 
2013); Mihail Danov and Florian Becker, ‘Governance Aspects of Cross-Border EU Competition Actions: 
Theoretical and Practical Challenges’ 10 Journal of Private International Law (2014) 359. See discussing the cross-
border element from and the applicability of EEA competition law: Christian N.K. Franklin, Halvard Haukeland 
Fredriksen and Ingrid M.H. Barlund, Private Enforcement and Collective Redress in European Competition Law - 
National report for Norway (2016). 
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subsidiarity principle, which also explains the lack of substantive cases dealing with UPPs at the 
EU level. 
9.4.2 When are UPPs under the scope of EU competition law? 
UPPs may or may not be outside of the scope of application of EU competition law, as explicitly 
recognized in Recital (9) of Regulation 1/20031919 and a recent Commission’s report.1920 In the 
following, I discuss the scope of application of EU competition law for UPP cases under Article 
101, Article 102 TFEU and the Merger Control Regulation.1921  
In the case of concentrations, what is evaluated is the likelihood of the imposition of unfair 
purchasing practices by the new entity that may significantly impede competition, particularly 
when the suppliers are dependent on a buyer, as discussed in this chapter and chapter 6, section 
6.4.3. Therefore, the exam is not an ex-ante but rather a potential ex-post situation which 
accounts for the limited availability of the EU concentration control to deal with UPPs, as I 
analyze below. 
Regarding Article 101 TFEU, UPPs will be under its scope when they are imposed pursuant to an 
agreement or a concerted practice among buyers – either in the form of a buyer cartel or a buying 
alliance.1922  
In accordance with the broad definition of an agreement in EU competition law,1923 UPPs that 
include a concurrence of wills as the faithful expression of the parties’ intention qualify as an 
                                                          
1919 “Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty have as their objective the protection of competition on the market. This 
Regulation, which is adopted for the implementation of these Treaty provisions, does not preclude Member States 
from implementing on their territory national legislation, which protects other legitimate interests provided that such 
legislation is compatible with general principles and other provisions of Community law. In so far as such national 
legislation pursues predominantly an objective different from that of protecting competition on the market, the 
competition authorities and courts of the Member States may apply such legislation on their territory. Accordingly, 
Member States may under this Regulation implement on their territory national legislation that prohibits or imposes 
sanctions on acts of unfair trading practice, be they unilateral or contractual. Such legislation pursues a specific 
objective, irrespective of the actual or presumed effects of such acts on competition on the market. This is 
particularly the case of legislation which prohibits undertakings from imposing on their trading partners, obtaining or 
attempting to obtain from them terms and conditions that are unjustified, disproportionate or without consideration”, 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1, Recital (9). 
1920 European Commission ‘Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-
Food supply Chain in Europe’ (2013), p. 10 and 13. 
1921 Also stressing that UPPs are covered by competition when they are the outcome of an agreement or exerted by a 
dominant firm see Tribunal Vasco de la Competencia (April 2009), p. 167. 
1922 For a discussion of regulating food retailing markets through oligopoly theories anchored on concerted practices 
or collective dominance see: ibid, p. 5 and 48-53 and making reference to the concerted practices case Judgment of 
14 July 1972 in SA française des matières colorantes (Francolor) v Commission, C-54/69, EU:C:1972:75. 
1923 Marian Paschke, ‘Anti-Competitive Practices (Agreements, Decisions, Concerted Practices)’ in Günther Hirsch, 
Frank Montag and Franz Jürgen Säcker (eds), Competition law: European community practice and procedure: 
article-by-article commentary (Sweet & Maxwell 2008), para. 2-1-010. 
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agreement.1924 In principle, it does not matter whether the supplier is forced into the agreement; 
what matters is the fact that the parties accepted to be in a commercial relationship: i.e. the 
supplier accepted the contract containing the UPP. In accordance with this general approach, 
UPPs imposed by a single buyer would be considered vertical agreements. Therefore as vertical 
agreements, most types of UPPs would be covered by the Block Exemption Regulation, unless 
the parties belonging to it are above the 30% market share threshold in both the upstream and 
downstream markets or they constitute a ‘hardcore’ restriction of competition pursuant to Article 
4.1925 Some UPP conducts that are likely to benefit from the Block Exemption Regulation would 
be, for example, slotting allowances, requirements to contribute with the payment of 
advertisement, and transferring certain types of contractual risks such as transportation, among 
others. However, if the UPPs in a vertical agreement are considered to be in breach of Article 
101(1) TFEU, it is important to remark that only the buyer that ‘forced’ the agreement should be 
fined by the competition authorities to prevent a double exploitation of the supplier. 
However, some UPPs, even if as part of a vertical relation would, in reality, constitute ‘unilateral 
conduct’1926 because by their nature they do not constitute an agreement. As clarified by the 
CJEU in BAI and Commission v Bayer, these practices do not fulfill the requirements to 
constitute an agreement because  
such an agreement cannot be based on what is only the expression of a unilateral policy of one of 
the contracting parties, which can be put into effect without the assistance of others. To hold that 
an agreement prohibited by Article [101(1)] of the Treaty may be established simply on the basis 
of the expression of a unilateral policy aimed at preventing parallel imports would have the effect 
of confusing the scope of that provision with that of Article [102] of the Treaty.1927  
Conducts such as delisting, refusing to renew a contract or unilaterally terminating an agreement 
would be unilateral because they are analogous to a refusal to deal. The problem with these 
‘unilateral conducts’ within an agreement is that they would not be captured under Article 101(1) 
TFEU but only captured by Article 102 TFEU if the buyer is dominant, which would be an 
unusual case. 
Therefore, it is likely that most types of vertically imposed UPPs would not be under the scope of 
Article 101(1) TFEU due to the Block Exemption Regulation or because the conduct is unilateral 
as it does not require the intervention of the supplier to cause its effects. 
                                                          
1924 Judgment of 26 October 2000, Bayer v Commission, T-41/96, ECR, EU:T:2000:242, para. 69. Upheld by the 
CJEU in Judgment of 6 January 2004 in BAI and Commission v Bayer, C-2/01 P, EU:C:2004:2. 
1925 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [2010] OJ L 102/1. 
1926 See discussing these aspects of the concept of an agreement: Paschke [2008], para. 2-1-029 to 2-1-037; 
Gjendemsjø, [2011]; Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 110-120.  




From a dominance perspective, UPPs are typically the outcome of individual conduct and, 
therefore, in accordance with Article 102 TFEU UPPs will be under its application scope if the 
undertaking that imposes them is dominant or whenever there is a collective dominant position, 
as remarked by the Basque NCA and Berasategi when dealing with food retailing.1928 However, 
studies and the case law show that very rarely do dominant undertakings impose anti-competitive 
UPPs or have been found to impose them, even at a national level, as confirmed by a 
Commission’s Report (Report on Unfair Practices),1929 including those countries in which the 
level of absolute dominance has been lowered, such as in Finland, Latvia or Lithuania, which I 
discuss below, because the buyers are not dominant under the national nor EU thresholds.1930  
If a buyer is dominant, the imposition of UPPs may amount to an abuse, even if such conduct 
would not warrant intervention and would not be seen as abusive if entered into by a non-
dominant undertaking,1931 which is particularly relevant in the case of UPPs. This is so because 
conducts by a dominant undertaking are presumed to have a significant effect on the market erga 
omnes because the structure of competition on the market has already been weakened, and 
because practices by dominant undertakings are by their “very nature, liable to give rise to not 
insignificant restrictions of competition”.1932 This also includes UPPs because it is presumed that 
such conducts as applied by the dominant buyer across all the upstream market will have a 
market-wide impact that goes beyond the relation of a single buyer-single seller. 
If a dominant undertaking exploits its suppliers through UPPs, the application of competition law 
would be warranted because these purchasing conducts would be likely to have an impact on the 
market overall,1933 even if such effect in the market is not concrete, being sufficient to prove that 
the abuse has an exploitative (or exclusionary) effect.1934 Thus, if the anti-competitive effect is 
proven, the effect is appreciable because the undertaking is a dominant one and because it is 
                                                          
1928 Tribunal Vasco de la Competencia (April 2009); Berasategi. However, this approach of regulating supermarket 
retailing is focused on its selling side aspect rather on the purchasing side. 
1929 European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 119. 
1930 The countries with the highest level of concentration in food retailing in Europe are (percentages represent the 
cumulative market share of the 3 largest firms): Denmark 89%; Finland 88%; Sweden 79,6%; Ireland 71.7% and 
Estonia 59%. In all other MS of the EU the 3 largest firms are below 50% market share. Source: European 
Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail 
Supply Chain (2014), Figure 1, 40. 
1931 Frédéric de Bure, Other Abuses, vol Vol. 5 (F. Enrique González-Díaz and Robbert Snelders eds, Claeys and 
Casteels 2013), para. 11.53. 
1932 Judgment of 6 October 2015 in Post Danmark, C-23/14, EU:C:2015:651, para. 73. 
1933 This same solution is the one adopted by several national legislations, among them the French, Italian Portuguese 
(and the former Spanish) Competition Act when dealing with abuses of dependence by a dominant undertaking and 
which I discuss below. 
1934 Judgment of 17 February 2011 in TeliaSonera Sverige, C-52/09, EU:C:2011:83, paragraph 64. Cf with the 
stricter approach taken by the CJEU regarding the lack of a minimum requirement of the seriousness of an 




assumed that the UPPs will be applied to a substantial group (or all) of the suppliers.1935 
However, the examination of the anti-competitiveness of the practice is not automatic nor per se 
as the EU case law has clarified that the determination of whether a contract condition is unfair 
depends on the “specific circumstances of the case” and the effect of the particular clause or 
measure.1936 Hence, not all UPPs that look ‘unfair’ would be anti-competitive, even if imposed by 
a dominant buyer. 
Several arguments back the application of EU competition law to UPPs imposed by a dominant 
undertaking. If an undertaking is dominant, it is subordinated to the doctrine of special 
responsibility as developed by the Courts, which limits the economic freedom of dominant 
undertakings, as their sole existence is deemed to have weakened the competitive structure.1937 
Furthermore, if a dominant undertaking imposes UPPs, it is under a presumption that their effects 
will go beyond a mere contractual issue and will have an impact on the overall market trading 
conditions. Additionally, Article 102 TFEU and EU competition law in general adopt a broader 
approach to buyer power triggering the application of the law to protect the competitive process 
and, indirectly, suppliers and competitors from being exploited unjustifiedly and anti-
competitively by dominant buyers, as discussed by Advocate General Kokott in British Airways v 
Commission, which implies that competition intervention will be triggered in a case of UPPs, 
even absent short term end consumer harm.1938 Lastly, the requirement of dominance for the 
application of EU competition law to unilateral behavior to UPPs is a screening device to avoid 
dealing with conducts that may have rather limited market impact. This threshold avoids 
overregulation, the employment of remedies not suited to deal with contractual imbalances and 
avoids excessive administrative burden for the Commission. 
Interestingly, and from an applicability perspective, albeit at a national level, Robles Martín-
Laborda argues that competition law will be applicable to UPPs whenever the dominant 
undertaking carrying out the behavior withholds demand (monopsony). If there is no demand 
withholding but exercise of bargaining power, in his view, unfair competition laws apply.1939 I, 
however, do not think this is an appropriate distinction concerning the applicability of EU 
competition law to UPPs imposed by dominant buyers as it disregards possible anti-competitive 
effects by bargaining power conducts, which is the most common scenario and may lead to under 
                                                          
1935 See also of the same opinion Pablo Ibanez Colomo, ‘Streetmap v Google: Lessons for Pending Article 102 TFEU 
Cases (Including Google Itself)’ (17th February, 2016) <http://chillingcompetition.com/2016/02/17/streetmap-v-
google-lessons-for-pending-article-102-tfeu-cases-including-google-itself/>. 
1936 Judgment of 10 July 1990, Tetra Pak v Commission, T-51/89, ECR, EU:T:1990:41, paras. 23-24. See also: 
Judgment in of 11 April 1989 in Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Others v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren 
Wettbewerbs, C-66/86, EU:C:1989:140. 
1937 Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36. 
1938 The protective aspect of Article 102 TFEU was subject of discussion in the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott 
of 23 February 2006 in Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2006:133, 
para. 69. 
1939 Robles Martín-Laborda, ‘La Cadena Alimentaria: Cuando el Poder de Mercado lo Tiene el Comprador’. 
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enforcement risks, even if bargaining power will be mostly procompetitive. Allowing a dominant 
undertaking that abuses its bargaining power to escape competition law application and only 
resort to unfair competition rules appears contrary to the definition of dominance and the 
established scope of application of EU competition rules. 
A question regarding dominance applicability, nevertheless, remains: To capture UPPs under 
Article 102 TFEU, in which market should the undertaking be dominant? In the case that it is 
required for the undertaking to be dominant in both the upstream and downstream market, there 
is a high risk of under enforcement of cases as firms are seldom dominant in both. In my view, 
the answer should be that dominance is required in either the upstream or the downstream market 
anchored on the protection of market structure and competition as a process. If the undertaking is 
dominant in the upstream market as a buyer there is no doubt that UPPs arise directly from its 
privileged market position and, therefore, UPPs may be captured by Article 102 TFEU. If the 
undertaking is dominant only in the downstream market but not in the upstream market, the 
imposition of UPPs should still be captured under the current EU competition law by analogy to 
the treatment given to buyer power market leverage, which I discussed in chapter 7, section 7.7 of 
this dissertation, if the conduct is able to use market power in a market to affect another.1940 As 
with market power leverage, the fact that the undertaking is not dominant in the market in which 
it imposes UPPs is not an impediment to capture the conduct of a buyer that employs its seller 
market power to impose trading conditions to suppliers. In this case, the retailers’ aim is to not 
only strengthen its already dominant position downstream but to also increase its market power 
as a buyer and extract supracompetitive profits from its suppliers. Furthermore, this argument is 
also anchored on the fact that if the buyer is dominant as a retailer this means that it is likely to 
constitute an important – if not necessary – distribution channel for suppliers to reach end 
consumers and be able to effectively commercialize its products. 
9.4.3 Are there any UPP cases in EU competition law? 
Following the previous discussion on the applicability of EU competition law to exploitative 
UPPs, in this section, I analyze the few cases in which UPPs have been subject to scrutiny under 
EU competition law. My research shows that UPPs have exceptionally been an EU competition 
law concern, with a mere five cases in which they have been subject of scrutiny. These being: the 
case of FENIN v Commission;1941 three merger cases dealing with creation of a position that 
                                                          
1940 See somewhat related the views of Doherty for cases regarding essential facilities and the criterion of eliminating 
competition the case where an undertaking must be dominant in an upstream market and also be dominant or have a 
strong position in the downstream market for an abuse to take place whenever refusing access to the essential facility 
in Barry Doherty, ‘Just what are Essential Facilities?’ 38 Common Market Law Review (2001) 397, p. 425. See also 
the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Judgment of 28 May 1998 in Bronner, C-7/97, EU:C:1998:264, para. 58. 
1941 Judgment of 11 July in FENIN v Commission, C-205/03 P, EU:C:2006:453; Judgment of 4 March 2003, Fenin v 
Commission, T-319/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:50. 
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could trigger UPPs based on a situation of economic dependence,1942 and one case of exploitative 
purchasing price discrimination based on dependence by a dominant buyer, as occurred in British 
Airways v Commission and as is discussed in chapter 8, section 8.4.1943 This trend also holds true 
for national cases, as confirmed by a 2014 Commission’s report, as buyers imposing UPPs do not 
qualify as a dominant undertaking, even if they might be strong,1944 and, therefore, ‘core’ 
competition law provisions are “almost never met in practice in the EU 28”.1945  
9.4.3.1  FENIN v Commission: a case of UPPs? 
In FENIN v Commission, a well-known case due to its impact on the definition of ‘economic 
activity’, the claimant Fenin filed an action against the purchasing behavior of the Spanish State 
while operating its national health system, as in its view the latter had unjustifiably delayed the 
payments for input acquired from its suppliers. According to Fenin, the Spanish State had a 
dominant position as a buyer and provider of healthcare in Spain and abused it by taking an 
average of 300 days to pay for the input acquired from its suppliers, including Fenin. 
Furthermore, Fenin claimed that these payment delays were discriminatory and exploitative 
because other suppliers were paid much faster.1946 Consequently, Fenin claimed before the 
Commission that the Spanish Government had engaged in UPPs when it argued that: 
[t]he abusive exploitation, individually or collectively, of the dominant position derives from […], 
secondly, the requirement of additional performance and obligation that, due to their nature and 
the commercial customs, do not have any relation with the contract object such as, for example, 
payment of extraordinary fees to celebrate hospital anniversaries, purchasing of outdated 
machinery as precondition for entering into new supply contracts; and thirdly, imposing 
maximum purchasing prices going against the innovative development of the sector.1947 
In short, Fenin claimed that the Spanish Government had exerted ‘classic’ examples of UPPs: 
payment delays; extraordinary contributions required from a supplier; complementary obligations 
to enter into a new supply agreement, and discriminatory treatment.1948 
                                                          
1942 Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53, taken from 
the unabridged version; Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 4064/89 (Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1. 
1943 Judgment of 17 December 2003, British Airways v Commission of 17 December 2003, T-219/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:343; Judgment of 15 March 2007 in British Airways v Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166. 
1944 European Commission ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Unfair 
Business-to-Business Trading Practices in the Food Supply Chain’ (2016), p. 3. 
1945 European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 17. 
1946 Judgment of 4 March 2003, Fenin v Commission, T-319/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:50, para. 1. 
1947 EU Commission Case IV.F.1/36.834-FENIN, document number SG(99) D/7040 (in Spanish and translation by 
the author), para. 12 (emphasis added). 
1948 See also briefly discussing this case as an example of unfair commercial practices: Jones and Sufrin, EU 
Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials [2011], p. 549-550. Cf with Whish and Bailey that refer to the case as 
a monopsonistic case, however probably meaning a large buyer case instead of demand withholding case in Whish 
and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 188. 
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Despite these allegations, neither the Decision nor the Judgments analyzed whether the alleged 
UPPs imposed by a dominant undertaking accrued to an abuse of dominance. Instead, the 
Commission, the General Court and the CJEU dismissed the complaint filed by Fenin because in 
their view the bodies of the Spanish healthcare service were not acting as undertakings, as pure 
purchasing does not constitute an economic activity in itself. Its qualification as ‘economic’ 
depends on the use of the purchased goods in the downstream market.1949 
Nevertheless, if the Courts had found that such practices were imposed by a dominant 
undertaking carrying out an economic activity by purchasing, the outcome of the case would 
have been different. In such a scenario, I submit that FENIN v Commission would have clarified 
that whenever UPPs are imposed by a dominant undertaking they may be captured under Article 
102(a) TFEU as imposing “other unfair trading conditions”. Alternatively, UPPs such as those 
allegedly imposed in this case could be captured under or Article 102(b) TFEU due to the 
hindrance of innovation and triggering hold up problems for suppliers by fixing maximum 
purchasing prices, or be contrary to Article 102(c) TFEU as the UPPs were imposed selectively 
among suppliers putting some of them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis rival suppliers. Also, it could 
be captured by Article 102(d) TFEU because it made the contract acceptance dependent on 
supplementary obligations not connected with the contract.  
Two reasons support this alternative interpretation of FENIN v Commission and which were 
covered in the previous section 9.4.2. Firstly, when UPPs are imposed by a dominant undertaking 
to a substantial proportion of its suppliers, there is a presumption that the effect goes beyond a 
contractual imbalance and becomes a market power problem because the imposition of them on 
suppliers affects a substantial proportion of market conditions and alters the competitive 
structure. Secondly, dominant undertakings have a special responsibility with regard to the 
competitiveness of the markets, and which implies that they are precluded from carrying out 
certain conducts that affect not only end consumers, but also suppliers and the market overall, 
and which could also explain why competition law applies to these type of cases. 
                                                          
1949 For literature discussing the case concerning the concept of ‘economic activity’ and the concept of undertaking 
see, inter alia: Jennifer Skilbeck, ‘Just When is a Public Body an "Undertaking"? Fenin and BetterCare Compared’ 4 
Public Procurement Law Review (2003) NA 75; K.P.E. Lasok, ‘When is an Undertaking not an Undertaking?’ 25 
European Competition Journal (2004) 383; Victoria Louri, ‘The FENIN Judgment: The Notion of Undertaking and 
Purchasing Activity. Case T-319/99, Federación Nacional de Empresas de Instrumentación Científica, Médica, 
Técnica y Dental v. Commission [2003] ECR II-00357’ 32 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2005) 87; Ronit 
Kreisberger, ‘FENIN: Immunity from Competition Law Attack for Public Buyers?’ 6 Public Procurement Law 
Review (2006) NA 214; Wulf-Henning Roth, ‘Case C-205/03 P, Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología 
Sanitaria (FENIN) v. Commission, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 11 July 2006, [2006] ECR I-6295’ 44 
Common Market Law Review (2007) 1131; Markus Krajewski and Martin Farley, ‘Non-Economic Activities in 
Upstream and Downstream Markets and the Scope of Competition Law After FENIN’ 32 European Law Review 
(2007) 111; Alison Jones, ‘The Boundaries of an Undertaking in EU Competition Law’ 8 European Competition 
Journal (2012) 301; Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules [2015], p. 135-142. 
399 
 
Regrettably, the CJEU opted to decide the case by dealing with the nature of the buyer involved 
rather than to determine if the claims were substantiated and the imposition of these conditions 
were indeed exploitative of suppliers. 
9.4.3.2 Risk of UPPs pursuant to a merger leading suppliers in a dependent position 
The risk of imposition of UPPs pursuant to a concentration among buyers has been discussed in 
three food retailing mergers as the concentration of two buyers could leave suppliers being 
dependent on the new entity and, therefore, prone to suffer UPPs and significantly impede 
effective competition.1950 However, the final impact of possible exertion of UPPs by the merged 
undertaking was only relevant in one of these cases, which reinforces the limited influence of 
UPPs in the applicability of EU competition law. 
Carrefour/Promodès, Rewe/Meinl and Kesko/Tuko have in common that whenever a buyer 
reaches a point equivalent or higher to the “taux the menace,”1951 in which said buyer represents 
22% of the profits of the supplier, then suppliers may be dependent on it, as argued by the 
Commission.1952 A dependent supplier is easy prey for a buyer to demand UPPs as its economic 
viability may rest on the existence of the contractual relationship and, therefore, losing that buyer 
would render its economic activity unprofitable due to a lack of sufficient alternatives to capture 
the large buyer’s demand.1953 Since for food suppliers large food retailers (supermarkets) are by 
far the most important sales channel for foodstuffs to reach end consumers, the seller depends on 
securing the contract with the buyer.1954 Thus, the risk of supplier dependence in these cases 
whereby the new buyer could represent at least 22% of the turnover of most of its suppliers was 
seen as a threat that could significantly impede competition in the upstream and downstream 
markets and led the Commission to declare the Kesko/Tuko concentration incompatible, along 
with other downstream competitive concerns. In the cases of Rewe/Meinl and 
Carrefour/Promodès, the UPP threat was not sufficient to declare the incompatibility of the 
concentration. In the following, I discuss these cases in detail. 
                                                          
1950 The cases in which suppliers’ dependence was taken as a factor to determine the buyer power of a proposed 
merger are: Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 
164/5, French public version; Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1; Commission Decision of 20 
November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market (Case No IV/M.784 - 
Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53, taken from the unabridged version. 
1951 In this case the proportion of sales a buyer represents for a supplier, and which lead to this threat point was of 
22%. Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 164/5, 
[2000], French public version, para. 52. 
1952 See also discussing these three cases under the optic of buyer power exploitation in Tribunal Vasco de la 
Competencia (April 2009), p. 58-60 and 140-145. 
1953 Ibid, p. 141. 
1954 Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 94-97. 
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In Rewe/Meinl, the Commission declared the merger between two food retailers located in 
Austria compatible despite the risks of future imposition of UPPs due to the adoption of 
purchasing strategy commitments.1955 The concentration operation was deemed as having the 
ability to affect competition upstream and downstream because the large buyer would also be a 
large retailer, as remarked by Ezrachi and Ioannidou,1956 an argument that echoes the hourglass 
shape theory.1957  
The Commission assessed the competitive conditions anchored on the market structure of a 
supplier side that is “much less concentrated than the demander side” in a big vs. small 
argument,1958 where suppliers depend on the buyer as a distribution mechanism to reach end 
consumers.1959 Furthermore, it found that with the concentration the new entity would have 
increased its shares in the upstream and downstream markets which would reinforce the 
dependence of the suppliers on Rewe/Billa as a customer and, therefore, strengthened its already 
strong position in the upstream and downstream market.1960 According to the data available, the 
proposed entity would have represented four large market shares (at least 25% in the less 
dependent sector for suppliers) of turnover for the suppliers and, therefore, reinforced their 
dependence on the new entity as a customer.1961 Furthermore, the amount of suppliers that were 
dependent on the new entity constituted a considerable proportion of them; i.e. not only a few 
marginal suppliers could be affected but most suppliers, which reinforces the idea that UPPs only 
raise competition concern when they affect a substantial portion of the suppliers in the upstream 
market.1962 
Also, from the investigation, it was revealed that suppliers were dependent on the buyer 
whenever the latter accrued to 22% of their turnover. From a survey, the Commission found that 
it “transpired that on average 22% of turnover is the figure above of which a customer can be 
replaced only at the cost of very heavy financial losses, if at all”.1963 As the buyers’ market was 
so concentrated, losing a major customer would leave the suppliers with no viable alternative to 
                                                          
1955 See commenting this case: Ezrachi [2014], p. 434-435. 
1956 Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014). 
1957 Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 71. 
1958 Commission Decision IV/M.1221 — Rewe/Meinl [1999] OJ L274/1, paras. 89-90. See recently raising the big 
vs. small argument: European Commission ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on Unfair Business-to-Business Trading Practices in the Food Supply Chain’ (2016), 2. 
1959 Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 98-99. 
1960 Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 98-99. 
1961 Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 99. 
1962 Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 100. 
1963 Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 101. 
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sell the proportion of goods they were selling or export their goods owing to the high investment 
costs they would incur in so doing and the estimated timespan of four or five years before a 
satisfactory export level would be reached. This lack of alternative buyers, is in my view, an 
important point of the Decision, as UPPs could only be credibly exerted if finding alternative 
demand sources for suppliers would be impossible or too costly; otherwise, if there were 
alternative buyers, the supplier would not have to accept the imposition of the UPPs. 
However, despite these risks of the imposition of UPPs, the Commission accepted a series of 
commitments offered by the parties that mitigated the dependence risks as the merging parties 
would remain independent in determining their purchasing patterns for an unlimited period.1964 
Consequently, this “sharply reduced market share increase in the distribution market (which) will 
mean that the dependence of suppliers on Rewe/Billa as buyers in the product categories referred 
to in recital 99 will be hardly any greater”.1965 Also, as Meinl would remain an independent buyer 
then suppliers could resort to it as an alternative demand source in case they were exploited by 
the undertaking resulting from the operation. 
A similar approach to dependence and risks of UPP imposition by a powerful buyer were 
evaluated in Carrefour/Promodès, a concentration that was declared compatible following the 
acceptance of divestiture commitments.1966 In this case the proposed concentration also raised 
concerns because the suppliers would be dependent on the new entity in the upstream market. 
Following the reasoning and using the threat point theory as in Rewe/Meinl, the Commission 
argued that a supplier would be in a dependent position to the buyer if this latter reached the 
‘threat point’ and, therefore, the supplier would be exposed to a risk of being exploited.1967 
However, in the assessment of the case, the risks of UPPs imposed by the creation of 
strengthening of a dominant position were less than in the Rewe/Meinl case as the parties agreed 
to structural commitments including the sale of shares in another supermarket chain to reduce 
extended risks of upstream dependence.1968 
Only in the case of Kesko/Tuko was the risk of dependence of suppliers to be exploited through 
UPPs a major concern and did it play a role when declaring the concentration incompatible with 
the internal market as it created or strengthened a dominant purchasing and retailing position, and 
                                                          
1964 Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 118; Ezrachi [2014], p. 435. 
1965 Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 123. 
1966 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 164/5, 
French public version. 
1967 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 164/5, 
French public version, para. 52. 
1968 Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 81-82. 
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ordering its divestiture as the concentration had been already implemented.1969 However, unlike 
in the previous cases, the market share thresholds which the merged entity would have achieved 
as a buyer and as a retailer were substantially higher and there were serious concerns regarding 
downstream competition and end consumer prices. Particularly because “[f]ollowing the 
acquisition of Tuko, Kesko would hold a market share of at least 55 % of the Finnish market for 
retail of daily consumer goods”,1970 likely to create strengthen or create a dominant position in 
the retail market, and also being a dominant undertaking in the cash and carry market. 
Unlike in the Rewe/Meinl and Carrefour/Promodès where the dependence levels were close to 
25-35%, suppliers in Finland would have been dependent on the merged entity for a proportion 
of about 50-75% of their total sales in Finland, almost three times more than in these other cases, 
which considerably increases the degree of dependence of suppliers to the new buyer.1971 This 
dependence, in particular, affected medium and small-sized suppliers, for which it was of “vital 
importance […] to maintain sales through Kesko at the present level”1972 and were therefore more 
likely to succumb to the imposition of UPPs by the powerful buyer-retailer absent alternative 
demand sources. Furthermore, the dependence was aggravated as post-merger suppliers would 
not have a similar possibility to switch to alternative buyers because the rest of buyers would 
only accrue 40% of the market demand, which was insufficient to produce goods at a sustainable 
level. Also, additional retail capacity was found to only be possible in the medium or even long 
term, which would have implied that those suppliers would not have been able to sell their 
goods.1973 Lastly, the ability of the merged entity to compete with suppliers through its own 
private label was seen as further pressure in the upstream market that made suppliers more prone 
to be exploited through UPPs.1974  
However, the main reason for the declaration that the merger was incompatible with the internal 
market was the combination of suppliers’ dependence with risks in distorting competition in the 
                                                          
1969 Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53, taken from 
the unabridged version. 
1970 Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53, para. 136. 
1971 Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53, taken from 
the unabridged version, para. 150. 
1972 Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53, taken from 
the unabridged version, para. 150. 
1973 Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53, taken from 
the unabridged version, para. 151. 
1974 Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53, taken from 
the unabridged version, para. 152. See also stressing the relevance of private labels in increasing suppliers’ pressure: 
Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014); Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 5.888. 
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downstream market, as before the merger one of the parties was already a dominant undertaking. 
Therefore, the increased buyer power due to the concentration would have allowed the new entity 
to increase its competitive advantage by leveraging market power and therefore foreclose 
downstream rival retailers that also competed as upstream buyers due to the combination of dual 
substantial market power. This circumstance was aggravated farther as other retailers in Finland 
had some commercial ties with the merged entity which did not allow them to sufficiently deter 
possible end consumer price increases. 
In connection to the former downstream market concern, both in the case of 
Carrefour/Promodès1975 and Kesko/Tuko,1976 the Commission also factored in the existence of the 
‘spiral effect’.1977 The spiral effect was found to be an additional concern that generates 
exclusionary risks to rival buyers that compete in the downstream market, as well as creating 
barriers of entry.1978 The spiral effect focused on the ability of a powerful buyer-retailer to gain 
downstream market share by offering better end consumer prices and raising their rivals’ costs. 
Therefore, the more the buyer gains downstream market power, the less chances its competitors 
have of offering better conditions to end consumers, for which they might end up being 
foreclosed, and in the long run being able to exploit end consumers. However, economic theory 
disputes this theory of harm because a powerful an efficient buyer may use its buyer power to 
lower its costs and improve (reduce) its retailing price to capture consumer demand, to the benefit 
of end consumers through low prices, as noted by Dobson.1979 
Lastly, an alternative reading to these cases is the position of Këllezi, who argues that the finding 
of anti-competitive risks under such low market share thresholds was not prompted by unilateral 
future behavior nor by risks of UPP exploitation. Rather, in her view, the risk was due to the 
possibility of collusion as the concentrations increased downstream concentration and could have 
generated a collusive response from other supermarket chains.1980 
                                                          
1975 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès) [2000] OJ C 164/5, 
French public version, para. 45-46. 
1976 The Commission considered that the concentration would create an entity with too high degree of buyer power 
creating a link of dependence of suppliers to the buyer, and also imposing too high entry barriers for potential 
competition. Commission Decision of 20 November 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the 
common market (Case No IV/M.784 - Kesko/Tuko) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 [1997] OJ L 110/53, 
taken from the unabridged version. 
1977 For a discussion of the spiral effect and its economic consequences, see chapter 3, section 3.6.1. 
1978 See discussing the spiral effect and its effects on competition: Overd (2001), p. 250; Office of Fair Trading, The 
Competitive Effects of Buyer Groups para 1.74; Bundeskartellamt ‘Buyer Power in Competition Law - Status and 
Perspectives’ (2008), p. 3; Tribunal Vasco de la Competencia (April 2009), p. 139; Dobson [2009], p 122; Ezrachi 
and De Jong (2012), p. 258. 
1979 Dobson [2009], p. 122-123. 
1980 For these two cases Këllezi argues that economic dependence can be a factor considered in merger control. 
However, I would not go as far as claiming that in these cases the dependence lead to a conclusion that the 
undertakings were dominant as it could be interpreted from her Table 2 which refers to “[d]ominant position in the 
EC and market shares” in Këllezi [2008], p. 76 and 81. 
404 
 
In conclusion, and in line with the prospective nature of concentration clearance, the concern in 
these mergers was the ability of the new entity to impose UPPs on a substantial part of its 
dependent suppliers. This risk of supplier exploitation was also coupled with the fact that 
suppliers did not have a sufficient buying alternative and that the concentration would have 
adversely affected the competitive conditions upstream and downstream. From the cases it can 
also be concluded that if the situation of economic dependence would arise only regarding a 
single supplier, or few suppliers, or there were other alternative sources of demand, these risks of 
future UPPs would not warrant competition intervention. This would be the case where such 
possible future breaches of contractual fairness would have a limited market impact, and because 
there can also be other regulatory means available to the harmed suppliers under national laws. 
Also, pure dependence of most suppliers without additional anti-competitive concerns – as in the 
case of Kesko/Tuko regarding some degree of downstream consumer harm, or substantial impact 
on the upstream market structure – is likely to be insufficient to render a concentration 
incompatible with the internal market. Hence, also in the case of concentrations, the room for 
applicability of EU competition law to tackle possible cases of UPPs anchored on the idea of 
suppliers’ dependence is limited. 
9.4.4 A glance at US Antitrust law 
In the US, “unfair competition” and UPPs receive treatment within and outside antitrust law. In 
general, “unfair competition rules” are a matter of state law and not federal law. The exception to 
this being Section 5 § 45 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which declares that “[u]nfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful”.1981 The vague wording of the provision is a 
catch all device as the Supreme Court has held that Section 5 “registers violations of the Clayton 
and the Sherman Acts” as well as the Robinson-Patman Act.1982  
Section 5 “enables the FTC to proscribe behavior beyond conduct prohibited by the other federal 
antitrust statutes” that fall outside core Antitrust issues.1983 Section 5, therefore, is analogous to 
European rules of “unfair competition laws” or national competition regulation going beyond EU 
competition law for unilateral behavior. This provision, however, is a jurisdictional device that 
grants the FTC administrative competence rather than a substantial piece of legislation of 
                                                          
1981 Section 5(a)(1) § 45 The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, last amended and incorporating the U.S. SAFE 
WEB Act amendments of 2006, codified under Title 15, Chapter 2, Section of the U.S.C. 
1982 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, at 609 (1953). See also: Neil W Averitt, ‘The 
Meaning of Unfair Methods of Competition in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act’ 21 Boston College 
Law Review (1979-1980) 227, p. 237. 
1983 William E. Kovacic and Marc Winerman, ‘Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act’ 76 Antitrust Law Journal (2010) 929, p. 929. 
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prohibited conducts as it does not list any forbidden behavior.1984 Furthermore, the FTC has 
employed it on very few occasions since 1914, which has diminished the practical value of 
Section, as remarked by Kovacic and Winerman.1985 
Another piece of legislation that deals with ‘unfair’ practices within US antitrust law is the 
Robinson-Patman Act, which I have analyzed in chapters 7 and 8 of this dissertation.1986 The 
Robinson-Patman Act, however, does not protect suppliers from the imposition of UPPs because 
it only applies to selling side discrimination (primary line discrimination) or to cases in which the 
discrimination is the result of buyer-induced pressure (secondary line discrimination). Therefore, 
it offers little protection to suppliers that feel they are ‘unfairly’ treated by powerful buyers. 
Lastly, in Federal US antitrust law the Packers and Stockyards Act grants sectoral coverage 
against UPPs regarding the purchasing of beef and poultry.1987 The Act prohibits any buyer of 
livestock, meats, meat food products, or livestock products in unmanufactured form, or any live 
poultry dealer, from imposing conducts akin to European UPPs, and also from engaging in other 
practices typically covered by US antitrust and the Clayton Act.1988 For example, the Packers and 
Stockyards Act expressly prohibits buyers from “[e]ngag[ing] in or us[ing] any unfair, unjustly 
discriminatory, or deceptive practice or device”,1989 or “subject[ing] any particular person or 
locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect”.1990  
The wording of the Packers and Stockyards Act resembles European national legislation dealing 
with unfair practices, rather than being a part of core Antitrust legislation, as also remarked by 
Hovenkamp when holding that the Act’s provisions “are simple tort-like provision, not monopoly 
or antitrust-like provisions”.1991 However, despite its clear wording, the US Courts have refused 
to apply these provisions dealing with UPPs absent significant consumer harm which implies 
that these unfair competition law provisions have been reinterpreted as Antitrust provisions with 
                                                          
1984 Section 5 § 45 Federal Trade Commission Act Incorporating U.S. SAFE WEB Act amendments of 2006, 
available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/statutes/federal-trade-commission-
act/ftc_act_incorporatingus_safe_web_act.pdf. For some literature discussion Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act see, inter alia: Averitt (1979-1980); Richard A. Posner, ‘The Federal Trade Commission: A 
Retrospective’ 72 Antitrust Law Journal (2005) 761; Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘The Federal Trade Commission and the 
Sherman Act’ 62 Florida Law Review (2010) 871; Kovacic and Winerman (2010). 
1985 Kovacic and Winerman (2010), p. 933-934. 
1986 See also discussing the Robinson-Patman Act as a piece of legislation seeking the fairness with regards to small 
buyers and suppliers: American Antitrust Institute [2008], p. 130. 
1987 The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, codified under Section 7 U.S.C. sections 181 to 229b. For a discussion 
of the law see: http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/articles/obrien_producermarketing_ch8.pdf. 
See also: Carstensen ‘Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of Discrimination 
Among Suppliers’ (2008), p. 274. 
1988 Herbert Hovenkamp, Does the Packers and Stockyards Act Require Antitrust Harm? (2011), p. 1 
1989 7 U.S.C. § 192(a). 
1990 7 U.S.C. § 192(b). 
1991 Hovenkamp, Does the Packers and Stockyards Act Require Antitrust Harm?, p. 3. 
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consumer welfare as a goal.1992 Therefore, through the case law rules originally designed with the 
intention to tackle UPPs and protect the wellbeing of small suppliers have been narrowed down 
in its scope and made applicable only upon end consumer harm, following the narrower and, in 
my view, under-inclusive standard that exists in the US regarding buyer power in general and in 
particular to UPPs when compared to the European regime. 
This narrowed scope of application was applied in Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc where the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply the provisions of the Packers and Stockyards Act when 
a large buyer – but not dominant undertaking – underweighted chicken to pay a lower purchasing 
prices, and unilaterally terminated purchasing of poultry contracts to counteract the organization 
of chicken growers to organize cooperatives.1993 The Court of Appeals concluded that absent 
market-wide harm to competition affecting end consumers the provisions (a) and (b) of the 
Statute did not apply, restricting therefore the protection of suppliers vis-à-vis UPPs under US 
Federal Law. 
9.5 Need for regulation 
In any case, it must be stressed that even if UPPs may usually be outside of EU competition law 
this does not imply that these exploitative practices do not require legal intervention to be 
corrected both at the national and EU level, or most likely at the national level in which national 
law is applied and extraordinarily EU competition law as well, as confirmed by European 
Competition Network.1994 On the contrary, national and European legislation having a wider set 
of protected goals,1995 which aim to “fill the alleged lacuna in the supra-national European 
                                                          
1992 Ibid, p. 6. 
1993 Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272 (6th Cir. 2010). 
1994 The report concluded that most instances in which NCAs dealt with claims of competition breaches in retailing 
markets and UPPs there was little application of EU competition law. From the 36 cases it analyzed in only 2 
occasions EU competition law was solely applied by national NCAs and Courts, and in only 8 cases EU and national 
competition law were applied concomitantly. In contrast, in 26 cases only national law was applied, European 
Competition Network (2012), para. 62. In fact, in 16 instances the law applied went beyond the limits imposed by 
Article 102 TFEU and was stricter as I discuss below setting lower limits to control unilateral behavior by strong 
buyers as “In this context it is important to note the distinction between buyer power and unequal bargaining power. 
Unequal bargaining power exists whenever one party to a proposed contract, be it either the supplier or the buyer, 
can ‘drive a hard bargain’; that is, can impose upon the other contracting party terms and conditions that are deemed 
unfavourable by that other party. Unequal bargaining power and resulting contractual imbalances do not necessarily 
imply a competition infringement in most cases. Such issues may be, where appropriate, addressed by other policy 
tools, such as contract and unfair commercial practices law. Buyer power, by contrast, exists if a market is 
concentrated to such an extent that a particular buyer has not only power over a particular supplier but over suppliers 
in general. From the perspective of EU competition law, the power of a buyer over its suppliers can constitute a 
problem, for instance, if this position is used to foreclose (potential) rivals to the detriment of consumers. However, 
buyer power can also be to the benefit of consumers, for instance, by acting as a countervailing power that exerts 
competitive constraints on a powerful supplier or by creating purchase efficiencies that are passed on to consumers”  
ibid, para. 73 (emphasis added). 
1995 See discussing the different width of goals protected by competition laws in a national and EU level: Rodger and 
MacCullogh, [2015], p. 14-18. 
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Law”,1996 confirms that UPPs are, and should be, under the scrutiny of some type of economic 
regulation; whether this be competition laws sensu stricto or another type of legislation, such as 
unfair competition laws or specific sectoral regulation. The issue is one of determining which 
regulatory avenue is better suited to tackle issues regarding UPPs. 
The fact that UPPs’ effects tend to mostly impact contractual fairness and, therefore, profit 
distribution between parties with a reduced effect on allocative efficiency does not mean that 
suppliers should be left unprotected against behaviors of buyers that are contrary to ethical 
business practices. This is so not only due to the moral component of the action, but because a 
widespread use of UPPs can, in the long run and from a dynamic efficiency perspective, 
adversely affect the competition conditions by compromising the viability and profitability of 
suppliers, conditioning entry and exit conditions from the market, and also unduly restricting the 
market participant’s economic freedom. 
In my view, it is the role of rules like unfair competition laws or tort-like provisions, and not 
stricter pure competition laws, to deal with UPPs at either the national level or the EU level (if 
there is a possibility for harmonization, which seems unlikely due to the different legal traditions 
among the MS). These contract or tort provisions are a better solution than core competition laws 
because they are designed for handling contractual imbalance issues and wealth distribution 
problems as well as having remedies available that are better suited to the redress of contractual 
balances, a proposition that is consistent with an ordoliberal competition policy approach. As 
expressed by Böhm, Eucken and Grossmann-Doerth: 
[f]ree competition must not be stopped on the erroneous grounds of alleged unfair practice. On the 
other hand, it must not be allowed to degenerate into truly unfair competition either. How the line 
is to be drawn between unfair and permissible competition, whether competition is restricted, 
whether competition is efficient or obstructive, whether or not price-cutting contradicts the 
principle of the system-all these issues can only be decided by investigations conducted by 
economists into the various stats of the market. The collaboration of [law and economics], which 
in this respect still leaves much to be desired is clearly essential.1997 
For ordoliberalism there is a tension between free competition and unfair competition practices, 
between market efficiency and the idea of fairness and the economic freedom of suppliers that are 
dependent on their buyers.1998 Therefore and in line with the idea of protection of the competitive 
order in a broad sense, it is the duty of the state or the EU to regulate the adverse effects of UPPs 
through competition regulation (lato sensu); to draw the line dividing which buying conducts are 
anti-competitive because they represent a market power problem from those that are typical of a 
                                                          
1996 Scheelings and Wright (2006), p. 235. 
1997 Böhm, Eucken and Grossman-Doerth [1989], p. 24-25. 
1998 This uneasy mix between competition and fairness is not only exclusive to EU competition law. In US antitrust 
law fairness was an important component of the application of the law until the ‘antitrust revolution of the 1970s’ 
when fairness is substituted for the protection of consumer welfare. For a thorough discussion of fairness in US 
antitrust law and price discrimination see: Gifford and Kudrle (2010), p. 1255-1259. 
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contractual imbalance that exploit suppliers and restrict the market freedom of inefficient and 
efficient market participants and which should be regulated by other type of rules.1999 This 
distinction is important because employing the wrong regulatory instruments to address UPPs 
may lead to a situation where it is detrimental to the competitive order by over-enforcing rules 
designed to tackle market power problems and not to remedy issues of contractual balance. 
Under EU law, other regulatory avenues outside EU competition law have been developed to 
partially address UPPs and unfair trading practices in general, such as the Unfair Commercial 
Practice Directive.2000 This piece of legislation, however, has a narrow scope of application 
covering only “unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices […] before, during and after a 
commercial transaction in relation to a product”.2001 Thus, the relation among undertakings in 
any spectrum of the commercial chain are excluded from its scope. Other alternatives employed 
at the EU level are the Late Payment Directive,2002 applicable to transactions among 
undertakings, or sectoral specific regulation, for instance in the case of the milk/dairy sector.2003  
Nevertheless, there is no indication that in the future the EU institutions will support adoption of 
community legislation dealing with UPPs from a buyer-supplier perspective as confirmed in 
2014 and again in 2016 by the Commission.2004 Two arguments justify this approach. Firstly, it 
would be difficult to find a harmonized legal landscape to tackle UPPs because of the myriad of 
national regulatory avenues adopted due to the quite distinct legal approaches of MS to unfair 
practices based on their legal roots. Furthermore, and in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation 
1/2003, MS have discretion to enact not only stricter rules regarding unilateral behavior but also 
                                                          
1999 See discussing the idea of fairness and protection of economic freedom as concerns of ordoliberalism and the 
concepts of “unfair competition” and “competition” sensu stricto and that ordoliberalism protects competitors and 
not competition: Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economic Approaches [2012], p. 
151-152. 
2000 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, 
Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) 
No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) [2005] OJ L 
149/22. For some literature dealing with the Directive’s application and derived case law see: Radeideh, [2004]; 
Handig (2005); Howells, Micklitz and Wilhelmsson, [2006]; Incardona and Poncibò (2007); Parry, [2008]; Willett 
(2010); Anagnostaras (2010); Shears (2012); Stuyck (2015). 
2001 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, 
Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) 
No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) [2005] OJ L 
149/22, Article 3.1. 
2002 Articles 1 and 3 of Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on 
combating late payment in commercial transactions [2011] OJ L 48/1. 
2003 Regulation (EU) No 261/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards contractual relations in the milk and milk products sector [2012] 
OJ L 94/38. 
2004 European Commission ‘Tackling Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business food supply chain’ 
(2014); European Commission ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Unfair 
Business-to-Business Trading Practices in the Food Supply Chain’ (2016), p. 3. 
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to adopt instruments that complement competition law to address economic issues that do not 
necessarily affect market-wide conditions. Therefore, alternative solutions tailored for each MS 
appear to be a better solution than a harmonized EU regulation. 
Due to this lack of EU legislation tailored to address UPPs and the little room for applicability of 
EU competition law, all European countries have developed mechanisms based on the idea of 
‘fairness’ to govern commercial activities and contractual balance within and/or parallel to 
competition laws,2005 with up to 20 MS that have recently introduced legislation exclusively to 
deal with UPPs.2006 These regulatory formulas outside EU competition law and arguably suited to 
meet the needs of each national market are better equipped to tackle imposition of UPPs by non-
dominant undertakings or practices that do not have an overall and substantial effect in the 
market, particularly if they do not aim at applying core competition laws nor remedies, unless 
such application is warranted because of a widespread and substantial effect of the UPPs in the 
market. 
In the following section, I discuss how MS deal with UPPs in their national legislation by 
classifying the solutions into four categories, depending on the legal strategy adopted to tackle 
UPPs. 
9.6 Alternative solutions to UPPs under national law 
An analysis of the regulation of UPPs in the MS shows that this is a matter open to national 
discretion where each national legislator adopts an alternative suited to its legal historical roots 
and market dynamics.2007 This explains why on the national level there is a “piece meal” 
approach to UPPs, as labeled by Henning-Bodewig.2008 However, all these different regulatory 
avenues concerning UPPs share a commonality, they “are often used to curb the negotiating 
power of large-scale retailers”, as stressed by Jenny.2009 
These different approaches and legal backgrounds explain why some MS, particularly those 
anchored on a continental law tradition, regulate UPPs as part of their competition act, others as 
part of laws on unfair competition, commercial or civil codes. On the other hand, common law 
countries usually place them as part of the common-law torts while jointly or alternatively 
                                                          
2005 Henning-Bodewig, [2006], xv. For an analysis of the legal treatment of UPPs within the food retailing sector 
from a worldwide perspective see: Pierre Kobel, Pranvera Këllezi and Bruce Kilpatrick (eds), Antitrust in the 
Groceries Sector & Liability Issues in Relation to Corporate Social Responsibility (Springer Berlin Heidelberg 
2015). 
2006 European Commission ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Unfair 
Business-to-Business Trading Practices in the Food Supply Chain’ (2016), p. 2. 
2007 Dennis Corgill, ‘United States of America’ in Frauke Henning-Bodewig (ed), International handbook on unfair 
competition (Beck Hart Nomos 2013), p. 1. 
2008 Henning-Bodewig, [2006], xvi. 
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adopting codes of self-regulatory conduct in specific sectors. However, this divide between 
continental and common law approaches is slowly fading as MS engage in a ‘mix and match’ of 
regulatory solutions to deal with UPPs. All these national legislative solutions, with the exception 
of ‘competition laws sensu stricto’ address UPPs in line with tort-law or contract law-like 
remedies tailored to deal with issues of contractual unbalance and not abuse of market power. 
Therefore, these solutions outside competition laws are in my view better suited for dealing with 
issues of contractual fairness, whereas competition law remedies are better suited to addressing 
the well-functioning of the market and addressing market power market failures, although not 
necessarily in line with the idea of business ethics. 
I classify these solutions into four different categories, which I discuss below by briefly analyzing 
the national legislation of some MS. Firstly, competition law provisions regarding dominance in 
food retailing that are stricter and adopt lower dominance thresholds than Article 102 TFEU in 
accordance with Article 3.2 of the Regulation 1/2003. Secondly, competition law rules or 
provisions dealing with abuse of dependence or relative dominance, also stricter than Article 102 
TFEU. Thirdly, rules dealing with UPPs through ‘unfair competition law-like’ provisions in 
either standard unfair competition laws, specific laws addressing food retailing, or general 
legislative instruments like commercial or civil codes. And fourthly, I discuss the soft-law 
alternatives of regulation by means of a code of conduct or other soft law measures.2010 In 
practice, however, these categories are not isolated but connected with each other, as MS are 
increasingly choosing to regulate UPPs by a mixture of these legislative solutions. 
9.6.1 Lower thresholds or special dominance provisions as part of competition 
law – the food retailing sector 
A few MS have included within their competition law provisions tailored to address the 
imposition of UPPs by large buyers in the food retailing sector. This solution adopts special 
dominance thresholds below the traditional standards triggering the application of competition 
law against powerful buyers (that act as retailers) in the food retailing sector and that may be able 
to exploit their buyer market power vis-à-vis suppliers. This approach, however, risks taking a 
simplistic approach to buyer power and UPPs based on ‘market share’ thresholds which may lead 
to over enforcement of competition law with respecto to situations that are better addressed by 
other regulatory means and involve the application of remedies that may be inadequate to solve 
contractual unbalancing. Furthermore, these threshold solutions sometimes impose a presumption 
of dominance outside of the market context or the conduct’s characteristics which sets a rigid and 
un-economically informed standard for large food retailing buyers that might not be justified. On 
the other hand, this trend corroborates that bilateral buyer market power surges with regard to 
specific suppliers at lower market share thresholds, as discussed in chapter 6. 
                                                          
2010 European Competition Network (2012), para. 254. 
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In Finland, the Competition Act amended in 2014 introduced a special provision establishing 
that, in the case of food retailers, an undertaking with 30% market share in the downstream 
and/or upstream market is a dominant undertaking: 
Definitions 
In the context of this Act […], 
Dominant position in daily consumer goods trade 
An undertaking or an association of undertakings with a minimum of 30 per cent market share in 
the Finnish daily consumer goods retail trade shall be deemed to occupy a dominant position in 
the Finnish daily consumer goods market. This includes both the retail and procurement 
markets.2011  
The provision not only lowers the threshold required for dominance under Finnish law but it goes 
beyond this by establishing a non-rebuttable presumption that an undertaking with 30% market 
share in food retailing is automatically dominant. Establishing a jure et de jure presumption that 
allows for no counterevidence appears excessive and non-proportional, and may lead to an over-
enforcement of Finnish competition law or, at least, an over employment of public resources to 
investigate cases in food retailing that do not have an overall market impact. To date, however, 
this provision has not been yet invoked before the Finnish NCA and/or in private litigation. 
The Latvian competition law also includes a specific provision dealing with abuses of 
dominance in the retail trade (at any level) aimed at precluding buyers from abusing dependent 
suppliers and imposing UPPS.2012 In this sense, Section 13(2) of the Latvian Competition Act 
holds that:  
(2) A market participant or several market participants are in a dominant position in retail trade if, 
considering their buying power for a sufficient period of time and the suppliers’ dependence in the 
relevant market, they have the capacity of directly or indirectly applying or imposing unfair and 
unjustified provisions, conditions or payments upon suppliers and may hinder, restrict or distort 
competition in any relevant market in the territory of Latvia. Any market participant who is in a 
dominant position in retail trade are [sic] prohibited from abusing such dominant position in the 
territory of Latvia.2013 
According to the Latvian NCA such a powerful buyer is not able to behave independently from 
its customers or competitors (traditional dominance) but is capable of exerting UPPs vis-à-vis 
most of its suppliers (relative dominance).2014 Therefore, this Latvian solution incorporates a rule 
dealing with economic dependence but only applicable to food retailing,2015 a difference to the 
                                                          
2011 Section 4a of the Competition Act (No 948/2011), available (in English) at http://www.kkv.fi/en/facts-and-
advice/competition-affairs/legislation-and-guidelines/competition-act/; and the official Finnish version available at: 
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/2011/20110948, last visited March 14, 2016. See discussing this provision 
Oinonen (2014), p. 97. 
2012 See also discussing this provision: Pozdnakova (2009). 
2013 Latvian Competition Law, lastly amended in 2009, Section 13(2), electronically available in its English version 
at: http://www.kp.gov.lv/en/abuse-of-dominant-position. European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework 
Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 57. 
2014 Ibid, p. 57. 
2015 College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 61-62. 
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general applicability of relative dominance provisions as adopted in other MS, as I discuss below. 
However, unlike the Finish or Lithuanian solutions, the Latvian provision does not apply when 
reaching a specific market share or even proportion of sales a buyer represents to a supplier. 
In Lithuania, dominance is presumed if the market share is at least 40% with the exception of an 
economic entity engaged in retail, in which the threshold is lower.2016 In the case of food retailing 
markets, according to Article 3 of the Lithuanian Competition Law: 
Unless proved otherwise, an economic entity engaged in retail trade with the market share of not 
less than 30 per cent shall be considered to enjoy a dominant position within the relevant market. 
Unless proved otherwise, each of a group of three or a smaller number of economic entities 
engaged in retail trade with the largest shares of the relevant market, jointly holding 55 per cent or 
more of the relevant market shall be considered to enjoy a dominant position.2017 
Thus, Lithuanian law has a similar approach as that of Finland, with the important difference that 
in the Lithuanian case the presumption is rebuttable, to limit the abuse of exploitative buyer 
power vis-à-vis suppliers. In addition, it has a special provision regarding collective dominance in 
food retailing that is not contemplated in any other legislation, that has not been to this date 
enforced. 
However, it is necessary to remark that these rules that set lower or special dominance thresholds 
for firms involved in food retailing respond to specific market circumstances in the Baltic area 
which may explain, albeit in my view fail to justify, this specific and rather strict and over-
enforcing solution to trigger the applicability of competition law to UPPs. Food retailing markets 
in these countries are very concentrated with few and large active players (three or four in most 
cases).  
Furthermore, these measures reinforce the idea that the buyer power effects of an undertaking 
that is not only a powerful buyer, but also a reseller with substantial market power downstream, 
tend to be more pernicious to competitive conditions. This is so because the exertion of buyer 
power can have repercussions in both upstream and downstream markets and may adversely 
impact end consumers of food products, a quite inelastic segment of purchases. 
Nonetheless, in my view, setting lower thresholds, as low as 30% market share for a buying 
undertaking to be considered dominant, might be excessively low and an inadequate competition 
policy, even if it is true that buyer market power tends to arise in situations with lower market 
share thresholds. Prohibitions of abuse of dominance are designed to keep under control the 
exercise of market power of particularly large undertakings which tend to have at least 40% of 
market share and in general market shares of 50% or more – indeed in the US those numbers are 
                                                          
2016 Also discussing the legal Lithuanian regime for dominance: ibid, p. 35-37. 
2017 Law on Competition 23 March 1999 No Viii-1099 (As last amended on 22 March 2012 No XI-1937), English 




even higher and up to 80%. Additionally, these types of provisions are prone to over-enforcement 
due to the ‘form based’ tests that are used with regard to dominance abuses in general, therefore 
increasing the risks of false positives. Hence, adopting the same type of prohibition of unilateral 
conducts and imposition of competition remedies may imply an excessive restriction of the 
undertaking’s economic freedom, the prohibition of efficiency-enhancing bargaining power 
conducts, and/or which may lead to instances of unjustified and disproportional application of 
competition law rules not suited to the problems at stake. Thus, in my view, the adoption of lower 
thresholds to apply competition law rules for unilateral behavior should be approached with 
caution. 
9.6.2 Economic Dependence and UPPs under national competition law 
Other MS address UPPs through the idea of ‘relative dominant positions’ or the abuse of 
dependence, as sub-types of abuse of unilateral behavior that tend to be below the traditional 
market dominance thresholds. Relative dominance and dependence describe situations where one 
of the parties to a relation has a much larger degree of bargaining power that allows it to exploit 
its other commercial partners, and is anchored on the idea of ‘big and strong vs small and weak’ 
undertakings. Both relative dominance and dependence appear on lower buyer market power 
thresholds, when compared to traditional dominance cases, and are conditions belonging to an 
inter partes situation; i.e. undertaking “A” is relatively dominant with respect to undertaking “B”, 
but not necessarily with undertaking “C”.  
At the EU level, I have shown how risks of imposition of UPPs and buyer market power 
assessment take into consideration whether a supplier is dependent on a buyer, and the 
Commission has found that an indicator is when the buyer represents 22% of the supplier’s 
turnover in cases concerning a merger among buyers as discussed above.2018 At the national level, 
however, my investigation found no replication of this or any other market share threshold to 
determine the existence of relative dominance or dependence, as the assessment is done on a 
case-by-case basis. What it revealed, however, was that most of these provisions are designed to 
capture unilaterally imposed UPPs at lower market shares and less wide market conditions than 
EU competition law rules regarding unilateral behavior. However, other countries trigger the 
application of competition law rules to issues of economic dependence or relative dominant 
positions only if the effect of the UPP affects a substantial part of the market and the competitive 
structure. This implies that these rules would trigger under almost the same requirements than 
traditional dominance or as I discussed in my proposal for the application of EU competition law 
to UPPs. Therefore, these types of provisions dealing with relative dominance and dependence 
                                                          
2018 Commission Decision of 3 February 1999 relating to proceedings under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1221 - Rewe/Meinl) OJ L 274/1, para. 101. 
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seek to protect smaller or weaker suppliers from the exertion of buyer power by large (but not 
dominant) undertakings, in a gray area between competition law and unfair competition law. 
In Austria, traditional dominance is presumed under lower thresholds than when compared to 
EU competition law,2019 and it is linked to the concept of relative dominance.2020 According to 
§4.3 of the Austrian Competition Act, an undertaking is in a relative dominant position if it has a 
superior market position with regard to its customers or suppliers and such condition is said to be 
particularly present if these undertakings are dependent on the other party to avoid serious 
economic disadvantages.2021 The provision is not drafted to specifically address buyer 
exploitation, but to cover any type of abuses of imbalances of bargaining power among parties to 
a contract having a wider scope. 
In addition to these rules, part of the Austrian Competition Act, Austrian national legislation, 
addresses imbalances of bargaining power by non-competition-like rules under the Improvement 
of Local Supplies and Competitive Conditions Act.2022 These rules adopt the form of tort/contract 
law-like solutions that are applicable to imposition of UPPs on specific sectors. 
In France the abuse of economic dependence and imposition of unfair trading practices are 
governed within the Commercial Code. However, it ought to be noted that competition law sensu 
stricto is also integrated under French Law in the Commercial Code under the Book IV entitled 
“De la liberté des prix et de la concurrence”.2023 According to Article L420-2 of the French 
Commercial Code, it is forbidden to abuse a dominant position by a single undertaking or a group 
of them with regard to the state of economic dependence vis-à-vis its other trading partners.2024 
However, this type of abuse will be prohibited when they are likely to affect the functioning or 
                                                          
2019 Firms are presumed dominant if they have 30% market share and alternatively, by comparing its market shares 
with those of its rivals on a 5% difference base, § 4.2 of the Austrian Bundesgesetz gegen Kartelle und andere 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Kartellgesetz 2005 – KartG 2005) (zuletzt geändert durch das Bundesgesetz BGB1. I. 
Nr. 2/2008), (author’s translation). 
2020 Also confirming this interpretation see European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering 
Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 44. 
2021 § 4.3 of the Austrian Bundesgesetz gegen Kartelle und andere Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Kartellgesetz 2005 
– KartG 2005) (zuletzt geändert durch das Bundesgesetz BGB1. I. Nr. 2/2008), (author’s translation). 
2022 Bundesgesetz vom 29. Juni 1977 zur Verbesserung der Nahversorgung und der Wettbewerbsbedingungen, 
available (in German) at: 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10002393. 
2023 French Commercial Code, Legislative Section, Book IV Article L410-1 to L470-8.  
2024 “Est en outre prohibée, dès lors qu'elle est susceptible d'affecter le fonctionnement ou la structure de la 
concurrence, l'exploitation abusive par une entreprise ou un groupe d'entreprises de l'état de dépendance économique 
dans lequel se trouve à son égard une entreprise cliente ou fournisseur. Ces abus peuvent notamment consister en 
refus de vente, en ventes liées, en pratiques discriminatoires visées au I de l'article L. 4426 ou en accords de 
gamme”, French Commercial Code, Legislative Section, Book IV Article L420-2. Also remarking that this provision 
regulates in exclusive manner the issue of economic dependence see: College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 50-
53. See for a discussion of the provision: OECD France - The Role of Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform, 
(2003), para. 46-47. 
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the structure of competition.2025 Therefore, this provision resembles more a state of general 
dependence to a traditionally dominant undertaking than a case or relative dominance,2026 as the 
provision would not apply if the effect is reduced to be purely inter partes and without affecting 
competition as such.2027 According to Nollet, there are several cumulative conditions that must be 
complied with to trigger the prohibition of economic dependence:  
notoriety of the supplier's brand; importance of the supplier's market share; significance of the 
supplier's market share in the sales figures of the company in question, provided this market share 
is not the result of a deliberate choice by the corporate customer; difficulty for the company to 
find other suppliers of equivalent products.2028  
Due to the difficulty in meeting these cumulative conditions, it is unsurprising that there have 
been few cases of abuse of dependence before the French NCA and Courts.2029 
Germany is an important country when it comes to the analysis of dependence and relative 
positions as it was the first country to introduce dependence provisions in its competition law, 
back in 1973.2030 Paragraphs §19 and 20 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition addresses 
expressly the issue of dominance and prohibits abuse of superior bargaining power for both 
buyers and sellers alike under a ‘relative dominance clause’.2031 Furthermore, the provision 
establishes that buyer induced dependence arises when:  
[…] a supplier of a certain kind of goods or commercial services shall be presumed to depend on 
a purchaser within the meaning of sentence 1 if this purchaser regularly obtains from this supplier, 
in addition to discounts customary in the trade or other remuneration, special benefits which are 
not granted to similar purchasers.2032  
These special benefits would be special purchasing conditions only granted to the powerful buyer 
and not other rivals. 
According to this provision, prohibition of abuse of dominance and discriminatory practices:  
                                                          
2025 See also remarking this fact that the UPP must affect market wide conditions: OECD ‘France - The Role of 
Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform’ (2003), para. 46. 
2026 See also briefly discussing the consequences of this wording: Këllezi [2008], p. 63. 
2027 See also suggesting that “[t]he provision is intended to repress the practice of unbalanced contracts implemented 
by an undertaking or group of undertakings, who dominate in one or more markets but hold a dominant position in 
the market as a whole” in College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 51. 
2028 Nollet (2003), p. N 116. See also highlighting these same conditions: European Commission, Study on the Legal 
Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 46, 
referencing to Nollet; and Këllezi [2008], p. 64. 
2029 European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 46-47. 
2030 Ibid, p. 47-48; Këllezi [2008], p. 61; College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 53; Gormsen ‘Article 82 EC: 
Where are we Coming from and Where are we Going to?’ (2006), p. 14, footnote 49. 
2031 Also remarking this see: KJ Cseres, ‘The Impact of Regulation 1/2003 in the New Member States’ 6 The 
Competition Law Review (2010), p. 152-153; College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 43. 
2032 §20.1. of the Act Against Restraints of Competition (2014) last amended by Article 5 of the Act of 21.07.2014 
(Federal Law Gazette I, p.1066) (emphasis added). 
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shall also apply to undertakings and associations of undertakings to the extent that small or 
medium-sized enterprises as suppliers or purchasers of certain type of goods or commercial 
services depend on them in such a way that sufficient and reasonable possibilities of resorting to 
other undertakings do not exist (relative market power)2033  
Thus, in German law there are two types of dominance and abuse of dependence:  
i) abuse of dependence by dominant buyers with an erga omnes effect;2034  
ii) abuse of dependence by non-dominant buyers with an inter partes effect and which 
requires a lower threshold of buyer market power to be applied.2035  
 
In the first case, a provision known as Anzapfverbot, the German Competition Act, forbids 
dominant undertakings from hindering other undertakings (buyers or suppliers) in an unfair 
manner either when settling purchasing or selling prices or treating them different “from similar 
undertakings without any objective justification”.2036  
However, for the second case called “relative Marktmacht”, as opposed to the traditional 
‘absolute market power’ cases,2037 the case law of dependence in Germany clarifies that 
dependence may occur even “where not in a market-dominating position, an enterprise can hold 
such a strong position in the market that it can disrupt the markets in a manner which para. 26 II 
GGWB intended to prevent and to combat”.2038 Thus, relative dependence may exist even if 
competition in the market as a whole is not significantly affected.2039 This applies to both cases of 
unfair hindrance (Behinderungsverbot) or discrimination (Diskriminierungsverbot) below 
traditional market power levels.2040 Thus, these two provisions are triggered in narrower 
                                                          
2033 §20.1. of the Act Against Restraints of Competition (2014) last amended by Article 5 of the Act of 21.07.2014 
(Federal Law Gazette I, p.1066) (emphasis added). 
2034 The Commission employs the term “relative dominant position” in European Commission, Study on the Legal 
Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 44. 
2035 Also suggesting that the dominance level is lower see: Këllezi [2008], p. 61; College of Europe and Studies 
(2012), p. 53. Cf with the Report of the 2015 Conference of the Ligue Internationale du Droit de la Concurrence by 
Pinar Akman, Question A: Abuse of a Dominant Position and Globalization (2015), p. 4 who remarks that in these 
legislations there is no requirement of dominance and “go over and beyond the prohibition found in Article 102 
TFEU”. For a discussion of the types of dependence in German Competition Law, including buyer related 
dependence see: Këllezi [2008], p. 62. 
2036 §20.1. of the Act Against Restraints of Competition (2014) last amended by Article 5 of the Act of 21.07.2014 
(Federal Law Gazette I, p.1066). For a discussion of the application of this provision in food retailing market see: 
Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 17-18. 
2037 European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 47. 
2038 German Federal Court, Rossignol [1975], BGH NJW 1976, 801, translation in English available at: 
https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=1488. For a discussion of the case 
see: College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 54-55. 
2039 European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 49. 
2040 Ibid, p. 48. 
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circumstances and in which neither traditional dominance under German law nor EU competition 
law would apply.2041  
In Italy the competition act applies whenever a dominant undertaking is abusing its suppliers 
dependence and significantly affecting competition and market conditions.2042 Therefore, 
competition law will apply if the UPPs have a market-wide impact on competition and in such 
cases it allows the Italian NCA to ex officio investigate abuse of economic dependence when it is 
“relevant for the protection of the competition and the market”, in a solution akin to the 
Portuguese competition law that I discuss below, and to a lesser degree to the German provision 
dealing with economic dependence.2043  
In Portugal the Competition Law Act2044 also regulates economic dependence under the scope of 
traditional competition law but with the caveat that it does so only if it affects market wide 
competition. The prohibition is established in Article 12 — independently from abuse of 
dominance (Article 11) — and it prohibits:  
one undertaking or more undertakings to abuse the economic dependence under which any of its 
supplier or customer may find itself as a result of the fact that any equivalent alternative is not 
available, to the extent that such a practice affects the way the market or competition operate.2045  
Despite the provision’s wording, the Portuguese Supreme Court interpreted it as implying that 
dependence might occur in both vertical and horizontal relations, which seems to be contrary to 
its text and the trend in the other MS.2046 This interpretation broadens the scope of the provision 
and may lead to an over enforcement of UPPs among competitors in a horizontal market in a 
logic that is hard to grasp. However, as I have discussed, UPPs are imposed on a vertical level 
and, therefore, it is unlikely and unnecessary to expand UPP protection in a horizontal manner. 
Furthermore, according to the Portuguese legislation, abuses of economic dependence will only 
be prosecuted under competition law when the conduct has an impact in the market or 
                                                          
2041 College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 57. 
2042 ibid, p. 61. 
2043 “2. Dopo il comma 3 dell'articolo 9 della legge 18 giugno 1998, n. 192, è aggiunto il seguente: 
"3-bis. Ferma restando l'eventuale applicazione dell'articolo 3 della legge 10 ottobre 1990, n. 287, l'Autorità garante 
della concorrenza e del mercato può, qualora ravvisi che un abuso di dipendenza economica abbia rilevanza per la 
tutela della concorrenza e del mercato, anche su segnalazione di terzi ed a seguito dell'attivazione dei propri poteri di 
indagine ed esperimento dell'istruttoria, procedere alle diffide e sanzioni previste dall'articolo 15 della legge 10 
ottobre 1990, n. 287, nei confronti dell'impresa o delle imprese che abbiano commesso detto abuso".” Article 11.2 of 
the Legge 57/2001, "Disposizioni in materia di apertura e regolazione dei mercati" published in the Gazzetta 
Ufficiale n. 66 of March 20, 2001 that modified Article 9.3 of the Legge 18 giugno 1998, n. 192. 
2044 Law No 19/2012 of 8 May, repealing Laws No 18/2003 of 11 June and No 39/2006 of 25 August, and makes the 
second amendment to Law No 2/99 of 13 January, available in English at: 
http://www.concorrencia.pt/vEN/News_Events/Noticias/Documents/Lei19_2012_En.pdf. 
2045 Article 12 of Law No 19/2012 of 8 May, repealing Laws No 18/2003 of 11 June and No 39/2006 of 25 August, 
and makes the second amendment to Law No 2/99 of 13 January (emphasis added). 
2046 European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 53. 
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competition overall but not when there only is a contractual imbalance. Therefore, abuse of 
dependence is no longer a pure inter partes effect but becomes erga omnes, adversely impacting 
upstream and/or downstream market conditions. This requirement of wide market impact 
demands a higher threshold of market power from the buying undertaking and the capacity to 
create buyer dependence in a large number of suppliers, which is a concept closer to the 
traditional abuse of dominance, and which steers away from pure relative dominance situations. 
Therefore, it is likely that this provision on dependence would rarely be applied by the 
Portuguese NCA absent traditional dominance.2047 
The Portuguese provision on dependence and its predecessor, however, have been subject to 
criticism and a recommendation was made that it ought not to be included in the last legislative 
reform due to risks of competition law over-enforcement or the application of non-suitable 
remedies to address issues of a more inter partes nature.2048 However, the 2012 Competition Law 
Act kept the provision with the aim of protecting smaller undertakings in particular vis-à-vis 
stronger buyers in the retail sector.2049 
Lastly, the Portuguese Competition Act also forbids “any unjustified break, total or partial, in 
established commercial relations, bearing in mind previous commercial relations, recognised 
practices in that particular economic activity and the contractual conditions that have been set 
down” as part of the dependence prohibition.2050 As remarked by Gorjao-Henriques and Sousa 
Ferro, these conducts would be prohibited even if they result from negligence following a strict 
application standard.2051 
Lastly, at least three countries — Cyprus,2052 Hungary,2053 and Romania2054 — adopted very 
similar legislations to the ones discussed in detail above tackling UPP’s imposition through their 
national competition laws based on rules dealing with economic dependence. 
                                                          
2047 This provision has never been enforced or applied in the finding of a breach of the competition act by the 
Portuguese Competition Authority. See: Miguel Gorjao-Henriques and Miguel Sousa Ferro, 
‘P/CPortugal/Commentary’ in Competition Law in Western Europe and the USA (Wolters Kluwer 2010), para. 57; 
College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 64. 
2048 Ibid, p. 63-64. 
2049 Ibid, p. 63. 
2050 Article 12.2.b) of Law No 19/2012 of 8 May, repealing Laws No 18/2003 of 11 June and No 39/2006 of 25 
August, and makes the second amendment to Law No 2/99 of 13 January. 
2051 Gorjao-Henriques and Sousa Ferro [2010], para. 55. 
2052 The Cypriot Competition Act also addresses the issue of economic dependence under its Article 6(2) – dealing 
with abuse of dominance – and in particular, the imposition of unfair trading practices. (Article 6.2 of the Cypriot 
Protection of Competition Laws of 2008 and 2014 available in English at: 
http://www.competition.gov.cy/competition/competition.nsf/All/41E291273015085EC2257E6D002F0ACB/$file/OL
C-COMP-Law%202008+2014-ENGLISH-FINAL.pdf?OpenElement). 
The rule covers practices addressed against customers, suppliers, produces, representatives, distributors or business 
partners and has been enforced only 11 times over a period of 21 years and always prompted by a private claim, 
which is an indication of the priority given to these types of cases by Cypriot authorities and/or the lack of market 
harm pursuant to UPPs. One of the cases dealing with UPPs dealt with complains of abuse of the economic 
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9.6.3 UPPs on specific legislative instruments – unfair competition rules 
Other countries regulate the imposition of UPPs and the abuse of economic dependence by 
buyers through legislation outside competition law, usually by resorting to unfair competition 
laws, or sectoral regulation with a particular emphasis on food retailing. 
In the Czech Republic the Act on Significant Market Power in the Sale of Agricultural and Food 
Products and Abuse thereof regulates imposition of UPPs derived from dependence or superior 
bargaining power in the food market.2055 The act applies to abuse of buyer (bargaining) power by 
purchasers whenever “the supplier becomes dependent on the buyer with regard to a possibility to 
supply own goods to consumers, and in which the buyer may impose unilaterally beneficial trade 
conditions on the supplier”, which may lead to situations of over enforcement.2056 The Act goes 
even further and remarks that “[a]n abuse of significant market power towards suppliers is 
prohibited” but without making a distinction of the type of supplier that faces a UPP.2057 Also, the 
Act employs a rebuttable presumption that a buyer has significant market power if it has a 
turnover above 5 billion CZK, although the determination must be made on a case-by-case 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
dependence of suppliers to a yoghurt processing cooperative that unilaterally terminated a purchasing contract for 
raw milk vis-à-vis a dairy farmer and which threatened the farmer to be driven out of business, see further in 
European Union, Roundtable on Competition Issues in Food Chain Industry -- Note by the European Union-- (2013), 
para. 32; European Competition Network (2012), para. 99. 
2053 In Hungary, the Hungarian Competition Law Act (The Competition Act (Act LVII of 1996), lastly amended in 
April 2010, available in English at: 
http://www.gvh.hu/en/legal_background/rules_for_the_hungarian_market/competition_act) also regulates 
dependence abuses by dominant undertakings in its Article 21.b) and c). These provisions only apply if the 
undertaking is dominant and if said undertaking has, for example, refused to create or maintain business relations 
without justification. Article 21 a), d) and j) of the Hungarian Competition Law Act may also apply to situations of 
“abuse of superior bargaining position” which attempt to limit the imposition of unfair trading practices in general 
and UPPs in particular. See further: European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-
Business Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 50,  
2054 The Romanian Competition Act precludes dominant undertakings to abuse “of the state of economic dependence 
of another undertaking towards such an undertaking or undertakings and which does not have an alternative solution 
under equivalent conditions, as well as breaking contract relations for the sole reason that the partner is refusing to 
submit to certain unjustified commercial conditions” (Article 6.1.f) of the Law of Competition 21 of April 10th 1996, 
last reformed in 14 of February, 2012, available in English at: 
http://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/uploads/docs/concurenta/LEGEA_CONCURENTEI_Nr_21_eng_rev_1.pdf). The 
provision is general and not limited to pure retailing sectors and covers all trading partners, and it adopts a ‘relative 
dominance’ approach as it requires the conduct and situation to be addressed specifically to a partner not requiring a 
market impact as a whole. The provision, however, has had a limited applicability and has been invoked in very few 
occasions. Also, a 2012 Commission’s report remarks that only ten (10) cases have been brought forth under this 
provision in College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 65. 
2055 Act No. 395/2009 of 9 September 2009 on Significant Market Power in the Sale of Agricultural and Food 
Products and Abuse thereof, available in English at: 
http://www.uohs.cz/download/Legislativa/legislativa_EN/2009_395_EN.pdf; Commission, Study on the Legal 
Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 55-56. 
2056 Article 3(1) of Act No. 395/2009 of 9 September 2009 on Significant Market Power in the Sale of Agricultural 
and Food Products and Abuse thereof. 
2057 Article 4 of Act No. 395/2009 of 9 September 2009 on Significant Market Power in the Sale of Agricultural and 
Food Products and Abuse thereof. 
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basis.2058 Lastly, ratione materiae the Act distinguishes between and applies to six categories of 
buyer market power abuse: invoicing; general business conditions; infringement of conditions 
agreed between suppliers and retailers; non-observance of sale conditions; exercising prohibited 
practices to buyers, and other prohibited customs between retailers and suppliers.2059 
In France, in addition to the rules on relative dependence as part of the Competition Law Section 
of the French Commercial Code, the Code under the Chapter II of the Book IV regulates in 
addition unfair commercial practices that a buyer may impose to its suppliers by means of Article 
L442-6, which forbids certain practices for suppliers and buyers.2060 These rules have been 
designed to tackle the issue of “marges arrières”, practices which aim at “changing the prices 
effectively paid from those shown on the invoice at time of delivery” and which have arisen with 
the increase of market power of the “5 or 6 largest distributors and retailers of consumer 
goods”.2061 The rationale behind this provision is not the protection of competition as such, but 
instead protecting small and medium enterprises from the abuse of larger companies and, 
therefore, addressing the issue of unfairness in contracting.2062 As remarked by an OECD Report, 
these provisions dealing with unfair commercial practices apply as a general prohibition against 
formal discrimination.2063 Hence, unlike the competition provisions, there is no need to prove 
existence or dependence, nor market power.2064  
In Greece economic dependence is regulated by Article 18.1. of the Act on Unfair Competition. 
This unfair competition provision aims at protecting individual traders from unfair practices that 
go against “good moral” customs and applies regardless of the existence of market power.2065 On 
the other hand, the current Greek Competition Law Act (modeled after Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU) 
does not contain any provisions dealing with abuse of economic dependence by a dominant 
party.2066 The reason given by the Greek legislator to not include a regulation of dependence was 
that its abuse is an issue of protection of individuals but not of competition or markets.2067 
                                                          
2058 European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 56. 
2059 Article 4 of Act No. 395/2009 of 9 September 2009 on Significant Market Power in the Sale of Agricultural and 
Food Products and Abuse thereof. For a discussion on the procedural aspects of the act in a critical way see: College 
of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 47-50. 
2060 French Commercial Code, Legislative Section, Book IV Article L442-6. 
2061 OECD ‘France - The Role of Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform’ (2003), para. 47. 
2062 College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 53. 
2063 OECD ‘France - The Role of Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform’ (2003), para. 46. 
2064 College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 51 making reference to a report by the General Directorate for 
Competition Policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control. 
2065 Article 1 of the Law 146/1914 of January 27, 1914, on Unfair Competition, available in English at: 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=127658. European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework 
Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 49. 
2066 Law 3959/2011 - “Protection of Free Competition”, English text available at: 
http://www.epant.gr/img/x2/categories/ctg391_3_1418031420.pdf. 
2067 College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 57. 
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Hungary constitutes a special case. The Act CLXIV of 20052068 establishes a concept labeled 
“abuse of significant market power”2069 targeting abuses of buyer (bargaining) power below 
traditional dominance levels,2070 which resembles relative dominance provisions.2071 The Act 
prohibits imposition of an extensive amount of conducts that qualify as UPPs such as: 
unjustifiably discriminating against suppliers; unjustifiably restricting suppliers access to sales 
opportunities; imposing unfair conditions on suppliers; unjustifiably altering contract terms, to 
the detriment of the suppliers; charging fees one-sidedly to suppliers; threatening with 
termination of the agreement (delisting).  
In Italy abuse of dependence is regulated outside of the scope of traditional competition and 
unfair competition laws through the 1998 Law on Subcontracting and which applies absent 
market power requirements.2072 The Law on Subcontracting regulates economic dependence 
following a unique approach through contract law provisions unlike most other MS of a civil 
tradition.2073 Its Article 9 deals with “abuse of economic dependence” and prohibits a buyer or a 
supplier to abuse of the dependence of its counterpart.2074 According to the law, dependence is 
defined as a situation in which an undertaking is able to determine in an excessive imbalance the 
rights and duties with other undertaking as part of a commercial relation.2075 In particular, the law 
on subcontracting prohibits refusing to sell or purchase, imposing unfair or excessive contractual 
conditions or a termination of a contract without sufficient reasons. 
                                                          
2068 Hungarian Act CLXIV of 2005 on Trade /competition law related provisions of the Act, available in English at: 
http://www.gvh.hu/en/legal_background/rules_for_the_hungarian_market/other_statutes_relating_to_the_activity_of
_the_gvh/act_on_trade_/4341_en_act_clxiv_of_2005_on_trade.html 
2069 “[S]ignificant market power’ refers to a market situation as a consequence of which the dealer becomes or has 
become a contracting partner for the supplier which the latter is unable to reasonably evade at forwarding its goods 
and services to the customers and which is able, due to the size of its share in the turnover, to influence regionally or 
all over the country market access of a product or a group of products”, §2 of the Act CLXIV of 2005 on Trade 
/competition law related provisions of the Act. 
2070 College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 34. 
2071 European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 50. 
2072 Legge 18 giugno 1998, n. 192, "Disciplina della subfornitura nelle attività produttive", pubblicata nella Gazzetta 
Ufficiale n. 143 del 22 giugno 1998, available (in Italian) at: http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/98192l.htm. For 
a detailed discussion of the Italian regulation of economic dependence in the law and the case law see: Valeria Falce, 
The Italian Regulation Against the Abuse of Economic Dependence (2015), p. 1. See also: College of Europe and 
Studies (2012), p. 60-61. 
2073 European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-Business Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 51. 
2074 Article 9.2 of Legge 18 giugno 1998, n. 192, "Disciplina della subfornitura nelle attività produttive", pubblicata 
nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 143 del 22 giugno 1998. 
2075 “È vietato l'abuso da parte di una o più imprese dello stato di dipendenza economica nel quale si trova, nei suoi o 
nei loro riguardi, una impresa cliente o fornitrice. Si considera dipendenza economica la situazione in cui un'impresa 
sia in grado di determinare, nei rapporti commerciali con un'altra impresa, un eccessivo squilibrio di diritti e di 
obblighi. La dipendenza economica è valutata tenendo conto anche della reale possibilità per la parte che abbia 
subito l'abuso di reperire sul mercato alternative soddisfacenti.”, Article 9.1 of Legge 18 giugno 1998, n. 192, 
"Disciplina della subfornitura nelle attività produttive. 
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In Lithuania, in addition to the special competition law provision for dominance in food 
retailing, the Law on Prohibition of Unfair Business-To-Consumer Commercial Practices governs 
the behavior of large food retailers and prohibits them from employing their buyer power 
‘unfairly’ vis-à-vis suppliers.2076 Specifically, it precludes food retailers from entering into UPPs 
and misleading practices more akin to trademark, origin or consumer protection. To date, the 
UPP provisions have been only applied in a case against a food retailer (Maxima Lt, Uab) that 
was deemed to have “significant market power” and breached the rules concerning “terms on 
return of goods”.2077 
In Portugal, as a complement to the rules concerning relative dominance in the Competition Act, 
UPPs are also regulated by the Decree-Law 166/2013 related to Unilateral Practices Restricting 
Trade. Under this regulation UPPs are forbidden regardless of a market power threshold as the 
Decree-Law aims at remedying contractual imbalances and protecting small suppliers from large 
buyers.2078 The Decree-Law prohibits, inter alia, discriminatory prices or terms of sale, sales at 
loss, and has received some criticism.2079 Unlike the provision on dependence, the law on unfair 
trading practices has been enforced privately on some occasions before courts and the NCA.2080 
In Slovakia the regulation of UPPs follows a similar approach as in the Czech Republic. There 
are no specific provisions dealing with dependence on the competition act, instead, they are 
regulated in a sectoral way by means of the Unfair Trade in Foodstuff Act.2081 This act replaced 
other laws dealing with contractual imbalances between buyers and suppliers in the retailing 
industry to give a fairer balance to suppliers facing powerful buyers.2082 To prevent the 
imposition of UPPs, the Act limits the ability of large buyers to exercise bargaining power and 
improves the position of suppliers by making some contractual practices illegal and void. The act 
lists more than thirty ‘unfair’ contract terms, including practices such as: 
pecuniary consideration by supplier to the reseller for services that have not been provided, 
immediate termination of contract without giving a notice period and grounds for such termination 
[…], sale of goods at a price below the purchase price [allowed in some cases].2083  
                                                          
2076 Law on Prohibition of Unfair Business-To-Consumer Commercial Practices 21 December 2007 No X-1409, 
available in English at: http://kt.gov.lt/en/index.php?show=advertising&adv_doc=law_pub. 
2077 Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania, ‘Competition Council Imposes a fine of 40 000 Ltl on 
Maxima Lt, Uab’ (2014) <http://kt.gov.lt/en/index.php?show=news_view&pr_id=1303>. 
2078 College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 64. 
2079 Gorjao-Henriques and Sousa Ferro [2010], para. 7. See also: College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 64. 
2080 College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 64; Gorjao-Henriques and Sousa Ferro [2010], para. 7. 
2081 Act No. 140/2010 Coll. on Unfair Terms in Business Contracts between Reseller and Supplier of Goods that are 
Foodstuffs. 
2082 Zuzana Turayova, ‘Slovakia's Unfair Terms in Business Contracts between Resellers and Suppliers of 
Foodstuffs’ e-Competitions N 31177 Concurrences (2010). See also discussing the Act in quite similar terms in 
College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 65-67. This was the case of the former Act No. 172/2008 Coll. on Unfair 
Terms in Commercial Contracts, repelled by the Unfair Trade in Foodstuff Act. 
2083 Turayova (2010). 
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Interestingly, the Unfair Trade in Foodstuff Act goes beyond prohibiting certain practices and 
encourages retailers and suppliers to enter into ethical codes regulating their conduct in an effort 
to shift from mere hard law to soft-law enforcement of unfair competition practices and a solution 
adopted in other Member States, which I discuss below.2084 
In Spain UPPs and unfair contractual terms are regulated by specialized laws whenever the 
exercise of buyer power does not impose a reduction in demand of goods (monopsony power)2085 
by a dominant buyer or have an impact on the market overall. These laws are the Unfair 
Competition Act2086 and the sectoral Act on Better Functioning for the Food Retailing 
Markets.2087 Previously, however, the former Spanish Competition Act regulated explicitly the 
imposition of UPPs practices by a dominant undertaking.2088 Nevertheless, the latest reform to 
the Spanish Competition Act revoked this prohibition as the legislator found that UPPs did not 
require a specific provision and were better addressed through specific instruments such as unfair 
competition laws. 
The Spanish Unfair Competition Act prohibits in its Article 16 the abuse of economic 
dependence and discrimination, and has a scope of application aiming to remedy contractual 
imbalances in a gray area between “internal commerce” and “consumer protection,” as clarified 
in its recitals.2089 The prohibition against discriminatory treatment only applies to non-justified 
differentiated treatment vis-à-vis consumers (hence it will not apply to buyers with regard to 
suppliers).2090 However, the prohibition of economic dependence applies to both “clients and 
suppliers that do not have an equivalent alternative to carry out their commercial activity”.2091 
Furthermore, the Unfair Competition Act establishes a juris tantum presumption of dependence 
whenever a supplier “in addition to the customary discounts or conditions, must grant its buyer in 
a regular manner additional benefits that are not granted to similar buyers”.2092 If the abuse of 
economic dependence leads to a substantial distortion of competition affecting the public interest 
– even absent dominance – then the Spanish Competition Authority is the competent authority, 
                                                          
2084 College of Europe and Studies (2012), p. 66; Turayova (2010). 
2085 Robles Martín-Laborda, ‘La Cadena Alimentaria: Cuando el Poder de Mercado lo Tiene el Comprador’. 
2086 Ley 3/1991, de 10 de enero, de Competencia Desleal, Boletín Oficial del Estado núm. 10, de 11/01/1991, 
available at (in Spanish): http://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1991-628. 
2087 Ley 12/2013, de 2 de agosto, de medidas para mejorar el funcionamiento de la cadena alimentaria, Boletín 
Oficial del Estado núm. 185, de 3 de agosto de 2013, páginas 56551 a 56581 (31 págs.), available at (in Spanish): 
http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2013-8554. 
2088 Article 6(2)(f) and (g) of Act 52/1999, of 28 December, amending Act 16/1989, of 17 July, of Competition, 
available at (in Spanish): https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1999/12/29/pdfs/A45778-45787.pdf. 
2089 Recital Section IV of Ley 3/1991, de 10 de enero, de Competencia Desleal. 
2090 Article 16.1 of Ley 3/1991, de 10 de enero, de Competencia Desleal. 
2091 Article 16.2 of Ley 3/1991, de 10 de enero, de Competencia Desleal (author’s translation). 
2092 Article 16.2 of Ley 3/1991, de 10 de enero, de Competencia Desleal (author’s translation). 
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reinforcing the argument put forth in this chapter that UPPs are, and should be, covered by 
competition law if they have a market-wide impact.2093  
The Unfair Competition Act includes a list of prohibited UPPs such as: forbidding buyers to 
terminate contracts without a previous written notification at least six months in advance, unless 
there are serious grounds for termination; or obtaining better terms and conditions (lower 
purchasing prices, modalities, additional fees, etc.) that were not originally established in the 
contract under duress.2094 
Furthermore, the Act on Better Functioning for the Food Retailing Markets is a new sectoral 
instrument enacted in 2013 which aims at addressing buyer power imbalances in food retailing, in 
particular because of the “vulnerable character” of the agricultural supply side, its “high 
atomization level” and opposing retailers that have two commercial channels,2095 in a way which 
resembles the history of the Robinson-Patman Act in the US.2096 The preamble of the Act stresses 
that, on the one hand, there is a food distribution channel that is:  
very concentrated in undertakings with large and medium sales locations and offering a wide 
array of goods and that, normally, belong to large groups of distribution and concentrate demand 
in specific sale point which confers great bargaining power vis-à-vis their suppliers.2097  
Whereas on the other hand, the other distribution channel is represented by small and specialized 
shops, usually a family-owned business, and spread around the country in the form of traditional 
market shops or small establishments. The law remarks that the asymmetries in bargaining power 
conditions the relations among suppliers and buyers in a vertical and horizontal level that it aims 
to address. 
The Act’s objective is controlling buyer power exercise to allegedly promote efficiency and 
competitiveness of food retailing markets by reducing the contractual imbalances among the 
market players.2098 However, these two goals may counteract each other if the positive effects of 
bargaining power for end consumers are compromised by limiting the capacity of buyers to 
neutralize any seller market power. To do so, Article 9 of the Act requires contracts among 
suppliers and buyers to comply with some minimum (or maximum) standards restricting the 
                                                          
2093 Article 3 of the Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia. Moreover, Article 2 of this Law is the 
one defining abuse of dominance. European Commission, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-To-
Business Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain (2014), p. 54. 
2094 Article 16.3 of Ley 3/1991, de 10 de enero, de Competencia Desleal (author’s translation). 
2095 Article 2 of the Ley 12/2013, de 2 de agosto, de medidas para mejorar el funcionamiento de la cadena 
alimentaria. 
2096 Recital Section I of the Ley 12/2013, de 2 de agosto, de medidas para. mejorar el funcionamiento de la cadena 
alimentaria. 
2097 Recital Section I of the Ley 12/2013, de 2 de agosto, de medidas para mejorar el funcionamiento de la cadena 
alimentaria. Also stressing the increasing concentration issue in food suppliers market in Germany see: 
Bundeskartellamt ‘Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector’ (2014), p. 3. 




parties’ contractual freedom in an ex-ante regulation method that is analog to solutions applied to 
consumer protection, as well as forbidding an extensive group of purchasing practices. Among 
these are included the modification or requirement of commercial payments not foreseen, 
exchange of sensitive information and handling of trademarks. 
Lastly, like in the case of Slovakia, the Act on Better Functioning for the Food Retailing Markets 
also requires the creation of a “Code of Conduct”2099 to regulate “good practices” that was finally 
approved in 2015 and draw inspiration from the UK solution, as discussed in the following 
section.2100 The Code is binding for those parties that agree to adhere to it, according to Article 
15.4, and its content is based on the prohibitions in the law, also providing an alternative dispute 
mechanism in case of conflicts between the parties.2101 
9.6.4 Soft Law alternatives? The case of the ‘codes of conduct’ 
Other countries, with the UK at the forefront in the EU/EEA, have decided to apply soft-law or 
self-enforcing mechanisms to deal with UPPs outside their competition law, and sometimes as a 
complement to sectoral regulation. The idea of self-regulation through a code of conduct comes 
from countries with a Common Law background with Australia as the first country to implement 
it by means of the Retail Grocery Industry Code of Conduct enacted in 2000, which has been 
replaced on several occasions, the latest one being 2015 with the Food and Grocery Code of 
Conduct.2102 In this section, however, I analyze the UK code of conduct as a European example 
of this alternative regulatory path due to its importance in modeling the content of other codes in 
different jurisdictions. 
The UK promulgated the Groceries Supply Code of Practice (the Code)2103 in 2009 pursuant a 
Groceries Market Investigation. The Code is administered by the Groceries Code Adjudicator Act 
of 2013 that created a Groceries Code Adjudicator, a body that administers it as an investigator-
arbitrator and imposes sanctions whenever it is breached by its parties. The Code aims:  
                                                          
2099 Title III of the the Ley 12/2013, de 2 de agosto, de medidas para mejorar el funcionamiento de la cadena 
alimentaria. 
2100 http://www.magrama.gob.es/es/prensa/codigobuenaspracticasmercantiles_tcm7-403866_noticia.pdf. 
2101 Article 16 of the Ley 12/2013, de 2 de agosto, de medidas para mejorar el funcionamiento de la cadena 
alimentaria. 
2102 Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes—Food and Grocery) Regulation 2015, Select Legislative Instrument 
No. 16, 2015 and available at: https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2015L00242. The Code is “voluntary” but 
“legally enforceable” instrument that aims to “deliver more contractual certainty in trading relations between 
suppliers and supermarkets, encourage the better sharing of risk and reduce inappropriate use of market power across 
the value chain” Australian Food & Grocery Council Food and Grocery Industry Code of Conduct, (2015). 
2103 Groceries Supply Code of Practice, published on 4 August 2009 by the Department for Business, Innovation & 
Skills and the Groceries Code Adjudicator. 
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to address the adverse effect on competition arising from the exercise of buyer power by grocery 
retailers with respect to their direct suppliers of groceries”.2104  
And in the words of the Code’s Adjudicator “the purpose of the Code is to ensure that the UK’s 
largest supermarkets treat their direct suppliers fairly.2105 
The Code applies to “Designated Retailers,” which are undertakings with a turnover exceeding 
£1 billion in the UK market for retail supply, or listed in an annex.2106 Hence it applies to large 
buyers but not to smaller or local ones. These Designated Retailers “must not enter into or 
perform any Supply Agreement unless that Supply Agreement incorporates the Code and does 
not contain any provisions that are inconsistent with the Code”.2107 
To prevent UPPs, the Code sets some minimum requirements, such as the duty to provide 
information to suppliers and have contracts in written form.2108 And, furthermore, it contains an 
extensive list of prohibited practices. Among them: fair dealing and keeping buyer-supplier 
relations based on good faith and without duress; rules on variations on supply and terms of 
supply; obligations to pay within a “reasonable time after the date of the Supplier’s invoice”;2109 
not requiring the supplier to pay for the buyer’s costs regarding advertisement;2110 prohibition of 
direct and indirect setting of slotting allowances; and strict rules on de-listing a supplier from a 
retailer’s stock. 
The Code’s enforcement is based on an alternative dispute resolution system regulated in its 
Section 5. Retailers and suppliers “must negotiate in good faith” to reach an agreement and if 
there is a dispute among them, the case ought to be brought before a Code Compliance Officer 
that will act as a mediator between the parties. If the complaint is not resolved, then the supplier 
(but not the buyer) can submit an arbitration request before the Ombudsman in accordance with 
the Rules of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. The Code Adjudicator’s decision is “binding 
and final” for the parties and may only be appealed under specific grounds regulated in the UK 
Arbitration Act. Regarding fees and expenses, the Code favors suppliers in all cases, except when 
                                                          
2104 Groceries Code Adjudicator, Investigation into Tesco Plc, 26 January 2016, public version available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/494840/GCA_Tesco_plc_final_report
_26012016_-_version_for_download.pdf, para. 51, last visited 27 January 2016 (emphasis added). 
2105 Groceries Code Adjudicator, Investigation into Tesco Plc, 26 January 2016 (emphasis added). 
2106 Competition Commission, The Groceries (Supply Chain Practices) Market Investigation Order 2009, Part 2, 
Article 4 (1). 
2107 Competition Commission, The Groceries (Supply Chain Practices) Market Investigation Order 2009, Part 2, 
Article 4 (2). 
2108 Competition Commission, The Groceries (Supply Chain Practices) Market Investigation Order 2009, Part 2, 
Article 4 (2). 
2109 Such a rule (or the absent of it) was precisely the main issue under discussion in Judgment of 11 July in FENIN v 
Commission, C-205/03 P, EU:C:2006:453; Judgment of 4 March 2003, Fenin v Commission, T-319/99, ECR, 
EU:T:2003:50. 
2110 “Shrinkage means losses that occur after Groceries are delivered to a Retailer’s premises and arise due to theft, 
the Groceries being lost or accounting error”, Schedule 1 of the Groceries (Supply Chain Practices) Market 
Investigation Order 2009. 
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the arbitrator decides that the supplier’s claim was “vexatious or wholly without merit”; 
otherwise, all costs have to be to be borne by the retailer. 
Since its adoption in 2009 there has been a single case dealing with a breach of the Code and 
imposition of UPPs. On January 26, 2016 the Groceries Code Adjudicator found that Tesco Plc, 
the largest retailing supermarket chain in the UK, with about 28% market share in 2015,2111 had 
breached the Code due to the payment delays regarding non-goods payments or in case of 
disagreement.2112 Tesco was also investigated for possibly demanding from suppliers slotting 
allowances to secure better positioning of their goods; however, the Adjudicator found no 
evidence to declare the Code’s breach in this regard. Despite the finding of the “serious Code’s 
breach” the Adjudicator was in no position to impose a financial penalty because of the entry into 
force of administrative Order granting this power. It was decided, however, to issue five 
recommendations for Tesco to follow to address the uncertainties and limit the pernicious effects 
of the payment delays.2113 
As mentioned above, the UK example of regulating UPPs through codes of conduct has been 
followed by other MS, such as Spain and Slovakia and proposed but rejected in the case of 
Norway. In my opinion, the adoption of Codes of Conduct to regulate UPPs as an alternative 
form of regulation may keep spreading through Europe, in particular, if the enforcement of the 
Code in the UK is perceived as a success story. 
However, a question concerning the adoption of codes of conduct remains: should these soft law 
approaches involve the imposition of fines and hard remedies? In my view, the use of soft 
enforcement mechanisms that impose behavioral remedies and ensure that the decision receives 
sufficient publicity, without resorting to fines, may be an adequate and sufficiently deterrent 
measure in countries in which there is a tradition of relying on self-regulation and common law 
approaches.2114 The same, however, might not necessarily work in other legal cultures and a 
“hard enforcement approach” might be required. I, however, find the idea of a softer approach 
within a Code of Conduct system a better alternative than the imposition of fines or other 
administrative sanctions for several reasons. The lack of fines will incentivize retailers to self-
report possible breaches to the Code; making the decision public will have an impact on the 
retailer’s goodwill and, thus, customers’ preferences when shopping for food; and the imposition 
of fines may backfire as food retailers might be tempted to recoup their losses by either 
                                                          
2111 http://www.statista.com/statistics/279900/grocery-market-share-in-the-united-kingdom-uk/, last visited 27 
January, 2016; http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/sep/22/tesco-asda-morrisons-sales-slump-despite-cut-
prices-supermarkets, last visited 27 January, 2016. 
2112 Groceries Code Adjudicator, Investigation into Tesco Plc, 26 January 2016. 
2113 I have discussed the details and implications of this case in an invited blog entry at the Competition Policy Blog 
of the Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia in Unfair purchasing practices and the Groceries 
Code of Conduct: the Tesco investigation. Available at: https://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2016/02/01/unfair-
purchasing-practices-and-the-groceries-code-of-conduct-the-tesco-investigation/, last accessed on February 1st, 2016. 
2114 Making a similar remark see: Jenny [2015], p. 4. 
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tightening their purchasing practices or increasing end consumer’s prices. However, for very 
serious cases, or if the soft approach proves to be insufficient, then fines might be required.2115 
9.7 The EU and the Supply Chain Initiative 
Pursuant to the political pressure and interest in regulating fairness within the commercial 
relations in the food supply chain at the EU level, the Commission’s High Level Forum for a 
Better Functioning of the Food Supply Chain developed the Supply Chain Initiative (SCI).2116 
The SCI follows a similar soft law approach like codes of self-regulation, as parties to the SCI 
will voluntarily adhere to it and commit themselves in not entering into UPPs and setting ethical 
standards when dealing to avoid abuses of bargaining power, and when these purchasing 
practices have a cross-border dimension. By 2016, over a thousand (1,155) undertakings in the 
retail, wholesale and manufacturing business had registered as parties to the SCI since its 
implementation in 2013.2117 However, as the Commission reported, farmers and SMEs are 
underrepresented in the SCI partially due to lack of awareness and support. 
In the SCI framework, the stakeholders implemented a set of “principles of good practices” that 
“provide a framework for doing business that respects contractual freedom and ensures 
competitiveness, trust and continuity, all required for business development, innovation and the 
three pillars of sustainability”.2118 These principles are rooted in three main aspects: first, the 
interest of end consumers; second, protection of the contractual freedom – or respect to each 
undertaking’s economic freedom from an ordoliberal perspective; and third, an obligation of fair 
dealing. At the same time, these pillars are operationalized by 7 principles of best practices:  
i) contracts must be in written form;  
ii) unilateral contractual chances are limited;  
iii) parties must comply to their agreements;  
iv) parties should respect rules regarding information confidentiality; 
v) and should also respect competition rules regarding exchanging sensitive information; 
vi) both parties should assume their commercial risks to a transaction; 
vii) parties should not resort to threats to obtain an advantage or transfer risks or costs.2119 
 
Additionally, the SCI lists a series of forbidden non-exhaustive and rather general UPPs which 
coincide with the different modalities discussed in section 9.2.2. 
                                                          
2115 “Unfair purchasing practices and the Groceries Code of Conduct: the Tesco investigation”. Available at: 
https://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2016/02/01/unfair-purchasing-practices-and-the-groceries-code-of-
conduct-the-tesco-investigation/, last accessed on February 1st, 2016. 
2116 European Commission ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Unfair 
Business-to-Business Trading Practices in the Food Supply Chain’ (2016), p. 8. 
2117 Ibid, p. 8-9. 
2118 Supply Chain Initiative (2011), p. 2. 
2119 Ibid, p. 3. 
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The SCI also adopts an alternative dispute resolution mechanism where parties to it, can raise 
complaints in cases where a principle has been breached under a contractual relation under five 
modalities:2120 the commercial track or within the company itself; contract options; an internal 
dispute resolution; mediation or arbitration; or, finally, jurisdictional methods.2121 The remedies 
adopted as part of the dispute settlement are decided on a case by case basis and parties are 
obliged to commit to them. 
Lastly, the SCI is complemented at the MS level by means of “national platforms” entrusted with 
the task of promoting knowledge regarding the SCI among undertakings engaged in food 
retailing and supporting its members. However, so far only Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland 
have created such platforms.2122 
9.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I discussed buyer power exploitation through the imposition of UPPs. My 
analysis shows that the regulation of these types of ‘unfair’ purchasing conducts lies in a gray 
area between competition and unfair competition laws as they are connected to fairness, 
contractual imbalances and matters of distributive justice and tend not to be issues of market 
power exercise sensu stricto, despite the fact that their widespread exertion can negatively impact 
the upstream competitive structure and dynamic efficiency. Therefore, it is not clear whether, 
when and how much scope of applicability EU competition law has when dealing with the 
imposition of UPPs, particularly regarding cases of unilateral behavior. 
I showed that UPPs arise from an unbalance in bargaining power between the parties in a 
commercial relation and are linked to the abuse of buyer power vis-à-vis dependent suppliers. 
Therefore, UPP regulation tends to seek the protection of supplier welfare and fairness in the 
exercise of buyer power but not necessarily address aspects related to market power abuse, 
economic efficiency, or end-consumer welfare. Because of this, legal intervention against UPPs 
seeks to redress issues of contractual balancing and distribution of profits between contractual 
parties having a clear protecting role with regard to weaker suppliers facing a powerful buyer, 
and which is not always consistent with the improvement of market efficiency or end consumer 
welfare, explaining the limited role of EU competition law. 
From a welfare perspective, UPPs by and large are an issue of profit distribution in which the 
buyer, thanks to its bargaining power, obtains supracompetitive benefits that are extracted from 
the supplier without an appropriate retribution. These types of issues connected with profit 
distribution to a contract are purely bilateral aspects, and an economic problem that is not a 
                                                          
2120 Supply Chain Initiative Rules of Procedure for the Governance Group, (2013). 
2121 http://www.supplychaininitiative.eu/faq#8 
2122 European Commission (2016), p. 11. 
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concern for EU competition law. However, UPPs can become a competition law problem 
affecting the upstream competitive conditions in allocative and dynamic terms, for example by 
eliminating incentives for suppliers to remain or enter the market or invest. This could be the case 
whenever the UPPs are imposed in a way that affects the market as a whole, for instance when 
they are imposed by a dominant buyer to most of its suppliers, pursuant a concentration or due to 
agreements concluded with a powerful, yet not dominant buyer. 
Hence, as an issue of profit distribution, UPPs may affect the financial viability of suppliers as 
their unjustified exploitation may force them to exit the input market and, consequently, have a 
detrimental effect on consumers in the long term. Furthermore, the generalized exploitation of 
suppliers by a dominant buyer may reduce choice, variety, and quantities offered in downstream 
markets, adversely impacting the competitive structure in the upstream market as well as end 
consumers. However, the existing data regarding the welfare effects of UPPs is not conclusive 
regarding the ‘squeeze-out’ effect on suppliers from the upstream market, at least in the short and 
medium term. The same ambiguous outcome regarding UPP effect appears regarding variety, 
innovation and end-consumer conditions. Therefore, a purchasing conduct that might appear 
‘unfair’ can actually be welfare enhancing. 
Therefore, while it is clear that abusive UPPs appear as practices that from a moral standpoint 
appear as ‘unfair’ (but not necessarily inefficient) and portraying a negative aspect of buyer 
(bargaining) power, it is less clear whether they constitute a core competition problem for which 
EU competition law is the adequate tool. 
I submitted that EU competition law will rarely and should rarely apply to cases dealing with the 
imposition of UPPs, as the very few cases confirm. As I put forth, UPPs will be captured by the 
current regime if they are imposed by a buyers’ cartel or are the outcome of a concerted practice 
under Article 101(1) TFEU. Regarding the exertion of UPPs within a vertical agreement, I have 
also shown that, unless the UPP constitutes a hardcore restriction of competition, it would likely 
be under the scope of the Block Exemption Regulation. Also, some of these UPPs even if part of 
a vertical agreement would be ‘unilateral’ in the sense that the supplier is not needed to generate 
the effect. These factors, along with the lack of prioritization of vertical restrains by NCAs make 
it unlikely that most UPPs would be under the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU. Consequently, 
UPPs if under EU competition law, would be mostly addressed by rules designed to tackle 
unilateral behavior, therefore requiring the buyer to be a dominant undertaking – either in the 
upstream or the downstream market as it could have been the case in FENIN v Commission, if 
the Courts would have found the purchasing to constitute an economic activity.2123 However, 
risks of future imposition of UPPs also could trigger the application of EU competition law 
                                                          
2123 Judgment of 11 July in FENIN v Commission, C-205/03 P, EU:C:2006:453; Judgment of 4 March 2003, Fenin v 
Commission, T-319/99, ECR, EU:T:2003:50. 
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pursuant to a buyers’ concentration that may lead to (most or all) the suppliers becoming 
dependent on the powerful buyer, as was discussed in Carrefour/Promodès, Rewe/Meinl and 
Kesko/Tuko. However, in these cases the risks of imposition of UPPs was only deemed relevant 
enough, along with concerns for downstream competition, to declare the concentration of 
Kesko/Tuko incompatible with the internal market. Therefore, in any of the different competition 
law areas there is limited room for intervention in cases of UPPs. 
This reduced room for the application of EU competition law, however, does not imply that UPPs 
are not a problem needing regulation within a broad ordoliberally influenced competition policy, 
at either the EU level or the national level, because of their possible adverse effects. On the EU 
level, I have discussed the limited applicability of the current instruments that exist to regulate 
unfair practices, as well as the position of the Commission in arguing that regulation of UPPs 
from a buyer-supplier perspective is better suited for national regulation than applying a 
harmonized non-core competition law regime. At the national level, I have analyzed how MS 
have adopted different alternatives within, although mostly outside, their national competition 
laws to tackle UPPs and particularly in the last decade. My analysis distinguished four different 
modalities: adopting lower dominance thresholds for food retailing within their competition laws; 
regulating UPPs through rules related to relative dominant positions and abuse of depedence; 
contract and tort-law like solutions based on ‘unfair competition laws’ or sectoral regulation; and 
lastly the adoption of soft law instruments as codes of conduct. Hence, the European map is 
anything but standardized and many different regulatory avenues tackle UPPs leading to 
somewhat similar outcomes: protecting small suppliers vis-à-vis large buyers and having a strong 
component of fairness and distributive justice. 
Despite this increasing trend towards the regulation of UPPs, partly pursuant to political and 
social pressure, my research found that cases of UPPs are rare, both at the EU as well as the 
national level. This lack of abundant cases, despite the ‘popularity’ of UPPs, can have several 
explanations. Firstly, one option is that UPPs are not really an issue of efficiency or market 
power abuse and suppliers complain against them not because they are exploited but because they 
are not paid as much as they would like to be or are required to assume risks that they normally 
would not be willing to take if they were in a stronger bargaining position. Furthermore, if the 
UPPs are seen as a way to countervail seller market power and pass on the benefits to end 
consumers, then authorities will perceive them to be consumer welfare enhancing because end-
consumer prices are lowered, and therefore efficient. Another answer is that as exploitative 
abuses are considered to be less pernicious and self-correctable, EU institutions and NCAs do not 
consider UPPs an enforcement priority. Also, another possibility is that UPPs are not denounced 
by suppliers as they fear retaliation from buyers they depend on, an explanation also supported 
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by the Commission.2124 Therefore, in case of a complaint the buyer can simply terminate any kind 
of commercial relation and perhaps drive the supplier out of business. Alternatively, it could well 
be that suppliers that complain due to imposition of UPPs happen to be not very efficient, and 
therefore have higher costs that may not be necessarily justified, as other providers could take 
their place. 
In sum, UPPs are an example of exploitative vertical buyer power practices that in most cases are 
not a market power problem but rather an issue of contractual imbalance as it is not clear, or at 
least it seems that UPPs have a limited market-wide impact on the competitive conditions in the 
upstream and downstream related markets, as shown by the recent Commission studies. Because 
of this, there is little room for the application of EU competition law to UPPs, as put forward in 
this chapter and recently clarified by the Commission.2125 This, therefore, is an area ripe for 
further sectoral research from a welfare perspective, both in terms of allocative and dynamic 
efficiency. Again, the key seems to lie in guaranteeing that the powerful buyer does not “pocket” 
this supracompetitive profit and passes it on to end consumers, without distorting in an adverse 
manner the competitive conditions in the upstream market, in either static nor dynamic terms. If 
that is the case, then EU competition law intervention is required to control the anti-competitive 
exercise of buyer power by buyers’ cartels, dominant buyers or as the outcome of a proposed 
concentration among buyers. This moderate approach to the scope of application of EU 
competition law to UPPs is also in line with the broader application of EU competition law to 
buyer power as it offers a degree to the competitive process and, consequently, some limited and 
justified protection to suppliers, the undertaking’s economic freedom and captures instances of 
anti-competitive harm, even absent evidence of direct end consumer harm. However, as shown, 
the room for applicability of EU competition law to UPPs is narrow as other regulatory and better 
avenues are available at the national level. 
  
                                                          
2124 European Commission ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Unfair 
Business-to-Business Trading Practices in the Food Supply Chain’ (2016), p. 6 and 10. 
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10 Countervailing Buyer Power 
10.1 Introduction 
Countervailing buyer power (CBP) is, along with UPPs, arguably the sub-topic of buyer power 
that has received the most attention in literature on EU competition law.2126 Despite this 
‘popularity’ its importance as a factor in the decision making by the Commission or the Courts is 
rather limited because the sufficiency test is rather strict, as I discuss in this chapter. CBP acts as 
a competitive constraint mitigating or nullifying the market power effects by a supplying 
undertaking,2127 acting as a defense argument as its existence prevents an undertaking from 
behaving independently from its buyer and, therefore, being dominant or significantly impeding 
effective competition in the future.2128 CBP, therefore, neutralizes seller market power making 
the suppliers lose a fraction of it and distributing profits and welfare among the remaining 
participants.2129 Therefore, in these cases it is the seller and not the buyer that is the one that 
claims the existence of buyer power, hence I entitled Part V ‘Buyer Power from a Seller’s 
Perspective’.2130 
In this chapter, I analyze CBP from a general perspective in light of the case law, the 
Commission’s practice, and other authoritative sources across all areas of EU competition law. 
My goal is to contribute to the existing literature by defining what CBP is in EU competition law 
and under which circumstances it is a sufficient force to neutralize seller market power. To 
answer these questions I have structured the chapter as follows. In section 10.2 I define the 
concept of CBP from a legal perspective. I employ a narrow approach to CBP by defining it as a 
specific expression of bargaining power that acts as an extraordinary circumstance precluding an 
undertaking from behaving independently of its customers or from significantly impeding 
competition by neutralizing seller market power. In section 10.3 I review and discuss the most 
relevant characteristics that define CBP, followed, in section 10.4, by a detailed analysis of the 
treatment of CBP by the Commission’s Guidance Notices and soft law instruments, according to 
its level of detail and importance. The remainder of the chapter deals with the analysis of CBP 
                                                          
2126 Cook and Kerse have stated that CBP is a factor regularly considered by the EU Commission but that it rarely 
alleviates significant competition concerns, the analysis of the case law done in this dissertation confirms this 
assertion, Cook and Kerse, [2009], p. 250-251. 
2127 Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice [2004], p. 121-122. 
2128 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 18; 
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 64-67; Kokkoris and Day (2009), p. 176. 
2129 American Antitrust Institute [2008], p. 105. 
2130 Also addressing this buyer power topic from a supplier’s perspective in the case of mergers see: Carlton, 
Coleman and Israel [2015], 540-546. 
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through the analysis of the case law and the Commission’s practice. In section 10.5 I discuss the 
treatment of CBP in EU competition law, its sources and which circumstances hindrance a buyer 
from exerting sufficient CBP. In section 10.6 I discuss applicability of CBP as an argumentative 
defense and identify a test employed by the Courts to determine the sufficiency of CBP, and also 
discuss how the test has developed over time. In section 10.7 I discuss how, and to what extent, 
the case law has required that CBP has a broader protective effect by creating a ‘spillover effect’ 
that requires that the neutralizing benefits favor not only the powerful buyer but also smaller 
buyers in their situation vis-à-vis the seller whose market power is being neutralized. Then, in 
section 10.8 I discuss whether the Courts and the Commission are under any obligation to ex 
officio analyze the existence and extent of CBP in a competition case. Lastly, section 10.9 
concludes the chapter. 
10.2 Defining countervailing buyer power: a narrow approach 
CBP is a form of countervailing power, as theorized by Galbraith in 1952 in American 
Capitalism;2131 I, however, and following the EU case law, define CBP in a narrow manner.2132 I 
submit that CBP in EU competition law represents the bargaining strength of a buyer vis-à-vis its 
supplier in a manner which allows the buyer to neutralize the exercise of selling market power, 
fully or partially in an upstream market, and is therefore sufficient to prevent the seller from 
behaving independently of its competitors and customers/buyers, hence neither being dominant 
or able to significantly impede effective future competition.2133 Consequently, CBP can exist in 
both the assessment of ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of a selling conduct. In simpler terms, the 
buyer(s) force(s) the seller to behave in a competitive – or as competitive as possible – manner by 
neutralizing its (or their) seller power through the exercise of buyer market power. This 
neutralization prevents the seller from increasing selling prices, reducing the quality of the goods 
or making conditions of delivery less favorable, as confirmed by the CJEU in AstraZeneca v 
Commission.2134 Therefore, for CBP to exist there must be a substantial degree of market power 
on both sides of the market (which oppose each other), also known as a bilateral power situation, 
                                                          
2131 Galbraith, [2010]. 
2132 Also using a narrow approach to CBP see: Catherine Corbett, Reena das Nair and Simon Roberts, 
‘Countervailing Power, Bargaining Power and Market Definition: A Reflection on two Mergers’. Also stressing the 
element of neutralizing sufficiency: Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 4.152 and Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], 
para. 5.877. 
2133 Judgment of 9 July 2007, Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, T-282/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:203, para. 
210; Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, para. 41; Faull, 
Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 5.879; OECD ‘Policy Roundtables: Monopsony and Buyer Power’ (2009), p. 60. 
2134 “AZ was able to maintain much higher market shares than those of its competitors while charging prices higher 
than those charged for other PPIs was a relevant factor showing that AZ’s behaviour was not, to an appreciable 
extent, subject to competitive constraints from its competitors, its customers and, ultimately, consumers” in 
Judgment of 6 December 2012 in AstraZeneca v Commission, C-457/10 P, EU:C:2012:770, para. 181. See also: 
Nazzini, [2011], p. 358. 
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a term coined by Faull and Nikpay.2135 To determine when CBP is sufficient, the case law, the 
Commission’s practice, and the guidance notices have developed a ‘comparison test’ that 
assesses the neutralizing buyer market power and determines its existence. This test has evolved 
from a mere contrasting of market shares among parties to a more accurate and complex 
comparison of several factors. 
An example helps illustrate the concept.2136 The undertaking “Engine Jet Producer” is involved in 
the manufacture of aircraft engines. Due to its commercial success, the capacity to innovate and 
its reputation, it has legally acquired a large market share that amounts to 75% of the market for 
the provision of jet engines. In normal conditions such an extraordinarily large market share 
would serve as a strong indicator that Engine Jet Producer is able to behave independently from 
its competitors and buyers and could impose high prices for jet engines, or engage in other types 
abusive selling conditions. There are two main buyers of jet engines from Engine Jet Producer: 
the undertakings “European Aircrafts” and “Fly-away”. European Aircrafts and Fly-away are 
fierce rivals in the design and manufacture of commercial planes and together account for more 
than 85% of the purchases of jet engines in the EU. Due to their importance as buyers for Engine 
Jet Producer, European Aircrafts and Fly-away ‘keep in check’ the behavior of the seller. This 
importance and countervailing ability as buyers is derived from their large size and strategic 
value for suppliers, the fact that no other purchasers have the capacity to acquire even half the 
amount of jet engines that European Aircrafts or Fly-away individually buy each year, and the 
fact that Engine Jet Producer has neither the interest or capacity to enter into the airplane design 
or production business. If Engine Jet Producer threatens to raise the prices of engines, European 
Aircrafts and/or Fly-away would stop purchasing them and look for an alternative supplier or 
may even decide to enter into the jet engine manufacturing business themselves. The buyers 
exercise CBP because they neutralize the market power of Engine Jet Producer as a seller. 
Not all authors adopt a narrow definition to CBP, and nor do the Commission’s guidance 
notices.2137 For instance the Commission defines CBP as the “bargaining strength that the buyer 
has vis-à-vis the seller in commercial negotiations due to its size, its commercial significance to 
the seller and its ability to switch to alternative suppliers”.2138 Other authors,2139 also use the term 
                                                          
2135 Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 6.326 and 6.330. 
2136 This example is loosely modeled after the Commission Decision of 3 July 2001 declaring a concentration to be 
incompatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement Case COMP/M.2220 — General Electric/Honeywell 
[2004] OJ L 48/1. In this case, however, the Commission concluded that purchasers of aircraft engines lacked 
sufficient CBP and decided to declare the concentration incompatible with the relevant market.  
2137 See for example Chen who uses the term countervailing power as synonym of bargaining power in Chen ‘Buyer 
power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy’ (2007); also Kirkwood uses the term countervailing power to refer to 
what is understood in this dissertation as bargaining power, see Kirkwood ‘Powerful Buyers and Merger 
Enforcement’ (2012). 
2138 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 64. 
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to represent the benign sign of buyer (bargaining) power in opposition to monopsony power. In 
my view, their understanding is synonymous to the concept of countervailing power by 
Galbraith.2140 This broader usage, however, faces two difficulties: firstly, it considers CBP 
synonymous with bargaining power, and, secondly, it assumes that CBP takes place 
automatically, I discuss these issues below.  
Firstly, and for the sake of precision, I employ the term CBP not as an equivalent to the theory of 
countervailing power by Galbraith, nor as equivalent to bargaining power in general, arising 
between two contractual parties. Instead, I employ the term within its legal meaning, pertaining to 
the appraisal of the existence of opposed market power. In my view, Galbraith’s theory is broader 
than CBP, the latter being a specific expression of bargaining purchasing power. This legal 
approach to the definition of CBP implies that this market power is an expression of an efficiency 
defense restraining the existence of unchallenged market power. Also, unlike bargaining power in 
general, CBP requires a much higher threshold to exist and be sufficient; i.e., it has to be enough 
to preclude dominance or prevent a significant impediment of competition by the opposed 
supplier.2141 This neutralization level is much higher than bargaining power in general because it 
may neutralize either very little or very much of opposing seller market power. Therefore, CBP is 
a degree of bargaining buyer power that must be sufficient to neutralize dominant seller market 
power, as it is employed by the Commission in its Decisions when it repeatedly discusses either 
the sufficiency or the limited character of CBP.2142 
Regarding the second assumption, while indeed CBP that allows for the neutralization of 
dominance by a selling undertaking, it should not be implicitly assumed that CBP will 
automatically restrain abuse of dominance. This is so because CBP will be exercised “only to the 
extent that it serves their own – buyers’ – interests”, as stressed by Hovenkamp,2143 or when the 
buyers’ actions will not be subject to free-riding by competitors, as decided in Prokent-Tomra.2144 
Therefore, and assuming a profit-maximization rationale, buyers will neutralize the seller market 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
2139 Kokkoris (2006); Kokkoris and Day (2009); Robert O'Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of 
Article 102 TFEU (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2013), p. 166-167; Kokkoris and Shelanski, [2014]. 
2140 Galbraith, [2010] 97 to 135, p. 97-135; for a commentary on Galbraith’s work in the context of merger analysis 
see: Facey and Brown, [2013], p. 239-241. 
2141 Also raising the question of sufficiency see: Bellamy and others, [2013], para 10.020. 
2142 See: Commission Decision of 17 October 2001 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2187 — CVC/Lenzing) [2004] OJ L 82/20, para. 
192-194 and 213-223; Commission Decision of 3 April 2001 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the 
common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2139 — Bombardier/ADtranz) [2002] 
OJ L 69/50, para. 81. 
2143 Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice [2005], p. 544. 
2144 Summary of Commission Decision of 29 March 2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement against Tomra Systems ASA, Tomra 
Europe AS, Tomra Systems BV, Tomra Systems GmbH, Tomra Butikksystemer AS, Tomra Systems AB and Tomra 
Leergutsysteme GmbH (Case COMP/E-1/38.113 — Prokent/Tomra) [2008] OJ C 219/11; taken from the unabridged 
version, para. 89. 
438 
 
power of a powerful seller only when doing so is more profitable than benefiting from the 
dominance structure in the seller’s market. This could happen, for example, if parties decide to 
coordinate their purchasing and selling behavior and behave like in a bilateral monopoly 
scenario.2145 If buyers coordinate the behavior with the seller then the consequences could be 
worse than pure selling market power as the firms could behave like monemporist exerting 
upstream and downstream market power in a coordinated fashion.  
Furthermore, and part of this narrow approach, my study found that there is a tension concerning 
the measurement and the degree of CBP’s effect and whether for CBP to exist it must affect a 
bilateral situation (buyer-seller) or has to affect competition as a whole. The case law and the 
Commission’s practice remark that CBP, if defined through its measurement, constitutes a 
relative concept that defines the relation of bargaining power between a seller and a specific 
buyer.2146 On the other hand concerning its effects and sufficiency as a neutralizing factor, the 
exercise of CBP must have a general impact on the competitive conditions as it has to neutralize 
the market power of the seller vis-à-vis the strongest buyer and also produce a ‘spillover 
effect’,2147 as I discuss in detail in section 10.8. This spillover effect implies that CBP cannot only 
have a limited effect between the supplier and its largest buyer(s), but it also ought to benefit 
(albeit not to the same degree) other smaller buyers; hence the effect cannot be solely inter partes 
but also produce a limited erga omnes effect that neutralizes the undertaking’s seller market 
power. 
10.3 Countervailing buyer power characteristics 
There are several characteristics that are topical to countervailing power. Firstly, CBP may exist 
regardless of whether its effect is actual or potential. As confirmed by the General Court in 
Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, CBP would neutralize seller market power if the 
buyers force a seller to either limit its increase in current prices or to refrain from increasing 
prices in the future.2148 Furthermore, in the case of CBP assessment in concentrations, the 
assessment is always forward looking, anchored on the post-merger market structure, as decided 
in JCI/FIAMM, whereas in the case of agreements or dominance the exam tends to be focused on 
                                                          
2145 For the discussion of bilateral monopoly see chapter 3 section 3.3, footnote 105 of this dissertation. 
2146 Judgment of 14 December 2005, General Electric v Commission, T-210/01, ECR, EU:T:2005:456, para. 277; 
Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64, 
para. 230. 
2147 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, para. 96. 




the actual effect.2149 Also, in CVC/Lenzing, the Commission stressed that in the pre-merger 
scenario the buyers “regard their current bargaining power as balanced, the vast majority expect it 
to be rather weak if the notified operation goes ahead”, therefore the risks of eliminating the 
existing CBP were taken into consideration as a consequence of the merger.2150 
Secondly, the measurement of CBP is a relative concept.2151 This implies that a customer may 
have sufficient CBP vis-à-vis a supplier whereas another buyer does not, as confirmed in General 
Electric v Commission.2152 Thus, the fact that a buyer has CBP does not imply that other 
undertaking’s customers do. Hence, the assessment and measurement must be made buyer-by-
buyer. The same, however, cannot be said of the extent of its effect, which, in the light of the case 
law, the Commission’s practice and the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines has to have a limited 
erga omnes or spillover effect. 
Thirdly, CBP is usually, but not exclusively, exercised by customers that are not physical end 
consumers (i.e.: natural persons), as confirmed in Airtours v Commission by the General 
Court.2153 End consumers possess little CBP because they purchase in isolation, do not pool their 
purchases like a buying alliance or a large undertaking would, and, more importantly, they may 
represent an insignificant proportion of the sales if taken in isolation, as confirmed by the 
Commission in Slovak Telekom.2154 However, the fact that a buyer may not exercise sufficient 
CBP does not imply that it would not be able to react to a price increase by shifting to a different 
supplier or stop purchasing the good, if such possibilities exist.2155 Also, the case law and the 
Commission’s practice confirm that it is more likely that large and sophisticated buyers will 
possess CBP than smaller firms in a fragmented industry.2156 
                                                          
2149 Summary of Commission Decision of 10 May 2007 declaring a concentration compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.4381 — JCI/FIAMM) [2009] OJ C 241/12, taken 
from the unabridged version. 
2150 Commission Decision of 17 October 2001 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2187 — CVC/Lenzing) [2004] OJ L 82/20, para. 214. 
2151 See also stating that “[b]uyer power is not an absolute concept, however, and it is important to consider the 
degree of buyer power and whether it operates as an effective constraint on the ability of the supplier to exert market 
power”, in Bellamy and others, [2013], para 10.141 
2152 “It is sufficient to find here, as the Commission does, that the buyer power refereed to in the decisions in 
question existed vis-à-vis companies other than the applicant and in respect of other products”, in Judgment of 14 
December 2005, General Electric v Commission, T-210/01, ECR, EU:T:2005:456, para. 277 (emphasis added); 
Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64, 
para. 230. 
2153 Judgment of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission, T-342/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:146, para. 262. 
2154 Summary of Commission Decision of 15 October 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39523 — Slovak 
Telekom) [2015] OJ C 314/7, taken from the unabridged version, para. 336. 
2155 Judgment of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission, T-342/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:146, para. 274. 
2156 Judgment of 9 July 2007, Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, T-282/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:203, para. 
210. Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 




Fourthly, CBP is a relevant factor to prevent or minimize the risks of the creation of collective 
dominance or to impede collusion among sellers.2157 In these assessments it ought to be 
considered whether CBP can prevent or limit coordination among undertakings by creating 
incentives to deviate from the agreement by offering a different purchasing price to providers that 
allows them to reap extra profits, as discussed in Airtours v Commission,2158 and further 
confirmed in the Sony/BMG Decisions and subsequent Judgments,2159 MCI WorldCom/Sprint,2160 
and Korsnäs/AD Cartonboard,2161 as I discuss below.  
A similar distortive argument was used in Carglass,2162 where CBP and the existence of dual 
sourcing from the buyers distorted the collusive agreement among the selling parties. However, 
and as remarked by the General Court in the annulment action, the existence of CBP power did 
not prevent the agreement to constitute an object restriction of competition in breach of Article 
101(1) TFEU, even though it might have limited the implementation of a cartel that had not been 
yet implemented.2163 
Concerning tacit collusion and the distortive role played by CBP, in Sony/BMG, CBP was raised 
as one of the elements that may neutralize the creation or strengthening of a collective dominant 
position. The final outcome of the case concluded that the proposed merger was compatible with 
the relevant market partially because the CBP acted as an incentive to deviate from a tacit 
collusion agreement.2164 However, the assessment of CBP as a mechanism to break up the tacit 
                                                          
2157 Also raising this issue see: Peder Christensen and Valerie Rabassa, ‘The Airtours Decision: Is there a new 
Commission Approach to Collective Dominance?’ 22 European Competition Law Review (2001) 227. 
2158 Judgment of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission, T-342/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:146. 
2159 This case involves two Commission Decisions, an annulment action before the General Court and an appeal 
before the CJEU. The involved legal instruments are, in order of its date: i) Commission Decision of 19 July 2004 
declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement 
(Case No COMP/M. 3333 - Sony/BMG) [2004] OJ L 62/30; ii) Judgment of 13 July 2006 in Impala v Commission, 
T-464/04, EU:2006:16; Judgment of 10 July 2008 in Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala, C-
413/06 P, EU:2008:392; and iv) Commission Decision declaring a concentration compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (COMP/M.3333 — Sony/BMG), [2007], taken from the 
unabridged version. 
2160 Commission Decision of 28 June 2000 declaring a concentration incompatible with the common market and the 
EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.1741 — MCI WorldCom/Sprint) [2003] OJ L 300/1, para. 302. 
2161 Commission Decision of Non-opposition to a notified concentration M.4057 — Korsnäs/Assidomän 
Cartonboard [2006] OJ C 209/12, taken from the unabridged version. 
2162 Summary of Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.125 — Car glass) 
[2009] OJ C 173/13. 
2163 Judgment of 17 December 2014, Pilkington Group and Others v Commission, T-72/09, EU:T:2014:1094, paras. 
287-289. Appealed and dismissed in its entirety as Judgment of 7 September 2016 in Pilkington Group and Others v 
Commission, C-101/15, EU:C:2016:631. 
2164 Article 1 of the Commission Decision declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the 
functioning of the EEA Agreement COMP/M.3333 — Sony/BMG, [2007]. 
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collusion was not fully carried out in the first assessment of the concentration2165 and was one of 
the reasons why the General Court annulled the Commission’s decision.2166 Upon this, the 
Commission was asked to assess CBP as an instability factor against collective dominant 
positions and the special role played by iTunes;2167 in particular that the buyer power of iTunes 
led music providers to charge iTunes a lower wholesale price than that charged other buyers, and 
not due to some form of coordination among the suppliers of online music.2168 Furthermore, 
iTunes’ purchasing behavior and CBP was a deterrent mechanism for the tacit collusion because 
its strength as a buyer allowed it to reject any wholesale price differentiation for single tracks, 
generating a “balance of power” between the music suppliers and iTunes. This, along with the 
lack of transparency and limited credible retaliation, led the Commission to conclude that no 
collective dominant position was being created or strengthened as result of the operation. CBP 
creates incentives to deviate from tacit collusion because it grants the buyer the ability to 
“negatively affect the ability to reach a coordinated effect,” in particular by offering incentives to 
deviate from the agreement.2169 This happens when the buyer represents a substantial portion of 
sales, even if the purchasing price it is willing to pay is below the coordinate price but above “the 
marginal cost of supply, firms will have a considerable incentive to accept the buyer’s offer”. The 
Commission, therefore, recognizes that buyer power, and in particular CBP, acts as a 
destabilizing factor in collusive cases. 
Also, the existence and ability of CBP to destabilize tacit collusion was assessed in MCI 
WorldCom/Sprint where the Commission recognized that as “customers could foster the 
emergence of other leading players by contracting with the existing smaller competitors”, CBP 
prevented the collusive outcome and, among other considerations, it decided not to pursue its 
objection of collective dominance related to the market for provision of global 
telecommunications services.2170 Additionally, In Korsnäs/AD Cartonboard, the Commission 
found that the presence of CBP reduced the risks of customer sharing among the merging party 
and its competitor, as the buyer could play off the suppliers by agreeing to acquire from one of 
                                                          
2165 For the Commission, however, there was no need to evaluate the existence of CBP as it concluded that one of the 
cumulative conditions for the existence of a collective dominant position – price transparency – was not present, in 
Judgment of 13 July 2006 in Impala v Commission, T-464/04, EU:2006:16, para. 505. 
2166 Judgment of 13 July 2006 in Impala v Commission, T-464/04, EU:2006:16, para. 490. 
2167 Commission Decision declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the functioning of the 
EEA Agreement COMP/M.3333 — Sony/BMG, [2007], taken from the unabridged version, paras. 96-98. 
2168 Commission Decision declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the functioning of the 
EEA Agreement COMP/M.3333 — Sony/BMG, [2007], taken from the unabridged version, para. 115. 
2169 Commission Decision declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the functioning of the 
EEA Agreement COMP/M.3333 — Sony/BMG, [2007], taken from the unabridged version, para. 146. 
2170 Commission Decision of 28 June 2000 declaring a concentration incompatible with the common market and the 
EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.1741 — MCI WorldCom/Sprint) [2003] OJ L 300/1, para. 302. 
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them the sale of the whole production and the buyer’s demand, as in this case there was spare 
capacity and costs that would have not been increased much further.2171 
Fifthly, and lastly, the origin of the CBP – public or private - is irrelevant for its effectiveness. In 
GE/Instrumentarium the Commission found that no sufficient CBP could be exercised against the 
merged entity by contracting authorities under the scope of public procurement law (mainly 
public hospitals). However, the Commission did not rule out the possibility that public buyers can 
also exercise it.2172 Also, in AstraZeneca v Commission, Advocate General Mazák dismissed the 
possibility that a public (monopsonist) buyer of prescription medicines could mitigate the seller 
power of a dominant undertaking.2173 However, the origin and nature of the CBP may limit its 
effectiveness, particularly if the buyer is subject to regulations limiting its freedom of contractual 
choice, even if the public buyer is a central purchasing body.2174 
10.4  Countervailing buyer power in the Commission Guidelines 
Unlike the majority of buyer power aspects, the Commission has devoted sections in its soft law 
instruments to describe the assessment, application and its policy concerning CBP for cases under 
Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU and horizontal concentration operations. Because of this unusual interest 
by the Commission in the topic and the detailed treatment given to CBP, I discuss these 
instruments in this section. Also, this discussion paves the way for the remainder of the chapter as 
the guidelines incorporate and have advanced further the legal treatment given by the Courts 
concerning CBP. Of particular importance for the analysis of CBP are the EU Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines from 2004, which summarize the “comparison test” and were used as the basis for the 
drafting of the successive guidelines with respect to Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU.2175 
                                                          
2171 Commission Decision of Non-opposition to a notified concentration M.4057 — Korsnäs/Assidomän 
Cartonboard [2006] OJ C 209/12, paras. 71 and 73. 
2172 Commission Decision of 2 September 2003 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.3083 — GE/Instrumentarium) [2004] OJ L 109/1, para. 
118.  
2173 Opinion of Advocate General Mázak in Judgment of 6 December 2012 in AstraZeneca v Commission, C-457/10 
P, EU:C:2012:293, para. 117-127. 
2174 For some literature concerning centralized purchasing and the ability of buyers to agglutinate countervailing 
buyer power see, inter alia, Chard, Duhs and Houlden (2008); Albano and Sparro (2010); Herrera Anchustegui 
‘Centralizing Public Procurement and Competitiveness in Directive 2014/24’ (2015); Sánchez Graells, Public 
Procurement and the EU Competition Rules [2015]; Sánchez Graells and Herrera Anchustegui, ‘Impact of Public 
Procurement Aggregation on Competition. Risks, Rationale and Justification for the Rules in Directive 2014/24’ 
[2016]. 
2175 Also stressing the importance of the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines for the assessment of CBP see: Ezrachi 
and Ioannidou (2014). For a brief analysis of countervailing buyer power in the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
see: Sylvie Maudhuit and Trevor Soames, ‘Changes in EU merger control: Part 2’ 26 European Competition Law 
Review (2005) 75. 
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10.4.1 Countervailing buyer power assessment in concentration cases  
10.4.1.1 EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
The 2004 EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines devote an important section to CBP as a competitive 
constraint imposed on a merging supplier by its customers, as discussed at length in its Section 
V.2176 According to these, CBP and its effectiveness on constraining the behavior of the merged 
undertaking ought to be weighed up when performing the competitive assessment of the proposed 
merger.2177 Furthermore, the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines embraces the ‘comparison test’ 
developed by the case law and the Commission’s practice and advocates carrying it out as part of 
the assessment of the concentration albeit without providing further guidance regarding its 
application.  
The EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines define CBP in a very general manner akin to bargaining 
power “as the bargaining strength that the buyer has vis-à-vis the seller in commercial relations,” 
having its origin in three main factors or sources,2178 which have been identified by the case law 
in Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission and Irish Sugar v Commission and 
incorporated into the Guidelines.2179 These sources are:  
i) size;2180  
ii) commercial significance;2181  
iii) the ability of buyers to switch to alternative suppliers,2182 vertically integrate, or 
sponsor upstream expansion or entry.2183  
                                                          
2176 Schwalbe and Zimmer, [2009], p. 153. See a brief discussion of CBP in the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines: 
Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 919-920. 
2177 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 10-11.  
2178 The sources of CBP and its assessment are linked to the sources and assessment of buyer market power in 
general as CBP is a sub-type of it. My general analysis concerning the sources and assessment of buyer power has 
been covered in chapters 3, 5 and 6 of this dissertation. 
2179 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 64. These CBP sources were ratified by the General 
Court in Judgment of 9 July 2007, Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, T-282/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:203, 
para. 210. See also Judgment of 7 October 1999, Irish Sugar v Commission, T-228/97, ECR, EU:T:1999:246. 
2180 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 64. See also in Irish Sugar v Commission where the 
General Court dismissed the plea of lack of independence from customers because the market share of the two 
largest customers was not large enough to counterbalance the market dominance by Irish Sugar, Judgment of 7 
October 1999, Irish Sugar v Commission, T-228/97, ECR, EU:T:1999:246, para. 97. Economists have expressed 
doubts on the importance of market shares and size as a genuine source of CBP, for example, see: Bishop and 
Walker, [2010], para. 7-046. 
2181 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 64. See the general discussion on the issue of 
commercial dependence in chapters 6 and 9. 
2182 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 64. See also: Commission Decision of 25 November 
1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement 




Concerning the buyer’s size, for the Commission, CBP is more likely to arise if buyers are large 
and sophisticated as opposed to small and ordinary buyers.2184 Also, CBP may be exercised by 
refusing to buy goods, or particularly “in the case of durable goods, delaying purchases”,2185 as I 
discussed regarding the ability to exercise monopsony power in chapter 3, section 3.3.1, and 
regarding exploitative purchasing prices in chapter 8, section 8.3.2. This, however, does not 
imply that the buyer has to be dominant, nor does it need to have particularly large market shares 
to exert sufficient CBP. This observation in the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines is consistent 
with bargaining power economics and the fact that bilateral buyer market power arises, and has a 
substantial effect, in lower market share levels than when compared with seller market power,2186 
as discussed in chapters 5 and 6. In this sense, the Guidelines also recognize that pure market 
shares are not enough to grant CBP if absent other factors.2187 
Additionally, according to the Guidelines the third source of CBP – alternative supply sources – 
only ought to be taken into consideration if the threat is credible and possible to be executed 
within a reasonable time frame.2188 Albeit not expressly mentioned in the EU Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines but connected to this source, spare capacity is also a relevant indicator, as competitors 
might be unable to meet the demand of customers, as discussed in Enso/Stora and SCA/Metsä 
Tissue.2189 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Commission found that the presence of few but large clients – major car manufacturers- able to switch suppliers was 
a competitive constraint of sufficient magnitude to neutralize the important increase of market share of Valeo as a 
spare parts supplier, Commission Decision of 30/07/1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the 
common market (Case No IV/M.1245 - Valeo/ITT Industries) [1998] OJ C 288/5, public version, para. 26. 
2183 Tetra Pak was deemed to have “the option of developing new capacity with other existing or new suppliers, 
should the parties attempt to exercise market power” and, thus, have every incentive to seek to exercise its CBP vis-
à-vis the merged entity between Enso and Stora, Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a 
concentration to be compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No 
IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, para. 91. See also the commentary of this aspect of the case in Baker 
and Lofaro (2000), p. 188. 
2184 Supporting this approach of sophistication over market power see: Nordemann (1995); Ezrachi and Ioannidou 
(2014), p. 84. 
2185 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 65. 
2186 Bishop and Walker, [2010] 388 to 389, para. 7-046-7048. See chapter 6, section 6.4.1 for the discussion of the 
market share thresholds used in buyer power cases. 
2187 In this sense, the proposed definition of CBP appears to include both monopsonistic buyers and buyers enjoying 
bargaining power, despite the fact that the welfare outcome of the exercise of CBP by these two types of buyers may 
be dissimilar. This, in turn, opens the question on whether a monopsonistic CBP should receive the same treatment 
as a bargaining CBP. 
2188 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 65. 
2189 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, para. 94; 
Commission Decision of 31 January 2001 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market and 
the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2097 SCA/Metsä Tissue) [2001] OJ L 57/1, para. 89; 
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Although not considering it as a source, the Commission suggests taking into account whether 
there are particular incentives of buyers to use their buyer power, reinforcing the idea that CBP 
does not operate automatically.2190 A positive incentive to CBP was found to exist for Tetra Pak 
in case the merger Enso/Stora had happened, as it would use its buyer power to neutralize seller 
market power and prevent price increases after the merger.2191 However, the EU Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines stress that there might be lack of incentives to exercise buyer power whenever 
the benefits of new entrants can be reaped by other customers by free-riding the investments.2192 
Concerning the analysis of the sufficiency of CBP to offset the adverse effects of a concentration 
on competition, the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide little guidance as to what 
situations and how the comparison test should be applied. Instead, they only suggest that CBP 
will be a sufficient constraint to the merging party market power when it is present in a sufficient 
degree to offset the potential effects of a merger.2193  
From a negative perspective, however, they indicate when CBP will be insufficient to offset 
adverse effects derived from a merger in two circumstances. Firstly, CBP will be insufficient if it 
would only preclude the merging entity from raising prices or diminishing trading conditions 
with respect to a specific segment of customers with a particularly substantial bargaining 
strength.2194 This implies that CBP ought to have at least a partial erga omnes effect. This also 
implies that the treatment of CBP recognizes, as buyer power in general does, as one of its aims 
the protection of the competitive structure, as well as protecting smaller (yet not inefficient) 
weaker buyers and has a concern regarding waterbed effects on rival buyers, as I discuss in 
further detail in section 10.8 of this chapter. Secondly, effective CBP must exist pre and post-
merger, otherwise it would be ineffective.2195 If as consequence of the merger, a credible 
alternative of supply is removed, the CBP will be diminished and buyers will be harmed.2196 In 
my view, this implies that assessment of CBP in merger cases has to be done in the pre and post 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Schwalbe and Zimmer, [2009], p. 153. See also stressing the importance of capacity in the Enso/Stora case: Motta, 
Competition Policy: Theory and Practice [2006], p. 122. 
2190 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 66. 
2191 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, para. 91. See also 
discussing this: Monti ‘The Concept of Dominance in Article 82’ (2006), p. 36-38. 
2192 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 66. See also: Schwalbe and Zimmer, [2009] 154, p. 
154. 
2193 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 67. 
2194 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 67. 
2195 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 67. 
2196 Elhauge and Geradin, [2011], p. 1034. 
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merger scenarios, as its absence or substantial diminishment post-merger, even if it exists pre-
merger, will mean that it does not sufficiently offset potential adverse effects. 
10.4.1.2 Non-horizontal Mergers Guidelines 
The “Non-horizontal Mergers Guidelines”2197 largely follow the CBP’s treatment in the EU 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines by simply referring to them when assessing buyer power in 
different vertical scenarios: the overall impact of competition in vertical mergers;2198 customer 
foreclosure in vertical mergers;2199 and the foreclosing effect of conglomerate mergers.2200 In all 
these cases, the Commission suggests assessing the existence of CBP as a mitigating factor 
without providing any further indications.2201 
10.4.2 Countervailing buyer power in the Guidance Notice on Article 102 
TFEU 
The Commission’s Guidance Notice on Article 102 TFEU takes into account CBP as part of the 
“constraints imposed by the bargaining strength of the undertaking’s customers [countervailing 
buyer power]”2202 when assessing whether an undertaking enjoys a dominant position.2203 In its 
assessment the Guidance Notice on Article 102 TFEU builds upon the methodology and 
considerations discussed in the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines, with some minor 
modifications or updates. 
Concerning the CBP sources, the Guidance Notice on Article 102 TFEU lists the same three as 
discussed above with regard to the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Namely:  
i) customer’s (buyer) size;  
ii) its commercial significance for the dominant undertaking;  
iii) its ability to quickly switch to competing suppliers, promote new entry or to vertically 
integrate and credibly threaten to do so.2204  
                                                          
2197 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6. 
2198 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 51. 
2199 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 76. 
2200 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/6, para. 114. 
2201 Also indicating that in these cases the presence of CBP may indicate that harm to consumers may be unlikely if 
see: Alex Petrasincu, ‘The European Commission's New Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers - 
Great Expectations Disappointed’ 29 European Competition Law Review (2008) 221. 
2202 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 12. 
2203 Witt (2010), p. 223. 
2204 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 18. 
These sources are somewhat based on the ideas expressed in the Commission’s Discussion paper on the application 
of Article [102] TFEU of 2005 where it stated that “[t]he presence of strong buyers can only serve to counter a 
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Regarding size the Guidance Notice on Article 102 TFEU makes an explicit reference to the 
Judgment of Irish Sugar v Commission by the General Court, in which a defense of CBP was 
rejected2205 as it was determined that the dominant seller was not successful in “demonstrating 
that the Commission erred by not regarding its alleged lack of independence vis-à-vis its 
customers as an exceptional circumstance”.2206 However, from the Judgment it can be interpreted 
that the General Court considered that even a very large buyer, such as Irish Sugar with over 90% 
of the market share could be constrained in its behavior even by small buyers. In this case, 
however, “the share of sales of the two largest customers does not counterbalance the dominant 
position of Irish Sugar”.2207 
Unfortunately, the Guidance Notice on Article 102 TFEU, like the other soft law notices, does 
not offer much guidance on how the CBP assessment through the comparison test ought to be 
made. Nevertheless, it states that countervailing buyer will be an effective competitive constraint 
if it may deter or defeat an attempt by an undertaking to profitably increase prices.2208 On the 
other hand, it will not be an effective constraint if it only ensures “that a particular or limited 
segment of customers is shielded from the market power of the dominant undertaking”,2209 
reiterating the concern over the protection of arguably weaker buyers and market structure 
expressed in the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
Additionally, countervailing power is considered by the Guidance Notice on Article 102 TFEU 
whenever discussing the imposition of exclusive purchasing agreements. In this case, however, 
countervailing power is used in a broad manner and not in the same form as CBP as defined in 
this chapter. By countervailing power the Commission refers to the need for a dominant 
undertaking to compensate a buyer when it comes to entering into an exclusive purchasing deal 
“for the loss in competition resulting from the exclusivity” in the form of countervailing 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
finding of dominance if it is likely that in response to prices being increased above the competitive level, the buyers 
in question will pave the way for effective new entry or lead existing suppliers in the market to significantly expand 
their output so as to defeat the price increase”, in European Commission, DG Competition (2005), para. 41. 
2205 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, footnote 5. 
Reference is made to Judgment of 7 October 1999, Irish Sugar v Commission, T-228/97, ECR, EU:T:1999:246, para. 
97-104. 
2206 Judgment of 7 October 1999, Irish Sugar v Commission, T-228/97, ECR, EU:T:1999:246, para. 94-96. 
2207 Judgment of 7 October 1999, Irish Sugar v Commission, T-228/97, ECR, EU:T:1999:246, para. 98, ratifying the 
CBP assessment carried out by the Commission Decision of 14 May 1997 relating to a proceeding pursuant to 
Article 86 of the EC Treaty (IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar plc) [1997] OJ L 258/1, para. 108. 
2208 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 18. 
2209 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 18. 
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benefits.2210 Therefore, the rebate (discount) constitutes a limitation of the buyer’s ability to resort 
to other suppliers, as I discuss in chapter 11, section 11.4. 
10.4.3 Countervailing buyer power and countervailing benefits in the 
assessment of cases under the scope of Article 101 TFEU 
The Commission refers to CBP in three instruments dealing with the application of Article 101 
TFEU. Namely, the Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU, the Guidelines on 
Vertical Restraints of 2010, and the Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements of 2011. However, in 
most of these cases the use of the term countervailing (buyer) power is much broader than the 
meaning I employ and the way it is used in the soft law for unilateral behavior as discussed 
above. With regard to Article 101 TFEU, the Commission refers to the ability of buyers to act as 
a competitive constraint in the assessment of agreements between non-directly competing 
undertakings, in particular in the case of single branding and exclusive supply agreements. In this 
perspective, countervailing power is factored when assessing whether an agreement may benefit 
from the application of Article 101(3) TFEU after a prior determination of its restrictive nature 
and impact,2211 which I expand upon in chapter 11, section 11.5 in the discussion of 
countervailing benefits. The lack of a detailed analysis of CBP under Article 101 TFEU is, on the 
other hand, logical because CBP would act in any case as an element to prevent coordination (as 
was discussed above regarding tacit collusion) and may also be used exceptionally to claim that a 
sellers’ agreement might not be anti-competitive as its market power effects are neutralized by a 
powerful buyer. 
10.4.3.1 Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements 
The Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements of 2011 expressly mention CBP as a mitigating 
efficiency defense in three circumstances. Firstly, as one of the factors to assess when 
determining the existence and extent of seller market power of the parties involved in an 
agreement that might be considered restrictive of competition by effect.2212 Secondly, CBP is 
weighed up when determining if an information exchange is genuinely public. If information is 
publicly exchanged, CBP may act as a constraint decreasing the likelihood of a collusive 
outcome, as customers would be able to jeopardize the expected outcome from the collusive 
behavior.2213 Thirdly, it is applicable when adopting a “countervailing seller power” approach, a 
scenario that I discuss in detail in chapter 11, section 11.5. In these cases, countervailing power 
                                                          
2210 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 34. 
2211 Guidelines on the application of Article [101](3) TFEU [2004] OJ C 101/97, para. 12. 
2212 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, paras. 20, para. 45. 
2213 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, paras. 20, para. 94. 
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of sellers is taken into account when assessing purchasing agreements. In this evaluation, the 
Commission considers that when a purchasing agreement is outside of the safe harbor of market 
shares,2214 the exercise of countervailing power by suppliers vis-à-vis the buyers of the agreement 
may in effect preclude the agreement from giving rise to restrictive effects in competition.2215 
Hence, it acts as a defense mechanism for deeming the agreement a pro-competitive one. 
10.4.3.2 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints of 2010 
The Guidelines on Vertical Restraints of 2010 consider countervailing (bargaining power) in a 
broad manner as a relevant constraint limiting the effects of single branding agreements,2216 and 
acting as countervailing benefits that compensate the buyer for its inability to find alternative 
suppliers. These countervailing benefits, therefore, do not preclude the parties to a selling 
agreement from behaving independently like CBP does, and instead constitute a measurement to 
determine whether the buyer is sufficiently compensated and whether or not the exclusive 
purchasing obligation is abusive nor anti-competitive. 
The same broad approach to countervailing power is employed by the Commission when 
analyzing exclusive supply agreements,2217 and using the countervailing power of suppliers as a 
relevant competitive constraint, as large suppliers will not easily permit being cut off from 
alternative buyers. If suppliers are weak and thus lack countervailing seller power, then the risk 
of foreclosure due to the exclusive supply agreement increases.2218 This happens because if the 
buyer is too powerful then other buyers will not be able to obtain the input from the supplier.2219 
On the other hand, if suppliers are strong and enjoy countervailing power then exclusive supply is 
said to be found in combination with non-competing clauses.  
10.4.3.3 Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU 
Lastly, the ability of buyers to exert competitive pressure on the parties to an agreement in a 
broad manner is also discussed by the Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU. In 
particular, the Guidelines are relevant when assessing whether or not an agreement eliminates 
                                                          
2214 In principle, it is unlikely that a purchasing agreement by parties that have a combined market share not 
exceeding 15% on the purchasing – upstream- and selling – downstream- market, respectively, may have restrictive 
effects on competition. Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, paras. 
20, and para. 208. 
2215 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 209. 
2216 Single branding agreements limit the ability to exercise buyer market power as “the buyer is obliged or induced 
to concentrate its orders for a particular type of product with one supplier”, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] 
OJ C 130/1, para. 129. 
2217 Exclusive supply agreements are understood as those “that have as their main element that the supplier is obliged 
or induced to sell the contract products only or mainly to one buyer, in general or for a particular use”, Guidelines on 
Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 192. 
2218 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 198. 
2219 Bellamy, Child and Roth, [2001] para 7.040; Bellamy and others, [2013], para. 7.065.  
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competition with respect to a substantial part of the products concerned. In such cases, and as part 
of the entry barrier assessment, the Commission resorts to the ability to bring new sources of 
competition into the market,2220 as this pressure may indicate that CBP is exercised by sponsoring 
entry, therefore further preventing the restriction of competition. 
10.4.4 Critical remarks to the Commission’s soft law 
According to the Commission’s Guidelines, CBP precludes (an) undertaking(s) from behaving 
(to an appreciable extent) independently or from significantly impeding competition in the 
market by exerting seller market power. Despite the scant guidance, the assessment according to 
the soft law is to be carried out through the comparison test, which entails determining whether it 
will impose a sufficient buyer-side constraint to the provider such that it is capable of offsetting 
the anti-competitive effects of the conduct. 
Interestingly, CBP is discussed across all areas of EU competition law, albeit it is only with 
respect to unilateral behavior (present or future) that the discussion is more detailed, and rightly 
so, with considerably lesser importance in the case of assessment of agreements. Furthermore, the 
treatment of CBP across the different soft law instruments and areas of competition law is largely 
similar, which indicates that the Commission adopts a homogenous treatment of CBP for all 
aspects of EU competition law, rather than adopting a casuistic approach to it, a position that is 
welcomed. The welfare effects of CBP will tend to be similar regardless of whether the case deals 
with dominance, an agreement or a concentration. However the specific assessment ought to take 
into consideration the particular market structure and specificities of each case, to determine 
whether it is sufficient to neutralize the other’s side market power. From a legal perspective, a 
homogenous approach to CBP is also desirable as it fosters predictability and legal certainty. 
However, in my view, what differs in the treatment is the threshold that CBP must reach to offset 
the anti-competitive effects generated by the dominant position, concentration operation or 
agreement among undertakings, a topic not directly addressed by the soft law. This differentiated 
threshold also appears to be the approach taken by the Courts, as will be discussed infra in 
section 10.6. 
Additionally, the Guidelines focus on stating the sources of countervailing buyer and clarifying 
under which circumstances CBP is deemed as sufficient. Although, they do not provide a defined 
methodology regarding how all these factors are to be assessed and compared vis-à-vis the 
market power of the selling undertaking. In my view, two reasons may explain this. First, the 
Commission tacitly recognizes that the Courts are the organs entrusted in setting legally binding 
standards, such as the elements to factor in the comparison test and determining when CBP is 
sufficient to offset negative effects on competition derived from the undertaking’s seller market 
                                                          
2220 Guidelines on the application of Article [101](3) TFEU [2004] OJ C 101/97, para. 115 (v). 
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power. Second, not formally embracing any assessment methodology for the comparison test 
grants a margin of discretion to NCAs to develop their own, at least in the case of ‘pure’ national 
cases. This room for limited diversity, still tied to the legal test set by the Courts, allows for 
further improvement of the economic assessment of CBP.2221 
Lastly, the soft law coincides in indicating that CBP will not sufficiently offset potential adverse 
effects derived from the seller’s market power when it only shields a particular set of customers 
from it. In other words, CBP must have a spillover effect on other buyers. Consequently, there 
appears to be a requirement for CBP to improve purchasing market conditions as a whole and not 
simply that of a sole buyer, adopting a broader and more demanding approach to determine the 
sufficiency of CBP.2222 This reaffirms an interest of EU competition law for the protection of the 
competitive structure in the markets, as well as concern for possible waterbed effects affecting 
weaker buyers.2223 
10.5 Countervailing buyer power in the case law and Commission’s 
practice: sources and hindrances 
The remainder of this chapter discusses how CBP has been dealt with by the Courts, through the 
analysis of different concepts and key issues that concern it, to determine what the legal treatment 
given to these different aspects of CBP by the Courts is, in a holistic manner. This first section 
deals with the origin of CBP and the assessment of these sources. From another perspective, I 
also discuss hindrances or impediments for buyers to exercise CBP.  
10.5.1 Sources of countervailing buyer power 
The EU case law and Commission’s practice confirms that CBP originates from different non-
exhaustive sources that depend on the circumstances at hand, as reiterated by the General Court 
in Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission,2224 and more recently by the Commission in 
Car Glass.2225 By and large, the sources identified by the Courts are those that have been 
                                                          
2221 See advocating for some room for limited diversity on the application of EU competition law see: Christopher 
Townley, ‘Co-Ordinated Diversity: Revolutionary Suggestions for EU Competition Law (and for EU Law too)’ 
King’s College London Dickson Poon School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series 2014-13 (2013) 1. 
2222 Judgment of 21 March 2002, Shaw and Falla v Commission, T-131/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:83, para. 163. 
2223 A similar concern was expressed by the Commission when stating “[…] given the fact that dominance is 
assessed in relation to a market, it is not sufficient that certain strong buyers may be able to extract more favourable 
conditions from the allegedly dominant undertaking than their weaker competitors.” in European Commission, DG 
Competition (2005), para. 41. 
2224 Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64, 
para. 232. 
2225 “Bargaining power apart, other reasons for the “rapport captif” referred to by Saint-Gobain result from i) the 
absence of carglass suppliers on the determination of a certain number of economic key parameters such as the 
renewal politics of the range of models of cars (e.g. design, technical specifications, and frequency of 
renewals/restyling of car models), marketing issues, volumes, and prices (including in particular the decision by car 
manufacturers to apply a target price for a target volume requested at the stage for the RFQ; ii) the transfer of a 
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incorporated in the Commission’s Guidance Notices, which I discuss in detail below. These are: 
alternative supply sources and demand shifting, buyer size, commercial significance of the buyer 
for the supplier, and price differentials. I shall deal with each one in turn. 
10.5.1.1 Alternative supply sources and demand shifting 
The capacity to find credible alternative supply sources or shift demand in a “reasonable time” is 
the most important source of CBP according the case law, the Commission’s practice and the 
literature,2226 and also constitutes a part of the traditional element to determine the existence of 
dominance, even absent CBP.  
Shifting demand and, therefore, resorting to additional supply sources represents the ability of the 
buyer to channel its demand through other sellers. The more options there are, the less the seller 
is able to behave independently from its buyer. This demand shifting can take several forms, as 
clarified by the General Court in Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, that go beyond 
just changing a supplier, as I discuss below.2227 However, there are circumstances where, even if 
there are other suppliers it is not always possible to switch demand due to infrastructural reasons, 
as occurred in Slovak Telekom, where the lack of alternative offers to the local loop infrastructure 
for telecommunications made entry into the market of other suppliers highly unlikely.2228 Also, 
the ability to switch to alternative supplies (in this case docking ports) and spare capacity was a 
factor to consider to determine the sufficiency of CBP in Hutchison/RCPM/ECT, in which CBP 
was not sufficient, but the concentration was accepted pursuant to commitments.2229 
Furthermore, the General Court has given further advice concerning the general assessment when 
determining if CBP arises from alternative supply sources, as discussed in Cementbouw Handel 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
significant amount of commercial risk which is partly imposed on the carglass suppliers; iii) totally one-way 
transparent market exclusively seen from the car manufacturers point of view (they receive all the detailed 
information from the carglass suppliers), in particular as regards the breakdown of prices in an RFQ; iv) it was not in 
the carglass supplier's interest to engage in price collusion as this would imply implementing further capacity which 
would increase heavy investments only to see itself loosing the business to another supplier. Even if the result is 
achieved and the bid is won/contract supply is renewed, the car manufacturers may have a strategic interest not to 
give more business to that particular glass supplier in order to maintain a balance between his glass suppliers; v) the 
margin of manoeuvre that the glass supplier has is very limited as car manufacturer may change several things 
regarding a model all the time”. Summary of Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 relating to a proceeding 
under Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case 
COMP/39.125 — Car glass) [2009] OJ C 173/13, taken from the unabridged version, para. 441, footnote 672. 
2226 Also making reference to these sources see: Johan Karlsson, ‘Clearance of near-duopoly’ 27 European 
Competition Law Review (2006) 514, Cook and Patel, [2013] para 2.79. 
2227 Judgment of 9 July 2007, Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, T-282/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:203. 
2228 Summary of Commission Decision of 15 October 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39523 — Slovak 
Telekom) [2015] OJ C 314/7, taken from the unabridged version, paras. 289-291. 
2229 Commission decision of 3 July 2001 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the 




& Industrie v Commission.2230 The General Court held that CBP has its origin and 
“compensate[s] for the supplier’s market power if those customers have the ability to resort to 
credible alternative sources of supply within a reasonable time if the supplier decides to increase 
its prices or to make the conditions of delivery less favourable”.2231 Therefore, the presence of 
credible alternative supply sources confers CBP if there is “a strong probability that the supplier 
is forced to limit any increase in prices or indeed to refrain from increasing prices”, as stressed by 
the General Court.2232 This should be interpreted as implying that the ability to switch demand 
and, therefore CBP, may be either actual or potential. Additionally, in Cementbouw Handel & 
Industrie v Commission, the General Court clarified that, unlike the Commission held,2233 not 
simply large buyers but indeed any buyer can resort to alternative supply sources to generate 
CBP, therefore the ability to switch demand is not dependent on the size of the buyer, but it is an 
alternative factor for the origin of CBP. 
In Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, the General Court dealt with the forms that 
finding alternative sources may take. For instance, this could happen as the buyer shifts purchases 
to other suppliers, credibly threatens to vertically integrate into the upstream market,2234 could 
sponsor upstream expansion or entry,2235 or could resort to in-house production of the input, even 
if not identical to that which is supplied by the seller.2236 In this case, production in house and 
vertical integration were of particular importance as the General Court concluded that the 
capacity to resort to in-house production “allows [buyers] to discipline their suppliers to a certain 
                                                          
2230 Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64. 
2231 Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64, 
para. 230. 
2232 Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64, 
para. 232. 
2233 According to the Commission countervailing buyer power is the “ability of large customers […] to resort to 
credible alternatives within a reasonable time if the supplier decides to increase its price or to make the conditions of 
delivery less favourable”, Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, 
ECR, EU:T:2006:64, para. 186 (emphasis added). 
2234 Judgment of 9 July 2007, Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, T-282/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:203, para. 
194. See also: Ezrachi [2014], p. 437. 
2235 Judgment of 9 July 2007, Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, T-282/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:203, 
paras. 191 and 210; Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the 
common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9; 
Commission Decision of Non-opposition to a notified concentration M.4057 — Korsnäs/Assidomän Cartonboard 
[2006] OJ C 209/12, taken from the unabridged public version, para. 46. 
2236 Judgment of 9 July 2007, Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, T-282/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:203, para. 




extent”,2237 even if it implies transferring just a substantial part of their requirements should it 
amount to a “significant proportion of the merged entity’s production”.2238 
Moreover, the case law and Commission’s practice also indicates that shifting demand can be 
effective even if not all of it is transferred to another supplier, particularly depending on the 
capacity of production or the specificity of the product. In Enso/Stora, the Commission 
concluded that losing a large volume of (but not all) purchases from a large buyer would mean 
that “the parties would have to find other customers in order to fill the capacity”,2239 thus 
referring to customers that may not yet exist. A similar conclusion was reached in Korsnäs/AD 
Cartonboard where it was concluded that buying enough orders to fill the capacity of one 
cardboard-processing machine was sufficient to generate CBP.2240 This is explained by the fact 
that in certain industries a decrease in the utilization of installed machinery may have a large and 
detrimental impact on the cost structure of the supplier undertaking, as remarked by Baker and 
Lofaro,2241 therefore partial shifts in demand can be sufficient to discipline the seller. 
Also, the Courts have recognized second supplier strategies as an additional and important 
source of CBP, as the Commission found that car glass (car windscreens) buyers enjoyed 
countervailing buyer power that allowed them to reduce or thwart the actions of a sellers’ cartel if 
they could obtain their supplies from an additional supplier.2242 In Carglass2243 the dual sourcing 
strategy allowed car manufacturers to partially neutralize the efforts of the cartel members as the 
allocation agreements were not always successful. This Commission’s finding was ratified by the 
General Court on the annulment action, as it held that CBP and the dual sourcing ran contrary “to 
the collusive practices of the cartel participants and the fact that those counterstrategies had 
allowed them to thwart some decisions taken in the context of that cartel”.2244 Also, a dual 
sourcing strategy was claimed to generate CBP in CVC/Lenzing, but the claim was rejected as 
                                                          
2237 Judgment of 9 July 2007, Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, T-282/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:203, para. 
213. 
2238 Judgment of 9 July 2007, Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, T-282/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:203, para. 
215. 
2239 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, para. 90. 
2240 Commission Decision of Non-opposition to a notified concentration M.4057 — Korsnäs/Assidomän 
Cartonboard [2006] OJ C 209/12, taken from the unabridged public version, para. 50. 
2241 Baker and Lofaro (2000), p. 188. 
2242 Summary of Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.125 — Car glass) 
[2009] OJ C 173/13, taken from the unabridged version, para. 677. 
2243 Summary of Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.125 — Car glass) 
[2009] OJ C 173/13, taken from the unabridged version. 
2244 Judgment of 17 December 2014, Pilkington Group and Others v Commission, T-72/09, EU:T:2014:1094, para. 
285. Appealed and dismissed in its entirety as Judgment of 7 September 2016 in Pilkington Group and Others v 
Commission, C-101/15, EU:C:2016:631. 
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only a handful of buyers resorted to this strategy, along with other indicators of the absence of 
CBP.2245 
Concerning the timeliness of the demand shift, the case law and Commission’s practice show a 
trend that has shifted from requiring a short term to a reasonable time in certain circumstances. 
In Enso/Stora, the Commission argued that if suppliers are unable to find alternative buyers in the 
short term, this means that the buyer has some or more CBP.2246 In Irish Sugar v Commission, the 
General Court rejected a claim of the existence of CBP because the largest buyers of an 
undertaking had no capacity to turn to other alternative supply sources, even in the short term, 
due to the existence of community export and import quotas on sugar.2247  
However, the switching timeliness may vary depending on the circumstances of the case and it is 
not always be possible, or indeed necessary for the shift to be conducted in the short term.2248 
This was the issue in CVC/Lenzing, where the Commission found that short-term switching of 
suppliers was not possible because each buyer had particular specifications that the supplier must 
comply with and adapt its equipment to.2249 Therefore, the buyer was locked-in to a specific 
supplier for more than a short term.2250 The intuition is that the longer it takes to switch to 
alternative suppliers the less powerful the threat is. However, there are situations in which the 
switch, even if not done in a short term, would still generate CBP, for example if the shift to a 
different supplier would entail that the current seller would have to de-utilize ‘tailored’ 
machinery of specialized service that involves high sunk costs, or if having a different buyer 
would require costs to suit the production to their specific needs, the threat to switch demand 
even if within more than a short term would still be credible. This criticism was noted by the 
Courts in Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission when the General Court held that the 
shift in demand would be a credible threat and generating CBP even if done “within a reasonable 
time”.2251 This change in criteria under these special circumstances is corroborated by looking at 
other versions of the Judgment. In both the French and Spanish version, the wording used by the 
                                                          
2245 Commission Decision of 17 October 2001 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2187 — CVC/Lenzing) [2004] OJ L 82/20, para. 213. 
2246 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, para. 90. 
2247 Judgment of 7 October 1999, Irish Sugar v Commission, T-228/97, ECR, EU:T:1999:246, para. 97. 
2248 Baker and Lofaro (2000), p. 188-189. 
2249 Commission Decision of 17 October 2001 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2187 — CVC/Lenzing) [2004] OJ L 82/20, para. 213. 
2250 Commission Decision of 17 October 2001 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2187 — CVC/Lenzing) [2004] OJ L 82/20, para. 222. 
2251 “First of all, it should be observed that, as the Commission maintained in its written submissions, without being 
challenged by the applicant, the buyer power of a supplier’s customers may compensate for the supplier’s market 
power if those customers have the ability to resort to credible alternative sources of supply within a reasonable time 
if the supplier decides to increase its prices or to make the conditions of delivery less favourable”, in Judgment of 23 
February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64, para. 230. 
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General Court is the same “dans un délai raisonnable” and “en un plazo razonable”, 
respectively. 
Synthetizing, the ability of buyers to shift to alternative supply sources (in all its different forms) 
constitutes the most important source for CBP to exist. This however does not imply that it is the 
only source, as the Commission erroneously held in SCA/Metsä Tissue when stating that “buyer 
power [rectius: CBP] can only by exercised if the buyer has an adequate choice of alternative 
suppliers”.2252 Furthermore, the case law clarifies that shifting to an alternative source of supply 
takes different forms besides just finding a new seller. Also, there is further guidance concerning 
the timeliness of the switch in demand. A first criteria was resorted to, which required change to 
be in the short term, and a more recent criteria that accepts the timeliness, even if within a 
reasonable time. Therefore, the standard seems to vary depending on the factors of the case but 
the longer time it takes to switch to other suppliers, the less threatening the demand shift will be 
and the lower the CBP of the buyer vis-à-vis the supplier. 
10.5.1.2 Buyer size 
Buyer size and market shares in the upstream market are other indicators of the existence of CBP, 
which the General Court qualifies as one of the “very relevant sources”.2253 If buyers are large, 
for example an electricity distribution company with respect to an energy producer,2254 and, in 
addition, they have a gate-keeping position, as occurred in the merger of Procter & 
Gamble/Gillette, then it is very likely that they will have large CBP.2255 Also, intuitively 
appealing, larger buyers, such as supermarket chains, “have more negotiating power than smaller 
retailers and are able to negotiate discounts which are not available to smaller retailers”,2256 as 
held by the Commission in The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S, but without necessarily 
implying that obtaining discounts or exerting some degree of buyer market power is equivalent to 
sufficient CBP vis-à-vis a powerful seller, especially if it has a must stock product. However, the 
                                                          
2252 Commission Decision of 31 January 2001 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2097 SCA/Metsä Tissue) [2001] OJ L 57/1, para. 86 
(emphasis added). In my view taking such a strict view that CBP can only be exercised if there is an adequate choice 
of alternative suppliers might be stretching too far the importance of this source. CBP can be exercised, as 
recognized by the Commission in Enso/Stora, in the case the sponsoring entry of new suppliers or even in the case of 
in-house production of the input. 
2253 Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64, 
EU:T:2006:64 E.C.R. [2006] II-00319, para. 232. 
2254 See briefly discussing CBP in the electricity markets: Pierce RJ, ‘Antitrust Policy in the New Electricity 
Industry’ (1996) 17 Energy Law Journal 29, p. 50. 
2255 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.3732 — Procter & Gamble/Gillette) [2005] OJ C 
239/6, public version, para. 120-133. See also commenting this case and discussing the important and large size of 
retailers exerting countervailing buyer power: Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 88-89. See also: Areeda, Hovenkamp 
and Solow, [1995], Volume IIA, ¶404c7. 
2256 Commission Decision of 11 September 1997 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.833 - The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S) 
[1998] OJ L 145/41, para. 81. 
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Commission’s practice illustrates that, in specific circumstances and in the presence of other 
factors, small buyers may exercise substantial CBP, as occurred in Enso/Stora2257 and 
Korsnäs/AD Cartonboard, cases discussed in detail infra in section 10.8.1.2258 In these cases, 
smaller buyers were able to place purchasing orders that utilized the capacity of a machine that, if 
left unused, would have constituted a high unemployed cost for the supplier.2259 
In Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, the General Court confirmed that market size 
and buyer side concentration are a very relevant source of CBP. If the buying market structure is 
concentrated this may “be capable of reinforcing [the buyer’s] bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
supplier”.2260 Also, the larger a customer is, the more CBP it will have, particularly if “demand is 
concentrated on a very limited number of large customers”, conferring upon them “considerable 
negotiating power” that is capable of neutralizing opposite seller market power.2261 In 
Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, the General Court also took into account market 
concentration and it confirmed the Commission’s argument that a high degree of market 
concentration of buyers – and consequently that they have relatively large market shares – 
“means that their limited number may be capable of reinforcing their bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the supplier”.2262 
In Carglass the sheer size and purchasing structure of car manufacturers – along with alternative 
supply sources – was a decisive factor for the Commission to acknowledge the existence of some 
degree of CBP vis-à-vis the members of a cartel supplying car-glass pieces.2263 The Commission 
found that car-glass purchasers “enjoyed countervailing buyer power which enabled them to 
devise counterstrategies, such as the systematic use of second supplier strategies, which allowed 
them in some cases to reduce or thwart the coordinated actions”.2264 CBP, therefore, was present 
as the car manufacturing market had four buyers that that represented more than 60% of the 
                                                          
2257 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9. 
2258 Commission Decision of Non-opposition to a notified concentration M.4057 — Korsnäs/Assidomän 
Cartonboard [2006] OJ C 209/12, taken from the unabridged public version, para. 47-53. 
2259 Commission Decision of Non-opposition to a notified concentration M.4057 — Korsnäs/Assidomän 
Cartonboard [2006] OJ C 209/12, taken from the unabridged public version, para. 50. 
2260 Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64, 
para. 232. 
2261 Judgment of 9 July 2007, Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, T-282/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:203, para. 
213. 
2262 Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64, 
para. 232. 
2263 Summary of Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.125 — Car glass) 
[2009] OJ C 173/13. 
2264 Summary of Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.125 — Car glass) 
[2009] OJ C 173/13, taken from the unabridged version, para. 677. 
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market shares for cars and car glass.2265 Also, in addition to the car manufacturer’s size, the fact 
that their purchasing pattern was centralized for all their own and affiliated brands reinforced 
their bargaining power and allowed them to secure EEA-wide deals.2266 
Although buyer’s size and its market share is an indicator of the existence of CBP, the same 
cautious approach concerning oversimplification of its meaning, as I discuss in chapter 6 when 
talking about buyer market power assessment, should prevail. Even in the presence of large 
market shares of buyer concentration, CBP may not exist or the buyers might not be incentivized 
to exert it.2267 Therefore, in my view, ability to switch supply is a more importance source of 
CBP. This view, however, is not shared by O’Donoghue and Padilla, who argue that market 
concentration is “the most important factor in assessing the extent to which a market is likely to 
be influenced” by CBP.2268 
In any case, the assessment of the origin and extent of CBP should consider the buyer’s size and 
the concentration in the market and also take into account commercial significance of the buyer 
to the seller. 
10.5.1.3 Commercial significance of the buyer to the seller: ratio of business 
Another key source of CBP as identified by the case law and the Commission’s practice is the 
proportion of profits that a buyer represents for a seller. This proportion of sales is also an 
indicator of the ability of a buyer to exert buyer market power on a supplier that is dependent on 
it, as I discussed in chapter 9, section 9.4.3, when discussing three cases of mergers in food 
retailing. 
In Enso/Stora the fact that Tetra Pak as a buyer acquired more than 50% of its liquid packing 
board from the merging entities and that this amount represented “the output of several board 
machines and about [more than 50 %] * of the parties' total output for the EEA” market was seen 
as an important source of CBP.2269 
Also, in Irish Sugar v Commission, the proportion of sales a buyer represents was taken into 
account by the General Court when a claim of existence of CBP was rejected. The applicant 
argued that it was not dominant because the ratio of profits and sales with respect to its two 
                                                          
2265 Summary of Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.125 — Car glass) 
[2009] OJ C 173/13, taken from the unabridged version, para. 29. 
2266 Summary of Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.125 — Car glass) 
[2009] OJ C 173/13, taken from the unabridged version, paras. 29 and 33. See in chapter 8, section 8.5 a discussion 
of centralized purchasing. 
2267 Also supporting that even if a buyer is ‘big’ it might not possess CBP see also making reference to these sources 
see: Karlsson (2006), p. 516; Carlton and Israel (2011), p. 134. 
2268 O'Donoghue and Padilla, [2013], p. 167. 
2269 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, para. 90. 
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largest customers precluded it from behaving independently. The General Court held that these 
customers did not have this level of commercial strength arguably due to their low ratio 
compared to Irish Sugar (Irish Sugar had ca. 90% of the sugar supply market but the public 
version does not show the market shares nor does it show the ratio of the buyers)2270 and because 
the buyers had no access to alternative sources of supply.2271 
In Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission the commercial significance of the buyer for 
the seller was also taken into account, as it was decided that, despite the relatively concentrated 
market in which five buyers of construction materials amounted to 60 to 80% of the sales of the 
undertaking under investigation, this factor in itself was insufficient to prove the existence of 
CBP. This was because “no single customer accounts for a substantial part of CVK’s 
turnover”.2272 This confirms that mere size alone is insufficient. Size has to be related to the 
proportion of sales the buyer represents. The larger the ratio, the closer the seller is to becoming 
dependent on the buyer absent other undertakings that it could resort to to sell their goods. 
Lastly, in Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, the General Court also stressed the 
influence of the ratio and commercial significance of a buyer for a particular supplier as a source 
of CBP when it held that “the applicant stated that its four largest customers represented about 
50% of its sales. However, it gives no details regarding the respective share [ratio buyer-supplier] 
of each of those four customers”.2273 The General Court decided that since the applicant failed to 
provide the details of this ratio buyer-supplier, it was unable to determine if they represented a 
substantial part of the turnover of the undertaking and dismissed the allegation. 
From the reading of these cases and the wording used referring to “no single customer”, doubt 
arises concerning whether for CBP to exist the buyer has to act alone or if the ratio of sales of a 
group of coordinated buyers can be taken into account. In my view, the answer should be 
affirmative in the sense that Courts and NCAs should also consider whether the ratio of pooled 
demand by a buying alliance as a whole is sufficient to generate joint CBP, and should not 
estimate the existence of it based on which proportion each of the members represents, and also 
because, for the supplier (if the alliance buys as a joint entity and is transparent), it is not possible 
to distinguish which proportion of purchases is represented by which member of the alliance. If, 
on the other hand, the interpretation given is that the ratio assessed must be measured on a 
purchaser by purchaser basis then the ability of the buying alliance to pool CBP would be 
artificially reduced for no good reason, making the sufficiency or existence of CBP more 
                                                          
2270 Commission Decision of 14 May 1997 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty 
(IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar plc) [1997] OJ L 258/1, para. 21. 
2271 Judgment of 7 October 1999, Irish Sugar v Commission, T-228/97, ECR, EU:T:1999:246, para. 97. 
2272 Judgment of 23 February 2006, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, T-282/02, ECR, EU:T:2006:64, 
para. 233. 




restrictive than it should be. Therefore, the proportion of sales, in cases of buying alliances, 
should be computed as a whole and not with respect to each member. This, however, seems 
unproblematic for future cases, as the Commission’s practice has not rejected this possibility 
explicitly or implicitly. 
10.5.1.4 Price differentials 
Another source employed in the assessment of CBP are price differentials. Price differential in 
general implies the difference between two different goods, or between the same good when 
bought by different buyers. These price differentials have been resorted to as an origin of CBP in 
CVC/Lenzing where the Commission employed them to determine whether “the price level of 
VSF for tampons (particularly of Acordis' speciality fibre Galaxy, but also of standard fibres for 
tampons) is above the price level for commodity VSF [...]*. Such a price differential would not 
be likely if customers actually had sufficient countervailing buyer power.2274 Therefore, the 
indication of a difference in price between two similar products from different sellers could be 
interpreted as a signal of the absence of sufficient CBP. 
10.5.2 Hindrances to countervailing buyer power 
The case law and the Commission’s practice also illustrates certain situations that constrain the 
possible exercise of CBP. As in the case of sources, there is no exhaustive list of what these 
hindrances are, but the following circumstances provide a good indication of when CBP can be 
limited or negated. In the following paragraphs I discuss how to assess these limitations. 
In Syniverse/Mach, the Commission found that low probability of entry of new suppliers in the 
market hinders the ability of buyers to exercise CBP and concluded that in the market for near 
real-time roaming data exchange, the concentration would significantly impede competition. In 
my view this must be interpreted as, if CBP were to be sufficient then it would have likely 
precluded the merged entity from impeding competition in such a market. Despite the absence of 
CBP, the merger was ultimately declared compatible with the internal market.2275 
In Tomra and Others v Commission, the General Court and the CJEU ratified the Commission’s 
finding that buyers might not be willing to exercise their CBP, for example by sponsoring entry 
of new suppliers, if its investments can be subject to free riding by its own competitors. As held 
by the Commission “[m]oreover, such behaviour would have been prone to free riding, as 
building up a competitor would have resulted in a public good. Therefore, there was no 
                                                          
2274 Commission Decision of 17 October 2001 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2187 — CVC/Lenzing) [2004] OJ L 82/20, para. 215 
(emphasis added). 
2275 Summary of Commission Decision of 29 May 2013 declaring a concentration compatible with the internal 




substantial countervailing buyer power which would have been able to challenge Tomra’s 
dominance in any of the markets concerned.”2276 Therefore, if sponsoring entry can be prone to 
free riding then the powerful buyer would not be incentivized to engage in the financing. This 
additionally reinforces the fact that CBP does not automatically takes place, as the buyer may 
choose to not exert it if it would not be the most optimal business strategy to maximize its profits. 
Also, the Commission has used brand recognition and the existence of a ‘must stock product’ as 
an argument to diminish the strength of CBP, as occurred in SCA/Metsä Tissue.2277 In this case, 
the merging entity would have controlled 80-90% of the sales of toilet paper and the brands with 
the strongest brand recognition in the geographical market. Therefore, when buyers even as 
powerful as food retailing stores face a supplier with a ‘must stock’ product, their bargaining 
power diminishes, as they are not in a position to retaliate by switching to another supplier 
because losing access to this desired input would negatively impact its sales in the downstream 
market. 
Brand recognition was also an important factor in The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S to 
determine that even large buyers that obtain discounts from a powerful supplier do not have 
sufficient CBP because these buyers saw the goods sold by the involved undertakings as ‘must 
stock’ brands that they are not able to obtain from other suppliers and, consequently, “they are 
not able to find other suppliers for their CSD requirements to such an extent that it could remove 
the dominance of the parties”.2278 Despite the finding that “little [rectius insufficient] 
countervailing buyer power exists”,2279 it was confirmed that despite the fact that “in the overall 
market for CSDs, TCCC's market share, the strength of its brand, the barriers to entry for 
competitors and the lack of countervailing buyer power, lead the Commission to conclude that 
                                                          
2276 Summary of Commission Decision of 29 March 2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement against Tomra Systems ASA, Tomra 
Europe AS, Tomra Systems BV, Tomra Systems GmbH, Tomra Butikksystemer AS, Tomra Systems AB and Tomra 
Leergutsysteme GmbH (Case COMP/E-1/38.113 — Prokent/Tomra) [2008] OJ C 219/11, para. 89. See also where 
this argument was not appealed by Tomra: Judgment of 19 April 2012 in Tomra and Others v Commission, C-549/10 
P, EU:C:2012:221; Judgment of 9 September 2010, Tomra Systems and Others v Commission, T-155/06, ECR, 
EU:T:2010:370. For some literature regarding the free rider problem see in an antitrust perspective, inter alia: 
Richard A. Posner, ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1979) 
925, p. 927-931; Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart, ‘Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory 
of the Corporation’ 11 The Bell Journal of Economics (1980) 42; Victor P Goldberg, ‘Free Rider Problem Imperfect 
Pricing and the Economics of Retailing Services’ 79 Northwestern University Law Review (1984-1985) 736; Z 
Neeman, ‘The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider Problem’ 15 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 
(1999) 685; Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh, [2011], p. 315-318. 
2277 Commission Decision of 31 January 2001 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2097 SCA/Metsä Tissue) [2001] OJ L 57/1, para. 87. 
2278 Commission Decision of 11 September 1997 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.833 - The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S) 
[1998] OJ L 145/41, para. 81. 
2279 Commission Decision of 11 September 1997 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.833 - The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S) 
[1998] OJ L 145/41, para. 81. 
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TCCC is dominant on the CSD market at the brand level”,2280 the concentration was compatible 
with the internal market following some commitments that included divestitures of the 
undertakings. 
Furthermore, in JCI/FIAMM the Commission found that the internal purchasing organization of 
an undertaking and internal managerial interest may limit the effective exercise of CBP. The 
assessment found that buyers were not able to leverage their buyer power into other goods to 
affect the terms and conditions concerning starter batteries.2281 This inability to affect the 
purchasing price was because buyers employed separate purchasing internal units for batteries 
and other automotive components, and diluted their buyer power by not acquiring goods from the 
same supplier as a whole, even if the separation was due to the specificity of the goods to be 
acquired. Also, the purchasing structure and the behavior of the managers had an impact as these 
would not purchase aggressively or to reduce the profitability of its section to increase the overall 
turnover of the undertaking.2282 While on occasion separateness of purchases within the same 
entity would be required and justified, the argument that managers decide not to exercise buyer 
power because their own division will suffer at the expense of overall profit is much weaker 
because it represents a problem of internal coordination and, arguably, bad management which is 
difficult to accept as a valid argument for the lack of exercise of CBP. However, it is still a fact 
that NCAs should also consider in their assessment, for the sake of thoroughness, particularly if it 
is proven and in dominance cases as opposed to mergers. 
In GE/Instrumentarium, the Commission found that CBP (and buyer power) may be limited by 
the fact that a public buyer ought to comply with tender rules when entering into public contracts 
under the scope of public procurement rules. A public buyer (or buyers) may see its (or their) 
ability to exercise CBP diminished for four reasons. Firstly, price may not be the most relevant 
factor when employing the most economically advantageous offer award criteria.2283 Secondly, 
the Commission’s investigation revealed that only large suppliers were generally able to meet the 
technical requirements set by hospitals when purchasing equipment, thus limiting demand 
switching. Thirdly, the inherent nature of public tenders hinders buyers from exercising CBP as 
                                                          
2280 Commission Decision of 11 September 1997 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.833 - The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S) 
[1998] OJ L 145/41, para. 82 (emphasis added). 
2281 Summary of Commission Decision of 10 May 2007 declaring a concentration compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.4381 — JCI/FIAMM) [2009] OJ C 241/12, taken 
from the unabridged version, para. 407-413. 
2282 Summary of Commission Decision of 10 May 2007 declaring a concentration compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.4381 — JCI/FIAMM) [2009] OJ C 241/12, taken 
from the unabridged version, para. 412. 
2283 Commission Decision of 2 September 2003 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.3083 — GE/Instrumentarium) [2004] OJ L 109/1, para. 
206 and 120. In my view, this is partially correct and the outcome depends directly on the weightings attributed to 
each award criterion where the good’s price can be the most important factor. 
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“once tenders are organised in order to meet the hospitals' needs, the actual purchase cannot 
realistically be delayed for a substantial period of time”.2284 Fourthly buyer’s demand was highly 
fragmented as the Commission considers each tender as an individual market (unless aggregated 
procurement techniques are employed).2285 
Also in connection with the ability of public buyers to exert CBP, in AstraZeneca v Commission 
the CJEU confirmed that even a “monopsonist” public buyer may on occasion not be able to 
sufficiently exercise CBP with regard to medicinal products issued on prescription due to the 
innovative character of the product,2286 mainly because these new drugs have an inelastic 
demand, as also remarked by Advocate General Mázak.2287 Thus, despite the buyer’s size and its 
condition of sole buyer in Germany, AstraZeneca was able to “to obtain from the public 
authorities a higher price as against existing products and ‘metoo’ products”.2288 Additionally, 
both the CJEU and the General Court confirmed that CBP exertion was hindered due to the 
structure of the tenders and the public financing. In the judgment, the CJEU reaffirmed that a 
buyer might not be able to exercise sufficient CBP if its purchasing schemes restrict it from 
doing so. This was the case because, besides demand being inelastic, end consumers do not pay 
the full amount of the value of the good as it is financed by the national social security 
systems.2289 Therefore, end consumers will be less incentivized to obtain a lower price or a 
different product and instead obtain the better or more innovative good. As end consumers were 
not price sensitive, this reduced the constraint of the buyer on the powerful seller. This argument 
by the CJEU and General Court is also consistent with my own research with regards to exercise 
of public buyer power under the scope of public procurement laws.2290 Public buyers do not set 
purchasing prices as a normal undertaking would do, as their demand is derived by end 
consumers in most cases and constrained by the application of public procurement rules and 
                                                          
2284 Commission Decision of 2 September 2003 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.3083 — GE/Instrumentarium) [2004] OJ L 109/1, para. 
208. 
2285 For a discussion on aggregated procurement strategies see: Sánchez Graells and Herrera Anchustegui, ‘Impact of 
Public Procurement Aggregation on Competition. Risks, Rationale and Justification for the Rules in Directive 
2014/24’ [2016]. 
2286 Judgment of 6 December 2012 in AstraZeneca v Commission, C-457/10 P, EU:C:2012:770, para. 170-182. See 
also: Judgment of 1 July 2010, AstraZeneca v Commission, T-321/05, ECR, EU:T:2010:266, para. 255-269. 
2287 Opinion of Advocate General Mázak in Judgment of 6 December 2012 in AstraZeneca v Commission, C-457/10 
P, EU:C:2012:293, para. 124. 
2288 Judgment of 1 July 2010, AstraZeneca v Commission, T-321/05, ECR, EU:T:2010:266, para. 179, and paras. 
256-260. 
2289 Judgment of 6 December 2012 in AstraZeneca v Commission, C-457/10 P, EU:C:2012:770, para. 180. 
2290 Herrera Anchustegui ‘Centralizing Public Procurement and Competitiveness in Directive 2014/24’ (2015); 
Sánchez Graells and Herrera Anchustegui, ‘Impact of Public Procurement Aggregation on Competition. Risks, 
Rationale and Justification for the Rules in Directive 2014/24’ [2016]. 
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public market particularities, as confirmed by the General Court in AstraZeneca v 
Commission.2291 
Lastly, in Slovak Telekom, a case discussing margin squeeze practices contrary to Article 102 
TFEU, the Commission also remarked that end consumers, despite there being many of them, are 
unable to exercise any appreciable countervailing buyer power against a dominant undertaking as 
“[e]ach individual customer in the retail mass-market for broadband services represents only a 
insignificant share of the total sales”2292 The same occurs, for example, in food retailing markets 
where end consumers – individually – are unable to exercise any countervailing buyer power 
because their purchasing power is atomized and, therefore, unless it is pooled, it is not sufficient. 
Also, in Slovak Telekom it was considered a hindrance for the exercise of CBP that the dominant 
undertaking that claimed its existence was vertically integrated and enjoyed a dominant position 
in the downstream market that prevented its competitors from “exercis[ing] sufficient pressure or 
influence on STæs decisions in the wholesale market for access to ULL”.2293 
10.6 Countervailing buyer power as a defense and its success 
CBP is an extraordinary circumstance that represents an “effective constraint on any exercise of 
market power”,2294 preventing a seller from behaving independently from its buyers,2295 in 
particular by deterring or defeating an attempt to profitably increase prices,2296 and neutralizing 
seller market power in any type of competition case. Traditionally, but not exclusively, as shown 
in this chapter, the Commission’s practice and the EU case law have dealt with it in the sphere of 
dominance2297 and concentration2298 cases. Therefore, CBP is a defensive2299 argument used by 
                                                          
2291 “The Court observes however that, since prices are influenced by decisions of public authorities as regards 
reimbursement levels or maximum prices, those prices are not the result of normal market forces. It is not therefore 
possible to argue that the level of a price set in such a context is competitive, since it has been set in the absence of 
competitive mechanisms for ascertaining where such a competitive level lies”, Judgment of 1 July 2010, 
AstraZeneca v Commission, T-321/05, ECR, EU:T:2010:266, para. 265 (emphasis added). 
2292 Summary of Commission Decision of 15 October 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39523 — Slovak 
Telekom) [2015] OJ C 314/7, taken from the unabridged version, para. 336. 
2293 Summary of Commission Decision of 15 October 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39523 — Slovak 
Telekom) [2015] OJ C 314/7, taken from the unabridged version, para. 291. 
2294 Judgment of 25 June 2010, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, T-66/01, ECR, EU:T:2010:255, para. 
247. Also considering CBP as a defense in Swedish national see: Henriksson, Swedish National Report: The Grocery 
Retail Market in Sweden: Is Antitrust Efficiently Handling this Market? (2013), p. 14. 
2295 Judgment of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission, T-342/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:146, para. 208. 
2296 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 18. 
See also Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 116. From a comparative perspective, see: Facey 
and Brown, [2013], p. 244. 
2297 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 




selling undertakings to mitigate their own seller market power and challenge the anti-competitive 
claims against their conduct. Also, CBP not only protects buyers, but iltimately end consumers, 
reinforcing the dualistic effect of buyer power in both the upstream and downstream markets.2300 
Concerning dominance cases, CBP plays a role as an extraordinary circumstance precluding 
dominance in accordance with Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission.2301 Therefore, the selling 
undertaking invoking the existence of one or more buyers with sufficient CBP claims that is no 
longer dominant because it is not able to behave independently. Despite being invoked on several 
occasions, the CBP defense has never been successful as a factor precluding dominance under 
Article 102 TFEU cases because neither the Commission nor the Courts have found it to 
sufficiently exist. This have been the cases of Judgments related to Irish Sugar v Commission;2302 
Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission;2303 and Tomra and Others v Commission.2304 
Similarly, in the Commission’s practice no dominant seller has sufficiently demonstrated that its 
position was neutralized by CBP itself or conjunction with other circumstances. What has 
occurred in these cases is that there is a degree of buyer market power enjoyed by some buyers 
that is insufficient to neutralize the dominance, therefore, not existing CBP as such. 
Contrastingly, CBP has been a more relevant argument in terms of offsetting the adverse effects 
of a proposed concentration and thus declaring its compatibility with the internal market. This 
was the state of affairs in the landmark case Enso/Stora, whereby CBP constituted the main 
reason to determine the compatibility of the merger due to the existence of a mirror structure in 
the buying and selling side and mutual dependence between buyers and sellers, as I discuss 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
2298 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 64-67. 
2299 For a discussion on the use of the term “defense” concerning efficiencies in abuse of dominance cases see: 
Gormsen, [2010], p. 54-57. 
2300 Summary of Commission Decision of 17 December 2008 declaring a concentration compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.5046 — Friesland Foods/Campina) [2009] OJ C 
75/21, taken from the unabridged version, para. 274. See also: Ezrachi [2014], p. 438. 
2301 Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, para. 41.  
2302 Commission Decision of 14 May 1997 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty 
(IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar plc) [1997] OJ L 258/1, confirmed by the General Court in Judgment of 7 
October 1999, Irish Sugar v Commission, T-228/97, ECR, EU:T:1999:246. 
2303 Commission Decision of 19 December 1990 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/33.133-A: Soda-ash - Solvay, ICI) [1991] OJ L 152/1, confirmed by the General Court in Judgment of 25 June 
2010, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, T-66/01, ECR, EU:T:2010:255. 
2304 Summary of Commission Decision of 29 March 2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement against Tomra Systems ASA, Tomra 
Europe AS, Tomra Systems BV, Tomra Systems GmbH, Tomra Butikksystemer AS, Tomra Systems AB and Tomra 
Leergutsysteme GmbH (Case COMP/E-1/38.113 — Prokent/Tomra) [2008] OJ C 219/11; confirmed by both the 
General Court and the CJEU in Judgment of 9 September 2010, Tomra Systems and Others v Commission, T-155/06, 




below.2305 However, most often CBP has played a minor role, albeit occasionally being 
significant, in contributing in the outcome of a case as a “deal maker”.2306 In fact, CBP has also 
been invoked many times by the parties but has been considered an insufficient constraint for the 
clearance of the concentration. 
Regarding Article 101 TFEU cases, my research shows that there has been no case in which CBP 
has been relevantly invoked either by a group of buyers or a group of sellers to neutralize the 
negative effects of a selling-side coordinated agreement. In Car Glass, a cartel that accounted for 
an object restriction of competition in the supply of car glass, the defendants claimed that the 
stability and implementation of the cartel was limited due to the countervailing power of its 
customers.2307 Both the Commission and the General Court accepted the theoretical argument that 
CBP could be used to neutralize the adverse effects of an agreement on competition but held that 
in an agreement that is anti-competitive by object (such as this one fixing selling conditions, 
establishing selling quotas and setting prices), the existence of some countervailing buyer power 
does not preclude the agreement from distorting competition by object.2308 This reasoning is 
sound, as the cartel has been created precisely to negate, as much as possible, the countervailing 
buyer power effects and, thus, increase profits of sellers. Hence, the aim was to eliminate any 
countervailing bargaining power in the market to exploit buyers and reap supracompetitive 
benefits. 
From a theoretical perspective, however, CBP may be used as an argument by a group of buyers 
to justify the existence of a buying alliance and, therefore, the competitiveness of a purchasing 
                                                          
2305 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9. 
2306 Commission Decision of 22 July 1992 relating to a proceeding under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.190 - Nestlé/Perrier) [1992] OJ L 356/1; Commission Decision of 14 May 1997 relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty (IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar plc) [1997] OJ L 258/1; 
Summary of Commission Decision of 29 March 2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement against Tomra Systems ASA, Tomra 
Europe AS, Tomra Systems BV, Tomra Systems GmbH, Tomra Butikksystemer AS, Tomra Systems AB and Tomra 
Leergutsysteme GmbH (Case COMP/E-1/38.113 — Prokent/Tomra) [2008] OJ C 219/11, para. 11, summarized 
version; Commission Decision of Non-opposition to a notified concentration M.4057 — Korsnäs/Assidomän 
Cartonboard [2006] OJ C 209/12, taken from the unabridged public version; Commission Decision of 3 April 2001 
declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement 
(Case COMP/M.2139 — Bombardier/ADtranz) [2002] OJ L 69/50. 
2307 Summary of Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.125 — Car glass) 
[2009] OJ C 173/13, taken from the unabridged version, para. 677. 
2308 Judgment of 17 December 2014, Pilkington Group and Others v Commission, T-72/09, EU:T:2014:1094, paras. 
287-289. Appealed and dismissed in its entirety as Judgment of 7 September 2016 in Pilkington Group and Others v 
Commission, C-101/15, EU:C:2016:631. Summary of Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 relating to a 
proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA 
Agreement (Case COMP/39.125 — Car glass) [2009] OJ C 173/13, taken from the unabridged version, para. 694. 
467 
 
agreement as it outweighs the restrictive effects on competition.2309 In accordance with Article 
101(3) TFEU, this would be the case if the creation of CBP would be indispensable to the 
attainment of certain objectives and does not afford the undertakings the possibility of 
substantially eliminating competition.2310 However, countervailing seller power has proven to be 
an important factor when determining if a conduct satisfies the requirements of Article 101(3) 
TFEU, in particular regarding exclusivity supply agreements.2311 
Lastly, I have identified two arguments to explain why CBP has very limited success as a defense 
in EU competition law. Most cases where CBP has been used as an efficiency defense were 
unsuccessful because at times the claims were weak and/or frivolous, particularly concerning 
dominance cases. In these circumstances the analysis is succinct and superficial because it is 
evident that CBP is not sufficiently present. The other reason that explains why CBP as an 
efficiency defense is unlikely to be successful has to do with the large threshold demanded to 
neutralize opposing seller power, which in the case of concentrations is lower than in dominance 
cases and partially explains why CBP is a more likely useful defense in such type of cases. 
10.7 Assessment of countervailing buyer power: ‘the comparison 
test’ 
10.7.1 Introduction and thresholds required for its sufficiency 
Once the origin and the type of case at hand has been assessed, the Courts and NCAs have to 
determine whether CBP is sufficient to neutralize opposing seller market power. To do so, the 
case law, Commission’s practice and its guidelines have suggested employing a ‘comparison 
test’2312 that determines if the degree of CBP can offset the market power on the selling side. In 
other words, the test determines if CBP is sufficient to preclude an undertaking from being 
dominant, the agreement having an anti-competitive effect, or significantly impeding effective 
competition in the case of a concentration operation.2313 Therefore, CBP has to reach certain 
thresholds depending on the type of case, and its sufficiency is carried out through the 
‘comparison test’, as I discuss in this section. 
                                                          
2309 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 20. 
2310 Judgment of 18 September 2001, M6 and Others v Commission, T-112/99, ECR, EU:T:2001:215, para. 74. 
2311 Commission Decision of 16 June 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
IV/36.081/F3 — Bass) [1999] OJ L 186/1, subject of an annulment action before the General Court and decided as 
Judgment of 21 March 2002, Joynson v Commission, T-231/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:84. 
2312 Term coined by the author. 
2313 As stated by the Commission: “[…] in an assessment of dominance the question is whether there is sufficient 
CBP to neutralize the market power of the parties”; Commission Decision of 11 September 1997 declaring a 
concentration to be compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No 
IV/M.833 - The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S) [1998] OJ L 145/41, para. 81. 
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In the case of dominance, CBP must be sufficiently large to be considered an exceptional 
circumstance that may preclude the existence of dominance, as stated in Hoffmann-La Roche v 
Commission2314 and ratified in AKZO v Commission.2315 To be sufficiently large to qualify as an 
exceptional circumstance it must neutralize the ability of a seller to exert market power vis-à-vis 
its buyers, whereupon it may “constitute a significant counterweight to the contractual power of 
large [suppliers] and make way for more effective competition”,2316 as supported by the case law 
in Irish Sugar v Commission,2317 and Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk 
Landbrugs Grovvareselskab.2318 Thus in dominance cases the sufficiency of CBP must reach a 
threshold in which it is found sufficient to neutralize dominance, and which it is a stern 
requirement. 
In the case of concentrations, CBP would be a sufficient exceptional circumstance whenever it is 
capable of precluding a merged undertaking from significantly impeding effective competition as 
a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.2319 The threshold, then, is no 
longer based on the creation or strengthening of a dominant position as it was under Article 2.(2) 
the Merger Control Regulation of 1989 and which would coincide with cases under Article 102 
TFEU,2320 but appears to be less demanding and lower. Therefore, if the CBP is capable of 
preventing the undertaking from significantly impeding effective competition then the 
concentration may be considered compatible with the internal market, in accordance to Article 
2(2) of the Merger Control Regulation.2321  
Also, as confirmed by the General Court in Airtours v Commission, CBP is a competitive 
constraint that ought to be taken into account as being capable of “counteracting the creation of a 
collective dominant position”.2322 In these cases of collective dominance pursuant a merger the 
threshold required seems to be less than under the standard purely unilateral merger cases. Upon 
interpreting the case law, and in particular Airtours v Commission, I conclude that CBP may be 
sufficient to prevent a collective dominant position post-merger if it is capable of “counteracting 
the creation of a dominant position” by disturbing the coordination and which, in the case of an 
                                                          
2314 Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, para. 41 
2315 Judgment of 3 July 1991 in AKZO v Commission, C-62/86, EU:C:1991:286, para. 60. 
2316 Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:413, para. 32. 
2317 Judgment of 7 October 1999, Irish Sugar v Commission, T-228/97, ECR, EU:T:1999:246, paras 93-104. 
2318 Judgment of 15 December 1994 in Gøttrup-Klim and Others Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab, C-250/92, EU:C:1994:413, para. 32. 
2319 Whish and Bailey, [2015], p. 906-907. 
2320 “A concentration which does not create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective 
competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared 
compatible”, Article 2(2) Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
[1989] OJ L 395. 
2321 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1, Article 2.2. 
2322 Judgment of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission, T-342/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:146, para. 277. 
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oligopoly, is sufficient to neutralize the joint market power as parties can no longer coordinate 
their behavior as if they were a single entity.2323 This would be the case whenever CBP is strong 
enough to create sufficient incentives to the suppliers to deviate from a coordinated behavior and 
fight off their competitor in the market to reap the profits. 
In the case of agreements under the scope of Article 101 TFEU, the CBP ought to determine 
whether the effects of the agreement are pro-competitive due to the existence of opposing market 
power and, consequently, may satisfy the requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU, barring the 
application of Article 101(1) TFEU. In my view, this is the lowest threshold that must be reached 
by CBP, as it has to be sufficient enough to, among other factors, make the efficiencies of the 
agreement offset its anti-competitive effects. However, as discussed above, CBP would not make 
an agreement by its object not being considered as such, and, therefore in such circumstances, it 
would be unlikely that the parties to an agreement restrictive by object would benefit from the 
existence of CBP. 
In the remainder of this section, I discuss how the comparison test has been applied and 
developed by analyzing the case law and the Commission’s practice. 
10.7.2 The ‘comparison test’ and its evolution 
As discussed before, the comparison test is applied by the Courts and the Commission in a 
similar fashion across all areas of EU competition as the key lies in determining whether CBP 
can offset the potential adverse effect in competition of the market power by the undertaking(s) 
under investigation.2324 What varies across the areas is the threshold required for its sufficiency, 
while the nature of the assessment remains the same. To determine its sufficiency, the 
comparison test contrasts several sources or indicators of the existence and the degree of CBP 
vis-à-vis the market power of the undertaking that claims the existence of this competitive 
constraint.2325  
In the initial development of the state, both the Commission and the Courts conducted a 
straightforward and simplified comparison of the market shares, concentration and structure of 
the undertakings under investigation, as occurred in Nestlé/Perrier,2326 The Coca-Cola 
                                                          
2323 Judgment of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission, T-342/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:146, para. 277. 
2324 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 67. Cf with the view of Van Bael and Bellis who claim 
that buyers are deemed to have enough countervailing power when its market share is greater than that of the 
supplier and/or there exist low barriers or consequences to the changing of a supplier, Van Bael and Bellis, [2005], p. 
809. 
2325 For a different perspective on the assessment of CBP (and arguably it sources) see O'Donoghue and Padilla, 
[2013], p. 167-169. 
2326 Commission Decision of 22 July 1992 relating to a proceeding under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.190 - Nestlé/Perrier) [1992] OJ L 356/1. 
470 
 
Company/Carlsberg A/S,2327 and Irish Sugar v Commission.2328 The test, nevertheless, has 
evolved to become a more in-depth analysis of the competitive constraints imposed on a supplier 
by its buyer(s) beyond symmetry. This evolution and departure from a comparison of market 
shares or market concentration is a welcome development because the previous practice 
overlooked the dynamics of buyer power, the fact that, in certain circumstances, CBP can be 
exercised sufficiently even by small buyers, and the fact that bargaining power can effectively be 
exerted under lower market share and concentration thresholds than seller market power 
comparatively.2329 However, practice shows that the thoroughness of the analysis depends on 
case circumstances and both the Commission and the Courts are ready to dismiss without further 
elaboration cases in which after a preliminary market share comparison the degree of asymmetry 
is large between the involved undertakings’ market shares. In the following, I discuss the 
evolution of the test in the case law and the Commission’s practice. 
In Nestlé/Perrier, the first occasion where the comparison test was applied, the Commission 
found that the ten largest customers of Nestlé represented 63.7% of its turnover, granting them 
certain buyer power.2330 However, it also remarked that:  
concentration of these buyers is much less important than the concentration of the supply side 
[…]. While 82% by value and 75% by volume (for still mineral waters over 90 %) of the supply 
side would be in the hands of only two suppliers which can easily engage in anticompetitive 
parallel behaviour […], the demand side is composed of a much greater number of independent 
companies, none of which exceeds 15% of the total water turnover of all three /two suppliers.2331  
After conducting a comparison of the market shares and market concentration ratios, the 
Commission concluded that the demand side “is composed of a number of buyers which are not 
equally strong and which cannot be aggregated to conclude that they may constrain the market 
power of the three, and after the merger, only two national suppliers.”2332  
An analysis of the criteria used by the Commission reveals that the CBP analysis was rather 
simplistic and perhaps too strict, as the Commission could have gone a step further and discussed 
whether, even though the demand side was smaller, its buyer power could have been deterrent 
enough to prevent post-merger coordination between the new entity and the other national 
supplier in the event of concerns of possible collective dominance. In such circumstances, and as 
                                                          
2327 Commission Decision of 11 September 1997 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.833 - The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S) 
[1998] OJ L 145/41, para. 81. 
2328 Commission Decision of 14 May 1997 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty 
(IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar plc) [1997] OJ L 258/1, para. 106 to 113. 
2329 Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 7-048. 
2330 Commission Decision of 22 July 1992 relating to a proceeding under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.190 - Nestlé/Perrier) [1992] OJ L 356/1, paras. 77 to 78. 
2331 Commission Decision of 22 July 1992 relating to a proceeding under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.190 - Nestlé/Perrier) [1992] OJ L 356/1, para. 78. 
2332 Commission Decision of 22 July 1992 relating to a proceeding under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.190 - Nestlé/Perrier) [1992] OJ L 356/1, para. 78. 
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stated above, it is likely that the threshold demanded for CBP to be sufficiently neutralizing 
would have been lower, as the requirement would have been to sufficiently disturb coordination 
by creating incentives to detach from the coordinated behavior. 
Later, in Irish Sugar v Commission, the comparison test was carried out by the Commission and 
the General Court to dismiss the allegation made by Irish Sugar that its buyers were in a position 
to preclude it from behaving independently as a seller of processed sugar. The Commission’s 
assessment was based also on comparing the concentration of buyers to the concentration on the 
supply side.2333 It was concluded that: 
[…] despite the presence of two large customers, the demand side is composed of a number of 
buyers which are not equally strong and which cannot be aggregated to conclude that they may 
constrain the market power of the supplier with over 90% of the market. The share of sales of the 
two largest customers does not counterbalance the dominant position of Irish Sugar.2334 
Therefore, the test in Irish Sugar v Commission resembled the previous experience in 
Nestlé/Perrier without going any further than the comparison of market shares. 
Additionally, in The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S, the Commission held that CBP did not 
exist because “the concentration ratio on the supply-side is much higher than on the buyer side”, 
along with the fact that the suppliers had ‘must-stock brands’ that the buyer would not have been 
able to obtain elsewhere. These two factors lead to the conclusion that even if buyers were large, 
they had insufficient CBP.2335 Therefore, the symmetry analysis was accompanied by further 
discussion of CBP buyer sources and hindrances, as I discussed in section 10.5. 
Furthermore, in Enso/Stora, a landmark Commission’s decision where CBP was the main factor 
in order to declare the compatibility of the concentration,2336 the comparison test was further 
developed and thoroughly applied, as also noted by Baker and Lofaro.2337 Following the 
precedent of Nestlé/Perrier, the Commission once again used the comparison test to determine 
the sufficiency of CBP to neutralize the possible anti-competitive effects of a merger between 
two cardboard producers in Enso/Stora.2338  
In Enso/Stora, the Commission first performed a comparison of the market shares, concentration 
and market structure of the involved merging suppliers and the customers. In so doing, it 
                                                          
2333 Commission Decision of 14 May 1997 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty 
(IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar plc) [1997] OJ L 258/1, para. 108. 
2334 Commission Decision of 14 May 1997 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty 
(IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar plc) [1997] OJ L 258/1, para. 108. 
2335 Commission Decision of 11 September 1997 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.833 - The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S) 
[1998] OJ L 145/41, para. 81. 
2336 Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 4.151; Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 86. 
2337 Arguing that the Enso/Stora decision was a step forward from the mere comparison of concentration/thresholds, 
see: Baker and Lofaro (2000), p. 189-190. 
2338 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9. 
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concluded that, due to the unique symmetrical market circumstances, the involved parties were in 
a situation of economic mutual dependence that kept in check the market behavior of both buyers 
and sellers.2339 The merging parties, Enso and Stora, were engaged in the production of different 
types of paper and cardboard, in particular liquid packaging board (LPB). In the LPB market both 
parties enjoyed a combined market share of between 50% and 70%, with two smaller rivals, 
Korsnäs and AssiDomän, with individual market shares of 10% to 20%.2340 Under the applicable 
regime at the time, a concentration between Enso and Stora would have prima facie created a 
dominant position, as the merged entity would have a market share that has been traditionally 
found sufficient to create a situation of dominance.2341 However, regarding CBP, the buying 
market for LPB also had few buyers and was dominated by a single large buying undertaking, 
Tetra Pak, which enjoyed a market share of 60% to 80% of market demand, and two smaller 
buyers Elopak and SIG Combibloc, with about 10% and 20% market share each.2342 In 
concentration terms, this implies that the supplier side had a HHI minimum of 3,000 and 
maximum of 5,125, whereas the demand side had a HHI minimum of 3,800 and maximum of 
6,800, not identical but rather similar.  
By comparing the market structures, concentrations and shares, the Commission reached the 
conclusion that: 
after the merger the structure of the supply-side will mirror the structure of the demand-side of the 
market for liquid packaging board, with one large supplier and two smaller suppliers facing one 
large buyer and two smaller buyers.2343 
Additionally, the assessment analyzed the supply-demand relationship between the parties, 
taking into account the commercial significance of the buyer to the seller, and concluded that the 
parties were mutually dependent because contracts in the LPB market are of long duration and 
suppliers and buyers reach agreements to suit their specific product needs, which requires 
investment from the supplier to specialize its production. The Commission also evaluated the 
ratio of sales a buyer represents for a supplier,2344 the fact that if Tetra Pak were to shift demand 
the merged entity would not be able to find other suitable buyers to fill the now spare capacity in 
                                                          
2339 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, para. 86. See also 
stressing the symmetry element: Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 86. 
2340 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, para. 74. 
2341 Judgment of 3 July 1991 in AKZO v Commission, C-62/86, EU:C:1991:286, para. 60 
2342 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, para. 84. 
2343 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, para. 84 
(emphasis added). 
2344 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, para. 90. 
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the short term,2345 as well as the capacity of Tetra Pak to sponsor entry or financially back other 
LPB suppliers. Lastly, in the comparison test, the ability of Tetra Pak to resort to alternative 
suppliers or sponsor entry if needed, along with its raw buyer power, was deemed sufficient to 
neutralize the risks of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position pursuant to the merger 
and, therefore, declaring the merger compatible with the market.2346 
Closely linked to the Enso/Stora Decision, the Commission once again reviewed a symmetrical 
market situation in Korsnäs/AD Cartonboard, which involved the same market and participants, 
declaring the concentration compatible with the market. Also, and as noted by Karlsson, in 
Korsnäs/AD Cartonboard the Commission further developed the comparison test by factoring in 
market shares, market concentration, and sale ratios, and dependency as I discuss below.2347 
Korsnäs and AD Cartoboard were undertakings involved in the production of LPB, competing 
directly with the now merged StoraEnso. The merging parties accounted for ca. 40% of the total 
supply of the EEA market, with StoraEnso enjoying a market share of 50-60%, as the other 
supplier. Despite the fact that this concentration would eliminate one independent source of 
supply it was declared compatible due to the CBP exercised by Tetra Pak. As a buyer, Tetra Pak 
enjoyed a market share of 40-60% of all purchases of LPB in the EEA, representing 80 to 100% 
of the LPB sales of both merging parties.2348 Furthermore, Tetra Pak adopted a multi-supplier 
strategy as it acquired goods from three suppliers: 20-40% from AD Cartonboard and 10-30% 
from Korsnäs as merging parties, and the remaining 40-60% from Stora/Enso. Based on these 
figures, the Commission concluded that “there is no doubt that Tetra Pak enjoys a significant 
degree of countervailing buyer power with respect to all LPB suppliers [including the merged 
entity and StoraEnso], as suppliers are heavily dependent upon Tetra Pak for a large share of 
their respective sales and profitability in relation to their LPB activities.”2349 Furthermore, Tetra 
Pak was deemed to be less dependent on its suppliers and able to exert sufficient CBP because, 
even after the merger, it would be capable of securing competitive LPB supplies by playing them 
off each other by having multi-supply sources and also avoiding the establishment of a collective 
dominance by the LPB supplier. Lastly, in the assessment the Commission also evaluated the 
possibility of the merger leading to a situation analogous to a bilateral monopoly in which buyers 
and sellers could coordinate their behavior. However, the assessment concluded that it was not 
                                                          
2345 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, para. 90. 
2346 Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 5.889. 
2347 Karlsson (2006). 
2348 Commission Decision of Non-opposition to a notified concentration M.4057 — Korsnäs/Assidomän 
Cartonboard [2006] OJ C 209/12, taken from the unabridged public version para. 44. 
2349 Commission Decision of Non-opposition to a notified concentration M.4057 — Korsnäs/Assidomän 
Cartonboard [2006] OJ C 209/12, taken from the unabridged public version, para. 46 (emphasis added). 
474 
 
possible to coordinate vertically due to the incentives created by CBP, which would make all 
participants play each other off.2350 
Both Enso/Stora and Korsnäs/AD Cartonboard represent a successful finding of CBP to 
neutralize the negative effects of a merger and are a step forward in the application of the 
comparison test due to the thoroughness of the analysis and its sophistication. At the same time, 
this level of sophistication can be explained because the prima facie observations – symmetry in 
market shares – was successfully achieved, unlike in the precedent of Nestlé/Perrier. This also 
can be understood as saying that a fully-fledged comparison test would be made when there are 
strong prima facie indications of the existence of some degree of CBP. However, it is important 
to remark that this preliminary assessment should not solely rest on an evaluation of symmetry, 
but has to consider all relevant CBP sources as a whole, as leaving the application of a thorough 
test upon symmetry disregards the economics of CBP. Hence, in my criterion the preliminary 
assessment should not be restrictive and, in fact, in case of doubt of even the possible existence of 
to a reasonable degree, regarding CBP, a fully fledged analysis ought to be undertaken to 
safeguard the procedural and substantive rights of the undertaking involved, regardless of the 
expenditure of human and economic resources by the NCAs and Courts. 
Later, in Tomra and Others v Commission, the General Court and the CJEU ratified a 
Commission Decision that found that Tomra had breached Article 102 TFEU, due to the grant of 
exclusionary rebates that prevented market entry of competitors, kept them small by limiting their 
growing possibilities, and eliminated them by means of acquisition.2351 Tomra alleged the 
existence of CBP to neutralize its dominance position and the Commission making a prima facie 
assessment found that “a comparison of the demand and the supply structure in the individual 
countries does not suggest that customers are able to outweigh Tomra’s strong position on the 
supply side”.2352 Even in markets that were highly concentrated, for example in the Nordic 
countries, the shares of the largest retailer where comparatively much smaller than they were in 
the Tomra situation. This very large difference between the sellers and the buyer helps when it 
comes to determining that there was no possibility of credible CBP as, additionally, there were no 
                                                          
2350 Commission Decision of Non-opposition to a notified concentration M.4057 — Korsnäs/Assidomän 
Cartonboard [2006] OJ C 209/12, unabridged public version, para. 66 to 81. I briefly discussed bilateral monopoly 
and indicated relevant literature in chapter 3, section 3.3 and footnote 105. 
2351 Summary of Commission Decision of 29 March 2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement against Tomra Systems ASA, Tomra 
Europe AS, Tomra Systems BV, Tomra Systems GmbH, Tomra Butikksystemer AS, Tomra Systems AB and Tomra 
Leergutsysteme GmbH (Case COMP/E-1/38.113 — Prokent/Tomra) [2008] OJ C 219/11, para. 11, summarized 
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2352 Summary of Commission Decision of 29 March 2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement against Tomra Systems ASA, Tomra 
Europe AS, Tomra Systems BV, Tomra Systems GmbH, Tomra Butikksystemer AS, Tomra Systems AB and Tomra 
Leergutsysteme GmbH (Case COMP/E-1/38.113 — Prokent/Tomra) [2008] OJ C 219/11, taken from the unabridged 
version, para. 88. 
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credible supply alternatives and the buyers had no incentive to sponsor new entrants, as the 
business of reverse vending machines was an ancillary activity for food retailers.2353 
One final and important aspect of the comparison test is the issue of the efficacy of CBP from a 
temporary perspective and the overall market conditions. In my view, in the assessment of CBP 
it has to be taken into account that the neutralization of the seller market power has to go beyond 
the short-term basis and extend into at least the medium term.2354 This is the case according to the 
Commission’s practice, at least regarding mergers, when it has been explicitly state that the CBP 
assessment must be made “in the context of the post-merger market structure”.2355 This policy 
choice of requiring CBP to be effective in the medium and long run with regard to the purchasing 
competition conditions has two implications that in my view are consistent with an ordoliberally 
oriented competition policy. Firstly, it implies that competition law ought to make sure that CBP 
is able to neutralize seller market power beyond the immediate situation to prevent abuses of 
market power in the longer run that would hurt the competitive process. Secondly, and related to 
the former, the exercise of CBP may also take into account the situation of weaker (but not 
inefficient) buyers and whether the benefits from the CBP spillover to them as I discuss 
below.2356 
10.8 Protecting weaker buyers: the spillover effect 
Once the assessment of the existence of CBP has been carried out, the Commission’s practice and 
its Guidance Notices require an additional step to determine the sufficiency of the CBP, as I 
discuss in this section. According to this second aspect of the test, the exertion of CBP has to 
benefit not only the powerful buyer that has it but it also must have a positive spillover effect, 
analogous to the anti-waterbed effect.2357 This means that for CBP to be sufficient, the effects 
must also benefit weaker buyers that do not possess the same degree of countervailing power as 
                                                          
2353 Summary of Commission Decision of 29 March 2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement against Tomra Systems ASA, Tomra 
Europe AS, Tomra Systems BV, Tomra Systems GmbH, Tomra Butikksystemer AS, Tomra Systems AB and Tomra 
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2355 Summary of Commission Decision of 10 May 2007 declaring a concentration compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.4381 — JCI/FIAMM) [2009] OJ C 241/12, taken 
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buyers may be able to extract more favourable conditions from the allegedly dominant undertaking than their weaker 
competitors” and even suggesting defining “separate relevant markets for, respectively, strong and weak buyers”, in 
European Commission, DG Competition (2005), para. 41. 
2357 The antiwaterbed effect implies that the exercise of buyer power benefits the powerful buyer and other buyers by 
reducing the overall purchasing price in the market. I discuss this effect in chapter 3, section 3.6.2. 
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the buyer exerting CBP, as the neutralization effect should benefit the competitive process as a 
whole and not only the position of a powerful buyer, as remarked by Hughes,2358 thereby granting 
some limited protection to smaller buyers. The protection is granted because CBP would not be 
sufficient if the buyer power would put rival buyers at a disadvantage compared to the powerful 
buyer and prone to seller side exploitation from the powerful supplier. In this sense, the spillover 
effect can be understood as a way to prevent or diminish the risk of weaker buyers becoming 
victim to a waterbed-effect-like situation in which the supplier concedes a better price to the 
powerful buyer but increases its prices vis-à-vis the rest, as I discussed in chapter 3, section 3.6.1. 
Therefore, the spillover effect prevents exploitation of buyers by a powerful seller, as well as 
protects buyers from being at a now greater competitive disadvantage regarding the powerful 
buyer exerting the CBP and, therefore, minimizes the risks of buyer power induced foreclosure, 
leading to further market concentration and the risks associated with it. 
This protection for smaller buyers, however, is not shared by all the literature; as Carlton, 
Coleman and Israel argue, “[i]f there exist a reasonably large number of large buyers, such that 
the downstream market would remain competitive even without price constraints from the 
smaller buyers, then there is little cause for concern”, because welfare overall remains the same 
or improves even if the weaker/smaller buyers are worse off. However, as the Commission’s 
practice shows, this more welfaristic proposal has not been endorsed in EU competition law.2359 
Therefore, in addition to proving that CBP must be sufficient sensu stricto vis-à-vis a specific 
buyer exerting the competitive pressure, the seller claiming the existence of CBP has the burden 
of proof to demonstrate the existence of the spillover effect. In my view, although the 
requirement of an additional spillover effect raises the bar when it comes to proving the 
sufficiency of CBP, it is a justified requirement finding anchorage in the overall buyer power 
treatment under EU competition law taking a broader approach to competitive harm. This is so 
because, by requiring a spillover effect, the logic is that buyer power is beneficial if it maintains 
or improves the upstream competition conditions as a whole for the protection of the competitive 
structure. This approach and additional requirement for the CBP sufficiency is consistent with an 
ordoliberal buyer power competition policy. 
The existence of this spillover effect is uncontroversial and has been recognized in the literature. 
For example, Bishop and Walker hold that “when assessing buyer power, it is important to 
confirm that it will protect small buyers as well as large buyers”.2360 Also Monti when 
commenting on the Enso/Stora Decision highlighted that for the Commission CBP is effective if 
“all buyers are able to exercise power so that the dominant firm is unable to price discriminate, 
                                                          
2358 Paul Hughes, ‘Business strategy and EC competition law - Two Systems Separated by a Common Language’ 
International Company and Commercial Law Review (2009) 387. 
2359 Carlton, Coleman and Israel [2015], p. 545. 
2360 Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 3-032. 
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offering low prices to the powerful buyers and high prices to the weak”.2361 More recently, 
Ezrachi and Ioannidou remarked that “even where the customers appear willing to switch to 
alternative suppliers, if the exercise of buyer power will benefit only these customers, to the 
detriment of smaller customers and consumers, countervailing buyer power cannot be found.”2362 
Cook and Patel go even further and claim that, “the strong buyer[s] should not only protect 
themselves, but effectively protect the entire market.”2363 In even stronger terms, Faull and 
Nikpay indicate that “[f]or buyer power to be accepted as the countervailing factor to the exercise 
of market power on the part of the supplier, it must benefit all customers in the market”.2364 Also 
this concern for the protection of smaller buyers is also present in the literature dealing with US 
and Canadian Antitrust.2365 
Additionally, an aspect that is important to explore is that, even though the spillover effect 
appears counterintuitive and unprofitable for the supplier it is not necessarily so. A supplier is, or 
should be, interested in preserving a degree of competition among its buyers so that it can have 
alternative sources of demand granting it bargaining power vis-à-vis the most powerful of its 
buyers, as was discussed by the Commission in Enso/Stora and which I address below. If CBP 
benefits a single buyer and gives that buyer an even stronger position, then the seller will be 
worse off when negotiating a new contract. Thus, the supplier claiming the existence of CBP in a 
specific case will also be interested when designing its selling strategies to make sure that the 
benefits of CBP do not benefit only the large buyer but also other ones. 
10.8.1 The spillover effect in the Commission’s practice 
The first decision to recognize and require the spillover effect is Nestlé/Perrier in which the 
Commission explicitly stated that:  
In the enforcement of the competition rules, the Commission must also pay attention to the 
protection of the weaker buyers. Even if some buyers might have a certain buying power, in the 
absence of sufficient competition pressure on the market, it cannot be excluded that Nestle and 
BSN apply different conditions of sale to the various buyers.2366 
                                                          
2361 Monti ‘The Concept of Dominance in Article 82’ (2006), p. 37. 
2362 Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 85. 
2363 Cook and Patel, [2013], para 2.81. 
2364 Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 5.892. 
2365 In US antitrust law, a merger and CBP is “to be evaluated by its impact on all buyers, however, not just on the 
larger more sophisticated ones”, as pointed out by Hovenkamp in Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of 
Competition and its Practice [2005], p. 544. Similarly, in Canadian Antitrust, CBP held by only some customers 
may not be sufficient to prevent all anticompetitive effects of a merger, particularly if sustained price discrimination 
between different customers groups is feasible, Facey and Brown, [2013] 242, p. 242. 
2366 Commission Decision of 22 July 1992 relating to a proceeding under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.190 - Nestlé/Perrier) [1992] OJ L 356/1, para. 78 (emphasis added). 
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Therefore, the Commission also considered the position in which smaller buyers would have 
been if CBP had been declared sufficient with respect to a large buyer, and what the effects of the 
concentration on the competitive conditions beyond the short term would be. 
Later, in Enso/Stora the protection of smaller or weaker buyers was central in the assessment of 
the sufficiency of CBP to declare the compatibility of the merger.2367 From the facts and the 
Commission’s assessment, it was clear that Tetra Pak in its condition of carton purchaser was 
able to beneficiate from CBP vis-à-vis the merging parties of Enso/Stora. The Commission, 
nevertheless, was concerned with the effects of the merger regarding the position and 
competitiveness of two smaller players vis-à-vis the new entity, as the merger would weaken 
their relative buyer power and could involve difficulties in switching supplier in the short term, 
therefore leaving them prone to exploitation.2368 However, the Commission found that the CBP 
exercised by Tetra Pak “will […] to a certain extent, spill over to Elopak and SIG Combibloc as 
well”2369 because the merging parties, to counteract the very strong bargaining position of Tetra 
Pak, would be incentivized to guarantee the presence of these smaller buyers in the market in 
order to have alternative demand sources.2370 In my view, the Commission’s assessment of the 
spillover effect is intuitively correct and in line with buyer power economics. The spillover effect 
in this case occurred not because after the merger the smaller parties would have CBP or more 
bargaining power, but rather because it was in the interest of Enso/Stora to offer them supply 
conditions that would guarantee its market presence so that the merged entity would not be 
dependent on the purchases of a single buyer. Alternatively, another way of explaining the 
spillover is the fact that the price reductions obtained by Tetra Pak would also have been 
demanded by the smaller buyers, particularly due to the sunk costs in operating the machines. 
Also, from Enso/Stora it can be concluded that the spillover effect not only is required to protect 
smaller buyers but that a supplier would avoid becoming dependent on a large buyer by offering 
attractive purchasing conditions to smaller/weaker buyers, therefore benefiting the competitive 
conditions as a whole. 
Like in Enso/Stora, the protection of other smaller buyers in the self-interest of the supplier was 
also factored in by the Commission in Korsnäs/AD Cartonboard, where it was found that after 
the merger of the cardboard producers, the second and third buyers in size also had some degree 
                                                          
2367 See also highlighting the discussion of benefits to all buyers: Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 5.897. 
2368 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, para. 94. 
2369 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9, para. 96 
(emphasis added). 
2370 Also stressing the ‘spillover effect’ of Tetra Pak’s CBP without explaining any further how the spillover operates 
see: Ezrachi and Ioannidou (2014), p. 86. See the views of Baker and Lofaro who argue that these smaller buyers, if 
switching to sources of supply, would have had substantial bargaining power vis-à-vis the merging entity in Baker 
and Lofaro (2000), p. 189. 
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of “buyer power vis-à-vis LPB suppliers as they place orders large enough to fill the capacity of a 
board machine”, even if they were much smaller in comparison to the largest buyer.2371 In this 
case the Commission concluded that the merging entity was in no position to discriminate against 
these weaker buyers – which implies a negation of possible waterbed effects – as this: 
[…] would clearly be counter-productive in medium to long term for LPB suppliers as it would 
affect smaller converter’s competitiveness and would ultimately put them at risk of being 
foreclosed from the market. This in turn would leave the LPB suppliers with a monopsonistic 
buyer [Tetra Pak].2372 
Therefore, exerting exploitative seller power vis-à-vis these weaker buyers would have been 
against the interest of the merging entity because the squeezing of these buyers out of the market 
would have left the seller facing a single and more powerful buyer, and due to the costs of having 
a board machine out of production. 
In SCA/Metsä Tissue, a merger declared incompatible with the internal market, the Commission 
also argued that weaker buyers would be under a worse situation with respect to the merged 
entity and could be subject to anti-competitive price discrimination through arbitrage as the 
supplier would have been able to raise prices above the pre-merger level to weaker buyers.2373 In 
this case, unlike in Korsnäs/AD Cartonboard, there were no special spare capacity circumstances, 
nor a single and very powerful buyer that would have prevented the merging entity from price 
discriminating vis-à-vis weaker buyers. Therefore, “even if the largest customers would be able 
to exercise some countervailing buyer power this would not protect smaller customers, and the 
new entity would still be able to raise prices above the pre-merger level.”2374 From the wording 
used by the Commission, my interpretation is that the exercise of CBP must protect or at least 
not put weaker or smaller undertakings in a worse-off situation than the pre-merger levels with 
respect to weaker buyers. In other words, the Commission took into consideration risks of 
possible waterbed effects that would have weakened the competitiveness of smaller buyers. From 
a total welfare perspective, however, the Commission did not analyze whether the increase in 
price to the weaker buyers may be neutralized by the discounts that may be achieved by the large 
buyers, which reinforces its interest in preserving a sufficient amount of players in the market to 
protect future competition. 
                                                          
2371 Commission Decision of Non-opposition to a notified concentration M.4057 — Korsnäs/Assidomän 
Cartonboard [2006] OJ C 209/12, taken from the unabridged public version, para. 50. 
2372 Commission Decision of Non-opposition to a notified concentration M.4057 — Korsnäs/Assidomän 
Cartonboard [2006] OJ C 209/12, taken from the unabridged public version, para. 52. 
2373 Commission Decision of 31 January 2001 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2097 SCA/Metsä Tissue) [2001] OJ L 57/1, para. 88. 
2374 Commission Decision of 31 January 2001 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market 




In Bombardier/ADtranz the lack of buyer (bargaining) power by weaker buyers was an element 
to conclude that no sufficient CBP existed, even if a large buyer had relative CBP with respect to 
the supplier. In this case, involving the demand for regional trains in Germany, the Commission 
concluded that even though Deutsche Bahn Regio AG (and a publicly owned undertaking) had 
CBP due to being the largest buyer, there were other smaller privately owned buyers that lacked 
buyer market power. Consequently, it concluded that the demand side in regional trains “does not 
enjoy the same degree of buyer power” and this was a factor to determine that sufficient CBP did 
not exist to neutralize the competitive risks pursuant to the concentration.2375 The decision, 
however, did not make an express assessment of the effects the merger would have produced on 
these weaker buyers, or the spillover of the CBP of the large buyer, and just dismissed the CBP 
claim. However, from the wording used by the Commission it can be inferred that the position of 
these weaker buyers was taken into account, either in terms of a spillover effect or the existence 
of their own CBP. My impression is that the Commission decided not to carry out an assessment 
of the spillover effect because the prima facie assessment based on a basic comparison led to the 
conclusion that CBP was unlikely to exist due to the asymmetrical market conditions. Despite the 
lack of sufficient CBP, and either CBP or a spillover effect on weaker buyers, the concentration 
was deemed compatible as the Commission was satisfied with a set of commitments that, instead 
of strengthening the position of the smaller buyers, divested parts of the supplier undertaking. 
Hence, in this case, the absence of the spillover was not critical for the merger assessment as a 
whole, but it was for not declaring CBP to be sufficient. 
Also, in the soft law the Commission has several times reiterated the need for CBP to have a 
spillover effect to the benefit of weaker buyers, in several of its policy instruments. In its 
Discussion Paper on the application of Art [102] TFEU, the Commission stated that:  
[t]he presence of strong buyers can only serve to counter a finding of dominance if it is likely that 
in response to prices being increased above the competitive level, the buyers in question will pave 
the way for effective new entry or lead existing suppliers in the market to significantly expand 
their output so as to defeat the price increase. In other words, the strong buyers should not only 
protect themselves, but effectively protect the market.2376 
This requirement of market protection and, therefore, CBP effects spillover to weaker buyers was 
reinstated in the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines when requiring that CBP: 
[…] cannot be found to sufficiently off-set potential adverse effects of a merger if it only ensures 
that a particular segment of customers, with particular bargaining strength, is shielded from 
significantly higher prices or deteriorated conditions after the merger.2377 
                                                          
2375 Commission Decision of 3 April 2001 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and 
the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2139 — Bombardier/ADtranz) [2002] OJ L 69/50, para. 67. 
2376 European Commission, DG Competition (2005), para. 41. 
2377 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 66 (emphasis added). 
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Despite the recognition of the protection of weaker buyers as part of the CBP by the EU 
competition law practice and the soft law, none of these Decisions or instruments incorporate any 
express rationale for the protection of weaker buyers. In my view, the raison d’être behind this 
protection is an interest in protecting the competitive market structure, the freedom to compete, 
and the wellbeing of small and medium undertakings,2378 as remarked by the literature,2379 which 
is consistent with the broader approach to buyer power harm used in other EU competition law 
areas and ordoliberalism.  
Put differently, these findings clarify that, at least when it comes to the CBP, EU competition law 
does not resort to a pure short term end consumer harm.2380 If that were the case, the protection of 
weaker buyers would not be a requirement and CBP would be sufficient if consumer prices 
would ultimately be lower in the short run for end consumers purely based on the benefits 
obtained by the large buyer. The protection of weaker buyers and the requirement for a limited 
erga omnes effect reveal that the Courts and, surprisingly, the Commission acknowledge the need 
for a more comprehensive approach to competition law as a whole, and buyer power related 
aspects in particular, by taking into account as part of the assessment competition in the upstream 
market and not only the benefits of end consumers in the short term. 
The problem with granting some limited protection and considering the position of weaker and/or 
smaller buyers to determine the sufficiency of CBP is that it can become a way to grant undue 
protection to inefficient firms. Therefore, determining what is the limit of the protection to 
weaker buyers is an important albeit difficult exercise that warrants a case-by-case assessment. 
However, and as expressed by Carlton and Israel, a general answer that can be given is that “[i]f 
there exists a reasonably large number of large buyers, such that the downstream market would 
remain highly competitive even without price constraints from the smaller buyers, then there is 
little cause for concern.”2381 The key, therefore, lies in the protection of the market structure and 
its intrinsic competitiveness for the spillover effect to be sufficient. 
10.9 Are the Commission and the Courts obliged to assess 
countervailing buyer power? 
A question that is left unaddressed thus far is whether it is the Commission or the Courts duty to 
assess the existence of CBP unless its existence is of particular importance for the case. My 
analysis of the Commission’s practice and the case law confirms that there is no such duty. 
                                                          
2378 The TFEU makes explicit reference to the need of fostering and protecting small and medium enterprises in three 
occasions: Article 153(2)(b); Article 173(1); Article 179(2). 
2379 Korah and O'Sullivan, [2002], p. 42-43. 
2380 Cf with the position of Kirkwood who argues for the protection of weaker suppliers instead of weaker buyers as 
part of a consumer welfare standard in US antitrust law in Kirkwood ‘The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting 
Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct’ (2013). 
2381 Carlton and Israel (2011), p. 135. 
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However, competition law practice does clarify that the extent of this analysis depends on the 
particularities of the case, implying that the degree of thoroughness to be exercised by the 
decision-maker varies and appears to incorporate a pre-requisite of a prima facie examination 
before performing the full-fledged analysis, as I mentioned before.  
The standard in EU competition law, therefore, appears to be that the one claiming the existence 
of the CBP is obliged to prove its existence in application of analogy to standard rules of the 
distribution of the burden of the proof in other areas of EU competition law, as confirmed by 
Directive 1/2003 Article 2,2382 as well as the case law regarding the application of Article 101(3) 
TFEU to agreements in GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others.2383Also, 
this is consistent with the general principles of distributions of the burden of the proof in EU 
competition law; the party that claims a circumstance has the burden of the proof to demonstrate 
its existence and extent. At the same time, the Commission also has a duty to assess particularly 
relevant circumstances of the case that may include the existence of CBP within the requirements 
of the principle of good administration.2384 I discuss the conclusions derived from the case law 
and the Commission’s practice in the following paragraphs. 
In Impala v Commission the General Court confirmed that the Commission is not obliged to 
reach a conclusion concerning the existence of sufficient CBP if the conditions for finding 
collective dominance are not present.2385 An interpretation a contrario implies that if the 
Commission would have found that the concentration was likely to lead to the creation or 
strengthening of a collective dominant position, then it would have had to evaluate the existence 
and sufficiency of CBP. In the Judgment the General Court confirmed that the Commission’s 
analysis “involving collective dominance calls for close examination in particular of the 
circumstances which, in each individual case, are relevant for assessing the effects of the 
                                                          
2382 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1. 
2383 Judgment of 6 October 2009 in GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others, Joined cases C-
501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, EU:C:2009:610, para. 78. 
2384 For a doctrinal and general discussion on the principle of good administration in EU (and EU competition) law 
see, inter alia: P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, ‘Improving EU Competition Law Procedures by Applying Principles of 
Good Administration: The Role of the Ombudsman’ 1 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (2010) 379; 
Johannes Siegfried Schnitzer, ‘Regulating Public Procurement Law at Supranational Level: The Example of EU 
Agreements on Public Procurement’ 10 Journal of Public Procurement (2010) 301; Melanie Smith, ‘Developing 
Administrative Principles in the EU: A Foundational Model of Legitimacy?’ 18 European Law Journal (2012) 269; 
Margrét Vala Kristjánsdóttir, ‘Good Administration as a Fundamental Right’ 9 Icelandic Review of Politics and 
Administration (2013) 237. For some cases dealing with the principle of good administration in EU competition law 
see: Judgment of 1 October 2015 in Electrabel and Dunamenti Erőmű v Commission, C-357/14 P,EU:C:2015:642, 
para. 29-31; Judgment of 24 January 2013 in 3F v Commission, C-646/11 P, EU:C:2013:36, para. 58-75; see also the 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Judgment of 29 June 2010 in Commission v Alrosa, C-441/07 P, 
EU:C:2009:555, para. 220 
2385 Judgment of 13 July 2006 in Impala v Commission, T-464/04, EU:2006:16, paras. 188 and 505. 
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concentration on competition in the reference market”.2386 Therefore, as CBP was not relevant for 
the case, it explains why the General Court did not discuss the need to evaluate CBP, even if it 
was part of applicant’s plea. 
In Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, the General Court more clearly stated that “even 
if the Commission ought to have taken the countervailing power of customers into account, the 
applicant has not shown that its customers were able to counterbalance its market power”,2387 
confirming that the Commission has a duty to assess CBP when it is of relevance for the case. In 
this case as the applicant did not prove that the customers were able to exercise CBP and simply 
claimed it without proving it, the General Court dismissed the allegations. 
Also, in Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, the General Court held that if CBP is to 
be assessed the sophistication of the analysis depends on the circumstances of the case, in 
particular the industry structure and seller strategies as carried out in Enso/Stora.2388 It held that:  
[f]urthermore, whilst the facts in Enso/Stora may have required, due to an exceptional market 
structure, sophisticated analyses of the industry structure and strategies that buyers could 
undertake to curb price increases post-merger, it is clear from the foregoing that this does not 
apply to the present case. In the light of the above findings, the Court considers that the 
Commission could not be required, in the circumstances of this case, to carry out a more detailed 
examination of the countervailing buyer power of the merging parties’ customers.2389  
This position of carrying out a detailed assessment only if it is of importance for the case was 
supported by Advocate General Kokott in Solvay v Commission when it dealt with whether the 
Commission is obliged to state reasons concerning the existence (or not) of CBP. The Advocate 
General concluded that the institution carrying out the assessment is “not required […] to define 
its positions on matters which are plainly of secondary importance or to anticipate potential 
objections”.2390 This claim was not dealt with by the CJEU in its Judgment, as it was found that 
arguments backing the appeal relative to the access to the administrative file were well founded 
and sufficient to set aside the General Court’s Judgment.2391 
                                                          
2386 Judgment of 13 July 2006 in Impala v Commission, T-464/04, EU:2006:16, para. 522 (emphasis added), making 
reference to Judgment of 31 March 1998 in France and Société commerciale des potasses and de l'azote and 
Entreprise minière and chimique v Commission, Joined cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 EU:C:1998:148, para. 222; and 
Judgment of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission, T-342/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:146, para. 63. 
2387 Judgment of 25 June 2010, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, T-66/01, ECR, EU:T:2010:255, para. 
277. 
2388 Commission Decision of 25 November 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.1225 - Enso/Stora) [1999] OJ L 254/9. 
2389 Judgment of 9 July 2007, Sun Chemical Group and Others v Commission, T-282/06, ECR, EU:T:2007:203, para. 
216 (emphasis added). 
2390 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott on 14 April 2011 in Judgment Solvay v Commission, C-109/10 P, 
EU:C:2011:256, para. 66. 
2391 Judgment of 25 October 2011 in Solvay v Commission, C-109/10 P, EU:C:2011:686, para. 73.  
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Contrasting with the previous case law, in SIV and Others v Commission the General Court 
criticized the Commission as it found that in its assessment of an allegedly collective dominance 
situation it had not submitted relevant evidence, nor it had “even attempted to gather the 
information necessary to weigh up the economic power of the three producers against that of Fiat, 
which could cancel each other out.”2392 The lack of CBP analysis was one of the reasons why the 
General Court set aside the finding of the collective dominant position, as remarked by Faull and 
Nikpay.2393 A way to interpret this requirement is that since the Commission had claimed the 
existence of a collective dominant position, it had to prove its existence and also the other 
relevant factors that could have had an impact on it, such as opposing CBP. 
Lastly, concerning object restrictions of competition under Article 101(1) TFEU the Commission 
has clarified that it is not obliged to assess CBP defenses or its sufficiency as held in Candle 
Waxes2394 and in Bananas.2395 In Candle Waxes the Commission concluded that even if the 
existence of buyer power in general may be a reason to enter into a seller’s cartel, the existence of 
countervailing buyer power “not be relied upon to negate the existence of an infringement 
itself”.2396 This was later on confirmed in Bananas when the Commission held that 
countervailing buyer power in itself cannot justify the infringement of Article 101 TFEU.2397 
10.10 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have analyzed CBP as one of the sub-expressions of buyer power and defined in 
a narrow manner the competitive constraint exercised by a buyer(s) vis-à-vis a seller that is 
sufficient to neutralize the exercise of seller market power. CBP, therefore, acts as an efficiency 
defense for selling side firms that claim that they are unable to substantially exercise market 
power that otherwise would have allowed them to behave independently from their buyers and 
                                                          
2392 Judgment of 10 March 1992, SIV and Others v Commission, joined cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89, 
EU:T:1992:38, para. 366. Also remarking that the General Court reproached the Commission’s lack of analysis see, 
Bellamy, Child and Roth, [2001], para. 9-058; O'Donoghue and Padilla, [2013], p. 167. 
2393 Faull, Nikpay and Taylor, [2014], para. 4.217. 
2394 Summary of Commission Decision of 1 October 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/C.39181 — Candle 
Waxes) [2009] OJ C 295/17, taken from the unabridged version, para. 322. 
2395 Summary of Commission Decision of 15 October 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty (Case COMP/39.188 — Bananas) [2009] OJ C 189/12, taken from the unabridged version, para. 282. 
2396 Summary of Commission Decision of 1 October 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/C.39181 — Candle 
Waxes) [2009] OJ C 295/17, taken from the unabridged version, para. 322. 
2397 Summary of Commission Decision of 15 October 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty (Case COMP/39.188 — Bananas) [2009] OJ C 189/12, taken from the unabridged version, para. 282, 
partially ratified in Judgment of 14 March 2013, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission, T-587/08, 
EU:T:2013:129, and on appeal as Judgment of 24 June 2015 in Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission and 
Commission / Fresh Del Monte Produce, C-293/13 P, EU:C:2015:416, in which the fine was reduced. 
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other competitors, significantly impede effective future competition or that an agreement between 
suppliers was not anti-competitive. 
I have also shown what the origins and characteristics of CBP are. With regard to its 
characteristics, I demonstrated that its effect may be actual or potential, also a relative concept 
between a buyer and a supplier, having the ability also to prevent coordination among sellers and 
which can be exercised by any type of buyers, but which unorganized end consumers would not 
exercise sufficiently.  
Concerning the sources, I have shown that the case law and the soft law have identified a non-
exhaustive list of them, including but not limited to the ability to shift demand to alternative 
suppliers, relative size and concentration, ratio of purchases/profit represented by a buyer to a 
seller and price differentials. Also, against these sources, other case circumstances that may 
hinder the ability of buyers to exercise CBP must be assessed. This implies that the assessment of 
the existence and sufficiency of CBP must be made on a case-by-case basis. 
This assessment is carried out through a comparison test that seeks to determine if CBP is 
sufficient to offset the opposed seller market power and that follows the assessment of sources of 
it. According to the test, if seller market power is sufficiently neutralized by the CBP and it has a 
spillover effect improving the overall conditions in the market, then it would be sufficient and 
effective. Importantly, this comparison test ought not to be made by a pure contrasting of market 
shares or market concentration, as substantial CBP may rise in lower market thresholds than 
seller market power, which may lead to erroneous conclusions. Nevertheless, a market share and 
market concentration can be a good first indicator of the level of symmetry (or lack thereof) 
providing a rebuttable presumption of the existence of CBP. 
My analysis has also shown that the Commission and the Courts employ a consistent approach 
regarding the application of the test across all areas of EU competition law, which, in my view, is 
the proper approach. The consistency appears to be due to the understanding of the economics 
behind bargaining power, but as there are no explicit remarks in this sense it is not possible to 
confirm that the consistent treatment is due to the economics of CBP. What is different, 
nevertheless, is the threshold required for CBP to be sufficient depending on the type of case at 
hand. For dominance cases, it must be sufficient at least to preclude an undertaking from 
behaving dominantly in a market; in the case of the assessment of a concentration, it must be 
sufficient to prevent the merging entities from significantly impeding effective competition, and, 
concerning agreements among undertakings, it may be invoked as part the assessment of the 
efficiency of the agreement in the application of Article 101(3) TFEU. 
Furthermore, my analysis of the Commission’s practice and the case law and the application of 
the comparison test shows that despite CBP being frequently invoked by parties, in only a 
handful of cases has it been found to be capable of overriding the competitive concerns of seller 
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market power. To date, CBP has not been a relevant defense in a dominant case. In the case of 
concentration, its invocation has been slightly more successful and on occasions has been either 
the fundamental aspect to declare the compatibility of the concentration, although more often it 
has been an additional factor in non-opposing the merger. 
Additionally, I have found that EU competition law demands for CBP to be sufficient also to be 
capable of shielding or protecting from the exercise of seller market power not only the large 
buyer exerting it, but also smaller/weaker buyers, having a spillover effect. This implies three 
important consequences. Firstly, this increases the threshold required for CBP to be sufficient as 
it not only has to neutralize seller power with respect to the buyer exerting it, but it also has to be 
beneficial to other buyers. Secondly, the CBP treatment is in line with the general buyer power 
competition policy in EU competition law that adopts a broader standard to harm seeking the 
protection of the competitive structure and preserving a sufficient amount of buyers and sellers to 
generate sufficient competitive pressure to keep markets competitive in the long run. This 
additional concern for the protection of weaker (yet not inefficient buyers) is also consistent with 
an ordoliberal competition policy regarding buyer power as protecting competition as such, and, 
to a certain extent, the protection of the economic freedom to compete. Thirdly, in requiring this 
spillover effect the Commission acknowledges that the exercise of CBP and buyer power in 
general may have ambiguous effects on other buyers in addition to suppliers, i.e.: the waterbed 
and antiwaterbed effect. The positive aspect of the spillover effect can be understood as, the 
exercise of CBP by a large buyer might generate positive consequences for other smaller buyers 
in the market vis-à-vis a powerful seller in the form of discounts or other preferential conditions. 
This occurs also because the seller would not risk becoming dependent on a single buyer and, 
therefore, would rather ensure that other buyers remain in the market. At the same time, the 
spillover effect, as has been applied by the Commission, seems to indicate that the exercise of 
CBP in certain circumstances may put smaller buyers in a weaker situation than before vis-à-vis 
their supplier. Because of this, they can be victims of seller power exploitation and therefore, 
they should receive some degree of protection to avoid them being excluded from the market, 
therefore, altering the competitive structure upstream. Which of these two antagonist effects is 
dominant depends on the circumstances of the case and awaits clarification by the Courts on 
whether the spillover assessment should be made in all cases or only if CBP is likely to 
sufficiently exist. 
Additionally, my study found that under EU competition law in general terms there is no 
obligation for either the Commission or the Courts to ex officio assess the existence and 
sufficiency of CBP in all cases. The rule of thumb is that CBP should be assessed thoroughly 
whenever it is particularly relevant for the case and when it has been invoked and supported with 
relevant and admissible evidence by one of the involved parties. 
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Lastly, an aspect that I did not directly address in my discussion of CBP but find ripe for further 
methodological discussion is the issue of during which stage of the competitive analysis CBP 
should be assessed. Should it be during the assessment of the relevant market or outside of it? 
The Commission’s practice and also the limited national case law discussed in the dissertation 
shows that authorities tend to evaluate CBP most of the time apart from the evaluation of the 
relevant market. This is usually done in a separate section of the decision and normally prompted 
by the defendant. However, as I discussed in chapter 6 when dealing with the assessment of 
buyer market power, CBP is at times considered and/or mixed with the existence of alternative 
supply sources and dependence. Therefore, competition authorities could evaluate the existence 
of CBP already at the market definition stage instead of at a later time, which may occasionally 
save time and resources at the administrative level. 
In sum, CBP is one of the most relevant and analyzed buyer power topics for good reasons. It is 
frequently invoked by parties before the Courts, albeit to very little success. Furthermore, its legal 
treatment is consistent and follows a progressive development of the comparison test, granting 
the parties relative legal predictability despite the fact that the assessment ought to be carried out 
on a case-by-case basis. An unanswered question remains, though: Will the theoretical possibility 
that a dominant undertaking see its market power neutralized by (one or more) buyer(s) become a 
practical reality in the scope of Article 102 TFEU? Only time and the circumstances of the cases, 




11 Limiting Buyer Power 
11.1 Introduction 
Buyer power may be limited by undertakings, when either acting individually, coordinated or 
even through the intervention of the state of its organs, when the behavior of these entities seeks 
to restrict the ability of a buyer to exert its market power vis-à-vis its suppliers. This can be done, 
for instance, by imposing minimum purchasing prices, limiting supply, granting some discount 
(rebate), a countervailing benefit, or imposing a legislative or administrative restriction. The first 
two of these restrictive of practices, as shown by the EU case law, tend to be imposed by 
association of undertakings or sellers’ cartels as the consequence of sectoral crisis related to 
agriculture. Rebates, on the other hand, are the mechanisms employed by powerful – dominant – 
sellers to prevent buyers from seeking alternative trading partners and create a relation of quasi 
exclusivity purchasing. Countervailing benefits, are usually employed as compensation 
mechanisms for the loss of buyer power in exclusive supply agreements. And lastly, legislative 
measures aim to address what is usually a structural problem in a specific market. 
All these measures constrain buyer power exercise as they limit the buyer’s capacity to negotiate 
better terms and conditions, by setting a floor price limit, or desincentivizing buyers to find 
alternative sources of supply. Therefore, they do not imply the exercise of buyer power but its 
limitation and constitute tactics used by suppliers to weaken the bargaining position of the buyer. 
Hence, I see buyer market power limitation from a seller’s point of view. Due the scope of this 
dissertation, I discuss these behaviors from a buyer power limitation perspective only, without 
dealing in length with the particularities of some of these practices, especially regarding the 
granting of rebates by dominant undertakings.2398 
My aim in this chapter is to analyze how and why suppliers attempt to limit buyer power exercise 
and whether such restrictions of the buyer’s economic freedom constitute a competition 
infringement. To answer these research questions I have structured the chapter on the analysis of 
four mechanisms to (unduly) restrict buyer market power. First, in section 11.2, I discuss the 
                                                          
2398 There is plenty of literature dealing with the treatment of rebates and well known case law in EU competition 
law. For some recent literature dealing specifically with these issues see, inter alia: Hans Zenger, ‘Loyalty Rebates 
and the Competitive Process’ 8 Journal of Competition Law and Economics (2012) 717; Paul Nihoul, ‘The Ruling of 
the General Court in Intel: Towards the End of an Effect-based Approach in European Competition Law?’ 5 Journal 
of European Competition Law & Practice (2014) 521; Richard Whish, ‘Intel v Commission: Keep Calm and Carry 
on!’ Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (2014) 1; Wils (2014); Brian Sher, ‘Intel: General Court 
Rewinds the Clock on Rebates’ (2014) <http://www.nabarro.com/insight/briefings/2014/june/intel-general-court-
rewinds-the-clock-on-rebates/>; Geradin (2015); Petit ‘Intel, Leveraging Rebates and the Goals of Article 102 
TFEU’ (2015); Nicolas Petit, ‘Rebates and Article 102 TFEU: The European Commission’s Duty to Apply the 
Guidance Paper’ 2 Competition Law & Policy Debate (2016) 4; Chan (2016). 
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imposition of minimum purchasing prices. This is followed in section 11.3, by the study of 
schemes designed to limit the quantities supplied by setting production quotas and preventing 
buyers from benefiting from economies of scale. In section 11.4, I discuss how the grant of 
rebates can also be used to compensate and/or restrict the ability of buyers to seek alternative 
supply sources if imposed by a dominant undertaking. In section 11.5, I address the granting of 
countervailing benefits in the case of vertical agreements, such as exclusive branding. Section 
11.6 concludes with a summary of the findings and synthetizing under which circumstances 
limiting buyer power constitutes an infringement to competition law. 
11.2 Imposing minimum purchasing prices 
Setting minimum purchasing prices limits the ability of buyers to exercise buyer market power as 
sellers impose a limit from which it is not possible to negotiate further. For example, if the 
suppliers decide to set a common selling price ‘P = X’ per unit, the buyer, even if it could have 
obtained a lower price by increasing its demand due to its bargaining power, would not be able to 
pay a price of ‘P = X-1’. Hence, it is forced to accept the price dictated by the sellers. These types 
of practices are, or should be, prohibited because, by their very object or nature, they restrict the 
competitive price formation, the buyer’s economic freedom and competition as a process by 
guaranteeing a supra-competitive profit for the seller. Furthermore, by setting minimum prices 
this indirectly fixes retailing prices and reduces the buyer’s incentives to lower the price vis-à-vis 
final consumers.2399 
Setting minimum purchasing prices restricts a buyer’s ability to exert buyer market power in 
several ways. Setting a price limit precludes buyers to decrease the purchasing price they pay 
either by monopsony and bargaining power, which guarantees a supracompetitive profit 
proportion to the supplier that would not have existed under normal competitive conditions. Also, 
it may negatively affect the quantity purchased by buyers as they lack incentive to buy larger 
amounts. This could also lead to scarcity of goods and consequently have an upward effect on 
prices as well as under-utilizing goods leading to a loss on allocative efficiency. Additionally, it 
undermines the incentives of buyers to compete in the downstream market and facilitates 
downstream collusion.2400 Furthermore, price limits may have a foreclosing effect in the upstream 
market for smaller buyers, who, if prices are too high, will not be able to compete with 
financially stronger purchasers.2401 Lastly, it may negatively impact innovation and investment by 
                                                          
2399 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 48 and 223. See also: Ehlers [2008], para 2.3.046. 
2400 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 224. 
2401 Judgment of 30 January 1985 in BNIC v Clair, C-123/83, EU:C:1985:33, p. 417; Guidelines on Vertical 
Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 224. 
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buyers to improve their products or distribution channels due to the lack of profitability from the 
exercise of their buyer power.2402 
Setting minimum purchasing prices can be done in several ways, for instance by imposing price 
ceilings (naked price fixing), setting selling ranges or increasing or decreasing sales percentages, 
along with other factors.2403 Moreover, purchasing price fixing is often accompanied by other 
restrictions of competition also aimed at limiting buyer power, such as imposing maximum sale 
quotas, as occurred in a Bulgaria when the NCA found that a union of poultry breeders had 
entered into a cartel from 2002 until 2007 to set minimum prices and production quotas on an 
example of object restriction of competition.2404 
11.2.1 Legal treatment to imposition of minimum purchasing prices 
Concerning unilateral behavior, Article 102(a) TFEU prohibits the imposition of “unfair purchase 
or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions”. Therefore, the fixing of a purchasing price to 
be anti-competitive would require being ‘unfair’ and exploitative/leading to inefficiency in order 
to be sanctioned. As I discussed in chapter 8, section 8.3, in EU competition law there have been 
very few instances in which an exploitative/unfair pricing behavior has been deemed as anti-
competitive. In this case, the fixing of a price limit would have an analog effect as imposing an 
exploitatively high purchasing price because the seller extracts a supracompetitive profit that is 
higher than it would have obtained absent the price ceiling and normal price competition.2405 
Despite this, my research confirms that such practices are rare because a supplier would be able 
to conduct this type of conduct only if there are no possible alternative suppliers, which is 
unlikely to happen, particularly in markets where buyer power plays a role, such as those of raw 
materials or retailing because there are several sellers offering the same or a similar good. 
Furthermore, this is corroborated by the absence of cases of this type in which a dominant 
undertaking imposes a minimum purchasing price with the aim of restricting its buyers’ ability to 
exercise buyer power.2406 
11.2.1.1 Object restrictions of competition 
In the case of agreements among suppliers to fix minimum purchasing prices, these conducts are 
expressly prohibited by Article 101(1)(a) TFEU, which, according to the case law and the 
                                                          
2402 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 224. 
2403 Bellamy and others, [2013], para 5.039. 
2404 European Competition Network (2012), para. 121; the decision by the NCA was upheld before the Supreme 
Administrative Court, 
http://www.novinite.com/articles/120369/24+Bulgarian+Firms+Fined+for+Forming+'Poultry'+Cartel, last visited 
06.10.2015. 
2405 Bellamy, Child and Roth, [2001], para. 9-073. 




Commission’s practice, constitute object restrictions of competition, as I discuss below.2407 These 
cases also have in common that undertakings coordinated their behavior to mitigate adverse 
circumstances related to sectoral agricultural crisis and in which the state or an association of 
undertakings intervened. 
The first confirmation that imposition of minimum purchasing prices constitutes an object 
restriction of competition was in connection to two interrelated cases dealing with the production 
and distribution of Cognac and involving the activities of the same association of undertakings, 
the Bureau National Interprofessional du Cognac (BNIC).2408 Since 1945 the retail prices of 
finished Cognac were fixed by public authorities setting minimum purchasing prices. These 
prices were imposed in meetings held among the members of BNIC. However, the price fixing 
measures became “unnecessary after 1967, as from then until 1973 and 1974 demand far 
outstripped supply.” 2409 Nevertheless, in 1976 and then in 1978-1980 BNIC adopted decisions 
fixing minimum purchasing prices for sale of Cognac in casks and bottles determined according 
several criteria.2410  
Based on these decisions, the Commission initiated an investigation in AROW/BNIC.2411 The 
Commission concluded that BNIC was an association of undertakings2412 and its price fixing 
measures constituted decisions of undertakings, even if they were adopted and approved under 
state conferred legislation.2413 Furthermore, the Commission found that the agreement fixing 
prices had the object and effect of restricting competition in the market by preventing free price 
formation among contractual parties and appreciable affected trade between MS, in breach of 
                                                          
2407 Judgment of 30 January 1985 in BNIC v Clair, C-123/83, EU:C:1985:33, para. 22; Judgment of 3 July 1985 in 
Binon v AMP, C-243/83, EU:C:1985:284; Judgment of 13 December 2006, FNCBV and Others v Commission, 
joined cases T-217/03 and T-245/03, EU:T:2006:391, para. 83 and 85, making reference to Judgment of 30 January 
1985 in BNIC v Clair, C-123/83, EU:C:1985:33, para. 22. See also: Wollmann [2008], para 2.2.032. 
2408 Judgment of 30 January 1985 in BNIC v Clair, C-123/83, EU:C:1985:33; Commission Decision of 15 December 
1982 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/29.883 - AROW/BNIC) [1982] OJ L 379/1. See 
also considering these cases as purchase price fixing: Ezrachi ‘Buying Alliances and Input Price Fixing: In Search of 
a European Enforcement Standard’ (2012), p. 55; Ezrachi, EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading 
Cases [2012], p. 134. Cf with Kokkoris that sees the case as part of a purchase price fixing instead of a limitation of 
buyer power in Kokkoris ‘Purchase Price Fixing: A Per Se Infringement?’ (2007), p. 480-481. 
2409 Commission Decision of 15 December 1982 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/29.883 - AROW/BNIC) [1982] OJ L 379/1, para. 15. 
2410 These decisions were made pursuant to national law which stated that if case parties fail to comply with the 
agreement contracts of cognac sales were automatically void and may imply the payment of compensation. Article 4 
Law No 75.600 of 10 July 1975 on the organization of agriculture, supplemented and amended by Law No 80.502 of 
4 July 1980. 
2411 Commission Decision of 15 December 1982 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/29.883 - AROW/BNIC) [1982] OJ L 379/1, para. 23. 
2412 Commission Decision of 15 December 1982 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/29.883 - AROW/BNIC) [1982] OJ L 379/1, para. 51. 
2413 Commission Decision of 15 December 1982 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/29.883 - AROW/BNIC) [1982] OJ L 379/1, para. 53. 
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Article 101(1)(a) TFEU.2414 Additionally, the Commission asserted that BNIC had forced Cognac 
shippers willing to sell the product at a lower price to raise their prices,2415 and shield suppliers 
from buyer market power. Consequently, the Commission declared that these measures had 
breached Article 101(1) TFEU and imposed a fine to BNIC. 
The legal treatment of purchasing price fixing as an object restriction was later confirmed by the 
CJEU in BNIC v Clair. This time BNIC complained before the national courts that Mr. Clair, a 
Cognac dealer, bought cognac from various wine-growers at prices lower than the inter-trade 
price, and which prompted a reference for a preliminary ruling.2416 In its assessment, the CJEU - 
largely following the Opinion of Advocate General Slynn -2417 concluded that the decisions 
between the wine growers and dealers constituted agreements by an association of 
undertakings.2418 Furthermore, it declared that an agreement as this setting minimum purchasing 
and selling prices by its very nature constitutes an object restriction of competition,2419 and 
therefore prohibited under Article 101 TFEU.  
The Commission’s intervention in BNIC v Clair is also interesting as it went further in the buyer 
power discussion than the CJEU,2420 and making remarks that support my claim that purchasing 
ceilings limit unduly buyer market power. It held that price ceilings restricted competition among 
suppliers willing to sell at lower prices, which could have a negative impact on consumers as 
retailers would not be willing to reduce their own output prices. These suppliers willing to sell 
below the fixed price wanted to do so because it was still profitable to do so, possibly because 
they were more efficient than other suppliers. Secondly, the Commission argued that setting price 
ceilings (minimum or maximum) could resort in weaker buyers being squeezed out of the market 
as they are unable to pay the minimum required, in an argument somewhat resembling a 
waterbed-like effect, and, which as I discuss in chapter 3, section 3.6, is disputed by modern 
buyer power economics. Thirdly, these restrictions had an upward rising effect on downstream 
prices for Cognac as there was a limitation on the ability of exercising buyer (bargaining) power. 
As parties had no possibility of negotiation, the room for a more efficient outcome is lost in 
inefficiencies generated by the price ceiling preventing lower purchasing prices to be passed on 
to end consumers in the form of lower retailing prices. 
                                                          
2414 Commission Decision of 15 December 1982 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/29.883 - AROW/BNIC) [1982] OJ L 379/1, para. 58 to 60. 
2415 Commission Decision of 15 December 1982 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/29.883 - AROW/BNIC) [1982] OJ L 379/1, para. 62. 
2416 Judgment of 30 January 1985 in BNIC v Clair, C-123/83, EU:C:1985:33, p. 405. 
2417 Advocate General Slynn Opinion of 2 October 1984 in Judgment of 30 January 1985 in BNIC v Clair, C-123/83, 
EU:C:1984:300 00391. 
2418 Judgment of 30 January 1985 in BNIC v Clair, C-123/83, EU:C:1985:33, para. 26. 
2419 Judgment of 30 January 1985 in BNIC v Clair, C-123/83, EU:C:1985:33, para. 22. 
2420 Judgment of 30 January 1985 in BNIC v Clair, C-123/83, EU:C:1985:33, p. 417. 
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Also in French beef – France Coop de Bétail the Commission, and later on the Courts, confirmed 
that setting minimum purchasing prices constitutes an object restriction of competition under 
Article 101(1)(a) TFEU. In this case the price limit was imposed in connection to the crisis 
generated in the beef industry because of the “mad cow disease” 2421 and the drastic drop in the 
prices for meat during 2000.2422 However, despite this price decrease in the upstream wholesale 
beef markets, the prices for end consumers remained largely the same before the crisis or even 
increased, partly owed to the extra costs to control the mad cow disease,2423 or maybe because 
supermarkets were not necessarily passing the price reductions to end consumers.2424 Due to the 
price drop, six federations of cattle farmers agreed to fix minimum purchase price for certain 
categories of cattle and suspending imports of beef into France.2425 The agreement was concluded 
with the acquiescence of the French government, which even encouraged it.2426 The agreement 
was intended to last until 30 November 2001 but parties had the intent to continue with its 
application.2427 
The Commission assessed this decision by an association of undertakings and held that the 
agreement had the object and effect of imposing minimum prices for the purchase of culled cows 
in France and ran contrary to Article 101(1)(a) TFEU.2428 The case was later on subject to an 
annulment action before the General Court and then appealed before the CJEU.2429 The General 
Court confirmed that agreements that direct or indirect fixing minimum purchasing prices 
constitute an object restriction of competition,2430 while also dismissing that competition law 
ought not to automatically apply to agricultural markets because of their special characteristics, a 
                                                          
2421 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. 
2422 Commission Decision of 2 April 2003 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.279/F3 — French beef) [2003] OJ L 209/12, para. 14. 
2423 Commission Decision of 2 April 2003 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.279/F3 — French beef) [2003] OJ L 209/12, para. 15. 
2424 This last point is interesting because it also illustrates a problem of buyer market power when exerted by a buyer 
that has an hourglass shape. There are two possible explanations to why even if upstream wholesale prices of beef 
decrease 20% end consumer prices remain stable or even increased. As suggested by the Commission, distributors 
had to incur in extra expenses to assure that the meat was not contaminated with the mad cow disease. Alternatively 
or jointly, if competition at the food retailing level was weak supermarkets could have been able to keep the supra 
competitive profits derived from buyer power exertion without having to pass the lower prices to end consumers. 
2425 Commission Decision of 2 April 2003 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.279/F3 — French beef) [2003] OJ L 209/12, para. 1. 
2426 Commission Decision of 2 April 2003 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.279/F3 — French beef) [2003] OJ L 209/12, para. 150 to 156. 
2427 Commission Decision of 2 April 2003 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.279/F3 — French beef) [2003] OJ L 209/12, para. 41. 
2428 Commission Decision of 2 April 2003 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.279/F3 — French beef) [2003] OJ L 209/12, para. 125 and 127. 
2429 Judgment of 13 December 2006, FNCBV and Others v Commission, joined cases T-217/03 and T-245/03, 
EU:T:2006:391; Judgment of 18 December 2008 in Coop de France bétail and viande v Commission, joined cases 
C-101/07 P and C-110/07, EU:C:2008:741. 
2430 Judgment of 13 December 2006, FNCBV and Others v Commission, joined cases T-217/03 and T-245/03, 
EU:T:2006:391, para. 83 and 85, making reference to Judgment of 30 January 1985 in BNIC v Clair, C-123/83, 
EU:C:1985:33, para. 22. 
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remark important for buyer power cases.2431 On appeal, the CJEU confirmed that the General 
Court and the Commission were correct in holding that the agreement was an object restriction of 
competition and, consequently, the General Court “was not bound to research the actual effects 
on competition of the measures adopted by that agreement”.2432 
Lastly, in Raw Tobacco Spain,2433 a dispute involving a buyers’ vs sellers’ cartels in which 
minimum and maximum prices for raw tobacco were fixed, the Commission found that such 
practices fixing price brackets per quality grade and additional purchasing conditions constituted 
an object restriction of competition. The suppliers’ cartel was formed to neutralize the buyer 
power of cigarette manufacturers and force the buyers to acquire goods at the same prices and 
conditions during part of the life of the agreement. Additionally, the agreement also included 
non-naked price purchasing modalities such as setting an “average minimum price per producer” 
and the “average minimum price per group”. The Commission found that such an agreement 
limiting prices restricted the interplay of competition and aimed at “impos[ing] on the processors 
conditions for selling raw tobacco that were as favourable as possible to their own interests”, and 
therefore was an object restriction of competition.2434 
All these cases confirm that fixing minimum purchasing prices – as all horizontal price fixing 
conducts – constitute an object restriction of competition and are prohibited under Article 101(1) 
TFEU because they disrupt the normal price formation and limit the ability to exercise buyer 
market power. This is a sound approach because these forms of price coordination have the aim 
to distort competition as such by hindering the purchasing prices be decreased due to the ability 
of a buyer to obtain better terms and conditions through buyer market power exertion. This 
implies that prices would be higher for the buyer and, therefore, for end consumers as well. 
Hence, the purchasing conduct is inefficient and it only benefits the suppliers who reap a 
supracompetitive profit. 
Moreover, in the case of agreements fixing minimum purchasing prices, and also applicable to 
unilateral conduct in connection to the general broad standard regarding buyer power harm, these 
conducts are prohibited even if these prices do not adversely impact those paid by the end 
                                                          
2431 Judgment of 13 December 2006, FNCBV and Others v Commission, joined cases T-217/03 and T-245/03, 
EU:T:2006:391, para. 86. 
2432 Judgment of 18 December 2008 in Coop de France bétail and viande v Commission, joined cases C-101/07 P 
and C-110/07, EU:C:2008:741, para. 88. 
2433 Commission Decision of 20 October 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.238/B.2) — Raw tobacco — Spain [2007] OJ L 102/14. See my analysis of this case with regard to 
buyer power exploitation in chapter 8, section 8.6.2. 
2434 Commission Decision of 20 October 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.238/B.2) — Raw tobacco — Spain [2007] OJ L 102/14, taken from the unabridged version, para. 330. 
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consumers, as clarified in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others.2435 However, in the case of fixing 
minimum purchasing prices this does not mean that the condition of end consumers is irrelevant 
or not affected. Instead, what it means is that in these cases it is inferred that end consumer harm 
exists because the price limit hinders the buyers to pass on any price reduction to end consumers 
achieved thanks to its buyer market power.  
In this sense, in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, a case dealing with fixing of prices paid to 
dealers concerning post-paid telephone subscriptions, the CJEU expressly recognized that 
“contrary to what the referring court would appear to believe, in order to find that a concerted 
practice has an anti-competitive object, there does not need to be a direct link between that 
practice and consumer prices.”2436 Furthermore, the CJEU remarked that declaring price fixing 
prohibited absent consumer harm was the consequence that competition law’s aim is “not only 
the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but also to protect the structure of 
the market and thus competition as such”,2437 echoing the Opinion of Advocate General 
Kokott.2438 This statement from the CJEU reinforces and it is consistent with the overall broad 
harm standard applicable to buyer power in other areas of EU competition law protecting the 
upstream competitive structure.2439 Furthermore, it is also in line with the ordoliberal concern of 
safeguarding the competitive process as a whole to prevent competition being distorted, causing 
harm in the long term to end consumers, even absent short term harm. 
Lastly, setting minimum purchasing prices is prohibited even if the agreement has not been 
implemented. In accordance to the case law, once the agreement has been entered into it is 
captured by Article 101 TFEU without requiring its implementation nor adverse effects in the 
market.2440  
                                                          
2435 Judgment of 4 June 2009 in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, C-8/08, EU:C:2009:343. See also the opinion of 
Ezrachi in similar terms in Ezrachi ‘Buying Alliances and Input Price Fixing: In Search of a European Enforcement 
Standard’ (2012). 
2436 Judgment of 4 June 2009 in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, C-8/08, EU:C:2009:343, para. 39. 
2437 Judgment of 4 June 2009 in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, C-8/08, EU:C:2009:343, para. 38. 
2438 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott on 19 February 2009 in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others, C-8/08, 
EU:C:2009:110, para. 58. 
2439 Judgment of 6 October 2009 in GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others, Joined cases C-
501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, EU:C:2009:610, para. 78; Ezrachi ‘Buying Alliances and Input 
Price Fixing: In Search of a European Enforcement Standard’ (2012), p. 58. 
2440 Judgment of 12 July 2001, Tate & Lyle and Others v Commission, T-202/98, ECR, EU:T:2001:185, para. 103; 
Summary of Commission Decision of 15 October 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty 
(Case COMP/39.188 — Bananas) [2009] OJ C 189/12, taken from the unabridged version, para. 284 and 292; 
partially ratified by the General Court in Judgment of 14 March 2013, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission, T-
587/08, EU:T:2013:129, and appealed before as Judgment of 24 June 2015 in Fresh Del Monte Produce v 
Commission and Commission / Fresh Del Monte Produce, C-293/13 P, EU:C:2015:416,where the fine was reduced. 
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11.2.2 Price fixing justifications and the legal consequences 
A question that arises from the reading of the case law is whether fixing minimum purchasing 
prices may be justified to palliate adverse circumstances faced by suppliers. The economic 
intuition is that if buyers are not able to decrease further their purchasing costs they will not be 
able to pass to consumers a fair share of the benefits of their buyer power in the form lower final 
prices. This, however, does not preclude undertakings from requesting that an agreement that 
imposes minimum purchasing price may be exempted if it satisfies the conditions imposed by 
Article 101(3) TFEU,2441 or under the objective justification in Article 102 TFEU. However, in 
both cases and due to its welfare detrimental nature it would be quite remote the possibility that 
minimum purchasing prices may satisfy the requirements imposed by Article 101(3) TFEU as 
they are unlikely to fulfill its cumulative conditions,2442 as confirmed by the Commission’s soft 
law,2443 and in analogy the same would apply for an efficiency analysis under Article 102 TFEU. 
Furthermore, naked agreements fixing minimum purchasing prices also constitute hardcore 
horizontal agreements and, therefore, are outside of the scope of application of the research and 
development block exemption regulation,2444 and the specialization block exemption 
regulation.2445 Furthermore, in accordance to the case law2446 object restrictions of competition do 
not benefit from the De Minimis exemption.2447 Hence, receiving a similar treatment as buyers’ 
cartels fixing prices as I discussed in chapter 8, section 8.6.1. 
Despite of this, the case law shows that whenever there is an imposition of minimum purchasing 
prices these practices are pursuant to an interest in protecting suppliers facing difficult conditions, 
for example in the case of excess capacity due to changes in the market structure,2448 as the result 
of an economic crisis,2449 or to protect supplier economically dependent of buyers, particularly in 
                                                          
2441 Judgment of 15 July 1994 in Matra Hachette v Commission, T-17/93, EU:T:1994:89 [1994], para. 85. 
2442 Wollmann [2008], para. 2-2-037; Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2012], p. 529. 
2443 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 
101/97, para. 46; and Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1, para. 246. 
See also: Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 47; Bellamy and others, [2013] para 5.058. 
2444 Article 5 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 
101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of research and development 
agreements [2010] OJ L 335/36. 
2445 Article 4 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1218/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 
101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of specialisation agreements 
2010] OJ L 335/43. 
2446 Judgment of 13 December 2012 in Expedia, C-226/11, EU:C:2012:795, para. 35 to 37.  
2447 Communication from the Commission — Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably 
restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis 
Notice), [2014] OJ C 291/1, paras. 2 and 13. 
2448 Judgment of 20 November 2008 in Beef Industry Development and Barry Brothers, C-209/07, EU:C:2008:643. 
2449 Judgment of 15 October 2002 in Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, joined cases C-
238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P, EU:C:2002:582, 
EU:C:2002:582 E.C.R. [2002] I-08375, para. 488. See also: Commission Decision of 17 December 1980 relating to a 
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the agriculture sector,2450 and in general as an instrument of public policy.2451 Because of this, the 
sellers part of the cartel have claimed that their conduct is not anti-competitive under an 
efficiency assessment or that no fine should be imposed. 
In AROW/BNIC, BNIC claimed before the Commission that fixing minimum purchasing prices 
was a policy oriented “to maintain the traditional quality of cognac, and to assure the consumer 
that there will be no artificial reduction in prices to the detriment of the characteristics of the 
product”.2452 The Commission rejected the measure’s justification on quality reasons as imposing 
minimum purchasing prices “is both pointless and ineffective for that purpose”,2453 implying that 
there were no efficiencies benefiting either the final consumer or competition as a process. 
Later, in BNIC v Clair, BNIC again tried justifying the imposition of minimum price as these 
intended to avoid “prices to depend on supply and demand would lead to a collapse which wine-
growers could not withstand” and lead them to financial failure.2454 The CJEU’s preliminary 
ruling did not deal with this justification expressly, but it held that EU competition law applies 
regardless whether these products are of economic importance for the producer’s viability, even 
if they were dependent in price.2455 
In French beef – France Coop de Bétail the existence of a sectoral crisis due to the mad cow 
disease did not render the agreement compatible with EU competition law pursuant to an 
assessment under Article 101(3) TFEU. While the Commission recognized that the beef industry 
was facing “a serious crisis” that lead to imposing EU-wide measures, a crisis, however, “cannot 
in itself preclude the anti-competitive nature of an agreement” as decided by the CJEU in 
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission.2456 However, it can be taken into 
account if an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU is requested, or more likely towards the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/29.869 - Italian cast glass) [1980] OJ L 383/19; see Wollmann 
who call this “structural crisis cartels” in Wollmann [2008], para. 2.2.046. 
2450 Judgment of 30 January 1985 in BNIC v Clair, C-123/83, EU:C:1985:33; Commission Decision of 2 April 2003 
relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C.38.279/F3 — French beef) [2003] 
OJ L 209/12. 
2451 Townley, [2009]. 
2452 Commission Decision of 15 December 1982 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/29.883 - AROW/BNIC) [1982] OJ L 379/1, para. 21. 
2453 Commission Decision of 15 December 1982 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/29.883 - AROW/BNIC) [1982] OJ L 379/1, para. 69. 
2454 Judgment of 30 January 1985 in BNIC v Clair, C-123/83, EU:C:1985:33, p. 408. 
2455 Judgment of 30 January 1985 in BNIC v Clair, C-123/83, EU:C:1985:33, para. 15. 
2456 Judgment of 15 October 2002 in Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, joined cases C-
238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P, EU:C:2002:582, 
EU:C:2002:582 E.C.R. [2002] I-08375, para. 487; quoted by the Commission in Commission Decision of 2 April 
2003 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C.38.279/F3 — French beef) 
[2003] OJ L 209/12, para. 130. 
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reduction of a fine.2457 In its assessment, the Commission found that the first two legs of the 
efficiency test were not satisfied as it did not improve distribution nor allowed consumers to 
share benefits.2458 The circumstances of the crisis, however, were taken into account as a 
mitigating circumstance, which led to a reduction of 60% of the fines. On the annulment action 
before the General Court the argument was used and the fine was reduced even further up to 70% 
compared to the original amount. 2459 
Furthermore, an alternative allegation to justify the imposition of purchasing prices by sellers 
different from sectoral crisis could be to argue that fixing minimum purchasing prices are not 
anti-competitive if they countervail the buyer power of a dominant undertaking, idea that has 
been suggested by Kirkwood under very narrow circumstances.2460 The logic here is that the 
creation of a ‘selling alliance’ will generate seller market bargaining power to neutralize a buyer 
and prevent the buyer from reaping supra competitive profits and, in particular monopsony 
power.  
In my view, however, two wrongs do not necessarily make a right, as confirmed by the 
Commission in Bananas were it was held that limiting buyer power is not a legitimate ground for 
the allowance of an anti-competitive agreement.2461 Imposing minimum purchasing prices shields 
suppliers from the exercise of monopsony power, but it may lead to a bilateral monopoly 
structure worsening the competitive conditions if suppliers and buyers coordinate their conduct 
and, even if they not, fixing purchasing prices leads to inefficiencies in allocative and dynamic 
terms. However, if that is not the case this could be a factor to consider in the assessment. 
Nevertheless, the existence of seller market power implies that suppliers will reap parts of the 
profits and which is likely to have a negative impact on end consumer prices as now the costs of 
the buyer can be higher. Therefore, this proposal of fostering seller market power seems to be 
counter-intuitive with obtaining lower purchasing prices, albeit it might be beneficial for 
consumers as it allows suppliers to invest and develop better products. 
                                                          
2457 Judgment of 15 October 2002 in Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, joined cases C-
238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P, EU:C:2002:582, 
EU:C:2002:582 E.C.R. [2002] I-08375, para. 488. 
2458 Commission Decision of 2 April 2003 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.279/F3 — French beef) [2003] OJ L 209/12, para. 130. 
2459 Judgment of 13 December 2006, FNCBV and Others v Commission, joined cases T-217/03 and T-245/03, 
EU:T:2006:391, para. 90. 
2460 Kirkwood ‘Collusion to Control a Powerful Customer: Amazon, E-Books, And Antitrust Policy’ (2014). 
2461 “The Commission also notes that once the anti-competitive object of the arrangements has been established, it is 
not relevant whether the trade in issue was, as certain addressees claim, subject to a significant "buying power", and 
the existence of any buying power could not justify the infringement found in the present decision”, Summary of 
Commission Decision of 15 October 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/39.188 — Bananas) [2009] OJ C 189/12, taken from the unabridged version, para. 282, Decision partially 
ratified in Judgment of 14 March 2013, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission, T-587/08, EU:T:2013:129, and on 
appeal in  
Judgment of 24 June 2015 in Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission and Commission / Fresh Del Monte Produce, 
C-293/13 P, EU:C:2015:416,where the fine was reduced. 
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To conclude this section, the argument employed by sellers regarding the efficiency or need for 
neutralizing buyer market power by fixing purchasing prices may, on very specific and limited 
occasions (perhaps almost just theoretically) comply with the precepts required by Article 101(3) 
TFEU for the exemption of neither the behavior nor an objective justification analysis under 
Article 102 TFEU. However, the Commission’s practice and the case law do not confirm this. In 
most cases, setting minimum purchasing prices to protect suppliers would not be found sufficient 
to declare the price fixing as efficient.2462 What has been considered by the Courts and the 
Commission’s practice, nevertheless, is that extraordinary circumstances that led to the 
imposition of these purchasing prices and therefore have may be taken into account as mitigating 
factors when setting fines, as it occurred in FNCBV and Others v Commission (French beef – 
France Coop de Bétail), in case the requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU are not fulfilled.2463 
11.2.3 Formation of ‘legal’ sellers’ cartels pursuant EU regulation 
The EU has implemented sectoral specific legislative measures to limit the buyer power of large 
retailers vis-à-vis small and fragmented suppliers of raw milk, by allowing sellers to jointly 
negotiate milk selling prices and other contractual conditions.2464 These legislative measures were 
imposed as a result of a selling price collapse for milk during 2008-2009, and also due to the 
large disequilibria concerning bargaining power of parties, which lead to producers of milk 
being in quite delicate financial situations,2465 or to counter the creation of buyer’s cartels in the 
milk industry.2466 Thus, this regulation seems to counter act conducts that are exploitative in the 
line of UPPs, a topic I discussed in detail in chapter 9. 
Pursuant to this sectoral situation, the EU has adopted Regulation 261/2012, which explicitly 
allows for “dairy farmers or their associations to jointly negotiate contract terms, including price, 
for some or all of its members’ production, with a dairy”.2467 These ‘sellers’ cartels’ aim at 
                                                          
2462 Commission Decision of 2 April 2003 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C.38.279/F3 — French beef) [2003] OJ L 209/12; Ritter and Braun, [2004], p. 174. 
2463 Judgment of 13 December 2006, FNCBV and Others v Commission, joined cases T-217/03 and T-245/03, 
EU:T:2006:391; ratified in Judgment of 18 December 2008 in Coop de France bétail and viande v Commission, 
joined cases C-101/07 P and C-110/07, EU:C:2008:741. See also: Judgment of 6 April 1995, Baustahlgewebe v 
Commission, T-145/89, EU:T:1995:66, paras. 121-122, partially upheld in Judgment of 17 December 1998 in 
Baustahlgewebe v Commission, C-185/95 P, EU:C:1998:608. 
2464 Regulation (EU) No 261/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards contractual relations in the milk and milk products sector [2012] 
OJ L 94/38. 
2465 Regulation (EU) No 261/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards contractual relations in the milk and milk products sector [2012] 
OJ L 94/38, Recitals (3), (5), (10) and (14). 
2466 There are reports of several cases dealing with buyers’ cartels for the purchase of raw milk in Greece, Bulgaria 
and Lithuania that, due to their scope, have not been evaluated in a EU level. For more on this see: European 
Competition Network (2012), paras. 97.101. 
2467 Regulation (EU) No 261/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards contractual relations in the milk and milk products sector [2012] 
OJ L 94/38, Recital (14) (emphasis added). 
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improving farmers conditions vis-à-vis powerful buyers and are exempted from the temporal 
application of EU competition rules pursuant to Article 42 of the TFEU, in particular the 
application of Article 101(1) TFEU.2468 With such an intervention, the aim is to address the 
bargaining power unbalance and allow sellers to join their efforts and neutralize the buyer market 
power of milk retailers (supermarkets and dairy companies). This extraordinary exemption from 
the application of EU competition law is subject to two limitations. Firstly, it is a legislative 
answer to a sectoral crisis and, secondly, it must be limited in time, but long enough to have a 
“full effect”.2469 
Furthermore, cartel members can only benefit from the exemption of the application of 
competition law if two cumulative and restrictive conditions are complied with.2470 First, the 
agreement has to be notified to the Commission. Secondly, and upon notification, the 
Commission must determine if the agreement is compatible with the Regulation’s 
requirements.2471 These milk-related agreements would not be compatible with the internal 
market if they:  
i) lead to market division;  
ii) affect the market’s operation;  
iii) are likely to create competition distortions and are not essential to achieve the 
objectives pursued;  
iv) fixed purchasing and/or selling prices;  
v) create discrimination or eliminate competition with regard to a substantial proportion 
of the products.2472 
 
Thus, even if the Regulation 261/2012 allows for the formation of selling side agreements to 
jointly negotiate vis-à-vis large milk buyers like some sort of ‘selling alliance’, it expressly 
forbids selling price fixing. However, even if price fixing is not allowed under the Regulation – 
which is in line with the approach to price fixing under EU competition law – allowing sellers to 
join efforts and negotiate jointly alters the competitive price formation. Also, it restricts the 
ability of buyers to exert bargaining power by setting static ways to determine the purchasing 
                                                          
2468 Regulation (EU) No 261/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards contractual relations in the milk and milk products sector [2012] 
OJ L 94/38, Article Art 1(5), modifying Article 177(a) of Regulation No 1234/2007. 
2469 Regulation (EU) No 261/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards contractual relations in the milk and milk products sector [2012] 
OJ L 94/38, Recital (21). 
2470 See also stressing the stringent character of the exemption Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2012], p. 936-
937. 
2471 Regulation (EU) No 261/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards contractual relations in the milk and milk products sector [2012] 
OJ L 94/38, Article 1(5), modifying Article 177(a) of Regulation No 1234/2007. 
2472 Regulation (EU) No 261/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards contractual relations in the milk and milk products sector [2012] 
OJ L 94/38, Article 1(5), modifying Article 177(a) of Regulation No 1234/2007. 
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price of milk based on factors such as market indicators, volume derived, quality, and 
composition of raw milk.2473 Therefore, there is no doubt that Regulation 261/2012 has a 
protectionist and fairness component to the price determination of raw milk, which is connected 
with the concern of buyer power in the food retailing markets, as discussed I chapter 9, 
particularly due to the politically sensitive sector in which it was enacted.  
11.2.4 Conclusions regarding imposition of minimum purchasing prices 
Summing up, conducts imposing minimum purchasing prices are considered both regarding 
Article 101(1) TFEU and Article 102(a) TFEU as infringements of EU competition law. In the 
case law, the instances in which this modality of buyer power limitation has been analyzed have 
always been in connection to agreements fixing prices, which have been qualified as object 
restrictions of competition. A strict legal standard for both unilateral and concerted behaviors 
regarding fixing purchasing prices is economically coherent and legally proportional because 
these conducts disrupt the competitive price formation process and, additionally, unduly restrict 
the buyers’ economic freedom to negotiate prices that can be lower and, therefore, be passed on 
to consumers. Furthermore, the practice reveals that these conducts are entered into through inter-
professional agreements with the participation of associations of undertakings and occasionally 
the approval of the state and pursuant to a sectoral crisis in agriculture. Also, because of these 
sectoral crises, the EU has decided to legalize the creation of ‘suppliers’ cartels’ in the raw milk 
industry, allowing them to negotiate prices jointly, but not to directly set minimum purchasing 
prices. 
Furthermore, fixing minimum purchasing prices may theoretically benefit from an efficiency 
defense under either Article 101(3) or Article 102 TFEU. However, this is very unlikely to 
happen due to the economic effects of the conduct. Nevertheless, the fact that purchasing price 
fixing has usually been resorted to as the consequence of a sectoral crisis in the agricultural sector 
and with the acquiescence of the state has played a mitigating role when determining the fines to 
be imposed, as confirmed by the Commission and the Courts’ practice. 
11.3 Supply limitation 
An alternative measure that also limits the exercise of buyer market power vis-à-vis suppliers is 
the imposition of maximum purchasing quotas. These types of practices have an analogous effect 
as fixing minimum purchasing prices because they aim at neutralizing the competitive price 
formation and the ability of buyers to obtain better terms and conditions based on the quantities 
of goods acquired (i.e. quantity rebates). As remarked by the Commission in Italian Cast Glass, 
                                                          
2473 Regulation (EU) No 261/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards contractual relations in the milk and milk products sector [2012] 
OJ L 94/38, Article 1(8).2, introducing Article 185(f) of Regulation No 1234/2007. 
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supply limitation agreements intend to stabilize supplier’s production and “protect the prices of 
[supplier’s] products from the effects of consumer demand”.2474 Therefore, supply limitation like 
purchase price fixing has a upward increasing pressure on purchasing prices because of scarcity 
effects.2475 Also, limiting supply means that there are fewer goods available for resale (unless a 
substitute can replace the shortage), which increases prices for end consumers and prevents 
marginal end buyers from acquiring the good. Because of their effect in competition, these types 
of practices can be captured by either of Article 101(1)(b) TFEU and Article 101(1)(c) TFEU, 
and the case law has clarified the constitute object restrictions of competition2476 or, alternatively 
in case of unilateral behavior, by Article 102(b) TFEU.2477 Again, like in the case of minimum 
purchasing prices, the case law and Commission’s practice there are only examples of 
coordinated behavior. 
In Pabst & Richards/BNIA the Commission evaluated the compatibility of a decision of 
undertakings that set production quotas limiting supply imposed by the Bureau National 
Interprofessionnel de l'Armagnac (BNIA),2478 an association of undertakings representing parties 
involved in the production of Armagnac.2479 The supply limitation was allegedly justified as a 
measure to guarantee Armagnac’s quality and prevent “suspicious” imports to Germany bearing a 
false age indication sold at “abnormally low prices”.2480 This supply limitation meant that buyers, 
particularly in Germany, were no longer able to purchase bulk Armagnac with a specific age 
grade. Upon this measure, an investigation was initiated by the Commission based, inter alia, on 
the fact that the supply limitation had the effect of “reduc[ing] supply artificially and raised prices 
so appreciably that the purchase of age grade 5 was no longer a profitable venture”.2481 After 
determining that the order was a decision by an association of undertakings and dismissing an 
allegation that the measures were adopted in the exercise of public powers,2482 the Commission 
                                                          
2474 Commission Decision of 17 December 1980 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/29.869 - Italian cast glass) [1980] OJ L 383/19, part II A, section 4. 
2475 Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2015], p. 568-569; Commission Decision of 26 July 1976 relating to a 
proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/28.980 - Pabst & Richarz/BNIA) [1976] OJ L 231/24, part I para. 
2. 
2476 Judgment of 15 July 1970 in Chemiefarma v Commission, C-41/69, EU:C:1970:71. 
2477 Van Bael and Bellis, [2005], p. 413; Wollmann [2008], para 2.2.041; Bellamy and others, [2013], para. 5.060. 
2478 Commission Decision of 26 July 1976 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/28.980 - 
Pabst & Richarz/BNIA) [1976] OJ L 231/24. 
2479 Armagnac is a type of grape brandy produced in the French region of Armagnac. Commission Decision of 26 
July 1976 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/28.980 - Pabst & Richarz/BNIA) [1976] 
OJ L 231/24, para. 1 and 3. The production of Armagnac involves three stages of production of the liquor; then 
bottled by the producer, cooperative or distiller and marketed under their label or else sold in bulk. If sold in bulk to 
a distributor this latter is the one bottling and label the final good. 
2480 Commission Decision of 26 July 1976 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/28.980 - 
Pabst & Richarz/BNIA) [1976] OJ L 231/24, part I, para. 6. 
2481 Commission Decision of 26 July 1976 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/28.980 - 
Pabst & Richarz/BNIA) [1976] OJ L 231/24, part I, para. 6. 
2482 Commission Decision of 26 July 1976 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/28.980 - 
Pabst & Richarz/BNIA) [1976] OJ L 231/24, part II, para. 1. 
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held that this measure was disproportional to achieve quality control and was not imposed by 
administrative authorities, thus qualifying as a private commercial decision.2483 Furthermore, the 
limitation of supply affected trade between MS by precluding distribution agreements to be 
entered into.2484 The Commission therefore concluded that restricting supply of Armagnac 
constituted an object restriction that had the aim of artificially reducing supply in the market to 
increase purchasing prices paid by the buyers to Armagnac suppliers.2485 As the effects of the 
measure were so obvious, the Commission found no need to assess competitive effect either in 
the upstream or downstream market. However, the Commission could have assessed whether the 
other measures less restrictive of competition could have been efficient, for instance to contribute 
in the quality control of the products or maybe to protect suppliers against purchasing price 
exploitation, if any. 
Later, in Italian Cast Glass a case dealing with a collective dominant position,2486 the 
Commission found that an agreement between suppliers of car glass had entered into agreements 
that had the object of restricting competition by fixing a maximum sale quota and sharing 
markets in breach of Article 101(1)(b).2487 The agreement used the imposition of sales quota (and 
therefore buying restrictions) to protect suppliers from “effects of consumer demand”2488 and as a 
stability factor for the cartel, as in cases of a quota breach a retribution mechanism to the benefit 
of the rest of the members was activated. The quota system prevented or limited the exercise of 
buyer power by car manufacturers (hence powerful buyers) and set prices unilaterally. The 
decision also evaluated if the agreement could satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU and 
concluded that the four cumulative conditions were not present, because the agreement shielded 
from competition more than half of all the Italian production of cast glass.2489 On appeal, the 
General Court overturned this aspect of the decision because of the absence of sufficient 
                                                          
2483 Commission Decision of 26 July 1976 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/28.980 - 
Pabst & Richarz/BNIA) [1976] OJ L 231/24, part II, para. 1. 
2484 Commission Decision of 26 July 1976 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/28.980 - 
Pabst & Richarz/BNIA) [1976] OJ L 231/24, part II, para. 3. 
2485 Commission Decision of 26 July 1976 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/28.980 - 
Pabst & Richarz/BNIA) [1976] OJ L 231/24, part II, para. 2. 
2486 Commission Decision of 17 December 1980 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/29.869 - Italian cast glass) [1980] OJ L 383/19, partially annulled in Judgment of 10 March 1992, SIV and 
Others v Commission, joined cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89, EU:T:1992:38. 
2487 See also discussing briefly the case as limitation of goods and market sharing: Faull and Nikpay, [1999], para. 
6.19; Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2012], p. 535.  
2488 Commission Decision of 17 December 1980 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/29.869 - Italian cast glass) [1980] OJ L 383/19, part II A, section 4. 
2489 Commission Decision of 17 December 1980 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/29.869 - Italian cast glass) [1980] OJ L 383/19, part II B, section 1. 
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evidence, but did not object to the finding that supply limitation infringes competition by 
object.2490 
In Zinc Producer Group the Commission found that parties to a resale price fixing agreement had 
also agreed to impose a limitation in supply of quantities sold.2491 Again, the fixing of supply 
quotas was accessory to the main anti-competitive conduct. The Commission determined that the 
agreement and these clauses constituted an object restriction of competition.2492 At the national 
level the same conclusion was reached by the Dutch NCA when an agreement among a decision 
by the fishermen’s association that fixed the amount of shrimps it could be sold and set minimum 
purchasing prices to protect suppliers from large buyers was also held liable of breaching the 
Dutch Competition Act.2493 
As noted from the cases below, supply limitation agreements are usually adopted as complements 
to other anti-competitive behaviors, such as price fixing, but rarely in isolation as they act as a 
security mechanism for the cartel member’s to guarantee that parties would not ‘cheat’ the 
collusive agreement.2494  
Additionally, the Commission’s practice in general for agreements imposing quotas clarifies that 
it is not necessary that all suppliers comply with the quota, as the mere existence of the 
agreement constitutes a breach of Article 101(1) TFEU.2495 
11.3.1 Efficiency assessment for supply limitation agreements 
Like in the case of setting minimum purchasing prices the imposition of supply quotas may be 
caused due to a sectoral crisis, for example to minimize overcapacity to achieve a better balance 
between supply and demand as remarked by Wollmann, and which was discussed by the CJEU 
Commission in Beef Industry Development and Barry Brothers that is discussed below.2496 
                                                          
2490 Judgment of 10 March 1992, SIV and Others v Commission, joined cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89, 
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2491 Commission Decision of 6 August 1984 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/30.350 - 
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Zinc Producer Group) [1984] OJ L 220/27, para. 71. 
2493 This case was the first opportunity upon with the Dutch NCA imposed a fine for infringement of EU laws (and 
not pure national law) and setting fines up to €13.8 million to cartel members. Decision No. 2269/326 [2013] full 
text available (in Dutch) at file://general.uib.no/JURHOME$/ian061/Downloads/boetebesluit-kartelverbod-
noordzeegarnalen-2003-01-14.pdf. For a summary of the decision in English see: 
https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/5980/NMa-Fines-Shrimp-Wholesalers-and-Shrimp-Fishery-
Industry-Due-to-Price-Agreements/. 
2494 Graham, [2010], p. 357. 
2495 Commission Decision of 13 July 1994 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EC Treaty (IV/C/33.833 - 
Cartonboard) [1994] OJ L 243/1. 
2496 Wollmann [2008], para. 2.2.042; Judgment of 20 November 2008 in Beef Industry Development and Barry 
Brothers, C-209/07, EU:C:2008:643. 
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In the preliminary ruling Beef Industry Development and Barry Brothers2497 the CJEU discussed 
whether issues of excess capacity and the creation of a ‘crisis cartel’2498 could be factors to 
consider regarding the exemption of the conduct under an efficiency analysis based on Article 
101(3) TFEU. The case dealt with an agreement among suppliers of beef to limit production due 
to excess capacity and industry changes, prompted by the lower beef consumption among Irish 
consumers. Due to the shifts in demand, the suppliers decided to restructure the beef industry 
through buyouts and payments of compensation, therefore limiting the supply of beef vis-à-vis 
buyers.  
The CJEU found that agreements limiting supply constitute an object restriction of competition; 
however it held that such restructuring arrangements may be exempted on the basis Article 
101(3) TFEU.2499 Despite this theoretical possibility, the CJEU made it quite clear that as the 
agreement included clauses restricting competition by object (non-competition clauses and 
compensation to the suppliers exiting the market) the existence of a sectoral crisis justifying a 
reduction of sale quotas could “be relevant for the purposes of the examination of the four 
requirements which have to be met under Article [101](3)”, and which is for the national court to 
assess.2500 
11.3.2 Conclusions regarding supply limitation 
As with purchasing price fixing, limiting supply is treated by EU competition law as an object 
restriction of competition under Article 101(1) TFEU and can be assumed that under Article 102 
TFEU it would also be found to be an abuse of dominance by a selling undertaking. My analysis 
shows that these anti-competitive provisions are usually found in connection with another type of 
anti-competitive conducts, as they act as a cartel stabilizing device. Furthermore, the case law 
clarifies that these conducts are likely to be anti-competitive, even if these measures have 
received the acquiescence of the state or are imposed pursuant to a sectoral crisis. In cases of 
sectoral crisis, and as discussed regarding Beef Industry Development and Barry Brothers, at 
most, these considerations can be taken into account as part of an efficiency defense under 
Article 101(3) TFEU or Article 102 TFEU to prevent over-production of an undesired good. 
However, the case law seems to indicate that these types of conducts restricting the ability to 
exert buyer power are unlikely to satisfy the efficiency analysis requirements. 
                                                          
2497 Judgment of 20 November 2008 in Beef Industry Development and Barry Brothers, C-209/07, EU:C:2008:643. 
2498 Tjarda Van der Vijver, ‘The Irish Beef Case: Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society and 
Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats (C-209/07), European Court of Justice’ 30 European Competition Law Review 
(2009) 198. 
2499 Judgment of 20 November 2008 in Beef Industry Development and Barry Brothers, C-209/07, EU:C:2008:643, 
para., 39. See also the Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak in Judgment of 20 November 2008 in Beef Industry 
Development and Barry Brothers, C-209/07, EU:C:2008:467, paras. 55 to 59, and 86. 




11.4 Rebates removing or restricting the buyer’s freedom to choose 
supply sources 
Suppliers, particularly if enjoying substantial market power, may grant rebates to buyers to limit 
their freedom to choose alternative trading partners. In this section, I discuss how or if the 
granting of rebates may (unduly) restrict the capacity of buyers to exercise their buyer power and 
as a side effect foreclose rival retailers to get access to the buyers that receive such discounts. The 
latter effect is at the center of the extensive discussion of rebates in EU competition law, which is 
the central reason why conditional rebates granted by a dominant undertaking are likely to be 
considered anti-competitive. In this section, I will not discuss the treatment granted to rebates 
from a seller perspective but only to the rebates’ ability to restrict the freedom of choice of a 
buyer and, consequently, neutralize (or compensate) its ability to exercise buyer power. Also I 
question whether rebates restrict the ability of a buyer to find alternative sources of supply or 
instead compensate the buyer for the less of such possibility. 
Granting rebates or discounts2501 is a common business practice that consist in the offering a 
lower purchasing price to a buyer that acquires a relatively large quantity of goods from a 
particular supplier (quantity rebates),2502 or because it reaches certain targets agreed by the parties 
on a contract (conditional rebates). Therefore, rebates are a form of price discrimination that can 
be lawful or prohibited depending on whether it has been granted by a dominant undertaking and 
if the rebate has an unjustified and anti-competitive foreclosure and/or exploitative effect, as I 
discussed in chapters 7, section 7.6 and chapter 8, section 8.4 from a buyer power perspective. If, 
on the other hand, the rebates are granted by an undertaking without substantial market power 
(dominance) then EU competition law sees these pricing practices as not generating a sufficient 
degree of competitive concern. 
Also, and recapitulating the discussion concerning the general legal treatment to rebates granted 
by a dominant undertaking in chapter 7, section 7.6, the Courts have classified them into three 
forms with different legal approaches: quantity rebates, fidelity or loyalty enhancing rebates, and 
rebates not directly linked to a condition of exclusive or quasi-exclusive supply from the 
undertaking in a dominant position but where the mechanism for granting the rebate may also 
have a fidelity-building effect.2503 
                                                          
2501 Rebates and discounts are used most of the time interchangeably in the literature despite not being exactly the 
same. A discount implies an immediate reduction of price of an item compared to a price list whereas a rebate 
implies a refund later paid by the supplier. 
2502 See also Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, 
para. 37. 
2503Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v Commission, T-286/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:547, para. 74 to 78. Cf with the 
Opinion of Advocate General Wahl of 20 October 2016 in Intel Corporation v Commission, C-413/14 P, 
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The EU case law links the granting of rebates by dominant selling undertakings with possible 
foreclosure and exploitative effects that, depending on the form of the rebate, can even, by virtue 
of its very nature, be capable of restricting competition and prohibited due to the application of 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions,2504 limiting the ability of buyers to freely 
determine who they acquire goods from.2505 The question, however, is: Do rebates really limit 
buyer market power or, instead, compensate it? 
11.4.1 Do rebates restrict buyer power exercise? 
From an economics perspective, rebates have a dual effect. On the one hand, they secure or help 
in securing demand for a supplier because they incentivize a buyer to acquire more (quantity) or 
acquire only from a specific supplier, which may lead to quasi-exclusivity demand obligation that 
limits the buyer’s ability to choose suppliers. In addition, but from a seller’s perspective, 
conditional rebates can have foreclosure effects on new suppliers entering the market as there are 
‘tied buyers’,2506 lack of share shifting, or can reduce the capacity of current competitors to extent 
their market share.2507 
From a buyer’s perspective, the granting of a rebate – even if requested by the buyer2508 – “tends 
to remove or restrict the buyer's freedom to choose his sources of supply,” as held by the CJEU 
in Michelin I.2509 This is the source of competition concerns for buyer power because it means 
that the buyer would not buy from other suppliers, limiting its own economic freedom (albeit 
most likely willingly, as I discuss below) and because it makes it more difficult for rival suppliers 
to reach to buyers. In the US, at least in the pre-Antitrust Revolution of the ‘70s, the US Supreme 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
EU:C:2016:788, paras. 39-174. Also, contrast this rather formal approach with the “more economic approach” 
proposed by the Commission regarding the “as efficient competitor test” in Communication from the Commission — 
Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, paras. 41 to 46. For some literature addressing 
this controversial topic see, inter alia: Alfonso Lamadrid, ‘Breaking news- The Intel Judgment is out: the European 
Commission wins’ (12 June 2014) <http://chillingcompetition.com/2014/06/12/breaking-news-the-intel-judgment-is-
out-the-european-commission-wins/>; Charles Rivers Associates, ‘Intel and the future of Article 102’ (June 2014) 
<http://ecp.crai.com/ecp/assets/Intel_and_the_future_of_Article_102.pdf> ; Wils (2014); Geradin (2015); Italianer, 
‘The Object of Effects’. See also: Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 6.028. 
2504 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v Commission, T-286/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:547, para. 80 to 93. See the opinion 
of Director General Italianer who draws a thin distinction between object and effect in Article 101 TFEU and nature 
and effect in Article 102 TFEU in Italianer, ‘The Object of Effects’. 
2505 Judgment of 9 November 1983 in Michelin v Commission, C-322/81, EU:C:1983:313, para. 73. 
2506 This explains why Gormsen argues that the treatment of rebates derives from the regulation of exclusivity 
agreements in Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, ‘Can Consumer Welfare Convincingly be Said to be an Objective of Article 
102 when the Methdology Relies on an Inference of Effects?’ in Caroline Heide-Jørgensen and others (eds), Aims 
and Values in Competition Law (DJØF Publ. 2013), p. 185. 
2507 See also Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, 
para. 19. Bishop and Walker, [2010], para. 6.037. 
2508 Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, para. 89. 




Court also recognized that restricting the economic freedom and choice of undertakings could 
potentially be contrary to US antitrust law in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.2510 By 
restricting a buyer’s freedom to determine from which supplier to buy, its capacity to successfully 
exercise buyer power is also diminished as it is less incentivized to seek alternative supply 
sources. 
However, such restriction of the buyer’s economic freedom is in reality a retribution by the 
supplier to the buyer so that the latter either accepts buying more goods from the former and/or 
being in a de facto exclusive supply situation. Therefore, its buyer power is exercised and 
compensated by the seller through the grant of the rebates, in analogy to the benefits granted in 
the case of exclusive purchasing, as I discuss below.2511 Seen from the perspective of the buyer, 
rebates will tend to be an economically rational conduct by the seller and to the benefit of the 
buyer, which compensates the fact that the purchaser does not resort to other supply sources. 
Furthermore, the grant of the rebate is the way in which the buyer market power reduces 
purchasing prices and ‘neutralizes’ seller market power. The price reduction is to the benefit of 
the buyer that sees its purchasing costs decrease and may also benefit end consumers if the 
reductions are passed on in the form of lower end prices. 
The relation between the loss of the buyer’s economic freedom pursuant to the rebate and the 
interest of the buyer to receive a discount is properly understood if the relative bargaining power 
of the parties is assessed. If the stronger party is the seller, the buyer, if sufficiently compensated 
by the rebate,2512 will be more likely to accept the loss of its relative buyer power and restrict its 
choice of supply. In this scenario the compensation granted by the rebate is as large or larger 
than the outside option of the buyer (its BATNA), this is, the discount it would obtain from 
exercising its buyer power vis-à-vis this or a different supplier. Therefore, even if the rebate may 
have a foreclosure effect for rival suppliers, it benefits the interests of the buyer. If the buyer has 
the competitive edge in the negotiation then it will be able to ask for a larger rebate and/or other 
favorable conditions without this necessarily implying that it will enter into an exclusive 
purchasing relation. The stronger the buyer it is, the more difficult it would be for a supplier to 
preclude buyers from seeking other supply sources and obtaining better terms and conditions 
from the rivals of the supplier. A powerful buyer would only agree to acquire most or all goods 
from the same supplier if its outside option is less attractive than the rebate, which means that its 
loss on economic freedom is sufficiently compensated by means of better purchasing conditions.  
                                                          
2510 “Since the antitrust laws serve, among other things, to protect competitive freedom, i.e., the freedom of 
individual business units to compete unhindered by the group action of others” in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange 
373 U.S. 341 (1963), 359-360. See a discussion of the goals of US antitrust law and the analysis of this Judgment in 
Jones (1989). 
2511 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 34. 
See also: Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 129 and 137. 
2512 See Graham who argues that this perspective is in line with the Chicago School in Graham, [2010], p. 156. 
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However, the granting of a rebate may also limit the ability or willingness of a buyer to exercise 
countervailing buyer power. In Tomra and Others v Commission, it was held that Tomra abused 
its dominant position as a supplier, inter alia, by granting loyalty enhancing rebates to its 
customers to exclude competition from other suppliers of Reverse Vending Machines (RVM).2513 
As discussed in chapter 10, section 10.7, Tomra unsuccessfully argued that it was not able to 
behave independently from its buyers because these had sufficient countervailing buyer power to 
neutralize its market power as a seller of RVM. Although it was not directly addressed by either 
the Commission or the Courts, one argument that could explain the insufficient countervailing 
buyer power of the buyers of RVM, in addition to a size comparison, as was made in this case, 
was the nature of the granting of loyalty enhancing rebates. These rebates and their exclusivity 
effect could have over-compensated the loss of the buyer’s freedom to resort to alternative 
sources of supply because of the retribution paid by the dominant firm was larger. This could 
mean that buyers were not incentivized to exert countervailing buyer power or resort to outside 
options. If seen as such, the rebate had a dual purpose/effect: excluding other suppliers of RVM 
by limiting the freedom of buyers to shift their demand, and reduce the ability of the buyers to 
neutralize the supplier’s seller power as there were few supplying options and sponsoring entry or 
self-sourcing was not a realistic possibility. 
Summing up, although the EU case law argues that a rebate “tends to remove or restrict the 
buyer's freedom to choose his sources of supply”, this restriction is usually a compensation for 
the loss of its ability to resort to alternative suppliers and is in the self-interest of the buyer. 
However, for that to happen, the rebate must represent an economic advantage as good as or 
better than the outside option of the buyer (which would be resorting to other suppliers). This 
effect to the benefit of the buyer prevents other suppliers from having access to this source of 
demand, which is why rebates might have a foreclosure effect with regard to sellers. On the other 
hand, if the rebate compensation is not large enough then the buyer will rather resort to an 
alternative source of supply in an exercise of its economic freedom. Hence, the limitation of a 
buyer’s economic freedom through rebates can be seen as a compensation for the exercise of its 
buyer power and in the self-interest of buyers. 
However, from a legal perspective, the fact that buyers see their ability to exercise buyer market 
power diminished and compensated by the rebate, even if it implies a loss in their economic 
freedom, is not the main reason why the granting of conditional and unjustified rebates by 
dominant undertaking. In fact, rebates that are agreed between sellers and buyers (being the buyer 
                                                          
2513 Summary of Commission Decision of 29 March 2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement against Tomra Systems ASA, Tomra 
Europe AS, Tomra Systems BV, Tomra Systems GmbH, Tomra Butikksystemer AS, Tomra Systems AB and Tomra 
Leergutsysteme GmbH (Case COMP/E-1/38.113 — Prokent/Tomra) [2008] OJ C 219/11; Judgment of 9 September 
2010, Tomra Systems and Others v Commission, T-155/06, ECR, EU:T:2010:370; Judgment of 19 April 2012 in 
Tomra and Others v Commission, C-549/10 P, EU:C:2012:221.  
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sufficiently compensated) can be and are anti-competitive because of the foreclosing effect it has 
on rival suppliers, but not the buyer. In other words, the main theory of harm in which the 
prohibition of rebates is grounded is the ability to foreclose rival suppliers from being able to 
attract demand from buyers and, therefore, the restriction of buyer’s economic freedom appears 
as a secondary and less important consideration in this respect. 
11.5 Countervailing benefits in exclusive branding and exclusive 
purchasing obligations 
Similarly, as occurs with rebates in general, countervailing benefits in exclusive branding and 
exclusive purchasing obligations are incentives granted by the suppliers to create an exclusivity 
relation with a specific buyer. Single branding agreements comprise contracts in which “the 
buyer is obliged or induced to concentrate its orders for a particular type of product with one 
supplier”,2514 while an exclusive purchasing obligation is a sub-type of single branding 
agreements, as remarked by Whish and Bailey.2515 These types of contracts constitute vertical 
agreements that will benefit from the Block Exemption Regulation if the share of each of the 
parties is less than 30%2516 and the duration is less than five years.2517 However, not all 
purchasing agreements would be within the scope of application of the Block Exemption 
Regulation and, therefore, its effects in competition law should be assessed on a case by case 
basis.2518 This is because these types of agreements, particularly if entered into by many buyers 
with a large supplier may lead to anti-competitive foreclosure of other suppliers that are unable to 
get sources of demand, preventing the entry or expansion of other undertakings and reducing 
variety or choice of different goods.2519 
Furthermore, these types of agreements limit the ability of buyers to resort to other suppliers, as 
rebates do, although not based on quantities or conditional benefits; instead they constitute a 
naked exclusivity obligation. However, buyers with bargaining power would not allow 
themselves to be cut off from the supply of the competing goods or services when entering into 
                                                          
2514 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 129. 
2515 Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2012], p. 637. 
2516 Article 3, Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [2010] 
OJ L 102/1. 
2517 Article 5.1(a), Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices 
[2010] OJ L 102/1. 
2518 “The Court observes, as a preliminary point, that the exclusivity clause does not require retailers to sell only HB 
products in their sales outlets. Consequently, that clause is not, in formal terms, an exclusive purchasing obligation 
whose object is to restrict competition on the relevant market,” in Judgment of 23 October 2003 in Van den Bergh 
Foods v Commission, T-65/98, EU:T:2003:281, para. 80; Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2012], p. 638. 
2519 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 137 in fine. 
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these agreements with a supplier unless they receive some form of compensation.2520 The intuition 
behind this is that the powerful buyer will see its product variety diminished at the expense of 
arguably cheaper input costs. This form of compensation is granted by the seller through 
countervailing benefits, which are price or non-price concessions in favor of the buyer so that the 
latter agrees to concentrate its orders for a particular good or service from a single supplier.2521 
The existence of these countervailing benefits, granted by the supplier to the buyer as a 
compensation for accepting the exclusive purchasing, are taken into account by the Courts and 
the Commission as additional factors to determine the likelihood of the agreement having anti-
competitive effects, particularly regarding intra and inter-brand competition. In the remainder of 
this section, I discuss the nature of countervailing benefits and its assessment from a buyer’s 
perspective. 
11.5.1 What are countervailing benefits? 
Countervailing benefits2522 are a form of compensation granted by sellers to buyers due to the 
loss of the buyer’s ability to seek alternative supply sources by accepting an exclusive purchasing 
obligation, or being forced into them by a supplier undertaking. These benefits are taken into 
account to determine the anti-competitiveness of a single branding agreement because they help 
determine the effects regarding intra-brand competition, as only certain goods from the same 
company can be acquired,2523 and, more obviously, because it forces buyers not to buy and resell 
or expose goods from other suppliers, as it was required in Joynson v Commission.2524 
Therefore, if a supplier attempts to impose an exclusive purchasing obligation it must grant  
the reseller certain economic and financial benefits, such as the grant of loans on favourable 
terms, the letting of premises for the operation of a public house and the provision of technical 
installations, furniture and other equipment necessary for its operation. In consideration for those 
benefits, the reseller normally undertakes, for a predetermined period, to obtain supplies of the 
products covered by the contract only from the supplier.2525  
These benefits take several forms but usually are linked to lower rental prices to be paid by 
tenants to a beer producer, quality-related in the form of valued added services such as discount 
on glassware, gas, supply, banking insurance, insurance and paint,2526 or for instance capital 
                                                          
2520 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 137. 
2521 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para. 129 and 137. 
2522 Graham calls these benefits “incentive schemes” in Graham, [2010] 407, p. 407. See also calling them 
“reciprocal benefits”: Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials [2011], p. 663. 
2523 Commission Decision of 16 June 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
IV/36.081/F3 — Bass) [1999] OJ L 186/1, para. 43. 
2524 Commission Decision of 16 June 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
IV/36.081/F3 — Bass) [1999] OJ L 186/1, para. 119. 
2525 Judgment of 28 February 1991 in Delimitis v Henninger Bräu, C-234/89, EU:C:1991:91, para. 10 (emphasis 
added). 
2526 Commission Decision of 16 June 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
IV/36.081/F3 — Bass) [1999] OJ L 186/1, para. 76. 
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maintenance and repairs of fixtures and fittings,2527 as well as benefiting from the “group’s 
purchasing power in relation to the insurance of the premises.”2528 
The evaluation of these benefits, along with other analysis of the agreement in question determine 
whether the single branding obligation is compatible with the internal market and has a positive 
effect in the distribution of a good, by sufficiently compensating the buyers and, in some cases, 
also having an overall positive effect in the market, as remarked by the General Court in Shaw 
and Falla v Commission.2529  
Hence, countervailing benefits are evaluated to determine if an agreement is indeed anti-
competitive or may satisfy the requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU – as occurred in Scottish and 
Newcastle2530 – or whether a single dominant undertaking may benefit from an objective 
justification under Article 102 TFEU, although this latter possibility is highly unlikely due to the 
obvious foreclosure effects triggered by an exclusive supply purchasing obligation with regard to 
a dominant undertaking,2531 as confirmed in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission.2532  
To determine the sufficiency of the countervailing benefits and the effects on the buyer’s 
economic freedom in cases related to vertical agreements (and not concerning unilateral 
exclusive purchasing obligations by dominant undertakings), the Courts, in a series of cases 
dealing with beer distribution, applied a ‘countervailing benefits test’ having as it aim “to 
determine whether the improvements of distribution brought about by the standard leases could 
materialise notwithstanding the existence of price differentials for tied leases”, as remarked by 
the General Court.2533 Also, and from a pure buyer’s perspective, the test also determines if the 
countervailing benefits compensate the buyer for “the loss in competition resulting from the 
                                                          
2527 Commission Decision of 16 June 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
IV/35.992/F3 - Scottish and Newcastle) [1999] OJ L 186/28, para. 79. 
2528 Commission Decision of 16 June 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
IV/35.992/F3 - Scottish and Newcastle) [1999] OJ L 186/28, para. 81. 
2529 Judgment of 21 March 2002, Shaw and Falla v Commission, T-131/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:83, para. 163. 
2530 Commission Decision of 16 June 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
IV/35.992/F3 - Scottish and Newcastle) [1999] OJ L 186/28. 
2531 As remarked by Whish and Bailey, there is little but unequivocal case law dealing with exclusive purchasing 
agreements granted by dominant undertakings and which appears to be a prohibition almost per se or by nature, 
Whish and Bailey, Competition law [2012], p. 683-684. 
2532 “An undertaking which is in a dominant position on a market and ties purchasers — even if it does so at their 
request — by an obligation or promise on their part to obtain all or most of their requirements exclusively from the 
said undertaking abuses its dominant position within the meaning of Article [102] of the Treaty, whether the 
obligation in question is stipulated without further qualification or whether it is undertaken in consideration of the 
grant of a rebate”, Judgment of 13 February 1979 in Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, 
para. 89 (emphasis added). See also the same wording in Judgment of 17 December 2009, Solvay v Commission, T-
57/01, ECR, EU:T:2009:519, para. 365; Judgment of 25 June 2010, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, T-
66/01, ECR, EU:T:2010:255, para. 315. 
2533 Judgment of 21 March 2002, Joynson v Commission, T-231/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:84, para. 150. 
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exclusivity” and limit the loss in intra-brand and inter-brand competition.2534 Therefore, the 
countervailing effect neutralizes the negative consequences imposed by the exclusivity and non-
competition obligations by rewarding buyers that lose their ability to seek alternative suppliers 
and also benefit beer distribution as a whole.2535 
Lastly, despite the name that may lead to confusions and the existence of a comparison test with 
countervailing buyer power, a concept I discussed in chapter 10, countervailing benefits do not 
act as a direct market power neutralizer, but instead act as a compensation for the loss of 
commercial freedom of a buyer. 
11.5.2 How are countervailing benefits assessed in vertical agreements? 
As mentioned, the Courts have assessed countervailing benefits in connection with the analysis of 
the competitive effects of single branding agreements in cases related to beer distribution. In this 
section, I discuss how the countervailing benefits were assessed in each of them. 
In Delimitis the CJEU for the first time dealt in extenso with the compatibility of agreements 
related to beer distribution containing non-compete obligations and minimum purchasing 
quantities clauses and countervailing benefits.2536 The CJEU concluded that exclusive purchasing 
obligations – even if mostly pro-competitive and covered by the Block Exemption Regulation2537 
– between breweries and its lessees may be incompatible with Article 101 TFEU under two 
cumulative conditions. Firstly, the agreements might make it difficult for competitors to enter the 
market or increase their market share to gain access to the national market for beer distribution. 
Secondly, the individual agreement must make a significant contribution to the sealing-off effect 
generated by the totality of these types of agreements in the market.2538  
However, the agreements can benefit from an efficiency exemption if they grant sufficient 
countervailing benefits to the tied buyers in compensation for the suppression of its contractual 
freedom and the loss of its buyer power. In so doing, the CJEU introduced in Delimitis a 
comparison test between the granted benefits and the effects of the exclusive purchase obligation 
                                                          
2534 See also Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, 
para. 34. 
2535 See also raising this point concerning the convenience for the buyer to accept the countervailing benefits despite 
losing its supply options in Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] 
OJ C 45/7, para. 34. 
2536 Judgment of 28 February 1991 in Delimitis v Henninger Bräu, C-234/89, EU:C:1991:91. See also: Korah and 
O'Sullivan, [2002], p. 290-291. 
2537 Articles 3 and 5 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 
101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted 
practices [2010] OJ L 102/1. 
2538 Judgment of 28 February 1991 in Delimitis v Henninger Bräu, C-234/89, EU:C:1991:91, para. 27. For the 
cumulative effects on competition of these type of agreements see: Judgment of 12 December 1967 in Brasserie De 
Haecht v Wilkin Janssen, C-23/67, EU:C:1967:54, p. 415. 
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to determine whether these favorable conditions for the reseller are gained in practice, and as 
required at the time by Article 8(2) of Regulation 1984/83.2539 
Building on the Delimitis, the Commission and the General Court reviewed exclusive purchasing 
agreements and the assessment of the countervailing benefits going further and developing the 
methodology employed to determine its sufficiency.  
In Joynson v Commission, the Commission and the General Court reviewed the legality of 
exclusive purchasing agreements that were declared incompatible with Article 101(1) TFEU and 
did not fulfill the requirements of the efficiency defense under Article 101(3) TFEU between 
Bass PLC – “Bass” – and its lessees operating public houses in the United Kingdom.2540 As part 
of the lease, Bass incorporated an exclusive purchasing and non-competition clause (beer tie). 
This beer tie obliged Bass tenants to acquire their beer in an almost exclusive manner from Bass, 
even if the purchasing conditions to acquire goods from other parties were more favorable. Both 
the Commission and the General Court analyzed the countervailing benefit effects and the 
General Court confirmed that a comparison has to be made in order to determine whether the 
improvements for beer distribution generated by the exclusive purchasing are able to materialize 
despite the price differential lost by the exclusive buyer.2541  
As in Delimitis, the beer ties could benefit beer distribution but also cause negative price 
differentials to the tenant’s detriment as they are unable to exercise their buyer power by losing 
alternative supply sources, particularly regarding lower whole purchasing prices than those 
obtained by non-tied pubs.2542 To determine whether the tenants were sufficiently compensated, 
the Commission did a comparison test assessing “the trade-off between the detrimental price 
differential ‘lost’ by the pubs with the quantification of the benefits”.2543 If the benefits 
sufficiently compensated, the “‘average’ lessee was therefore in a position to compete on a ‘level 
playing field’ with its trade counterpart”.2544 If such was the case then, the exclusive purchasing 
agreement may satisfy the requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU. Pursuant to an annulment 
action, the General Court further developed the methodology employed for determining the 
                                                          
2539 Judgment of 28 February 1991 in Delimitis v Henninger Bräu, C-234/89, EU:C:1991:91. Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to categories of 
exclusive purchasing agreements [1983] OJ L 173/5. In the Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven if a beer 
exclusive supply agreement does not include a “more favourable terms” clause falls outside the application of 
Regulation 1984/83, see: Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven of 11 October 1990 in Judgment of 28 February 
1991 in Delimitis v Henninger Bräu, C-234/89, EU:C:1990:358. 
2540 Commission Decision of 16 June 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
IV/36.081/F3 — Bass) [1999] OJ L 186/1. 
2541 Judgment of 21 March 2002, Joynson v Commission, T-231/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:84, para. 150. 
2542 Commission Decision of 16 June 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
IV/36.081/F3 — Bass) [1999] OJ L 186/1, para. 177-179. 
2543 Commission Decision of 16 June 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
IV/36.081/F3 — Bass) [1999] OJ L 186/1, para. 186; Bellamy and others, [2013], para. 7.156. 
2544 Commission Decision of 16 June 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
IV/36.081/F3 — Bass) [1999] OJ L 186/1, para. 186. 
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sufficiency and it held that the trade-off is to be evaluated by means of a comparison test through 
which “a specific comparison had to be made between the position of Bass tied lessees and that 
of individual free trade operators”.2545 To carry out the test, countervailing benefits ought to be 
calculated by comparing the trade-off between the price differentials ‘lost’ by the purchaser 
object to an exclusive purchasing agreement when compared to non-tied purchasers and the 
countervailing benefits granted by the supplier.2546 
In Shaw and Falla v Commission, the General Court went one step further by assessing which 
undertakings should be part of the comparison. In this additional step, it took a restrictive 
approach as it dismissed arguments to broaden the type of beer-selling places and evaluate the 
different benefits these types of undertakings receive. The General Court clarified that the 
comparison ought to be made with undertakings that operate at “the same level of distribution as 
Whitbread’s tied lessees, so that a reliable comparison may be made with those lessees”.2547 
Thus, other kinds of beer retailers, such as pub companies, managed houses and clubs should not 
need to be taken into account when defining the comparison group based on an argument of 
collective bargaining power. Non-tied pubs had to buy on an individual basis vis-à-vis the beer 
supplier, whereas tied pubs negotiated “collectively for the whole pub company or brewery. It 
follows that the amounts of beer order are much greater (…), and the discounts given by 
Whitbread on those collective orders are consequently higher than those given on order from 
individual free house operators”.2548 Hence, the scope of the benefits of tied leases, who 
purchased collectively was broader and therefore the assessment should have not included 
independent pub owners. 
Additionally, a reading of the case law seems to suggest that the sufficiency of the countervailing 
benefits goes beyond a mere retribution to the buyers tied but also requires an improvement 
regarding the overall distribution chain, as remarked in Shaw and Falla v Commission, in an 
analogue to the spillover effect in cases of countervailing buyer power, as I discussed in chapter 
10, section 10.8. The General Court required this additional element because as the context of the 
exemption of the lease agreements was general, the countervailing benefits were to be also 
generally assessed taking into account the effect “on the functioning of the market, and hence on 
the situation of the tied lessees taken as a whole, not on each lessee considered in isolation”.2549 
                                                          
2545 Judgment of 21 March 2002, Joynson v Commission, T-231/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:84, para. 150. 
2546 Bellamy and others, [2013], para. 7-154. 
2547 Judgment of 21 March 2002, Shaw and Falla v Commission, T-131/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:83, para. 69. 
2548 Judgment of 21 March 2002, Shaw and Falla v Commission, T-131/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:83, para. 70. 
2549 Judgment of 21 March 2002, Shaw and Falla v Commission, T-131/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:83, para. 163. 
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Thus, the countervailing benefits have to produce an overall market benefit, regardless of 
whether it may or may not have a different scope concerning individual beneficiaries.2550 
Lastly, the case law confirms that in the assessment of the countervailing benefits, it is irrelevant 
whether the countervailing benefits originated in pre-established contractual obligations or were 
voluntarily granted by Bass “once it was certain that they were actually made available only to 
tied lessees and were quantifiable”.2551  
11.5.3 Conclusions regarding countervailing benefits 
Countervailing benefits represent, like rebates, a different type of compensation a supplier must 
offer to a buyer so that the latter accepts having restricted its ability to exercise buyer power by 
precluding the buyer from switching to alternative sources of supply. Furthermore, despite the 
terminology used, these countervailing benefits are not equivalent to the concept of 
countervailing buyer power because they do not aim at neutralizing seller market power, sensu 
stricto. However, they do have in common that to determine their sufficiency concerning whether 
the agreement or conduct is not anti-competitive, a comparison test must be made between the 
tradeoffs of accepting the exclusive obligation or being able to freely negotiate with other 
suppliers. If the tradeoff is sufficient, then this is a factor to take into account when determining 
the adverse effects on inter and intra-brand competition. This comparison takes into account the 
many and varied types of compensatory benefits vis-à-vis the detrimental price differential ‘lost’ 
by the pubs, but also requires, that, in addition, the exclusive supply obligation has an overall 
positive effect in the distribution of the good in the market overall, which resembles the spillover 
effect of countervailing buyer power. 
Lastly, unlike the cases of imposing minimum purchasing prices or limiting supply – more akin 
to rebates – the granting of a countervailing benefit, even if it limits a buyer from exerting its 
buyer power will be, by itself, unlikely to be deemed as an anti-competitive practice. In fact, it is 
the reverse: the countervailing benefits may allow an exclusive purchasing agreement to be 
exempted from being prohibited by Article 101(1) TFEU, as shown by the case law. 
However, I submit that the legal treatment to the same type of exclusive dealing under an 
objective justification analysis within Article 102 TFEU is quite different, as there is no evidence 
that neither the Courts nor the Commission resort to the analysis of countervailing benefits to 
justify the imposition of exclusive supply obligations. In fact, the case law and the assessment of 
these type of conducts is very strict because it is assumed that the likelihood of anti-competitive 
foreclosure effects of these type of conducts is much higher than in the case of ‘vertical 
                                                          
2550 Also of the same opinion is Townley when stating “[o]ne should look at the overall impact of all the notified 
agreements, in their economic context, as opposed to examining the impact on individual members of the group in 
isolation”, in Townley, [2009], p. 189. 
2551 Judgment of 21 March 2002, Joynson v Commission, T-231/99, ECR, EU:T:2002:84, para. 150. 
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agreements’. Therefore, in my view it is unlikely that the granting of some form of compensation 
to buyers would sufficiently address the concern created over the competitive conditions of rival 
buyers and, therefore, would be adequate to justify the conduct over an objective analysis 
justification within the application of Article 102 TFEU, a similar situation as described in the 
previous section with regard to the granting of rebates with an anti-competitive foreclosure effect. 
11.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have discussed buyer power from a reverse angle when compared to the rest of 
this dissertation. Instead of analyzing how buyer power is exerted, I have shown four different 
mechanisms through which sellers aim at limiting the exercise of buyer power. In a nutshell, EU 
competition protects the exercise of buyer power against interferences regarding the competitive 
setting of prices and the economic freedom of buyers, a position also shared under US antitrust 
law, particularly when dealing with boycotting agreements that are treated as per se violations.2552 
In the cases of imposition of minimum purchasing prices and limiting supply, the aim is to 
prevent suppliers from having to transfer part of their profit to the buyers by artificially and anti-
competitively intervening in the natural price formation. These two anti-competitive conducts 
have in common that their object or nature is to restrict competition and are, therefore, likely to 
be held liable from infringing either Article 101(1) TFEU or Article 102(b) TFEU. The case law 
and the Commission’s practice further clarify that these two types of practices seldom occur and 
when they do these tend to be the outcome of an agreement among agricultural suppliers and, 
more often than not, pursuant to a decision by an association of undertakings. The reason why 
these suppliers’ cartels arise in agricultural markets can be explained due to the likelihood that 
these sellers were or are dependent on the buyers and joined forces to neutralize the imposition of 
arguably exploitative practices. Also, I have shown that pursuant to the case the law and the 
Commission’s practice, undertakings that fix purchasing prices or set selling quotas are unlikely 
to benefit from an efficiency defense under either Article 101(3) or Article 102 TFEU because 
the likelihood of its anti-competitive effects is clear and the probability of procompetitive effects 
is remote.2553 However, the fact that there is a sectoral crisis or that buyers are in a weaker 
position may be taken into account when setting the fines as an attenuating circumstance. 
Also, the chapter has shown the exceptional case of lawful sellers’ cartels in the market for raw 
milk. This specific and rare piece of legislation allows milk producers to jointly negotiate prices 
to counteract the buyer power of large retailers while being excluded from the application of EU 
competition law. However, Regulation 261/2012 sets rather strict requirements for this waiver to 
apply, which also begs the question whether such a solution has any impact when it comes to the 
                                                          
2552 Jones (1989), p. 89. 
2553 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985), 294. 
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price negotiation of raw milk purchases and, furthermore, whether such an interventionist 
approach might be detrimental for the wellbeing of end consumers in the form of higher final 
purchasing prices. 
When buyer power is to be restricted through unilateral behavior suppliers resort to rebates, 
instead of price limitation or fixing purchasing quotas, to limit the ability of buyers to freely 
determine with whom to carry out their purchases. In my view, more than simply restricting the 
buyer’s freedom, the aim of rebates is to compensate the buyer for its loss of buyer power, as if 
the buyer is able to obtain better contractual conditions elsewhere, it will require a further and 
better discounts from the buyer. However, rebates restrict the ability of buyers to seek alternative 
supply sources, in particular if the buyer is weak in relation to the seller and is over-compensated, 
as its outside option of negotiating with a third party as that alternative will be less profitable. In 
this way it is understood the concern of the EU case law regarding limitation of the buyers’ 
freedom as a secondary and linked theory of harm to the risk of anti-competitive foreclosure 
effects that conditional rebates have over rival suppliers, because these benefits restrict their 
ability to find sources of demand. In other words, conditional rebates by dominant undertakings 
are prohibited mainly due to their foreclosure effects on rival buyers and less so because they 
limit the buyer’s economic freedom. This same concern and outcome is observed when dealing 
with exclusive purchasing obligations imposed by dominant undertakings, which are highly 
likely to be anti-competitive by nature due to their foreclosure effects rather than the buyer’s 
economic freedom restriction. 
Also, the chapter has discussed how, in the cases of exclusive vertical purchasing agreements, a 
supplier will compensate its buyer for the loss of the ability of the latter to exert buyer power, in 
particular for the different price it would obtain if not tied under an exclusive purchasing 
obligations under Article 101 TFEU. These countervailing benefits have been factored in when 
determining the compatibility of exclusive purchasing agreements in beer retailing and whether, 
as a whole, the agreement improves the distribution of beer in the overall market under an 
efficiency analysis pursuant to Article 101(3) TFEU. As remarked, despite their name, 
countervailing benefits test the limitation of buyer power but not the countervailing of opposing 
seller market power, as CPBs would do. I have shown how these benefits are assessed through a 
comparison test and which sorts of factors are taken into account. 
Lastly, in none of these four modalities in which buyer power limitation was found to be a breach 
of EU competition law was end consumer harm a deciding factor. Conducts fixing purchasing 
prices, limiting supply or granting exclusionary rebates are prohibited under EU competition to 
protect the natural formation of prices in the market – the core of the competitive process as such 
under an ordoliberal perspective – and to safeguard the economic freedom of buyers, which 
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reinforces this thesis’ proposal that buyer power regulation in EU competition law takes a 













12 Final Conclusions 
12.1 Introduction 
Echoing this thesis’ introduction, the ambition of this research project was to establish the legal 
treatment that is afforded to buyer power by EU competition law as expressed in the judgments 
and decisions by the Courts, the Commission and policy makers. In general, the main goal of my 
study, has been to clarify what the EU competition law regulation of buyer power is, from a de 
lege lata perspective. 
In pursuance of this goal, my aim has been to identify, synthetize, clarify, discuss, evaluate, and 
compare the EU competition regulation of buyer power in a holistic manner across all areas of 
EU competition law. Moreover, I carried out this legal analysis based on an economically 
informed legal analysis integrated into the legal discussion anchored on state of the art 
microeconomics and employed ordoliberalism as a benchmarking tool to determine the degree of 
similarity of EU regulation of buyer power with this competition policy school of thought. 
Additionally, I have contrasted the regulation of buying conducts under EU competition law with 
equivalent cases in US antitrust law, and, to a far lesser extent, to some MS, to determine 
similarities and differences. A pure comparative buyer power study is an area ripe for further 
research. 
In this conclusion, I contribute to knowledge by identifying the findings of my study through a 
synthesis of the answers given my research questions, chapter findings, and discuss what, in my 
view, the future of buyer power looks like in terms of competition enforcement, policy making 
and future research. 
12.2 General findings 
Buyer power has been, and remains, something of a secondary and rare topic within EU 
competition law. I put forth four reasons that provide an explanation regarding why buyer power 
has received little competition enforcement and academic scholarship. First, anti-competitive 
buyer power cases are rare. On the one hand, monopsony power exertion seldom occurs because 
it is not the most profit-maximizing purchasing behavior and it may force suppliers to exit the 
market, leaving the buyer without input sources. On the other hand, anti-competitive instances of 
buyer power are rare because bargaining power tends to be efficiency enhancing and, therefore, 
it improves and increases welfare. If the buyer conduct is efficient and welfare enhancing, 
suppliers will be unwilling to bring forth a case without merit as competition authorities will not 
condemn the behavior as it does not negatively affect competition. Second, because of the rarity 
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of buyer power cases, competition authorities have not prioritized them compared to other anti-
competitive conducts, as occurs in the EU, with regard to the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities. This lack of prioritization is also connected with the view of some competition 
authorities – mainly the US antitrust law agencies and, to a much lesser degree, the Commission 
– and academics that only see buyer power as a competition problem whenever there is evidence 
of direct consumer harm, as discussed in Weyerhaeuser. Therefore, and as a third reason, absent 
evidence of direct end consumer harm, competition, authorities may be less tempted to initiate 
proceedings against a buying behavior that may be anti-competitive but only regarding upstream 
competition or affecting rival buyers. This narrow approach is something I have criticized 
through the thesis. My criticism is grounded on the fact that such a stringent perspective 
disregards the EU competition law goals of protecting competition as a process by focusing 
purely on the downstream aspects of buyer power cases. Such restrictive view overlooks that by 
protecting competition as such and the competitive process substantial harm to the competitive 
upstream structure will negatively impact upon the wellbeing of end consumers in the medium 
and long-term. Therefore, in my view, this narrow approach to buyer power harm should not be 
adopted as it entails under-enforcement risks and acts contrary to the protection of the 
competitive process and a dualistic approach to buyer power cases. Lastly, a fourth reason that 
may explain the lack of buyer power cases is that up to now there is scant legal guidance 
available regarding conducts that may constitute buyer power abuses and, therefore, suppliers 
and rival buyers may be less willing to bring forth cases because of the uncertainties and 
difficulty in determining whether the conduct would be anti-competitive.  
This limited amount of anti-competitive buyer power cases observed in practice also applies 
regarding unfair purchasing practices, behaviors that are said to be exerted by large buyers in the 
food retailing sector and which have attracted significant societal and political attention. 
Furthermore, I have also shown that unfair purchasing practices by and large do not constitute a 
competition law problem because they tend to have a limited adverse welfare effects from a static 
or dynamic efficiency perspective, not having a substantial impact in competition as a process in 
either the upstream or the downstream markets. Instead, what takes place is a redistribution of 
profits between suppliers and buyers on a bilateral level due to the bargaining power of the 
parties, which is better regulated by means of other types of legislation suited to deal with 
contractual balancing. 
Furthermore, I have shown why treating buyer power fully economically and symmetrical to 
monopoly power is not the correct approach, nor is the way in which the Courts apply the law to 
it. This is an undesirable approach because buyer power economics and effects are not 
symmetrical to monopoly power. My research confirms that EU competition law is not applied 
nor designed in buyer power cases to be fully symmetrical – albeit also not that different 
treatment – when compared to analogue selling side cases. Adopting a purely symmetrical 
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approach to selling side cases would disregard the particularities of buyer (and especially 
bargaining) power effects, its dualistic nature in the upstream and downstream markets and that 
buyer power cases have triggered, and will trigger, competition intervention absent end consumer 
harm, the countervailing nature of buyer power, and the fact that bargaining power can, and tends 
to be, efficiency enhancing, unlike monopoly power. This does not, however, imply that I 
advocate for a complete reshaping of EU competition law relating to buyer power cases, nor that 
in the absence of buyer power precedents, selling side cases cannot be used to analogically guide 
the application of the law with the proper adjustments to buyer power realities. Using analogue 
selling side cases as guidance is justified as it would preserve the inner logic of EU competition 
policy as a whole, and would provide undertakings further legal certainty and a greater ability to 
predict to a certain degree the legality of a conduct. 
Furthermore, and connected to the former, buyer power cases can be divided into two large 
categories: those involving demand withholding (monopsony effect) and those involving price 
reduction by other means (bargaining power). Concerning monopsony power, both the economics 
and the legal regime applicable are straight-forward: monopsony conducts are anti-competitive 
because they generate a societal deadweight loss to allocative losses and may also have 
detrimental effects on end consumers if the buyer also has downstream market power. Therefore, 
for monopsony cases, their evaluation and legal treatment is rather unsophisticated. However, 
monopsony cases seldom arise, as confirmed in this study, as instances of demand-withholding 
do not occur often and when they do so it has been as naked and obvious restrictions of 
competition. Therefore, the legal and economic discussion should be centered on bargaining 
power cases and conducts because they occur more often, do not have straight-forward answers, 
and require more detailed legal and economic analysis. 
Within the scope of this distinction of buyer power cases, I have found that EU competition law 
in general seems to treat buyer power in a coherent and rather homogenous way across all its 
areas, as the Courts and the Commission do not make unjustified or unobserved distinctions 
among the different cases, nor when compared to equivalent seller side cases. In other words, 
buyer power cases are treated homogenously despite the fact that the conducts may arise in 
different competition law areas. For example, a buyer actively countervails the seller power of a 
unilateral undertaking, but it may also do so regarding future behavior pursuant a concentration 
among sellers, or the fact that monopsony power can be exerted by a single undertaking or a 
buyers’ cartel. This does not mean, however, that buyer power regulation has to be identical in 
all areas of EU competition law. Single and coordinated behaviors differ by nature and what 
might be forbidden as a unilateral conduct for a dominant undertaking could be allowed for a 
non-dominant one, and what is forbidden in an agreement might not be for unilateral behavior, as 
the legal and policy treatment distinguishes between them. Furthermore, even if the Courts and 
the Commission do not make an express distinction between monopsony and bargaining power 
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by ‘labeling the conducts,’ the case law does indeed implicitly recognize that monopsony and 
bargaining power are different sub-types of buyer power with different economic implications in 
the ratio decidendi of the cases. This is quite palpable in several types of conducts. For example, 
concerning bargaining power, buying alliances are seen as a pro-competitive and enjoy a 
presumption of legality, as well as the benevolent approach to countervailing buyer power; 
whereas in the case of monopsony power, buyers’ cartels, exploitatively low purchasing 
practices, and restrictions on purchasing quantities, are under a rebuttable presumption of anti-
competitiveness and it is up to the involved undertakings to prove that the effects are not anti-
competitive, which is highly unlikely.  
This coherent and homogenous treatment of buyer power in EU competition law is the 
appropriate approach for several reasons. First, applying different unjustified legal regulations to 
the same economic problems concerning, for example, buyer power exclusion or exploitation is 
economically unsound and discriminatory, as the legal regime would treat equivalent 
circumstances in different ways. Second, applying a uniform and coherent treatment to buyer 
power regardless of the competition area in which the conduct takes place generates internal 
cohesion of the legal system; at the same time, this guarantees predictability and legal certainty 
which allows undertakings to evaluate whether their purchasing conduct conforms with EU 
competition law. Third, there are no economic nor legal arguments that support a different buyer 
power treatment based solely on the specific area of the law to be applied; what does find support 
in the economics literature is distinguishing whether the conduct involves a monopsony or 
bargaining power effect and the fact that its competitive analysis is different. 
However, the extent of this coherent and homogenous treatment is limited and has not been tested 
for consistency because most of the theories of harm analyzed in this study have been addressed, 
if at all, only once or few times by the Courts and others only by the Commission’s practice. 
Therefore, there have been limited opportunities for the Courts to re-assess their previous 
judgment on analogue cases; when that has occurred the case law shows that there is an overall 
consistent. However, it also shows that a more specific and detailed assessment of cases 
involving coordinate behavior and countervailing buyer power exist when compared to other 
buyer power topics. However, in my view, there seems to be little room for a radical re-
structuring of the ongoing buyer power treatment as a whole.  
However, an aspect of the case law that can be criticized concerning the regulation and legal 
treatment of buyer power is the lack of sophisticated and explicit economic discussions 
concerning buyer power effects (and the dichotomy between monopsony and buyer power) in 
contrast to the far more economically explicit judgments of US courts. This lack of ‘economic 
explicit talk’ by the Courts is not exclusive to buyer power cases; on the contrary it is a general 
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characteristic of EU competition law, and can be explained by the nature of the judicial revisions 
of the courts and European legal traditions. 
Additionally, I submitted that buyer power cases have to be analyzed from a dualistic 
perspective. This is so because buyer power has effects both in the upstream market where the 
purchasing activity takes place vis-à-vis suppliers and rival buyers and in the downstream market 
where the buyer acts as a retailer having effects on end consumers and rival sellers (that may or 
may not be rival buyers). This dualistic approach requires carrying out dualistic market 
definitions and taking into account the buying conduct’s effect in both markets to fully capture 
the competition impact it has.  
In connection to the former, I demonstrated that buyer power is at its most pernicious whenever 
the undertaking involved has market power both as a buyer and retailer as an hourglass-shaped 
undertaking, as confirmed by buyer power economics, the Commission’s practice and the case 
law. As a buyer in the upstream market, the undertaking will exert its buyer power vis-à-vis 
suppliers to obtain a price reduction, and, as it has substantial seller market power, it is not 
pressured by competition as a retailer to pass on the buyer power benefits to end consumers. 
Therefore, and as a general indicator, whenever buyer market power is exerted by an undertaking 
that has concurrent buyer and seller market power, then buyer power abuse is more likely. On 
the other hand, if the undertaking has buyer market power but faces stern downstream 
competition, it is much more likely that the obtained price reductions as a buyer will be passed on 
to end consumers as a result of the competitive pressure. The pressure exerted by downstream 
competition explains why US antitrust law and the Commission center their attention on cases 
where short-term downstream consumer harm takes place. However, this does not imply that 
buyer power may not be pernicious absent consumer harm as rival buyers may not compete as 
retailers or simply because buyer power may negatively impact the competitiveness of the market 
purely in the upstream market. Building on this, the fact that an undertaking has substantial 
market power as a buyer and as a retailer is a preliminary indication that the exercise of buyer 
power in a market may lead to competition issues, as also remarked by the Commission2554 and 
Chen2555 in their buyer power models. 
Moreover, the dualistic approach and the perniciousness of buyer market power is also linked 
with this thesis’ finding that EU competition policy concerning buyer power goes beyond 
requiring direct end consumer harm to trigger the application of EU competition law. Therefore, 
and as clarified by the Courts, competition intervention will take place whenever buyer power has 
a substantial and detrimental effect on the competitive process and competition as such in the 
upstream market, even absent evidence of direct end consumer harm because this has already 
                                                          
2554 European Commission and others (2000), p. 19. 
2555 Chen ‘Buyer power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy’ (2007), p. 32-37. 
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substantially affected competition among buyers and suppliers or among buyers themselves. This 
broader harm standard is found under EU Competition and US antitrust law concerning the 
treatment of buyers’ cartels, and cartels that unduly restrict a buyer’s market power and economic 
freedom (by setting minimum purchasing prices, for example). In this case, the broader approach 
is justified because the cartel in itself is an agreement to thwart the competitive process. 
However, when it comes to unilateral behavior, present or future (in the case of concentrations), 
the stance is quite different. In the US antitrust law, as shown by Weyerhaeuser, the approach to 
triggering the application of the law is narrow as the US Supreme Court requires direct end 
consumer harm to sanction the unilateral conduct of a buyer when attempting to exclude its 
competitors. This narrow approach to buyer power cases risks under-enforcing and denying 
protection to the competitive process in the upstream market or between undertakings that only 
compete as buyers but not as retailers.  
The broader approach to buyer power harm has the advantage of being more inclusive and 
captures better the complex buyer power dynamics in the markets involved than a policy stance of 
intervening exclusively whenever there is short-term end consumer harm. This broader approach 
to buyer power intervention takes into account the competitive interests of all market players and 
not solely end consumers anchored on the idea that detriment to upstream competition and 
competition as such will lead to harm in the downstream markets in the long run. Also, by 
protecting the competitive process and economic freedom, EU competition law grants a limited 
protection of the economic interest of other undertakings in buyer power cases, as occurs 
concerning countervailing buyer power. In my view, this wider approach to the economic 
protection of the wellbeing of the market is anchored in the regulatory and political history of the 
EU competition law and the policy goals in which has been built, that inter alia, seek to protect a 
system of undistorted competition,2556 grant importance to the parties’ economic freedom, and the 
ordoliberal influence arising therefrom. Such perspective also finds support beyond the EU 
dimension in the work of Carstensen who argues that “[b]y retaining workably competitive 
buying markets, many of the problems involved in focused analysis of specific buyer conduct can 
be avoided”.2557 This protective and more interventionist approach is not exclusive to buyer 
power regulation but common to EU competition law in general, as recently confirmed in CB v 
Commission, which concluded that restrictions of competition are prohibited when they reveal “a 
sufficient degree of harm to competition”, and not requiring direct end consumer harm.2558 
                                                          
2556 Protocol No 27 on the Internal Market and Competition of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
consolidated version [2012] OJ C 326/47. 
2557 Carstensen ‘Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among 
Suppliers’ (2008), p. 331. 
2558 Judgment of 11 September 2014 in CB v Commission, C-67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204, para. 54. 
527 
 
The problem with this broader approach, and common to instances dealing with vertical 
restraints,2559 is that, in the interest of protecting the competitive market structure and the 
undertaking’s economic freedom, the intervention may limit instances of efficient behavior and 
affect static and dynamic efficiency due to over-enforcement. Therefore, the extent and the 
adequacy of the protection of economic freedom and other participants’ economic interests must 
be approached with caution. In connection with these criticisms, the broader approach to harm in 
buyer power cases has been timidly challenged by some of the Commission’s guidelines that 
place the burden of triggering competition law intervention whenever there is downstream 
consumer harm. This attitude, likely influenced by the ‘more economic approach’, has not been 
endorsed by the Courts and is evidence of the general policy tension regarding EU competition 
law goals between these institutions. 
In connection with these findings, I also embarked on an analysis of whether the EU buyer power 
treatment is in line with ordoliberal competition policy? This question prompted me to devise a 
policy framework with which to contrast the legal treatment to buyer power, and to make value 
and policy judgments concerning the outcomes and the choices made by the Courts and the 
Commission. My findings are that the current EU buyer power regulation anchored on its 
dualistic and broader harm approach seems to be compatible with an ordoliberal competition 
policy, as discussed in chapter 4. There are several factors that support such a finding, among 
them the emphasis placed by the Courts concerning competition intervention even absent 
evidence of direct end consumer harm, the protection of the competitive process, certain 
protection for the wellbeing of other buyers in countervailing buyer power cases, prohibition of 
unilateral purchasing exploitation vis-à-vis suppliers and the prohibition of unduly and 
disproportionally restricting the economic freedom other undertakings. This correlation, however, 
does not necessarily imply causation; i.e.: I do not claim that the EU buyer power regulation is 
purely inspired by ordoliberalism because proving or refuting such claim requires a different 
methodology and approach than the one I used in this study. 
In contrast, my analysis of the US antitrust regulation of buyer power, shows that ordoliberal-like 
ideas have had far less influence and that there has been a shift from an ‘old’ interventionist and 
protective regime towards a ‘new’ buyer power approach focused on pure end consumer harm. 
The ‘old’ case law and laws like the Robinson-Patman Act have a competitors-protective 
emphasis, and the competitive protection to the upstream process and intervention absent 
consumer harm goes even further than what EU competition law does. However, with the 
‘Antitrust Revolution’ and the influence of the Chicago School from the 1970s onwards, the 
stance to buyer power has become narrower, particularly regarding unilateral conducts, and US 
antitrust law intervention is limited to circumstances where there is presence of direct end 
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consumer harm. The risks with this approach is that it might be under-enforcing and that it 
disregards all cases in which buyers do not compete as retailers downstream. 
Also, I identified that potential anti-competitive buyer power arises more frequently in markets 
with specific characteristics. Among them, a high level of demand side concentration; 
atomization of suppliers; related to processing of raw material or foodstuffs; cases where the 
buyer is an important distribution mechanism; and markets in which retailers seek to integrate 
upstream. This makes industries such as food retailing or those that process raw materials good 
examples. However, buyer (bargaining) power arises in any type of commercial relationship and, 
therefore, authorities should resist the temptation to limit their scrutiny to specific industrial 
sectors or market structures. 
Furthermore, my analysis also confirms that the most pernicious and problematic buyer power 
forms of abuse are related to exclusionary harm rather than exploitative buyer power conducts. 
In my view, the Commission should follow its current approach to selling side cases by placing 
an enforcement emphasis on exclusionary buyer power cases for three fundamental reasons. 
Firstly, buyer power exclusion is not self-correctable or as self-correctable as buyer power 
exploitation may be,2560 which requires intervention of competition authorities to prevent issues 
of barriers of entry or market foreclosure. Secondly, buyer power exclusion tends to follow a 
strategy in which the buyer excludes a rival from the upstream market to directly affect its ability 
to compete in the downstream market as a retailer, causing therefore harm in both markets and 
which is likely to have a much shorter negative impact effect on end consumers. Lastly, buyer 
power exploitation sensu stricto, where one buyer is capable of squeezing suppliers out of the 
market, is not the most economically rational purchasing behavior. This is so, as the buyer may 
eventually either lose all supply sources or grant more seller market power to the few remaining 
suppliers, tilting the bargaining power balance in their favor. 
Moreover, I identified that buyer power problems may also be connected with previous and 
current state/public ownership. In some of the cases discussed, the involved undertakings were 
once, or still are, publicly owned, or qualified as contracting authorities under the scope of the 
application of EU public procurement law (and thereby, in principle shielded from the application 
of EU competition law). This occurred, for example, concerning the Spanish Ministry of Health 
in FENIN v Commission, the German medicine purchasing system in AOK Bundesverband, 
British Airways as a former publicly-owned airline carrier in the UK, Irish Sugar as a former 
state monopoly for the purchase and resale of sugar in Ireland, and, as recently occurred in 
Norway, concerning possible buyer power abuses by Statoil.2561 Therefore, exercise of public 
                                                          
2560 My discussion concerning whether buyer power exploitation is as self correctable as in seller side cases is in 
chapter 8 of this dissertation. 
2561 https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/utreder-konkurranseforholdene-i-petroleumsnaringen/id2508080/. The 
final report was issued on October 1, 2007 and some information in English about is available at 
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buyer power in recently liberalized sectors may also be an area where competition authorities 
should maintain a vigilant eye. 
Lastly, and as a policy issue flowing from the previous findings, if buyer (bargaining) power 
tends to be welfare increasing because it has the ability to neutralize seller market power fully or 
partially, should buyer power be actively encouraged by competition policy?  
As has been discussed in this dissertation, buyer (bargaining) power tends to be welfare 
enhancing if it is able to neutralize seller market power, reduce purchasing prices and pass on 
these benefits to end consumers in the form of cheaper products, better quality and greater variety 
and innovation. However, this is not the case for monopsony power as it is always inefficient and 
creating welfare loss due to demand withholding. Therefore, the answer concerning monopsony 
is simple: despite the fact that it reduces purchasing prices it should not be encouraged because it 
is an anti-competitive practice with negative welfare effects.  
On the other hand, bargaining power tends to be efficiency enhancing but can also be used to 
exploit suppliers or exclude rivals, as has been demonstrated in this dissertation. Therefore, active 
intervention that encourages the creation of bargaining power could be potentially dangerous and 
distort the competitive balance. Also, fostering bargaining power to the benefit of large firms 
may raise issues concerning increased market concentration, possibilities of bilateral monopolies, 
discrimination, and possible instances of illegal state aid. What it is likely is that bargaining 
power will continue to naturally grow to oppose seller market power and that the new academic 
knowledge will allow competition authorities to adequately assess bargaining power extension 
and distinguish pro-competitive from anti-competitive conducts. However, what may occur, and 
is occurring, is that governmental intervention is being observed in certain markets – for instance 
regarding the bargaining power of small agricultural producers or cooperatives – and that 
regulations and policies will foster the creation of (buyer or seller) bargaining power to the 
benefit of small and medium enterprises in these socially sensitive sectors. 
12.3 Chapter-specific findings 
I discussed the economics of buyer power and demonstrated that, unlike monopoly, buyer power 
is an umbrella term covering two different types of buying conducts with different economic 
effects, as analyzed in detail in chapter 3. On the one hand, monopsony power is indeed the 
analogue figure of monopoly power as it describes how a buyer is able to decrease an input’s 
purchasing price below the competitive level by withholding demand (i.e.: purchasing less of it) 
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to reap supracompetitive profits. The monopsony effects are quite straight-forward: withholding 
demand always generates allocative efficiency loss as fewer resources than optimal are employed 
and a profit transfer takes place from suppliers to the monopsonist. Furthermore, and depending 
on the competitiveness in the downstream market, monopsony power can have further pernicious 
effects for downstream consumers as prices are pushed upwards if the monopsonist buyer can 
also exert downstream market power. On the other hand, the economic effects of bargaining 
power are not so straight-forward, as this purchasing behavior can be pro or anti-competitive 
from an allocative and dynamic efficiency perspective. Bargaining power is efficiency enhancing 
because the price reduction obtained by the buyer is not based on demand withholding but on 
resorting to its negotiation abilities to reduce the purchase price towards the competitive level. 
Therefore, bargaining power is pro-competitive because it countervails opposing seller market 
power shifting prices towards the competitive level (but not below it), increases the amount of 
goods acquired, may incentivize innovation by rival buyers and suppliers, and may pass the price 
reductions to end consumers if the downstream market is competitive. However, bargaining 
power can also be employed anti-competitively to exploit and exclude suppliers or rival buyers, 
especially if the powerful buyer also holds market power as a retailer. Therefore, bargaining 
power is a hybrid concept from a welfaristic perspective. Additionally, for both monopsony and 
bargaining power, I submitted that whenever a buyer exerting monopsony or bargaining power 
also enjoys market power as a retailer it possesses the hourglass shape and its ability to leverage 
market power from (or to) the purchasing market to the retail market may raise further 
competition concerns and have a direct impact in the prices paid by end consumers. Lastly, 
because of the ambiguous welfare effects of bargaining power it is not possible to say that buyer 
(bargaining) power is economically equivalent to monopoly power and no straight-forward 
answer can be given to cases as the outcome will depend on the conduct at hand, the 
undertaking’s bargaining power extent, and the competitive conditions in the upstream and 
downstream markets. 
Following the buyer power economics discussion, I found that one of the main buyer power 
competition implications is its ability to have dual competition effects in the upstream and 
downstream markets where the buyer carries out its economic activity, thus, having a direct 
impact on how the relevant market is defined in buyer power cases, as discussed in chapters 5 
and 6. Defining buying relevant markets is different from selling side cases because it requires 
the adoption of a dualistic approach to the market definition and buyer power assessment to fully 
capture the buyer market power effects on suppliers, rival buyers and end consumers. This 
dualistic approach involves assessing the undertaking’s relevant purchasing market upstream and 
its buyer power as well as the relevant downstream market and its seller market power. A dual 
market definition allows competition authorities to better determine the existence of competitive 
harm and fully appreciate the buyer power effects on competition as a whole. If the market 
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definition analysis is carried out solely in the purchasing upstream market, the competitive effects 
of buyer power on end consumers would not be fully assessed, and the same is true vice versa. 
Furthermore, adopting a dualistic approach to buyer-oriented market definition is consistent with 
a policy that triggers competition law intervention whenever the competitive process is harmed 
either upstream or downstream and not exclusively whenever there is direct short term end 
consumer harm. 
Furthermore, defining relevant buying markets goes beyond applying a reverse methodology to 
the selling-side product market definition, and a reassessment of the methodology and variables 
applied when carrying out the Buyer’s SSNIP test has been proposed. This buyer market 
definition methodology implies a re-focusing of the concepts of demand and supply substitution, 
going beyond a mere reverse of the application of the hypothetical monopsonist test and defining 
the relevant market upstream and downstream, and which has been gradually accepted by the 
Commission as well as the NCAs of some MS, such as the UK and Germany. However, the 
endorsement and refinement of these methodologies still requires further legal guidance by the 
Commission as the little available guidance is insufficient and underdeveloped. This re-tailoring 
of buyer’s market definition is not solely an European concern. Other countries and institutions 
have, since the mid-2000s, started to re-think and apply market definition techniques for 
purchasing markets in a different manner. For example, in the US with the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, in Canada with its Merger Guidelines, or at the OECD level with its proposal of a 
hypothetical monopsonist test. 
Following the dualistic buyer market definition proposal, I have also answered the question 
concerning how and under what circumstances buyer power arises, in chapter 6. One of my 
findings is that substantial buyer market power (but not dominance) is capable of arising at lower 
market share thresholds than when compared to selling side cases because, in most transactions, 
the buyer is the one that ‘decides’ in the operation, as originally highlighted by Carstensen.2562 
However, this idea must be further refined. Substantial buyer power arises at lower thresholds 
when compared to selling side cases and has the ability to affect the relationship between a 
supplier and a buyer in a bilateral manner because the former may be dependent on the latter. 
Nevertheless, the fact that a supplier is dependent on a buyer does not imply that all or most 
suppliers depend on it and that the buyer may behave independently from its suppliers and rival 
buyers. Therefore, what is of importance is the market power of the buyer vis-à-vis all suppliers, 
rival buyers, and end consumers as a retailer.  
To properly evaluate the undertaking’s market power, and following the dualistic approach to 
buyer power, the assessment of market power must also be made as a buyer and also as a retailer. 
My analysis focused solely on the determination of buyer market power as a purchaser in the 
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upstream market, as the downstream analysis of market power has been the topic of extensive 
discussion and is outside the scope of this thesis’. I identified and discussed the buyer-specific 
assessment tools to measure an undertaking’s buyer power: market shares, market concentration, 
dependence, unavoidability, the buyer’s role as a gate-keeper, and alternative supply sources. 
Lastly, the chapter also discussed the Buyer Power Index as a direct source for quantifying 
market power, as proposed by Blair and Harrison and how, despite its attractiveness, this 
methodology anchored on the use of demand elasticity is not adequate in practice. 
Part III of this dissertation embarked on a discussion of buying conducts that may raise anti-
competitive concern to answer the question of which types of buying behaviors may trigger 
competition intervention. For this purpose, I identified theories of harm and types of harm from a 
holistic perspective, deviating from an ‘article-based’ approach, as previously carried out by van 
Doorn.2563 This methodological choice allowed me to discuss similar buying conducts and their 
legal regulation from different angles, explain their economic underpinnings, contrast them, and 
avoid repetition of legal and economic arguments. In so doing, I grouped buying conducts from 
an active perspective into three types: exclusionary buying conducts, exploitative buying 
conducts, and exploitative and unfair buying conducts. 
Exclusionary buyer power tactics are the most pernicious form of buyer power behavior, which 
warrant a major degree of intervention by competition authorities, as they involve the use of 
buyer power in the upstream market to foreclose rivals that compete in either the upstream 
market as a buyer and/or the downstream market as a retailer, as discussed in chapter 7. 
Therefore, exclusionary buyer power has horizontal and vertical competition effects. The buyer 
will aim to exclude its rivals by increasing their costs. This can be done in several ways: by 
entering into exclusive supply obligations with the most or most efficient suppliers and leaving 
available to rivals other suppliers not as efficient. However, not all exclusive supply obligations 
are anti-competitive nor are they treated as such as they can also lead to efficiencies as some of 
these agreements may benefit from the Block Exemption Regulation. Overbuying is another 
exclusionary tactic, which involves acquiring more input than necessary, thereby increasing the 
purchasing price paid to prevent rivals from acquiring it and forcing them to exit the upstream 
market. Overbuying cases are rare, the US seminal case of Weyerhaeuser was discussed in 
extenso due to its importance. In Weyerhaeuser, the US Supreme Court adopted a narrow 
approach to buyer power exclusion, by only intervening upon the existence of direct consumer 
harm. In my opinion, this narrow approach to buyer power harm may be underenforcing in those 
situations in which buyers do not compete as retailers, and shows a lack of concern for the 
protection of upstream market conditions that in the medium and long run may affect the 
wellbeing of downstream consumers. I also discussed mergers in which possible input rival 
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foreclosure was perceived as an anticompetiive concern. Then, I analyzed the treatment to 
exclusionary buying discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act, as an example of US 
legislation applicable to such conducts, and which seeks protection of rival buyers and not 
economic efficiency. This discussion set the basis for the analysis of exclusionary leveraging of 
buyer market power through which a buying undertaking exerts its purchasing power to affect 
competition in a related market, as discussed in extenso in British Airways v Commission by the 
Courts. This judgment shows that dominant buyers may abuse their dominant position by 
granting supracompetitive rebates with a loyalty-enhancing component that incentivizes suppliers 
to sell their goods or services exclusively or mostly to the dominant undertaking. In this case, the 
Courts sanctioned the undertaking’s conduct even absent evidence of direct end consumer harm 
and chose a broader harm standard of intervention whenever the competitive structure in the 
upstream market is affected, in contrast to the narrow approach of the US Supreme Court in 
Weyerhaeuser. Additionally, I discuss the hybrid theory of harm of ‘squeeze to buy’, where the 
buyer pays an exploitatively low purchasing price, followed by a take-over of the supplier which 
is forced to sell its business at a lower price than in a competitive setting. The chapter concludes 
with two discussions concerning the difficulty and unsuitability of the ‘as efficient buyer test’ for 
exclusionary abuses, and how EU competition law intervenes in exclusionary buyer power cases 
even absent evidence of direct end consumer harm if the conduct has a substantive detrimental 
effect on the competitive structure upstream, and the contrast to the position under US antitrust 
law. 
In chapter 8, I analyzed buyer power exploitation as a vertical exercise of buyer market power 
vis-à-vis suppliers that consists of imposing purchasing prices, quotas, distributing geographical 
markets, or setting purchasing patterns which extract supra-competitive rents from suppliers to 
buyers. However, and despite its intuitive appeal, buyer power economics show that imposing 
exploitative purchasing prices below the competitive level for a long period of time is unlikely to 
be an effective tactic. Therefore, my analysis confirms that pure exploitative practices, especially 
unilateral, are rare, which is confirmed by the small amount of existing case law. Also, other 
conducts that may appear exploitative might not be; lowering purchasing prices towards the 
competitive level has a countervailing effect that transfers supracompetitive profits kept by 
suppliers. My analysis discussed unilateral exploitation by imposing unfairly low purchasing 
prices below the competitive level, revisiting the United Brands test and proposing a buyer-
oriented standard anchored on the supplier’s marginal cost and the competitive purchasing price. 
Furthermore, I discussed how unilateral behavior can be used to exert exploitative purchasing 
price discrimination among suppliers and the strict stance of Courts concerning these types of 
practices, as confirmed in British Airways v Commission. This approach seeks to prevent 
discrimination among suppliers and to protect the level playing field among rivals, but it might 
also be criticized from a welfaristic perspective. Additionally, I evaluated the efficiency and 
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rationale of centralized purchasing structures as purchasing and collaborative behaviors, as well 
as cooperatives as agglutinators of buyer power. This was followed by a discussion concerning 
buyer power exploitation through buyers’ coordination and the distinction between buyer cartels 
that seek to impose restrictions on price competition among buyers and reduce rivalry in the 
downstream markets by exerting monopsony or exploitative bargaining power, and buying 
alliances that seek to agglutinate buyer power to oppose seller market power and bring 
purchasing prices towards the competitive level. Buyer cartels constitute object restrictions of 
competition, whereas buying alliances enjoy a presumption of legality and may be considered an 
effects-based restriction of competition. I concluded the chapter with an analysis concerning the 
harm required to trigger competition intervention in exploitative cases. The case law shows that 
for concerted behavior, both the EU and US Courts, will intervene in the absence of end 
consumer to sanction naked buyers’ cartels. However, there is a trend lead by the Commission 
concerning concerted and unilateral behavior which narrows, centers and seeks to trigger the 
enforcement of EU competition law on instances where the supplier exploitation may have direct 
end consumer harm or it is used as a tool to decrease competition among rival undertakings in the 
downstream market. 
I have identified additional forms of buyer power exploitation through the imposition of unfair 
purchasing conditions, as discussed in chapter 9. These conducts involve a transfer of profits 
from suppliers to buyers without adequate compensation, which are commonly linked to practices 
of large food retail chains. In this chapter, I inquired if and when these unfair purchasing 
practices are a competition law issue or, alternatively, whether these types of exploitative 
practices should be addressed by other means of economic regulation, as they are generally 
problems of profit distribution within a contract but not market efficiency. My main finding is 
that unfair purchasing practices are usually not a competition concern, but may be under EU 
competition law scrutiny whenever they are imposed by a dominant buyer, may arise pursuant a 
buyer’s concentration, or are imposed by a buyers’ cartel or through a vertical agreement, 
because they may have an adverse effect on market-wide competition or because their imposition 
creates competition distortion among rival buyers and also among suppliers. When these 
circumstances materialize and there is substantial harm to competition as a process and existing 
or potential harm to dynamic efficiency, then EU competition law as it stands ought to intervene. 
However, these instances have been very rare, as confirmed by case analysis. Nonetheless, unfair 
purchasing practices have generated a great deal of social and political commotion as they are 
seen as exploitation of small suppliers that may depend on their buyers for their economic 
viability. Because of this and the fact that legal systems tend to protect fairness in contractual 
relations, most MS have adopted different legislative measures to limit the imposition of unfair 
purchasing practices within, although mostly outside of, EU competition law, solutions which I 
have categorized and evaluated. Lastly, I discussed the EU strategies employed against the 
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imposition of unfair purchasing practices outside competition law as the EU Supply Chain 
Initiative. 
In Part V I analyzed buyer power from a seller’s perspective by evaluating the legal treatment of 
countervailing buyer power as a neutralizer of seller market power, and how buyer power can be 
anti-competitively limited by suppliers. In chapter 10 I inquired as to what countervailing buyer 
power is, how it is measured and what the effect of countervailing buyer power is. Countervailing 
buyer power is a form of bargaining power invoked as a defense based on the inability of 
suppliers to behave independently from their customers/buyers, therefore being unable to exert 
seller market power. Accordingly, my approach to countervailing buyer power is narrow, as I 
require a degree of sufficiency to offset opposing seller market power. Furthermore, from the 
Commission’s practice and the case law, I have identified the existence of a ‘comparison test’ 
that seeks to determine the sufficiency of the countervailing buyer power to sufficiently neutralize 
the market power of the selling undertaking. The test has been developed in concentration and 
dominance cases following a similar approach and tested in several cases, but with a handful of 
instances in which the sufficiency was met, and only with regard to concentrations but not to 
dominance cases. Furthermore, I have identified a requirement adopted pursuant to the 
Commission’s practice and incorporated within the soft law, that necessitates that sufficient 
countervailing buyer power must neutralize seller market power vis-à-vis a powerful buyer, and it 
must also generate a positive spillover effect on weaker buyers. The grounds for this requirement 
is the interest in protecting the competitive structure in the upstream market – although it might 
also protect rivals – and avoid pernicious waterbed effects on weaker buyers. 
Lastly, in chapter 11, I inquired in which ways sellers may anti-competitively limit buyer power 
exertion. My study shows that coordination among suppliers to limit buyer power by setting 
purchasing ceilings or quotas infringes competition by object. I identified several instances in 
which the Courts declared the imposition of minimum purchasing prices or quotas by coordinated 
sellers as an object restriction of competition. However, in other instances, these price limitations 
arose because of sectoral crises or pursuant to national regulation shielding suppliers from the 
vagaries of the market. These crises were used as arguments to reduce the fines or even allow 
some degree of selling side coordination, as occurs concerning the sale of raw milk. In the case of 
unilateral conduct, the supplier would seek to neutralize buyer power by means of granting a 
rebate to the buyer and, therefore, lowering the prices it has to pay. In this section, I discussed 
whether rebates restrict the buyer’s economic freedom, or compensate the buyer sufficiently for 
the loss of buyer power through price purchasing reductions. Only whenever the rebate 
substantially over-compensates the loss of economic freedom to choose alternative suppliers 
(creating an unjustified loyalty enhancing effect) can it have anti-competitive foreclosure effects, 
where this risk of foreclosure of rival suppliers is the main reason for its illegality and, to a lesser 
extent, the loss of buyer market power or the buyer’s economic freedom. Otherwise, sanctioning 
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suppliers by compensating buyers for their ‘loss’ of buyer power would hinder the neutralizing 
characteristics of buyer power and prevent reductions in purchasing price that may also benefit 
end consumers. 
12.4 An EU buyer power doctrine? 
The question that remains as a synthetization of this thesis is whether a consolidated EU 
competition law buyer power doctrine exists. Despite the limited case law and legislation 
expressly dealing with buyer power, I have identified several principles that guide the application 
of EU competition law to control the exercise of buyer market power across all competition law 
areas. 
EU competition law applies and controls the exercise of market power by buyers in all its areas: 
agreements, unilateral behaviors, and concentrations. Furthermore, buyer market power would be 
under competition law scrutiny regardless of whether the conduct would be exclusionary or 
exploitative. Even in the realm of unfair purchasing practices, EU competition law has a narrow 
scope of application and may rarely capture any of these practices, as confirmed by the 
Commission’s practice and the case law; the policy approach is justified and the toolbox is still 
sufficient, as most of these instances have a limited market-wide impact in terms of static and 
dynamic efficiency. Therefore, the EU competition law tools contained in the Treaties are 
adequate and sufficiently comprehensive enough to address anti-competitive exertions of buyer 
market power.  
Also, buyer power is under the scope of EU competition law in its two forms, monopsony and 
bargaining power, even if the Courts do not explicitly make a distinction between them. 
However, from the treatment given to the type of buyer power by the Courts and the 
Commission, it is evident that there is an implicit distinction between monopsony and bargaining 
power cases; it is established in the Commission’s practice and the case law that certain exertions 
of buyer power such as buying alliances and countervailing buyer power are efficiency enhancing 
and, therefore, constitute acceptable behaviors. Moreover, despite the fact that the Courts do not 
explicitly engage in explicit economic discussions concerning the nature of buyer power 
practices, the language used in the judgments reveals an understanding of buyer power 
economics, particularly – although not exclusively - in the more recent ones, albeit not always, 
which is more influenced by an economic analysis of the cases and a less formalistic or 
economic-freedom based stance.  
Furthermore, EU competition law adopts a wide approach to buyer power as buyer power abuse 
is condemned even absent evidence of direct end consumer harm or downstream market effects. 
It is sufficient that competition as such, and to a lesser extent the economic freedom of rival 
buyers and suppliers, is adversely affected by the buyer’s conduct in the upstream market to 
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trigger competition law intervention. This stance is uncontroversial concerning cartels that exert 
buyer market power but more contested concerning possible anti-competitive buying alliances 
and, in particular, the unilateral behavior of dominant undertakings or pursuant to a 
concentration. In the latter case, examples such as US antitrust and some of the recent 
Commission’s soft law instruments adopt a narrower stand and intervene only in the presence of 
downstream end consumer harm. While it is true that whenever an undertaking has upstream and 
downstream market power the likelihood of anti-competitive effects generated by buyer power is 
higher, particularly regarding direct end consumer harm in the short term, only triggering 
competition law intervention in the presence of short term downstream harm is under-inclusive. 
And more importantly, this is not in line with the legal standard adopted by the Courts because it 
fails to sufficiently protect the competitive process from buyer power harm. On the other hand, 
the broader standard concerning competition harm adopted by the Courts runs the risk of over-
enforcement and, therefore, this is a risk that should be taken into account by the Commission 
and the Courts to minimize false positives errors as much as possible. 
12.5 On the future of buyer power 
Buyer power has so far received little attention from legal scholars and competition authorities 
because anti-competitive cases are rare and because it involves looking at competition law from 
‘the other side of the fence’; i.e.: from a buyer’s and not a seller’s perspective. In this thesis’ final 
section, I discuss three aspects that I consider relevant concerning the future of buyer power as a 
competition policy and competition law aspect. 
From an enforcement perspective, I do not expect a surge of many buyer power related cases in 
the near future, although I do foresee an increase in the attention and importance afforded to 
buyer power for four main reasons. First, retailing markets are set to become more concentrated 
due to the advancement of modern retailing business models, the prevalence of large 
multinational firms, and franchising. The more concentrated the purchasing markets, the more 
buyer power exertion increases for both pro-competitive bargaining power practices and buyer 
power exploitation. Second, since the early 2000s, the amount of economic and legal research 
concerning buyer power has increased substantially. This new knowledge and the contribution of 
this dissertation may assist the process of detecting instances of anti-competitive buyer power 
conducts that were not considered as such before. Third, mergers involving powerful buyers and 
upstream integration will continue to be assessed and the Commission and NCAs will further 
scrutinize buyer power implications in both upstream and downstream markets. Fourth, buyer 
power interest will also spur publicly-driven markets due to the increase in purchasing 
centralization techniques and the welfare concern regarding the competitiveness of public 
procurement in Europe. 
538 
 
From a competition policy perspective, I anticipate a shift in the way NCAs, policy makers, and 
the legal audience will look at buyer power issues. In this contribution, I have shown that 
bargaining power is the most common form of buyer power and it is also mostly efficiency 
enhancing as it neutralizes seller market power and increases welfare. Furthermore, a general 
evaluation to the limited legal regime applicable to buyer power in EU competition law is 
positive; the regulation of it is mostly coherent, consistent, economically informed, and uses 
sufficient regulatory tools to tackle all anti-competitive buyer power instances. However, the EU 
buyer power regime may appear over-enforcing to some when compared to US antitrust law due 
to its broader approach to buyer power harm. I, nevertheless, think that this broader approach is 
appropriate as it fully captures buyer power dynamics and is also consistent with the general EU 
competition law policy on competition harm and the understanding that to achieve end consumer 
welfare in the medium and long term there is a need to protect upstream competition and 
competition as a process. 
Therefore, I expect authorities, academics and practitioners to change their overwhelmingly 
negative perspective to buyer power and shift away from the myth that buyer power is always 
negative because it is only monopsony power. Instead, the ‘new approach to buyer power’, as 
remarked by the Bundeskartellamt,2564 should be focused on those instances of anti-competitive 
bargaining power, with a particular emphasis on buyer power exclusion.  
Lastly, in order to contribute to the full understanding of buyer power and give further guidance 
to authorities, policy makers and Courts regarding how to enforce competition law in buyer 
power cases and improve the current legal regime, I have identified several areas that may be ripe 
for future economic and legal research. 
The economics of monopsony power is a well-known research phenomenon that requires little 
further academic work. The same, however, cannot be said of bargaining power and, in 
particular, its effects on dynamic efficiency. As I highlighted in chapter 3, the economic literature 
is ambiguous when dealing with the bargaining power effects on innovation, investment, variety, 
quality effects, and the waterbed and spiral effects. With regard to the latter two, further 
economic clarification is needed because these effects are often invoked by the parties and have 
been used by the Commission and the Courts, albeit sometimes without sufficient precision or 
scientific rigor. Another area ripe for research is the effects of buyer power and private labels in 
dynamic and static efficiency and retail markets. Is the rise of private labels and the participation 
of large buyers as producers and retailers a source of competition concern in the downstream and 
upstream markets? Is product variety negatively affected? 
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In this dissertation, I have shown that EU competition law adopts a broad approach to buyer 
power harm and competition intervention as Courts have declared the behavior illegal absent 
consumer harm with the intent to protect competition as such, and, to a certain extent, to the 
benefit of other undertakings in the upstream market. However, what is left unresolved and ripe 
for future research is whether there is room for protection of rival buyers, and, if so, how much 
room for protection of rival buyers is legitimate and required under EU competition law?  
Also, I identified as another fertile area for further research the interaction between cooperatives 
and the creation, exertion and limitation of buyer power, especially when compared to 
‘traditional undertakings’. Cooperatives are horizontal and vertical agreements that group small 
producers (in agriculture, but also other buyer power sensitive markets) that may generate and 
also prevent buyer power exertion. Cooperative groups enjoy certain non-competition law 
benefits (tax, labor and societal rules) that grant them a competitive edge when compared to other 
undertakings and enable them to over-pay for their input, which may lead to instances of 
unjustified buyer power exclusion, as has been investigated in New Zealand regarding milk 
production cooperatives.  
Connected to the former, I believe there to also be room for further research concerning the 
sectoral regulation of buyer power in agriculture. In my research, I have identified that these 
markets are characterized by concentrated purchasing markets (supermarket chains, large food 
producers/distributors) vis-à-vis small producers (farmers or independent good producers), which 
makes then suitable for buyer power exploitation. In my research, I briefly discussed the limited 
special sectoral regulation that permits certain types of sellers’ cartels to oppose buyer power, 
both in Europe and the US. However, there is room for further analysis of the adequacy of these 
measures. 
Lastly, I submit that the area of EU wide regulation of UPPs within and outside EU competition 
law is another buyer power aspect that is also ripe for academic research, particularly concerning 
the policy measures (or lack thereof) adopted by the Commission, and possible EU-wide 
solutions to tackle unfair purchasing practices. 
All in all, I hope that the analysis and findings put forward by this thesis will contribute towards a 
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